

MATERIALS TOWARDS
A
STATISTICAL ACCOUNT
OF THE
TOWN AND ISLAND OF BOMBAY



IN THREE VOLUMES.

VOLUME I.—HISTORY.

सत्यमेव जयते

Under Government Orders.

BOMBAY:
PRINTED AT THE GOVERNMENT CENTRAL PRESS.
1893.

THE absence of any administrative necessity for the information, the want of the needful official machinery for collecting details and compiling statistics, and, at the same time, the excellence of Maclean's Guide to Bombay were considered reasons enough for excluding the Town and Island of Bombay from the Gazetteer series of District Statistical Accounts.

Nearly three years ago the Secretary of State expressed the wish that a Statistical Account of the Town and Island of Bombay should be prepared. A scheme was drawn up, and, in anticipation of sanction, a small establishment was engaged, and the necessary preliminary examination of the Secretariat Records was begun. The preparation of any suitable account of the Town and Island of Bombay implies the engagement of a large and highly paid special staff. Objections which could not be overcome were raised to the scale and the cost of the proposed scheme. The undertaking had to be abandoned. Meanwhile the small staff at work on the Secretariat Records had extracted and arranged a mass of materials.

The issue of these notes in printed form is due to the consideration of the Government of Bombay, who were unwilling to see wasted the work and pay spent on this preliminary to any suitable official account of Bombay. These present materials are of necessity rough and disconnected. From the large number of missing important papers, they are also fragmentary. Further to some extent they repeat papers already published in Mr. Forrest's carefully chosen Selections. Still the minute and intelligent care with which, as formerly in preparing the Gazetteer Land Administration Chapters, Mr. Krishnarao Narsinh has examined the Records, has I believe secured the merit of accuracy and of such completeness as the state of the Secretariat Records allows.

The Chapters on Trade, Capital, and Justice have been revised and prepared for the press by Mr. A. M. T. Jackson, I.C.S., and on all points connected with Portuguese names and history ready help has been received from Dr. Gerson Da Cunha.

For the benefit of a future Compiler the scheme for the Statistical Account of Bombay for which funds have not been found available, as well as a list of important papers not available in Bombay but believed to be available at the India Office in London, are printed as an Appendix.

*Bombay Customs House,)
1st September 1893. }*

J. M. CAMPBELL,
Collector of Bombay.

CONTENTS.

BOMBAY TOWN AND ISLAND.

CHAPTER I.—HISTORY.	PAGE
Acquisition to Union of Companies, 1661 - 1708	1 - 143
Union of Companies to French War, 1708-1744:	
<i>Section I.—Military and Political</i>	144 - 253
<i>Section II.—General</i>	253 - 280
French War (1744) to 1803	281 - 436
Notes :	
<i>Batty Village</i>	437
<i>Drowned Lands</i>	437
<i>The Pilgrim Ship Gunsway</i>	438
<i>Butcher's Island</i>	438
<i>Mopont or Mohopanth that is the False Channel</i>	439
APPENDIX I.	
<i>Proposed Scheme and Heads of Inquiry</i>	441 - 467
APPENDIX II.	
<i>Missing Papers</i>	468 - 494



ERRATA.

Page 87, note 1, for *No details* read *Such details as*.

Page 87, note 1, after *referred to* read *are given below at page 437*.

Page 146, line 17, for *perhaps Mohopáda above Panvel* read *Mohopanth or the False Channel* and see details below at page 439.

Page 227, line 17, for *Khárbhao* read *Khárbho*.

Page 280, note 4, for *Feb.* read *Sept.*

Page 280, note 5, after *1751* read , *37*.

Page 231, line 1, for *French War (1744 to 1803)* read *French War (1744) to 1803*.


Page 286, in the margin, for *1774* read *1747*.

Page 337, against Bombay Coolies, under Batty, for *52—8* read *55—8*.

Page 439, note 5 *a*. In asserting the absence of connection between Butcher's Island and watermelons another passage in Fryer's New Account was overlooked. At page 76 Fryer says 'The Putachoes, a garden of melons, were there not wild rats that hinder their growth.' This reduces the probability that the suggested meaning-making origin of Putachoes from *Bhattiche* is correct.



BOMBAY TOWN AND ISLAND.



सत्यमेव जयते

BOMBAY TOWN AND ISLAND.

CHAPTER I.

HISTORY.

Acquisition to Union of Companies, 1661-1708.

THE following papers giving details regarding the Marriage Treaty between King Charles II. and the Infanta of Portugal concluded the 23rd June 1661 and the hindrances thrown in the way of the British acquisition of the island of Bombay are extracted from the Bombay Secretariat Records.¹ The copies were obtained in September 1794 by one Miquel de Lima e Souza of Bombay from folio 340 of the Manuscript Library of the Secretary of State at Goa.²

Treaty between the Most Serene and the Most Potent Kings Affonso VI. of Portugal and Charles II. of Great Britain, of the most strict peace between one and the other kings and principally of the marriage which shall be celebrated between the Most Serene King of Great Britain and the Most Serene Princess Infanta of Portugal made and concluded by His Excellency the Most Noble Francisco de Mello, Count da Ponte, His Majesty's Ambassador Extraordinary, for and on behalf of the King of Portugal and the most noble and illustrious gentlemen, Edward Earl of Clarendon, High Chancellor of England; George Duke of Albemarle, Master of Horse to the King and Captain General of the Armies of Great Britain and Ireland; Thomas Earl of Southampton, High Treasurer of England;

Chapter I.
History.
Acquisition.

Marriage Treaty,
23rd June 1661.

¹ Foreign Powers Treaty Volume 39 of 1796 and Secret and Political Diary 53 of 1796, 1726-1767. Forrest's Selections, Home Series, II. 367-374. A postscript to a Bombay Government letter to the Governor General in Council of the 3rd October 1796 in Bombay Government Diary of 7th October 1796, shows that these papers were procured from the Goa Archives in 1796 in connection with an application of the Portuguese Government to appoint a Portuguese Consul-General in Bombay. Secret and Political Diary 53 of 1796, 1704-05 and 1709.

² The chief English references to Bombay between their establishment in Surat in 1612, and the cession of the island of Bombay by the Portuguese in 1661, are: In 1625 the Court of Directors propose that the Company should take Bombay (Bruce's Annals, I. 273). Apparently in consequence of this proposal in 1626 the English in Surat suggested to the Dutch that they should join in taking Bombay and should divide it (Bruce's Annals, I. 273). Accordingly in October 1626 a joint force of Dutch and English landed on Bombay and burned the Great House or Castle but withdrew without any attempt to retain possession. (Details of this expedition and copies of David Davies' Sketch Map of Bombay Harbour (1626) are given in Sir G. Birdwood's Report on the Old Records of the India Office (1891), 214-215, and with local identifications in Douglas' Book of Bombay, I. 37-40). In 1640 Bombay is mentioned (Bruce's Annals, I. 366) as the best place on the West Indian Coast. In 1652 the Surat Council recommended that Bombay and Bassein should be bought from the Portuguese. Bruce's Annals, I. 472.

Chapter I.
History.

Marriage Treaty,
23rd June 1661.

James Duke of Ormond, Steward of the King's Household ; Edward Earl of Manchester, Chamberlain of the King's Household ; Edward Nicolas and William Morris Knights of the Golden Order, both First Secretaries of the King and Commissaries on the part of the King of Great Britain :

Whereas after having duly considered and deliberated upon every particular it was mutually agreed between the Most Serene and Potent Affonso, by the Grace of God King of Portugal and of the Algarves, and Charles, by the same Grace of God King of Great Britain France and Ireland, That the Most Serene and the Most Potent King of Great Britain shall, with the utmost expedition that the completing of so great a business will admit of, espouse the Most Excellent Princess the Lady Catharina Infanta of Portugal in order at the same time to establish a more solid and durable peace between the two Crowns and promote the mutual interest of the people of both nations, as it will henceforth behove each of them to consult the advantage of the other, no less than if they were immediately its own, it is hereby covenanted and concluded :

1. That all Treaties made to this time between Portugal and Great Britain shall be ratified and confirmed in every particular and to all interests and shall, by this present Treaty, receive so equal a force virtue and validity as if special mention were or should have been made of every and each article word for word therein respectively contained.

2. The King of Portugal with the assent and advice of his Council gives, transfers, grants and confirms, by these presents, to the King of Great Britain, his heirs and successors for ever, the City and Castle of Tangier with all its rights, profits, territories and appurtenances whatever together with the revenue and income, the direct, full, and absolute dominion and sovereignty of that city and fortress, and the aforesaid territories, with all their royalties, freely entirely and absolutely, and also covenants and promises that the full and peaceable possession shall be given of the said city and fort and other premises with all possible expedition, and that the same shall be freely and effectually delivered to the King of Great Britain for his use in pursuance of this cession. And it is agreed that as soon as this Treaty shall be signed by the King of Great Britain and the contract of marriage between the said King and the Lady Infanta shall take place according to the terms of this Treaty, the said King shall send to Lisbon five ships of war or as many as he shall judge proper, which shall there receive directions to sail for the port of Tangier and to remain there, both for the purpose of transporting the troops, and securing the place : And as soon as the Governor of that place shall have made known that he has executed the directions of the King of Portugal concerning the delivery of the same place, and the said Treaty be ratified and confirmed by the King of Portugal, the King of England shall be acquainted with the greatest expedition possible : When the King of Great Britain shall immediately send to the port of Lisbon a squadron or fleet of twelve ships of war which within four or five

days after its arrival there, shall receive orders to go and receive and take possession of the City and Fort of Tangier with all other premises thereunto belonging for the use of the King of Great Britain which city with its fort territories and other premises shall be ceded to, and remain under, the absolute dominion and sovereignty as well as in the possession of the King of Great Britain, his heirs and successors, and become annexed to his Imperial Crown for ever.

3. That all the military and other inhabitants of the aforesaid City and Fort of Tangier, or as many of them as shall choose to remain and reside there, shall be treated on the most friendly footing. The free exercise of the Roman Catholic Religion shall be permitted to them, and in all civil matters they shall obey the King of Great Britain as his subjects living in the dominion of the said King of Great Britain. And they shall be ruled and governed by the same laws and customs as have hitherto been used and approved in the aforesaid town and castle. But should any soldiers or other inhabitants of whatever condition they may be choose to return to Portugal, they shall sell and dispose of all their estates and effects, and be then transported to Portugal for which purpose the King of Great Britain shall afford them ships whenever they may ask for them, together with such train of artillery and cannon as may without detriment be spared from the Fort of Tangier.

4. As soon as the city of Tangier with its forts and territories shall (in pursuance of this Treaty and the date of its transfer and absolute dominion to the King of Great Britain) have been effectually delivered for the use and possession of the said King of Great Britain, the fleet shall return to Lisbon and there the Lady Infanta shall be received on board the Flagship with such tokens of joy and manifestations of respect and such other formalities as become the high rank and dignity of her person.

5. The King of Portugal promises and binds himself by these presents to give to the King of England as a dowry with the said Lady Infanta two millions of crowns or Portuguese crusados, of which one-half shall be laden on board of the said fleet before the Princess herself, and the said half or so large a portion of it as may consist of money shall forthwith be delivered (to be carried afterwards to account) to such persons as the King of Great Britain shall depute to receive the same in his name and for his proper use: But such portion of the above half, so embarked on board of the fleet as shall consist of jewels sugar and other merchandise, shall not be carried to the account of the King of Great Britain, but shall be imported into the river Thames, to be delivered to those persons whom the King of Portugal shall authorize to receive. And these persons shall be obliged, and the King of Portugal doth covenant and bind himself for the payment, that these persons shall really and truly make within two months after that part shall have been delivered to them, effectually accounting and paying the said King of Great Britain the full and entire value of the same in English money as agreed upon. In regard to the other half of the dowry

Chapter I.

History.

Marriage Treaty
23rd June 1661.

Chapter I.

History.

Marriage Treaty,
23rd June 1661.

amounting to one million of Portuguese crusados, the King of Portugal obliges himself to pay within the space of one year from the time of the Princess' arrival in England, that is to say, in two instalments, the one within six months next following and the other within the term of the said year, both payments to be made in the city of London out of the produce of the jewels and other merchandise to be transported on board the ships of the said King of Great Britain as aforesaid, and such portion of this half as shall consist hereof shall be imported into England and delivered to those persons whom the King of Portugal shall depute to receive, and these persons shall be obliged as above mentioned to account for and pay to the King of England the full and entire value thereof in English money.

6. From the time that the Most Serene Infanta shall have been received on board the Royal Fleet the said Lady together with all her retinue shall be transported to England at the expense and charges of the Most Serene Lord the King of Great Britain who, as soon as he shall be apprised of this most desirable news of Her Majesty's arrival in England, shall hasten with all possible expedition to receive her, and her reception shall be attended with all those marks and demonstrations of affection corresponding to the dignity of so great a personage and His Majesty's wish. And at this time the instrument of marriage shall be publicly recited to which both the Lord King and Lady Infanta shall personally give their assent, and every thing else that can be made for the greater solemnization and completion of the above, shall be done in such a manner as to answer the wish and expectation of the most Serene King of Portugal.

7. It is also covenanted that the Most Serene Queen of Great Britain and her family (or her household) shall be permitted the free exercise of the Roman Catholic religion. For this purpose in all the palaces or royal houses in which it may please Her Majesty at any time to reside, she shall have a chapel or other place particularly destined for such use (and this at all events) in the same manner as it was formerly allowed the Queen Dowager and shall have with her that number of chaplains and ecclesiastics the said Queen had, with the same privileges and immunities. Besides this the King of Great Britain promises that he shall neither offer his espoused any molestation in matters of religion and conscience, nor suffer any person whatever to do so.

8. That the King of Great Britain shall, within the space of one year after the Queen's arrival in England, assign and secure to her, as a nuptial gift and jointure, thirty thousand pounds a year of English money, as also a palace or a royal house at least wherein Her Majesty may reside and dwell, which shall be fitted out and furnished in a manner suitable to her dignity, and of which she shall have the use during her life in case she should survive her royal consort.

9. That Her Majesty's family or household shall be ordered and settled from the time of her arrival in England, and shall be composed of such number of officers and domestics as become her dignity, and in the same manner as the Queen Dowager had.

10. If Her Majesty should survive the King of Great Britain, and be inclined to return to Portugal or to go to any other country, she shall be at liberty to do so, and to carry with her all her jewels effects and moveables. The King of Great Britain at the same time binds his heirs and successors by these presents to provide for the same and honourable transportation of Her Majesty in a manner becoming her royal character and at their own expense and charges. He moreover binds his said heirs and successors to the annual payment of the above mentioned sum of thirty thousand pounds to the said Queen in the same manner as if she had remained in England.

11. That for the better improvement of the English interest and commerce in the East Indies, and that the King of Great Britain may be better enabled to aid, assist, defend and protect the subjects of the King of Portugal in those parts from the power and invasion of the States of the United Provinces, the King of Portugal with the assent and advice of his Council gives, transfers, and by these presents grants and confirms unto the King of Great Britain, his heirs and successors for ever, the Port and Island of Bombay in the East Indies with all the rights, profits, territories and appurtenances whatsoever thereunto belonging, and together with all income and revenue, as also the direct and absolute Dominion and Sovereignty of the said Port and Island of Bombay and premises, with all their royalties, freely, fully, entirely, and absolutely. He also covenants and grants that quiet and peaceable possession of the same shall, with all convenient speed, be freely and effectually given and delivered to the King of Great Britain (or to the persons whom the said King of Great Britain shall depute for this purpose) for his own use. In pursuance of their cession the inhabitants of the said island (as subjects of the King of Great Britain, and under his Commands, Crown, Jurisdiction, and Government) shall remain therein and enjoy the free exercise of the Roman Catholic religion in the same manner as they now do: This must be understood as it is now declared once for all that the same regulation respecting it shall be observed for the exercise and preservation of the Roman Catholic religion in the City of Tangier, and in all other places which by the King of Portugal shall be granted and delivered to the King of Great Britain, in the same manner as were covenanted and stipulated in the delivery of Dunkirk to the English gentlemen. And when the King of Great Britain shall send his fleet to take possession of the port and island of Bombay, the English shall carry instructions to treat the subjects of the King of Portugal in the East Indies in the most friendly manner, and to help, assist, and protect them in their trade and navigation there.

12. In order that the subjects of the King of Great Britain may enjoy more ample benefits from their trade and commerce throughout the King of Portugal's dominions, it is covenanted and granted that over and above the grants made to them by the former Treaties the merchants and factors shall, by virtue of this Treaty, have liberty of residing in all places where they shall judge proper. Particularly they shall dwell and enjoy the same privileges and

**Chapter I.
History.**

**Marriage Treaty,
23rd June 1661.**

Chapter I.

History.

Marriage Treaty,
23rd June 1661.

immunities so far as they shall relate to trade, as the Portuguese themselves in the cities and towns of Goa Cochin and Diu; provided that the subjects of the King of Great Britain resident in any of the abovementioned places shall not exceed the number of four families in any one of them.

13. The subjects of the King of Great Britain shall enjoy the same privileges, liberties, and immunities in the city of Bahia de Todas as Santos (or St. Salvador's Bay), Penambuco and Rio Janeiro in the Province of Brazil, and throughout all the dominions of the King of Portugal in the West Indies.

14. If, however, the King of Great Britain or his subjects should at any time hereafter recover from the States General of the United Netherlands or from any others, any towns castles or territories that may have belonged heretofore to the Crown of Portugal, the King of Portugal, with the assent and advice of his Council, grants the supreme sovereignty and the full entire and absolute dominion of the same and of every of them whatsoever to the said King of Great Britain, his heirs and successors for ever, freely entirely and absolutely (excepting Maskat which is now inhabited by the Arabs). And if ever the island of Zeila (commonly called Zeilam) should in any manner whatever come into the possession of the King of Portugal, he binds and obliges himself by this Treaty to cede and transfer to the King of Great Britain the town and port of Galla with a full and absolute dominion over it and cause most effectually the possession of the said town and port with all its appurtenances to be given and delivered to the said King of Great Britain, the aforesaid King of Portugal reserving however to himself the town and port of Columbo, but the common trade shall nevertheless be equally divided between the English and Portuguese. In the like manner if over the said island should come into the power of the King of Great Britain he is bound effectually to restore and surrender the dominion and possession of the town and port of Columbo to the King of Portugal, the trade of cinnamon being in the manner aforesaid equally divided between the English and Portuguese.

15. In consideration of all which concessions and privileges contributing so manifestly to the utility and benefit of the King of Great Britain and his subjects in general; And because those places of so much value and consequence which are to be made over to the King of Great Britain and his heirs, must add so considerably to his dominions, as well as on account of the dowry itself so greatly exceeding any ever given with an Infanta of Portugal before, the King of Great Britain promises and declares, with the assent and advice of his Council, that he will pay the sincerest regard to the interest and welfare of Portugal and of all his dominions, and that he will with his utmost power take upon him the defence of it both by land and by sea as if it were England itself; and to this end will at his expense transport thither two Regiments of Horse of five hundred men each and two Regiments of Foot each consisting of one thousand, who shall be all armed and equipped at the expense of the King of Great Britain. After their arrival in Portugal they shall enter into the pay of the King of Portugal, and

if the said regiments should be diminished either by loss in battle or by other means, the King of England shall supply such deficiency of number at his own cost; in the meantime he shall cause the said Regiments of Horse and Foot to be transported as soon as the Lady Infanta shall arrive in England in case the King of Portugal should then require it.

16. The King of Great Britain further promises, with the consent and deliberation of his Council, that on the petition of the said King of Portugal whenever and so often as Portugal shall be invaded, he shall send thither ten good ships of war and whenever or so often as it shall be infested with pirates, he shall then despatch three or four. All these ships shall be sufficiently manned and furnished with provisions for eight months to be computed from the time they shall set sail from England and shall obey the commands and directions of the King of Portugal; And if necessary that they should continue there longer than six months, the King of Portugal shall supply them with the provisions for the time they remain and for one month more on their departure for England. Should the King of Portugal be dangerously attacked and closely pressed by his enemies, all the King of Great Britain's ships at that time in the Mediterranean Seas or in the Port of Tangier shall have orders in such cases to repair to the assistance and defence of the King of Portugal, and to act according to his instructions. And in consideration of the above-mentioned grants and concessions on the part of the King of Portugal, the King of Great Britain his heirs and successors shall at no time require any compensation for such assistance.

17. That besides the right of making people (or recruits) which the King of Portugal has by the former Treaty, the King of Great Britain does by this present Treaty oblige and bind himself in case the Port of Lisbon or any other maritime place be besieged or shut by the Spaniards or by any other enemy, to furnish proper assistance both in Ships and Troops according as the circumstance of affairs and situation of the King of Portugal shall appear to require.

18. The Lord King of Great Britain, with the consent and deliberation of his Council, engages and promises never to enter into any Treaty with Spain which may in the least preclude him either directly or indirectly from sending full and sufficient succours to Portugal for its necessary defence and never to restore Dunkirk and Jamaica to the King of Spain, nor ever to neglect employing any means that may be requisite for the safety of Portugal notwithstanding he should thereby be compelled to go to war with the King of Spain.

19. It is likewise further covenanted and agreed by the King of Great Britain that the said Princess of Portugal, in consideration of the dowry given with her by the King of Portugal, shall renounce all her rights of both her paternal and maternal inheritance and of all other things which may become due to her, such as lands houses and other things, moveables jewels and money, which by any right should belong to her. Also all other things which henceforth shall or may belong to her (excepting what shall hereafter be excepted) and which might either have been bequeathed

Chapter I History.

Marriage Treaty
23rd June 1661.

Chapter I.
History.

Marriage Treaty,
3rd June 1661.

to her by the late King her father, or have devolved to her upon his death according to the Laws of Portugal under the title of dowry, or which might descend to her on the decease of the Queen her mother, according to the same laws. It being understood that the said Princess does in no way renounce nor did she mean or intend to renounce any right, inheritance, title, claim or interest which she herself or any of her heirs or descendants may have in or to the crown or kingdom of Portugal or any of its dominions in whatsoever manner such rights now do or may hereafter appertain to her or to them. But all and singular these rights to the said kingdom and crown which may in anywise devolve to her in future she wholly and expressly reserves to herself her heirs and descendants and retains and means to retain them entirely and effectually both at present and always in perpetuity.

20. Finally it was covenanted agreed and concluded that the said Most Serene Kings should sincerely and faithfully observe all and singular the articles contained in and settled in this Treaty, and cause them to be observed by the subjects and inhabitants of their respective kingdoms. Neither shall they themselves directly or indirectly infringe them, nor suffer them to be infringed by the subjects and inhabitants of their respective kingdoms. And all and singular the articles above stipulated they shall ratify and confirm by their letters signed under their hands and sealed with their great seals, and shall ratify and confirm in proper and due form as aforesaid, and they shall faithfully truly and effectually deliver or cause them interchangeably to be delivered within three months from the date of these presents.

In testimony and faith of all matters above related, I, Francisco de Mello, Earl of Ponte, Ambassador Extraordinary for His Serene Majesty the King of Portugal, having to this effect full powers, have signed and sealed the present Treaty with my hand and seal. Given at the palace of Whitehall, the 23rd June of the year of our Lord one thousand six hundred and sixty-one.

Secret Article.—Besides every thing and each of them covenanted and agreed upon in the Marriage Treaty between the Most Serene and Potent Prince Charles II. King of Great Britain, and the Most Serene Dona Catharina Infanta of Portugal, it is further concluded and covenanted by this Secret Article that the said King of Great Britain shall do the most he can and shall apply all his force and powers to the end of making a firm and permanent peace between the Most Serene King of Portugal and the States General of the United Provinces of the Netherlands including the said King of Portugal in that confederation which shall be made with the said States. And in case of the said States refusing to adhere to those conditions which shall be deemed just, sure, and honourable ones to the said King of Portugal, then the said King of Great Britain, when he shall send his fleet to take possession of the island of Bombay, shall also send such force which shall go well furnished of all the necessaries as well as of instructions to defend aid and assist all the Portuguese country in the East Indies. And if so should happen that the said States General of the United Provinces

or their subjects, within or after the time in which the King of Great Britain shall offer his mediation to the said States in order to bring on a peace between them and the King of Portugal, accept the mediation which may or shall be proposed to them, such places or territories as they may have or as shall henceforth be taken from the King of Portugal, the said King of England shall most effectually insist upon all and each of these places and territories being restored to the King of Portugal, employing for this purpose the greatest and sufficient force of his in order to procure the said restoration, and for all the assistance and succours which shall for the above-mentioned purpose be given to the King of Portugal the King of England shall not ask for any satisfaction or compensation.

It is covenanted and concluded that the above article and everything therein contained and stipulated shall be sealed by the said Lords the King of one and the other part with the great seal, and that it shall be confirmed and ratified in the most authenticated form and within three months the same shall be duly and reciprocally exchanged.

In faith and testimony whereof I, Francisco de Mello, Earl of Ponte, Ambassador Extraordinary of the King of Portugal, have, by virtue of the force and vigour of the said Commission, with my own hand signed and sealed this Secret Article with my seal. Given at the Palace of Whitehall, the 23rd June in the year of our Lord 1661.¹

In pursuance of this treaty the King of Portugal, on the 9th April 1662, issued the following orders to Antonio de Mello e Castro, Viceroy of Goa :

I, King, send you greeting. By the article of the contract which has been agreed on with the King of England, my good brother and cousin, concerning the dowry portion of the Queen his wife, my most beloved and esteemed sister, which you will receive with this letter, you will understand why and how the port and country of Bombay relates to him, and the obligation I am under for directing the same to be delivered over to him. Immediately as you arrive at the States of India you will ask for the credentials from the King by which you will understand the person to whom possession should be given and make delivery. You will accordingly cause the same to be made in the manner and form of that capitulation, observing the same yourself and causing the whole and every part thereof to be duly observed, and direct that the whole may be committed to writing very clearly and distinctly so as at all time to appear the whole that may pass in this affair. You will further send the same to me by different conveyances in order to settle and adjust the acquittance of the dowry promised to the King, and by the other articles of that treaty it will be present to you, the Union

Chapter I. History.

Marriage Treaty,
23rd June 1661.

¹ To the Record copy of this Treaty the following note is added: This Treaty was entered from the book that has for its title *Proofs of the Genealogical History of the Portuguese House*, Book 7, folio 827, a true copy agreeable to the original.—(Signed) Sebastiao Joseph Ferreira Baracho, This Treaty is conformable to the authenticated copy of the above Book 2nd of the Treaty of Peace, and so I attest.—Antonio Luis Ribeiro wrote this at Goa the 13th September 1794.—(Signed) Sebastiao Joseph Ferreira Baracho, Secretary.

Chapter I.
History.

King's Fleet
at Bombay,
1662

we celebrated, and the obligation the King has to afford me succour in all my urgencies and necessity I may have. In any necessity you may find it convenient to apply to the English you will do so, and at the same time you will assist them in the same way. Written at Lisbon, the 9th April 1662.¹

The King's fleet arrived at Bombay on the 18th September 1662 and demanded the cession of the island and of its dependencies conformably to the Treaty between the King and the Crown of Portugal. The Portuguese Governor of Bombay evaded the cession of the island. And the Viceroy who had come out in the English fleet refused to interpose his authority till he should proceed to Goa and receive instructions from the Portuguese Viceroy of the Indies. It now appeared that the English Admiral had interpreted the terms of the treaty to signify Bombay and its dependencies or the islands of Thana and Salsette, and that the Portuguese Viceroy interpreted the Treaty to signify the cession of the island of Bombay only, not the cession of the dependencies situated between Bombay and Bassein, because that would lay open the principal Portuguese station to the English at Bombay.² The Earl of Marlborough demanded in the first instance the cession of Bombay which was admitted to be within the terms of the treaty. This was objected to by the Portuguese Governor, on the pretext that Sir Abraham Shipman, the Commander of the English troops, had not arrived. He therefore refused to allow the troops to be landed, though the Earl of Marlborough pleaded the length of the voyage, and the number of men which were daily dying from want of refreshment.³ On his arrival a few weeks later (October 1662), Sir Abraham Shipman produced his full powers and demanded from Dom Antonio de Mello e Castro that the cession should be made agreeably to the treaty. To this the Portuguese Viceroy objected alleging that the form of the Letters or Patent of the King did not coincide with the usages observed in Portugal in like cases. He offered to retain the island for the King of England till sufficient authority should be obtained from Lisbon and from England empowering him to make the cession. Under these embarrassments, the Earl of Marlborough and Sir Abraham Shipman applied to Sir George Oxinden to solicit permission for them to land the troops at Surat. But the President represented that such an application would give offence to the Moghal Governor, who, if it should be attempted, might probably seize the Company's investment and expel their servants from that fort.⁴ The only place open to the British troops was the uninhabited island of Anjidiv south of Goa. Here the 500 troops were landed and in the eighteen following months, during which Bombay remained

¹ Bombay Government Secret and Political Diary 53 of 1796, 1749-1750. This is marked True copy.—(Signed) Luis Monteiro da Costa.

² Captain Brown of the *Dunkirk* to Sir George Oxinden, Bombay, 20th September 1662; and Mr. Aungier to Sir George Oxinden, Bombay, 26th September 1662. Bruce's *Annals of the East India Company* (1810), II. 126.

³ The Earl of Marlborough to Sir George Oxinden, 6th October 1662. Bruce, II. 126-127.

⁴ The Presidency of Surat to the Earl of Marlborough, 8th October 1662; The Earl of Marlborough to Sir George Oxinden, 18th October 1662; Dom Antonio de Mello e Castro to Sir Abraham Shipman, 16th October 1662. Bruce, II. 127.

closed to the English, 300 died. Of their leaders the Earl of Marlborough returned to England with the fleet and Sir Abraham Shipman died at Anjidiv in September 1665.¹

Regarding the action of the Portuguese Pepys' Diary (15th May 1663) has the following entry :

The Portuguese have choused us in the island of Bombay in the East Indies ; for after a great charge of our fleets being sent thither with full commission from the King of Portugal to receive it, the Governor by some pretence or other will not deliver it to Sir Abraham Shipman, sent from the King, nor to my Lord of Marlborough,² which the King takes highly ill, and I fear our Queen will fare the worse for it. The Dutch decay there exceedingly, it being believed that their people will revolt from them there, and they be forced to give up their trade. I did inform myself well in things relating to the East Indies, both of the country and the disappointment the King met with the last voyage, by the knavery of the Portugal Viceroy, and the inconsiderableness of the place of Bombaim, if we had had it.³ But, above all things, it seems strange to me that matters should not be understood before they went out. And also that such a thing as this, which was expected to be one of the best parts of the Queen's portion, should not be better understood ; it being, if we had it, but a poor place and not really so as was described to our King in the draught of it, but a poor little island ; whereas they made the King and Lord Chancellor and other learned men about the King believe that that and other islands which are near it were all one piece ; and so the draught was drawn and presented to the King, and believed by the King, and expected to prove so when our men come thither ; but it is quite otherwise.⁴

In agreement with Pepys' entry in May 1663 the Surat Council wrote to Fort St. George : Although little Europe news is come to our ears since the ships left England, we are very willing to impart it to you. It is this. Our letters of the 30th November (1662) were arrived in England in May (1663). The King was very much troubled at the actions of the Viceroy of Goa, and was resolved to have full satisfaction from the Crown of Portugal.⁵

Chapter I. History.

Portuguese
evade Cession,
1662.

¹ Historical Account of Bombay, 1791, 3-5.

² James Ley, third Earl of Marlborough, killed in the great sea-fight with the Dutch, 1665. Sir G. Birdwood's Report on the Old Records of the India Office (1891), 84.

³ "Bombay or Bombaim as it is called by old writers has been naturally supposed by Europeans to derive its name from the Portuguese, and to have denoted an advantage of its geographical position. But Briggs (Ferishta, Volume IV. Chapter 4) declares, without however giving his authority, that in ancient days part of the island was called Máhim and part 'Mumbaye' from an idol." Anderson's English in Western India (1854), 50-51. Quoting the authority of a paper by R. X. Murphy Esquire, in the transactions of the Bombay Geographical Society, Volume I., Anderson adds : "and certainly an old temple, dedicated to Mumba Devi or the goddess Mumba, formerly stood on the plot now called the Esplanade. About a century ago it was taken down and rebuilt at some distance from its former site. The place where it now stands is well known." Anderson (1854), 51.

⁴ The Chandos Classic Edition of the Diary of Samuel Pepys Esquire, F.R.S., pages 155 and 176 ; and Birdwood's Report on Records (1891), 84.

⁵ Surat Government (Messrs. Oxinden, Gbodier, Gary, and Aungier) to Fort St. George, Surat, 16th February 1663-64, Surat Factory Outward Letter Book No. 1 of 1630-1673, 52 ; Forrest's Home Series, I. 35.

Chapter I.
History.

Portuguese
evade Cession,
1662.

On the 16th August 1663 in consequence of the remonstrances of the English Court the King of Portugal issued the following orders to Antonio de Mello e Castro, Viceroy of Goa :

I, King, send you greeting. By the way of England intelligence reached me that in the States of India doubts arose with respect to the delivery of the town of Bombay to the order of the King of Great Britain, my good brother and cousin, in conformity of mine which you carried with you. At this I was greatly surprised and am very sorry, because besides the reasons of convenience of this Crown and more especially of the State of India which made it necessary for me to take that resolution, I wish much to give the King of England my brother every satisfaction. For these and other considerations of the same idency, as well as because the king my brother must have sent fresh orders removing every doubt there might have originated from those he sent first, I therefore direct and order that you do, in compliance of those orders of mine which you carried with you, cause to execute the said delivery with every punctuality, and without the least contradiction, as the matter does not admit of any, and the delay is very prejudicial. By complying therewith as I expect from you I will consider myself well served by you. If you meet with any impediment from any person you will order to proceed against him publicly as the case may require. Written at Lisbon, the 16th August 1663.¹

Shipman's
Commission,
1663.

Shortly afterwards (23rd November 1663), to remove any doubt as to the person to whom Bombay should be handed, King Charles issued the following Commission in favour of Sir Abraham Shipman :

Charles by the Grace of God King of Great Britain France and Ireland, Defender of the Faith,—To all to whom these presents shall come and to each of them in particular we send greeting. In the manner that it was settled concluded and treated between us and the Most Serene King the Prince Dom Affonso, by the same Grace King of Portugal, brother relation and most dear and beloved friend, the said sovereign of Portugal gave, transferred, granted and confirmed unto us our heirs and successors for ever the port and island of Bombay in the East Indies with all its rights utilities appendages and territories whatsoever, and having moreover settled and concluded in the said treaty that the port and island aforesaid should be peaceably and quietly delivered unto us, or to the persons deputed by us for this purpose, that we may have free use of one and the other: Be it therefore known that confiding in the prudence and integrity of the faithful Abraham Shipman, our beloved subject, Knight of the Golden Ensign and Gentleman of our Privy Council, have made, ordained, and deputed and do by these presents make, ordain, constitute and appoint our true and indubitable Commissary Deputy and Attorney to take possession of the said port and island of Bombay, giving and granting unto the said Abraham Shipman our true and lawful powers and authority to receive in our name and for our use the said

¹ Bom. Gov. Secret and Political Diary 53 of 1796, 1750-1751. The entry is marked a true copy.—Luis Monteiro da Costa.

port and island of Bombay, together with the fortress and other things belonging to us by the contract. And for the better execution of the said concession or grant made us, we have in witness whereof and by these presents set our hand and caused our seals to be affixed. Given in our Palace of Whitehall, the 23rd day of the month of November 1663, the fifteenth year of our reign—(Signed) Charles R.¹

Chapter I
History.

On receipt of this Commission on the 5th April 1664 Sir Abraham Shipman issued the following orders: I, Sir Abraham Shipman of His Majesty's Privy Council, Governor of all the Forces of His Britannic Majesty in the island of Bombay in the East Indies, do by virtue of the Commission given me by His Majesty of Great Britain under the seal dependent of England constitute and ordain Humphrey Cooke as Vice-Governor and in his absence Ensign John Torne commanding a regiment of soldiers at present quartered on the island of Anjidiv till such a time as other orders come from England. I therefore direct all the Captains, Ensigns, Serjeants, and all the rest of the officers and soldiers of the said regiment shall obey the orders of the said Humphrey Cooke and in his absence those of Ensign John Torne. Written at Anjidiv, the 5th April 1664.—(Signed) Abraham Shipman. Signed sealed and delivered in presence of us—(Signed) John Foldevry, (Signed) Thomas Price, (Signed) Roger Morgan, (Signed) Henry Anderson.

Cooke's
Commission
1664.

In November 1664 a copy of Mr. Cooke's Commission was forwarded to Goa with the following endorsement: We whose names are hereunder written do certify that the above writing with the signatures is a true copy of the original which remains in charge of the said Vice-Governor Humphrey Cooke. Written at Anjidiv, the 17th October 1664.—(Signed) John Stevens, Valenter Farred, Walter Golopher, John Bird, William Lincoln, Thomas Farly. To this is added: I, Joao Gregorio of the Company of Jesus, do certify in verbo sacerdotis that this is a true translation conformable to the original. This 5th day of November 1664.—(Signed) Joao Gregorio. I, Antonio Gabriel Preto, Senior Clerk of the Civil Court and of Justifications of the State of Goa, do hereby attest that the certificate of the above translation, and signature attesting the same, is the handwriting and signature of Padre Joao Gregorio of the Company of Jesus. Goa, 6th November 1664.—(Signed) Antonio Gabriel Preto.²

It appears that after Sir Abraham Shipman's death at Anjidiv in September 1664, Mr. Humphrey Cooke pressed the Portuguese authorities to hasten the transfer of Bombay. Delays were caused the Goa Authorities refusing for a time to admit that Humphrey and Inofre were the same name. When this doubt had been removed, on the 26th December 1664, the Viceroy of Goa Antonio de Mello e Castro drew up the following statement of the case:

¹ Secret and Political Diary 53 of 1796, 1756-1757.

² Secret and Political Diary, 53 of 1796, 1758-1759.

Chapter I.

History.

Bombay
Transferred,
1664-65.

To give possession and to make delivery of the said island of Bombay and its port to the Most Serene King of Great Britain Charles II. the King our Master Dom Affonso VI. having promised it to him in dowry on the marriage of the Most Serene Sinhora Infanta of Portugal Dona Catharina de Gusmao; his most beloved and esteemed sister, now Queen of Great Britain, and for other reasons contained in the capitulations made by and between the two Crowns, or to the person who should be vested with powers and authority from the Most Serene King of Great Britain to receive charge of the said port and island of Bombay for and in his behalf and in his name, Governor Humphrey Cooke being present, stated he was the person who had powers and authority from the Most Serene King of Britain, his Master, to accept, in his name, possession and charge of the said island of Bombay and its port, having succeeded in the room of Sir Abraham Shipman, to whom the said possession and charge was to have been given and who appointed and nominated him, Humphrey Cooke, to succeed him in case of his death. The directions of the Viceroy did not mention the proper name of Governor Humphrey Cooke in order to give him the possession and cause the delivery of the said island and its port. This occasioned some doubts, but the said Governor Inofre Cooke replied that he was the same Humphrey nominated in the English language by Sir Abraham Shipman, and that Luis Mendes de Vasconcellos, Overseer of the General Estates, being of the Goa Council, knows it to be so. Upon this it was determined to give him the said possession and make the said delivery of the said island. The same was also known to the Chancellor who was consulted on the occasion and his opinion was taken by the Viceroy of which the said Inofre Cooke was acquainted having been told so at Goa. Further Governor Cooke presented several letters which the said Viceroy had written to him upon the subject, addressing him by his proper name Inofre Cooke, Governor of the island of Bombay and of the warlike people of His Most Serene Majesty King of Great Britain; stating that he had orders to put him in possession of the said island and its port and that on that account he had come from Goa accompanied by the fleet which the said Viceroy sent as far as the city of Chaul, the Captain Commandant of which was his son Dionizio de Mello e Castro; also that the Most Serene King of Portugal admitted of no further delay and ordered the island to be delivered without the least doubt or delay. This the said Governor Humphrey Cooke did accordingly ask and demand in behalf and in the name of the Most Serene King of Great Britain with three letters from the said Viceroy which remove every doubt there might exist. The first of these letters dated Panjim 26th December 1664, runs as follows¹: I did not answer the Governor's first letter because I looked upon the execution of what he requested of me to be the best and the most short answer which I now have the pleasure to send rejoicing much at his safe arrival at this Bar, and that he

Viceroy of Goa to
Mr. H. Cooke,
1664.

¹ Secret and Political Diary 53 of 1796, 1759-1761.

may have come with health is what I wish. A person shall be appointed to-morrow to go and deliver Bombay. It is also necessary to know by what vessels the people are going on account of Shiváji's fleet, because if the English gentlemen have no peace with him, steps must be taken to avoid every damage or risk as I wish to see the Governor and all other subjects of His Most Serene Majesty King of Great Britain safe.—(Signed) Antonio de Mello e Castro.¹

The second letter dated Panjim, 4th January 1665, runs: Having given the necessary orders to deliver Bombay to your Honour in the manner as the King my Master's order is to do, the fleet sailed to convoy the Europe ship to a Latitude and will return to-day. Your Honour may take your departure whenever you like, acquainting me whether you require any thing else, as I am ready to do every thing convenient or necessary for the service of the King of Great Britain and for your own accommodation. You will always find me with good will. May God preserve you.—(Signed) Antonio de Mello e Castro.²

The third letter dated Panjim, 8th January 1665, runs: All the despatches are ready for your Honour to depart and take possession of Bombay, and the fleet will be paid to-morrow, if it is not already paid. This, which was the only thing wanting to be done, could not be effected on account of the death of Francisco de Mello e Castro, of which your Honour must have heard. Mr. Henry Gary carries the memorandum your Honour required of me by which your Honour will observe little difference can arise on the part of or with the ministers that are going with you because all the articles are conformable to the treaty of peace and agreement between the two Crowns. Should your Honour require any thing else of me, you will find me ready and with good will. May God preserve your Honour.—(Signed) Antonio de Mello e Castro.³

The instrument of Possession was in the following terms: In the name of God, Amen. Be it known to all to whom this public instrument of the possession and delivery of the port and island of Bombay shall come: That in the year of the Birth of our Lord Jesus Christ, one thousand six hundred and sixty-five (1665) on the 18th day of February of the said year, then and there being in the said port and island of Bombay, which is of the jurisdiction of Bassein, at the Large House of the Lady Donna Iguéz de Miranda, widow of the deceased Dom Rodrigo de Moncauto, Present Luis Mendes de Vasconcellos of His Majesty's Council and his Overseer of the Estates in general in India, and Doctor Sebastiao Alvares Migos, Chancellor of the Court of Justice at Goa, the Vereadores and other officers of the Chamber of the said city of Bassein, noblemen inhabitants residing therein, the Judge, Lord Mayor and Aldermen of the said city, as also one Humphrey Cooke (which in the Portuguese or Spanish language is the same as Inofre Cooke) Governor of the warlike men of His Most Serene

Chapter I. History.

Viceroy of Goa to
Mr. H. Cooke,
1665.

Instrument of
Delivery of
Bombay,
1665.

¹ Secret and Political Diary 53 of 1796, 1761.

² Secret and Political Diary 53 of 1796, 1762-1763.

³ Secret and Political Diary 53 of 1796, 1762.

Chapter I.
History.
Instrument of
Delivery of
Bombay,
1665.

Majesty King of Great Britain, and Ensign Joao Torne, and other persons of the English Nation, being all present with me Notary Public hereunder mentioned, where it was declared by the said Luis Mendes de Vasconcellos, Overseer of the Estates in general, and Doctor Sebastiao Alvares Migos, Chancellor of the Court of Justice at Goa, that they had come there from the city of Goa by order of the Viceroy and Captain General of India, Antonio de Mello e Castro, who had sent them giving them two letters from the King our Master, and his said Viceroy's directions with the credentials from the Most Serene Majesty the King of Great Britain, and the commission by which Sir Abraham Shipman had made and appointed the said Humphrey Cooke to succeed him on his death.¹

Antonio de Mello e Castro of His Majesty's Council, Viceroy and Captain General of India, maketh known to all to whom this Alvara (or instrument) may come, that whereas in conformity of the order I have received from His Majesty for delivering the port and town of Bombay unto the person nominated by His Serene Majesty King of Great Britain, I have for this purpose appointed and nominated Luis Mendes de Vasconcellos, Overseer of the Estates in general, and Doctor Sebastiao Alvares Migos, Chancellor of the State, and as it is expedient (for the better definition of all which on this occasion they shall have to treat about) that they should be invested with sufficient powers as the nature of the matter requires and from the confidence I have on the abovementioned persons that they shall act in a manner most pleasing to His Majesty, and satisfactory to His Most Serene Majesty the King of Great Britain, I am pleased, and have *bond fide* granted unto them and do hereby grant all my powers unto the said Luis Mendes de Vasconcellos and Sebastiao Alvares Migos, that they may determine upon and remove all and whatever doubts may arise observing nevertheless the instructions I have ordered to be given them, and on every act of theirs being conformable thereto, shall have the same effect and validity as if they were by me done, determined or ordered, adverting, however, that in the event of any cases offering where they cannot proceed with my order that they shall acquaint me with every particular with their opinion thereon to enable me to resolve upon them as may be most convenient. I do accordingly notify the Captains of the city of Chaul, Bassein, the Factors and Judges thereof, and to all other Ministers of Estates and Justice, officers and other persons whom this may concern, and I do hereby direct and order them to comply with this Alvara or instrument, and to see that it is wholly and fully complied with, kept, observed, and obeyed without the least doubt or contradiction as if it was given in the name of His Majesty, and will not pass to Chancery, nor pay the fees called a half Natta, it being on the service of our Sovereign, notwithstanding any custom to the contrary contained in the Statutes L 2 Nos. 39 and 40. Written by Nicolao Ferreira at Panjim, the 10th January 1665.²

¹ Secret and Political Diary 53 of 1796, 1746.

² The Record copy of this instrument has the following endorsement: I, Doctor

Though the Portuguese authorities were at last forced to give up Bombay they were able to burden the transfer with a large number of conditions. These conditions were: That the island of Bombay shall be delivered to the English gentlemen with a declaration that whereas the other islands of the jurisdiction of Bassein have through the Bay of the said island of Bombay, their commerce, trade and navigation with equal right, liberty and freedom, which the said English gentlemen shall never prevent or cause any impediment nor levy any tribute or gabella, neither on the exportation of salt or any other merchandize of those islands and countries, nor on any other articles which may be brought there from abroad. And it shall be free for all vessels loaded or empty to navigate from the said islands and countries of the Portuguese or other Nations that might come to them and the subjects of the King of Great Britain shall not oblige them to make their first discharge or pay anything in their Custom House, nor by any other means whatsoever. Nor shall they for this purpose make use of any pretence because it is thus declared from this time for ever, and they shall not only have good treatment and free passages to our countries but to those of other parts as they have hitherto been in the habit of doing.

That the port of Bándra in the island of Salsette nor any other of the islands shall be impeded, and all vessels from that port or ports, and others coming to them shall be allowed to pass and re-pass very frankly, and the English gentlemen shall not allege that they pass under their guns because it is under this condition that the island is delivered to them and they cannot expect more than what is granted to them by the Articles of Peace and the Marriage Treaty.

That they shall not admit any deserter from our country, be it for whatever cause, nor shall they under any pretence whatever pretend to conceal or defend them, as this is the most effectual means of preserving peace and friendship between both Crowns, and of avoiding scandalous practice and future injuries and in case of any person going to them they are obliged to send and deliver him up to the Captain, for the time being, of the city of Bassein. And because many Gentus who have in their charge goods and money belonging to the Portuguese and other subjects of His Majesty by way of retaining the whole, it may happen that they

Luis Monteiro da Costa, gave order to write this. The Alvára or instrument by which your Excellency was pleased to grant, and by these presents grant all your Excellency's powers to Luis Mendes de Vasconcellos, Overseer of the Royal Estates in general, and to Doctor Sebastiao Alvares Migos, Chancellor of the Estado, by which they may determine upon, and resolve any and whatever doubts may occur concerning the delivery of Bombay, adhering notwithstanding in every matter to the form of instructions which your Excellency has ordered to be furnished them with, and all they may accordingly do, to have its full effect as if ordered and determined by your Excellency, with proviso that if the cases be such as to appear to them that your Excellency's order is necessary to acquaint the same to your Excellency with every particulars with their opinion thereon for your Excellency to resolve upon as it may be most necessary and expedient as above declared. For your Excellency to see and is worth (wrote ?) like a letter, and is not to pass the Chancery, nor to pay the fees called a half Natta, it being on His Majesty's service. Registered in the Book 2nd of the General Records, folio 22, paid nothing.—Nicolao Ferreira Antonio de Mello e Castro. Bomb. Gov. Secret and Political Diary 53 of 1796, 1747-1749.

Chapter I.

History.

Articles of
Delivery,
1665.

Chapter I.

History.

Articles of
Delivery,
1665.

may come to Bombay and shelter themselves under the shadow and protection of the colours of the Most Serene King of England, the English gentlemen shall not only apprehend such people till they satisfy what they may owe and on their not doing it within two months they shall deliver them up to the Captain of Bassein in order to satisfy the parties as it may be just and right.

That the English gentlemen shall not interfere in matters of Faith, nor will compel the inhabitants of the said island of Bombay, neither directly or indirectly, to change their Faith or to go and attend their sermons; and shall allow the ecclesiastical ministers the exercise of their jurisdiction without the least impediment, being a condition mentioned in the articles of peace under which the delivery of the island is ordered to be made, and if at any time anything contrary is done it is understood that the whole agreed upon and promised will be violated, and that the right of the said island shall fall again into the Crown of Portugal.

That the fleets of the King of Portugal our Master, both ships of the line and the smaller vessels and any other vessels of his, will at all time be free to sail in and out of the said Bay without the least impediment. Nor will they be obliged to ask any leave, because by the reason of the other islands and countries belonging to him a part of the said Bay belongs also to him, and it is free to him to make use of it as his own without any doubt or question.

That all the inhabitants residing at Bombay as well as those who may have estates in the said island, when they should not like to reside in the said island, it shall be free to them to farm out their estates or sell the same on the best terms they may be able to obtain, and if the English gentlemen should require them, it shall be for their just and equal value, and not on any other terms. But if the English gentlemen should not choose to buy them, nor the holders live in them, it shall be free to them to alienate the same, and until they do so, it shall likewise be free to them to enjoy and make use of the same as they have hitherto done without the least contradiction from the part of the English gentlemen.

That the inhabitants of the said islands of Sálsette, Karanja, and Baragoo¹ and of other places of our jurisdiction shall freely fish in the said Bay and river, and in the arm of the sea which enters and divides Bombay from Sálsette by Bándra till the Bay, and the English gentlemen shall not at any time prevent them, nor will they at any time and under any pretence whatever demand any tribute on this account, and the inhabitants of Bombay shall be allowed to do the same with the same liberty and freedom.

That the Kunbis, Bhandáris, and the rest of the people Abunhados (a sort of people bound to serve the land-holders) or inhabitants of the villages of our jurisdiction shall not be admitted at Bombay, and on their or any of them resorting thereto, they shall be immediately delivered up to their respective owners;

¹ Barágaoon, Twelve Villages, a name still in use as a salt revenue subdivision of Karanja island.

And the same shall be observed with respect to slaves which may run away and likewise with regard to the artificers that may go from our countries to Bombay, such as carpenters, weavers, turners, joiners, caulkers, sawyers, drillers, smiths, and any other. They shall be immediately delivered up. And if the English gentlemen should at any time require these artificers they shall ask them from the Captain of Bassein who will send them for a limited time, they keeping their families in our countries. And on their being still wanted even after the expiration of the limited time, they shall go and present themselves to the Captain of Bassein for the time being to whom the English gentlemen shall ask for them again and know thereby that neither the capitulations nor the good neighbourhoodship, which we shall also observe, is to be violated.

That in case any of the deserters should be willing to change his religion and pass to the confession of the English gentlemen to prevent their being restored to us, the English gentlemen shall not consent thereto, and the same shall be observed on our part with regard to those that may desert to our countries.

That although the manor right of the lady, the proprietrix of Bombay, is taken away from her estates if she lives in the island, they are not to be intermeddled with or taken away from her unless it be of her free will, she being a woman of quality, they are necessary for her maintenance. But after death and her heirs succeed to those estates, the English gentlemen may if they choose take them paying for the same, their just value, as is provided in the case of other proprietors of estates. And should the English gentlemen now wish to take her houses to build forts therewith they shall immediately pay her their just value.

That every person possessing revenue at Bombay either by patrimonial or Crown lands, shall possess them with the same right and shall not be deprived thereof except in cases which the Laws of Portugal direct, and their sons and descendants shall succeed to them with the same right and clause abovementioned, and those who may sell the said patrimonial or Crown estates shall transfer to the purchaser the same right and perpetuity they had, that the purchaser may enjoy the same and their successors in the like manner.

That the Parish Priests and Monks or regular Clergy that reside in Bombay shall have all due respect paid them as agreed upon, and the Churches shall not be taken for any use whatever nor shall sermons be preached in them, and those who may attempt it shall be punished in such manner as to serve as an example.

That the inhabitants of Bombay and the landholders of that island shall not be obliged to pay more than the *foras* they use to pay to His Majesty, this condition being expressly mentioned in the capitulations.

That there shall be a good understanding and reciprocal friendship between both parties, rendering one another every good office like good friends as this was the end of the delivery of this and other places, and the intention of His Most Serene King of Great

Chapter I.

History.

Articles of
Delivery,
1685.

Chapter I.
History.

Mr. H. Cooke
takes Possession,
1665.

Britain, as appears by the treaty made and entered into by and between both Crowns. Given at Panjim, the 14th January 1665.—
(Signed) Antonio de Mello e Castro.¹

On the acceptance of these Articles possession was immediately given and delivery made of the island of Bombay and its port, which comprehends in its situation and territories the villages of Mázgaon, Parel, and Warli. The said Governor Inofre or Humphrey Cooke accepted and received it, saying he did receive possession and delivery of the island of Bombay and its port in the name of the Most Serene King of Great Britain in the manner and form contained in the instructions from the Viceroy Antonio DeMello e Castro with all and every declaration, clause, and condition of the said instructions, promising, in the name of the Most Serene King of Great Britain, that there was not, or should not at any time come, any defect in part or in full against this instrument. On the contrary that he should himself, his heirs and successors, servants, subjects and ministers comply with the whole of the articles and conditions agreed upon without the least doubt. Saying, assuring, and promising this should be so, he took himself personally the possession and delivery of the said port and island of Bombay, walking thereupon taking in his hands earth and stones, entering and walking upon its bastions, putting his hands to the walls thereof, and walking also on the said island taking into his hands the earth and stones thereof, and making all other like acts which in right were necessary without any impediment or contradiction. He accordingly took possession and delivery of the said port and island of Bombay very quietly and peaceably that the Most Serene King of Great Britain might have possession and become master (also his heirs and successors) of the said port and island in the form and manner stipulated in the agreement between the two Crowns and in the instructions from the Viceroy. Further in order that the inhabitants thereof, gentlemen and proprietors of estates and properties within the circuit and territories of the said island abovementioned, who pay *foros* to the King our master, may pay the same henceforth to His Most Serene King of Great Britain who is charged and invested with the possession of the said island in the manner and form abovementioned. Of all this the said Luis Mendes Vasconcellos, Overseer of the Royal Estates in general, and Sebastiao Alvares Megos, Chancellor of the Court of Justice at Goa, and the Governor Humphrey Cooke ordered this instrument to be made in order to give copies thereof to the parties as they may require, and to register the same in the Book of Tower of Tombos (Archives) of the City of Goa and in that of the Chamber of the City of Bassein and of the Factory of the said city, and at all other competent places. Also to cause all the necessary declarations to be made in those Books in order to make clear at all times the manner in which this possession was given and delivery was made of the said island

¹ Bombay Government Secret and Political Diary 53 of 1796, 1751-1756. Forreast's Selections, Home Series, II. 377-379.

and port of Bombay. And as they thus ordered this public instrument to be made, they the said Overseer of the Royal Estates in General, and Luis Mendes de Vasconcellos of the Court of Justice at Goa, put their names thereto in testimony of their having made the said delivery and given the said possession of the island of Bombay and its port and that the Governor Humphrey Cooke had accepted the possession and delivery in the manner aforesaid with the testimony of those who were present at the time.

These witnesses were the Vereadores of the city of Bassein, Joao Mendes de Menezes, Dom Luis Henriques Nicolao Galvao, the Judge ordinary Manoel de Silva, the attorney Antonio da Costa Raporo, and the clerk of the Chamber Sebastiao Rodrigues da Silva, the Mayor of the city Vicente Rebello d'Almeida, and the Factors and Judge Amaro de Azavedo. The Captain of the city of Bassein Rui Mendes de Vasconcellos Costa could not be present to be a witness to this deed because he was ill and confined to his bed. The English witnesses were Ensign John Torne, John Stevens, Henri Gueri, Richard Ball, Walter Galoper, John Bird, John Foldersy, and Thomas Petery. I, Antonio Monteiro de Fonseca Notary Public of the city of Bassein and districts by the King our master, came here to Bombay at the requisition of the said Overseer of the Royal Estates in general and the Chancellor of the Court of Justice at Goa, the Royal Minister and those that came to Bombay with powers aforesaid from the Viceroy to give this possession and to make the delivery aforesaid. They ordered and directed me to make this instrument of possession and delivery in the manner and form above related, the Field Captain of the said city Valentim Soares and other noblemen and knights that were present have also signed this with me, the said Notary Public, who wrote this in my Notarial Book where the said Overseer of the Royal Estates in general Luis de Vasconcellos Sebastiao Alvares Migos and the said Governor Inofre Cooke, Vereadores, Judge Procurator and clerk of the noble city its mayor and other witness have all signed and which I have hereunto copied and I have signed with my public signature and which is as hereunder as follows. Doubts should not arise on account of several words badly wrote in folios 2, 3, and 7.¹

Under the convention with the Viceroy of Goa, Mr. Cooke took possession of the island of Bombay without any of its dependencics, and Mr. Gary, one of the Council of Surat, held a muster of the troops and ordnance brought to Bombay from

Chapter I.

History.

Mr. H. Cooke
takes Possession,
1665.

State of Bombay,
1666.

¹ The Record copy has this endorsement. Vicente Rebello d'Almeida, Judge for the city of Bassein and its Jurisdiction, by the King our master maketh known to all whom this certificate of justification shall come that the above writing at the foot of the copy and the public signature thereon is the handwriting and signature of Antonio Monteiro de Fonseca, Notary Public for this city, and I do hereby attest on the faith of the clerk who wrote this and in testimony whereof I have put my name and sealed with the seal of the Royal arms of the Crown of Portugal used in this Court. Bassein, this 26th day of February 1665. Paid nothing but 14 res for the signature and seal. I Gregorio Rebello wrote this. Vicente Rebello d'Almeida without seal ex causa Rebello. A true copy: Antonio de Azavedo e Brito. Bom. Gov. Secret and Political Diary 53 of 1796, 1763-1766.

Chapter I.
History.

State of Bombay,
1666.

Anjidiv. Instead of assisting the English or enabling them to render Bombay either a retreat for their trade or a place of defence, the Portuguese, by heavy imposts on their boats passing Karanja or Thana, made Mr. Cooke and the garrison immediately feel the effects of being deprived of the dependencies of the island, which had been ceded to the King by treaty. So burdensome was the levy of 10 to 12 per cent. duty on the merchandize and provisions which Bombay boats brought from the continent, that Mr. Cooke was forced to put soldiers on board the boats to resist the demand.

Cooke's settlement and management of Bombay found little favour with the Council at Surat. Sir George Oxinden soon discovered that the Moghal Government had become jealous of the English possessing an island and forming a garrison on it in the immediate vicinity of Surat.

The jealousy of the Moghal Government was heightened by Mr. Cooke inviting native merchants to settle at Bombay under the protection of the English garrison. This measure convinced the Moghal Governor of Surat that the whole scheme had for its object to remove the President and Council to Bombay. Whatever names the English might assume, he considered it impossible that two distinct bodies could belong to the same nation, the officers and servants of the King and of a Company of merchants who had hitherto professed trade to be their only object, but who were now furnishing provisions and aid to a garrison with which they pretended to have no common interest.

Under these embarrassing conditions in January 1666, the President and Council of Surat recommended the Court of Directors to solicit the King's permission to build a Factory at Bombay to which goods might be brought from the Deccan or Coromandel Coast as well as from the Malabar Coast and from Surat. With a suitable factory Bombay might become a depôt for the goods brought from both sides of Cape Comorin, to be ready for the ships on their arrival at Swally or at Bombay. At the same time the Council explained that this project would be impracticable unless proper arrangements were introduced into the government of the island, and persons appointed duly qualified to administer its affairs under fixed regulations.¹

Cooke's
Convention
Disavowed,
1666.

Cooke's conduct and settlement found even less favour in England than in Surat. Late in 1665, on learning under what terms Mr. Cooke had agreed to receive the island of Bombay from the Viceroy of Goa, the King of England resolved to disavow the convention as contrary to the treaty between the Crowns of England and Portugal, to recall Mr. Cooke and have him tried for malpractices, and to appoint Sir Gervase Lucas to be Governor of Bombay, giving at the same time assurances to the Company that their

¹ The President and Council of Surat to the Court, 1st January, 16th March, and 4th April 1666; Mr. Cooke to the President and Council of Surat, 21st February 1666; President and Council of Surat to Mr. Cooke, 1st March 1666. Bruce's Annals, II, 174-176.

factories and trade would be protected by the Royal forces occupying Bombay.¹

In January 1666 before leaving England to take up his appointment, Sir Gervase Lucas had the whole of the documents transmitted by Mr. Cooke laid before him. He represented to the King that the Bombay fortifications were ruinous and by no means suited either for its defence or for the security of the troops; that stores of every description would be required, the greater part of those sent with Sir Abraham Shipman being useless or lost; and that in his opinion it would be necessary to embark 400 men as a garrison, being the same number Sir Abraham Shipman had under his command; that the pay and other yearly charges of the garrison would amount to £7371 exclusive of artificers and contingencies. He submitted to His Majesty that eighteen months' stores and provisions of every kind must be embarked and some addition made to the pay of the Governor, at this time only £2 a day, an amount insufficient to defray the expenses that must be incurred at so distant a station.² His Majesty referred Sir Gervase Lucas' report to the Duke of Albemarle (General Monk), Lord Arlington, and Sir William Coventry, Secretaries of State. They reported that from the uncertainty whether the island of Bombay was in possession of His Majesty or not, it would be improper to incur any great expense upon it. They therefore recommended a reinforcement of 60 men under a Lieutenant, who was to have Captain's pay or eight shillings a day, together with a supply of clothes ammunition and stores, and a small vessel to be attached to the garrison. The whole expense with eighteen months' pay and provisions for the troops was estimated at £11,498 16s.³ When Sir Gervase Lucas embarked on board the Company's ship *Return*, he, at the King's desire, obtained from the Company a credit for £1500 on the Presidency of Surat, for which he was to grant bills on England at 30 days' sight.⁴ On his arrival in Bombay on the 5th November 1666, Sir Gervase assumed the Governorship and appointed Mr. Henry Gary to be Deputy Governor.

In connection with the credit of £1500 the following entry appears in the Surat Consultations (3rd December 1666): Sir Gervase Lucas, Knight and Baronet, Governor of the island of Bombay and Commander-in-Chief of all His Majesty's Forces in India,⁵ brought a letter of credit from the Honourable East India Company, our Masters, for the payment of £1500 to him for His Majesty's occasions. This letter was accompanied by one from Sir Gervase of

Chapter I.

History.

State of Bombay,
1666.

Sir G. Lucas
Governor,
1666.

¹ Bruce's Annals, II. 168.

² Sir Gervase Lucas's observations on the papers respecting Bombay, 18th January 1666 (East India Papers in the State Paper Office, No. 232); Court to the President and Council of Surat, 7th March 1666; Historical Account of Bombay, Bruce, II. 168-169.

³ Original report of the Duke of Albemarle, Lord Arlington, and Sir William Coventry, to the King, relative to Bombay, 26th March 1666 (East India Papers in the State Paper Office, No. 236). Bruce, II. 169-170.

⁴ Court to the Presidency of Surat, 24th and 31st March 1666. Bruce's Annals, II. 170.

⁵ Besides his political failure Mr. Cooke was charged with fraud and embezzlement. The seat of government from which he was ejected was occupied by Sir Gervase Lucas who arrived in Bombay on the 5th of November 1666. Anderson's English in Western India (1854), 54.

Chapter I.
History.

Sir G. Lucas
Governor,
1666.

date the 9th of November brought us by Mr. Ball, who was empowered to receive the value of the said sum in dollars. He expects the remittance should be accompanied to Bombay by some trusty persons appointed by us, the risk being ours until the money is safely delivered him. To this we demurred for the following reasons: First, by reason of an error in the calculation of the dollars, which he computes the Seville at 215 the Mexico at 213 rupees per 100, when by the standard of this place the Seville is worth 214 and the Mexico 211: Secondly, our inability to procure so many dollars in specie, none being permitted to pass the mint without coinage into the current money of the country rupees: Lastly, our running the adventure of the money to Bombay, for which we have no order from the Company, and in case of miscarriage the loss may fall upon our own heads. Wherefore, we made our addresses by letter of the 16th of said month, desiring Sir Gervase to take the aforesaid reasons under consideration, and in respect to the want of dollars to accept of rupees or sequins. And in case he shall still impose the adventure on us, that the moneys may be drawn from us at several times, that if a loss happen it may be the less considerable. To which we having now by this letter of the 24th of the past month received his positive answer to furnish him with the aforesaid sum upon our adventure without further dispute by changing the specie, or by exchanges as we should best contrive, we conclude it requisite to prevent misunderstandings between us, and such ill consequences as may from thence arise of prejudice to the Company's affairs, to ensure said money unto him on the Company's account, and to procure what exchanges we can to Bassein at the easiest loss, which was the present import of this consultation.¹

Capt. H. Gary,
Governor,
1667.

Sir Gervase Lucas died the 21st May 1667 and Captain Henry Gary succeeded as Governor. About the close of the year Mr. Gary transmitted with his letters to the King and to the Secretary of State the following statement of the revenues of the island, as improved by Sir Gervase Lucas and himself:

Rent of		Xeraphins.	
Mazgaon	9,300 0 40
Máhim	4,797 2 45
Parel...	2,377 1 56
Vadála	1,738 0 40
Sion	790 0 60
Warli	571 1 34
Bombay	6,344 2 61
			25,920 1 18
Rent of			
The Tobacco Stanck or Farm	9,550 0 0
The Taverna	2,400 0 0
The Account of Customs	18,000 0 0
The Account of Cocoanuts	18,000 0 0
		Xeraphins	73,870 1 18
More may be advanced	1,129 1 62
		Total Xeraphins	75,000 0 0
Which at 13 Xeraphins for 22s. 6d. sterling	
amounts to	£6,490 17 9

¹ Surat Consultation, 3rd Dec. 1666, Surat Fact. Diary 1 of 1660-1696, 111-112, Forrest's Home Series, I. 210.

To this account of the revenue Mr. Gary subjoined, in his letter to the King, the state of the treasury at the time and the measures he had taken by laying in provisions and adding such men to the garrison as he could draw together for its defence. The amount of treasure was 16,000 Xeraphins or £1384, and the numbers of the garrison were 285. These were composed principally of French Portuguese and Natives. Only 93 English officers were included.¹

In their letter of 23rd April 1672 the Surat Council ask Bombay if there is any truth in the rumour that Shivaji is building a castle on Henry-Kenry. They say the Surat Governor makes this news a reason for not letting the President go, because he says the President will help Shivaji. Let us hear of this say the Council. If Shivaji is building a fort on Henry-Kenry it is a much more serious matter for Bombay than for Surat.²

During Mr. Gary's Government the relations between Bombay and Surat were far from cordial. One of the chief points in dispute was the practice of the Surat Council granting passes to native ships. On the 5th September 1667 the Council recorded that the President (Mr. Oxinden) had made known to the Surat Council that Mr. Henry Gary, the Governor of Bombay, by his letter of the 4th of July, had directed Mr. Gerald Aungier to acquaint the President that he expected the President should forbear giving any more passes for the secure navigation of junks, but should send all such persons as required passes to the said Governor to receive them from him. This command from one who had been many years a servant to the Company and knew full well the prejudice which would fall on the transaction of affairs in Surat should the Council be deprived of the liberty to grant passes, would have seemed the more strange did they not know him to be a person ill affected to the Company's interest and an instigator of Sir Gervase Lucas to make the like demand by a second hand. The Council held that to be deprived of a practice dating from the first settlement of the Company's trade in Surat would be a great debasement to their repute and credit. Without the power to grant passes, they continue, how can we expect to keep these people in a good decorum. For this power has ever been an awe upon them engaging them to a civil appearance towards us, and has much conduced to the Company's benefit in the recovering and getting in of debts, which otherwise would have proved desperate. Should we now be deprived of this privilege, the loss of our reputations here may cause this king to nip in the bud those great immunities and privileges lately granted us so much to the Company's benefit.

These considerations, they add, bring us to this conclusion: That as the said Governor had laid his commands upon us by a second hand, namely Mr. Gerald Aungier, he should also receive

Chapter I.

History.

State of Bombay,
1666.

Henry-Kenry.

Navigating
Passes,
1667.

¹ Mr. Gary to the King and to Lord Arlington, Bombay, 12th December 1667. Statement of the revenues of the island of Bombay enclosed in the preceding letters. East India Papers in the State Paper Office, Nos. 243, 245, 246, 248, 249. Bruce's Annals, II. 212-216.

² Surat to Bombay, 23rd April 1672, Surat Fact. Out. L. Book 1 of 1630-1673, 257. Forrest's Home Series, I. 62.

Chapter I.

History.

Navigating
Passes,
1667.

our answer from him. That we could by no means lay down so ancient a practice, so much consistent with the Honourable Company's interest, which His Sacred Majesty was graciously pleased to own when the ship Return came out, when the Company addressing themselves upon advice from us that Mr. Humphrey Cooke in the time of his government did impose upon us to the obstructing their affairs, he was graciously pleased to return them answer by the Right Honourable the Lord Arlington, Principal Secretary of State, that effectual directions should be given to the respective Governor or Governors of Bombay that they act nothing to the Company's prejudice or contrary to their Charter. That living under the government of these people we could not refuse to give passes to such as demanded them. Therefore, except it appear to be our King's Majesty's immediate command, or the Company give us their order to the contrary (either of which as in duty bound we shall readily obey and conform ourselves to), we cannot lay down this so ancient a custom and privilege. And therefore we do entreat the Governor to forbear urging us further in this business until we shall receive commands from Europe concerning it, promising in the interim not to constrain these people to take our passes, nor be profuse in giving them until we are urgently moved to it, which we hope he will find so reasonable that we shall have his assent for the present.¹

In the following year (1668) the Governor of Bombay again required the Council to cease issuing passes. The Surat Factory Diary contains the following entry of a consultation held on the 31st July: The receipt of letters by the ship Charles, some directed to Sir Gervase Lucas and others to himself, has so elevated Mr. Gary that he now says, as His Majesty's interest is like to take root and flourish, he cannot be defective in a point so much tending to His Majesty's honour as not to have his authority acknowledged to reside at Bombay, which must no longer be disputed. He therefore hopes it will not be ill resented that he (Mr. Gary) renews his demands concerning the passes, which, though it has lain dormant awhile, is not deceased; he doubts not but our zeal to His Majesty's grandeur will incline us to acquiesce therein. Our passes were indeed summoned by him the last year, when we let him know (what before he well understood) how prejudicial it would be to the Company's affairs here. Yet we would be so observant as not to contradict His Majesty's orders, and declared then to relinquish our right to issue passes if he had His Majesty's Commission for it. Until he had such Commission we entreated him to forbear troubling us. But he, to show his own grandeur and to lessen our esteem with these people, not only renews his demands of the passes from us, but has written letters in Persian to the Governor, the Shawbandar or Harbour Master, and all the owners of junks in Surat commanding them to fetch their passes from him, in whom the supreme power resides; that His Majesty intended to make the port of Bombay the most flourishing

¹ Surat Consultation, 5th Sept. 1667, Surat Fact. Diary I of 1660-1693, 118, 119, Forrest's Home Series, I. 211.

port in India, and that he is setting out an Armada to scour the coasts from pirates. These his letters have put the town in an uproar and raised such jealousies in the king's ministers, that we have been often sent for by the Governor and upbraided, that we who had received such signal favours and immunities from the king, and enjoyed a peaceable and flourishing trade in this his port and other of his dominions so many years, were now destroying this port to set up one of our own. Telling us how ill the king would resent this business, wondering very much that Mr. Gary should set out an Armada to scour their seas, who never desired any such kindness from him. Nor would the Governor believe, but Mr. Gary was revolted and set up for himself; and those his Armada were pirates intended to rob the junks of the king's port. The President assured him Mr. Gary had no such intentions, nor could such a thing be. To this the Governor hastily retorted: What (says he) cannot be? Did you never hear of a son who put his father in prison? The Governor was very inquisitive after the situation of the island, its bigness, what towns and houses, how inhabited. He asked more especially after the fortifications as he was told by the man who brought the letters that they had built a castle. This we would not understand, but palliated the business what might be. And after that the President had urgently pressed him to let the merchants fetch their passes from thence, telling him that Mr. Gary being the king's minister, it would be rather safer for them than if they received them of us, he dismissed us for that time, telling us the business was of no small consequence, and would highly incense the king. And not being satisfied with our evading his discourse about their building fortifications, he sent the patamar that brought his letters with his broker home to our house to justify it.

This past, the Governor summons all the king's officers and the merchants of the town to the king's darbár, where, when they had consulted about the business, we were sent for again. The Governor then asking the President who Mr. Gary was. The President told him Mr. Gary was a person of honour and the King's governor of the island. Then he asked whether he were greater than we? The President answered: Yea, as the Governor himself and the king's ministers were superior to the merchants of the town. Yet some of the merchants knowing Mr. Gary ceased not to set him at naught with much earnestness, declaring they would receive none of his passes, although we often pressed them to it as a thing that might conduce more to their peaceable navigation than if they received ours. Nothing that we could plead would prevail with them. They told us that we in our articles had agreed to give them passes here, and as we have continued so to do even to this day, so would they still expect passes from us while we remain in their port. To which the President answered that when those articles were made there was no other interest in these parts but the Company's. Now there is another of the King's, which ought to have the greater respect, and to which the Company must submit. This swayed not anything with the merchants. To those articles they would still bind us; while we reside and trade in their country they would go no further for their passes. The

Chapter I.

History.

Pass Disputes,
1668.

Chapter I.

History.

Pass Disputes,
1663.

Governor told us should Surat shipowners submit to go to Bombay for their passes to-morrow the Dutch would send them to Batavia and the French to Madagascar. If you shall object (said they) that we send to Goa for the Portugal passes, it is because the Portugals have none of their people residing in our country for trade. If they did we would make them give us passes here. To conclude, the Governor first on behalf of the king and port, and the Shawbandar for the merchants, gave us this positive answer: That as they had ever received their passes from us in this port, so would they still demand them. If we refused to give passes they would send their vessels to sea without them. And if in their navigating any junk or the least boat did receive any disturbance from any of our nation, they bid us look to it, for they would have full satisfaction from us. Then the king's intelligencer required our positive answer that he might write our resolutions up to the king. But foreseeing the danger of the king's displeasure, and the hazard of the Company's estate thereby, the President desired the governor, the intelligencer, and the rest to suspend their resolution of advising the king of this business until he had written to the Governor of Bombay and used his endeavours with him, declaring this was newly happened and without his knowledge. This being granted we took our leave. Since then they have been enquiring very narrowly after the condition of the island, and the king's intelligencer sent the President word that he must advise the king of their fortifying, lest he suffer under the king's displeasure as his predecessor had done for neglecting it.

All that we have here collected, makes it perspicuous that this king and his ministers have a jealous eye upon His Majesty's island and port of Bombay. The King will have far greater jealousy (we pray God it extend not to the loss of it, and our trade in his dominions) when he shall come to read those immature unreasonable letters of Governor Gary's sent to the king's ministers here, in a time when Bombay is not in a condition to be defended against the arms of so powerful a king bordering upon them, from whose country they are stored with all manner of provisions. Nor can we imagine what future troubles this may bring upon us in our persons. We must certainly expect great trouble in the Company's affairs. So that having fully debated this business, we conclude to send Governor Gary a narrative of these proceedings that he may see into what a labyrinth of troubles he has involved us; endangering the Company's estate and privileges and (we fear) His Majesty's island; and to entreat him once more not to molest us and obstruct the course of our trade; but to defer his pretences to the passes to a more convenient opportunity, unless he have His Majesty's positive order to command us to lay them down, to which we shall most humbly submit, being ready to suffer all manner of ways rather than disobey His Majesty. Desiring him for our security to send us that clause which warrants him to his demands, telling him that unless it be expressly commanded from the Court, we cannot answer it, not having yet received anything to warrant us to take our orders from him, but from the Company grounded upon their Charter.¹

¹ Surat Consultation, 31st July 1663, Surat Fact. Diary 1 of 1660-1696, 127-129, Forrest's Home Series, I. 215-217.

During the same year (1668) the question whether ships from Surat to England should call at Bombay caused some irritation at Surat. The Factory Diary under date 31st July 1668 has the following entry: The President having received several letters from Governor Gary, more particularly two of them of date the 3rd and 11th July, concerning the Company's general affairs, he convened his Council and caused the said letters to be read. The first, treated wholly about our sending down the first ship we shall despatch for England, to touch at the port of Bombay, where he promised she shall remain not longer than twelve hours, to receive those advices indispensably necessary to be sent His Majesty by the first conveyance, whereby we shall do such an eminent piece of service that all our former cannot parallel, and will make amends for that sudden and hasty departure of the Return from India without Sir Gervase's advices. These with many other rhetorical expressions accumulated and pressed home upon the President, we having well considered, we concluded the ship in her passage home shall wait upon him, if we have not positive orders from the Company to the contrary or something more than we can imagine at this distance intervene.¹

Meanwhile during the latter part of 1667 and the beginning of 1668, on the one hand the friction and rivalry between Bombay and Surat, on the other the cost and trouble of managing Bombay had resulted in the offer of the Company to take over Bombay and in the decision of the King to approve the transfer. At a General Consultation held at Surat on the 3rd of September 1668, whereat were present the Right Worshipful Sir George Oxinden, Knight, President, Mr. John Goodier, Mr. Gerald Aungier, Captain Henry Young, Mr. Streinsham Master, and Mr. Mathew Gray, Secretary, the following note was recorded:

The ship Constantinople Merchant by God's blessing arriving two days since at the Bar of Swally, the Commander Captain Ward and Captain Henry Young came up in their boat the last evening, presenting the President with the Honourable Company's advices. Among the advices were His Majesty's Royal Charter under the broad seal of England for the taking possession of the island of Bombay with all and singular the appurtenances and revenues thereunto appertaining, His Majesty having been graciously pleased freely to bestow it on the Honourable East India Company, our Masters, who by an instrument under their common seal have deputed their President and Council, and some other persons therein nominated, or any two or more of them, to receive and possess the said island for their use. Forasmuch as of the several persons nominated, no more were at present in Surat than those convened at this Council, and seeing the matter to be urgent the President propounded the choice of some persons out of this Council that should immediately prepare themselves for this urgent

Chapter I.

History.

Surat and Bombay.

Surat officers
deputed to Bombay,
1668.Transfer to
Company,
1665.

¹ Surat Consultation, 31st July 1668, Surat Fact. Diary 1 of 1660-1696, 126, Forrest's Home Series, I. 215.

Chapter I.

History.

Transfer to
Company,
1668.

affair; he declared how necessary it was, and with what willingness he would go himself in person. But the Company's affairs were so pressing, large advices from the Company and many things to speak to and a ship speedily to be laden for England, that it was not possible for him to leave Surat. He therefore propounded Mr. John Goodier, next in Commission and quality, and by his intimacy with the Deputy Governor Gary, and the influence he hath upon the affections of the other officers, gained in a visitation of that island, were very much to conduce to their peaceable surrender and our quiet possession of the place. Mr. Goodier readily accepted the proposal, declaring his willingness to serve the Company upon all occasions. As neither Mr. Aungier, by reason of his employment in the warehouses, many of which being full of goods housed by him to be laden on the first ship, and by the absence of Mr. Goodier receiving into his charge the accounts, nor Mr. Gray who was required for despatch of advices to the Company could be spared, Captain Young and Mr. Streinsham Master, being all that remained of the persons nominated in Commission were joined with Mr. Goodier. Mr. Tho. Cotes having accepted the Company's service and being well acquainted with all the officers and soldiers upon the island, and with the customs of the people and privileges of the place, was added to the other three, all four to make a Council, Mr. Goodier to reside chief, and convene the rest upon all occasions that shall require consultation.

It was further determined, for more expedition in the unloading of the ship, that she might be prepared to receive on board the aforesaid deputed persons and voyage with them to Bombay, that the Constantinople Merchant should remove from her anchoring at the river's mouth and proceed into Swally Hole to unload.¹

Four days later (7th September 1668) the Surat Council held their first consultation on the improvement of their Masters' new possession of Bombay and recorded the following note:

Schemes for
Bombay,
1668.

It being the Honourable Company's desire in a clause of their letter of the 27th March last (1668) now received (1st September 1668) by the Constantinople Merchant, that we contrive the best way for the making Bombay a port for the exportation and importation of goods and persons to and from Persia, Mokha, and other parts; And for the effecting of this that we employ at present the Chesnut pink and get some other vessel to be there that merchants may be encouraged to come thither, and further that we advise them what shipping will be fitting for the encouraging this affair, and they will send them us. We deliberately considering thereon, do find many reasons inducing us to build them shipping in this country, where timber, iron work, carpenters, and many other materials are very cheap, the building far more substantial than in England, and more proper for these parts, in regard they will require no sheathing, nor caulking more than the decks, and by the industry of these people from what they have learned from our nation, as handsomely built as our English vessels, and yet further for the drawing merchants to the port, who may be encouraged when they see us building shipping there,

¹ Surat Fact. Diary 1 of 1660 - 1696, 143 - 144. Forrest's Home Series, I, 224 - 225.

and for the encouragement of the natives in setting them on work, so that the money expended will remain in the island, and the people be the better enabled to pay those duties and rents annually received from them, the best timber being procurable near hand very cheap. These reasons we doubt not will be satisfactory to the Company, it tending wholly to the benefit and increase of trade in that port and island. Wherefore we conclude to set two ships upon the stocks at their island of Bombay, one about 200 the other 300 tons, and to write home to be sent us by the first shipping standing masts, yards, guns, pitch, tar, cordage, all other things being procurable here.¹

The Commissioners reached Bombay on the evening of the 21st September 1668, and His Majesty's Warrant was at once delivered to Captain Gary. A day was spent in preparation for the ceremony, and on Wednesday the 23rd the Commissioners landed and were received by the Governor with military honours. The island was then taken possession of in the name of the Honourable Company and the necessary transfers effected.

Of these 'necessary transfers' the Commissioners give the following details in their letter to the President, Surat, dated Bombay Road 28th September 1668. Our last was from on board the Constantinople Merchant of the 20th current per hoy Despatch. On the 21st, in the evening, we happily arrived in Bombay road when Captain Young and Mr. Cotes went on shore to deliver His Sacred Majesty's letter directed to Sir Gervase Lucas and Deputy Governor Gary, as also a particular letter from John Goodier, copy of which is herein enclosed, as also Governor Gary's particular answer returned next morning by Corporal Roby. After this Governor Gary despatched Captain Young and Mr. Cotes on board, to assure us by word of mouth that they were making all possible speed for our reception on shore, and that the next morning would be a convenient time. This message we gladly received, and returned by Captain Young a civil grateful answer. So we prepared ourselves for the next day's ceremonies, when according to promise Captain Young and others came on board to accompany us on shore. The Commanders of the ships showed themselves very civil at our disembarking, as well in the term of our voyage. Wherefore we humbly entreat your particular acknowledgment to them, for we have found them on all occasions very ready to assist us. Captain Ward has been at expense of wine and cheer more than ordinary, which please to consider as you think fitting, and so we leave them to acquaint you.

At our landing we were met by Governor Gary, and other officers, who at the head of their several Companies military drawn up by the sea side, received us with very much respect and ceremony and so accompanied us into the Fort. In the Fort Governor Gary caused all the soldiers to make their approach toward us in military order, first being by the Chief Officers commanded to lay down their arms and to march towards us without them, yet in decent rank, and

Chapter I. History.

Schemes for
Bombay,
1668.

Commissioners
reach Bombay,
1668.

¹ Surat President & Council's Consultation, 7th Sept. 1668, Surat Fact. Diary 1 of 1660-1696, 145. Forrest's Home Series, I. 225-226.

Chapter I.

History.

Handed to the
Company,
1668.

there in the head of them all he made a short speech, much in the honour and praise of the Honourable Company and caused His Majesty's privy Seal to be publicly read. At which for the generality the officers and soldiers were well pleased that His Majesty had disposed the island to the Honourable Company to whom they owned obedience. After this we caused the Company's Commission (in parchment) to the President and Council, together with your Commission to us to be also read publicly. When the reading was over they marched back to their arms, and took them up for the Honourable Company when John Goodier made a short speech to encourage and confirm them in their obedience by assuring every man his former quality and pay, Captain Gary excepted. At present Captain Gary is very busily employed in making up several accounts, which being effected he intends to deliver the balance in unto us, and promises his utmost endeavour and assistance in the Company's service. This we have reason to believe, because that hitherto he hath met all our desires with a ready compliance, indeed it is beyond what we could expect, and therefore we humbly request he may be looked upon accordingly.

The several Officers as Captain Toldery, Lieut. Burgess, Lieut. Houghton, Ensign Gollopher, and Ensign Langford were very instrumental in their several degrees and stations to promote our desires, and further the Company's interests, when divers soldiers deserted their service, and with their mutinous example had like to have infected many more, who laid down their arms, denying any future service. Wherefore we were enforced to confine them in a room, in order to sending them on board. Which when they saw, they used the mediations of Captain Toldery that they might be admitted to their arms again, promising much obedience for the future. They were received accordingly, only lost this by their refractoriness: that the civility and kindness we intended to show them, we are now enforced to exchange for a more reserved demeanour.

By the vacancy of Mr. Price, who was Lieut. to the late Governor, Lieut. Burgess at present Lieut. to Captain Toldery, claims his place, by military right of succession; also Lieut. Houghton, who is provisional Lieutenant with but Ensign's pay, claims his right to be real Lieutenant. Ensign Langford is also but provisional Ensign with Serjeant's pay, but he pretends to be real Ensign as is his due. So that for the preventing all discontents and further obliging them, we could wish your Honour's personal appearance here, or that you would please to give order for Commissions to be given them according to their desires exhibited to us respectively. Samuel Burgess made his humble request to us that according to that general promise of continuing every one in their places, he also might be continued in his, whose reasonable desire we kindly recommend to your Honour's favourable confirmation, as also his wages according as you in your wisdom shall think him deserving.

As for giving the Englishmen encouragement to earn a penny by setting and planting and breeding of hogs and ducks, it is a work of time, and requires rather our observation and study than further reply. As for hogs and ducks they have been looked upon

as the annoyance of this island in the time of corn, being wont to break down and through the best fences that the husbandry of this island affords, so that (as we are informed) proclamations have been issued out for their destroying as often as they are found upon the corn. According to your orders we shall defer setting of land to that purpose till your Honour's coming, which for many weighty reasons we desire may be with all convenient speed.

The Portuguese Gentus and other inhabitants have made their congratulatory addresses, the former petitioning us for mercy and redress (being much oppressed, especially in the behalf of orphans and widows whom they pretend to be deprived of their lands), to which we gave them a civil answer, encouraging them according to order that they shall have all fair redress at the President's arrival, which we hope to be sudden. So they returned to their habitations well satisfied.

As for the settling of the Customs, we shall punctually observe your orders by giving all encouragement to merchants. To that purpose have settled Mr. Cotes at Máhim and for the present are necessitated to appoint Mr. Francis in Bombay, who hath orders to comply with the merchants according to your directions to us.

As for the business of Cullian-Biwnde we have not had time or opportunity to enquire concerning it, having been so busily employed in several various affairs, and talking so much as some of us have lost our voices; therefore desire your patience till the return of the Bantam, when we hope to give satisfaction.

Concerning Thána and Bádra we shall enquire, and after information given to us we shall communicate it to you according to order.

For encouragement to merchants we shall observe your directions set down to us, and hope ere long to reap the fruits of our labours which yet requires some time. Captain Gary makes no dispute of money or anything else, but promises with all expedition to surrender up to us whatever is here, or in Surat or Persia, so that his readiness shows his sincerity for the Company's service, which he hopes you will in convenient time consider.

As for the licenses of tobacco and rents of cocoanuts, we shall at more leisure inform ourselves and send you an account thereof.

As to the soldiers that are mariners, we find none desirous to leave the Company's service but two seamen who are debauched and ill-governed men, therefore are sent on board Capt. Ward with the character befitting their deportment.

As for the Chesnut pink much charge has been laid out upon her, being in a great part repaired, yet will require some time ere she is fitted, which we will hasten what possibly we can. For her quicker despatch we have this day made Henry White Commander according to your orders and have also made Francis Morewood Boatswain, and the rest of the officers and seamen we shall place according as we see occasion and desért.

We have acquainted Captain Gary that the acknowledgment for

Chapter I.

History.

Transfer Details,
1663.

the island shall be authenticated in what manner will best content him, at which he is well pleased and satisfied and thankful for your care.

For the two ships intended to be built there are some preparations made already, as some quantity of timber and more will shortly be procured, after we have learnt the experience of these parts. Which may give us further light into what you mention concerning the Portuguese Customs, and we do not doubt but expedients may be found to regulate their actions. Hirji Modi we shall advise withal concerning the timber, at a more leisureable time; in the mean time we have used arguments to persuade him to be honest and industrious as he promises.

The 10,000 rupees mentioned are safe in the Company's fort. We should have been glad that the broadcloth you intended had been shipped on the Constantinople Merchant, for we are informed that some will vend in these parts, wherefore have desired the quantity expressed, in the note of other goods here enclosed, to which please to be referred. The Chirurgery Chest is brought on shore and in the doctor's custody. Will. Menchin was intended home, but upon second thought desires to continue in the Company's service, and so according to order we have his note herewith sent for the Honourable Company's satisfaction. The Constantinople we were necessitated to continue in the road to this day, in regard that yesterday was the Sabbath day and the tides falling out so early hath occasioned her stay a day longer, for which we crave your favourable censure.

Mr. Streinsham Master doth now return on the Constantinople Merchant in conformity to your order, though our extraordinary occasions require a person of his abilities and deserts, who as he hath been so would have yet further been very useful to us in this juncture of business; but our occasions must submit to your pleasure; he will more fully satisfy you of all proceedings in these parts; we wish him a prosperous passage and safe arrival with you. Captain Young is invested in the charge of Captain Gary's Company of foot soldiers, a list whereof, as also of Captain Toldery's, is now sent. The book of account Captain Young intends to enter upon with all convenient speed, for whose assistance we have appointed Mr. Jno. Martyr.

One Peter Stephenson, who at our first landing was very mutinous and refractory, and laid down his arms, having used many oaths and imprecations that he would never serve the Honourable Company, but among the first laid down his arms refusing to take them up again till (by whatever persuasions) the next day, excusing then his former error by pretence of being in drink, yet the very same night was drowned in a well and so attained not to the honour he was unworthy of, dying thus suddenly as a terrible example.

Mudan desires to take his passage on the ship which we granted him in respect of his urgent and earnest occasions at Surat, whose experience here hath made him very able to do us service; therefore if you think fitting, your licensing his return to us again may be

useful to us in our future proceedings; he will inform you what cloth and other commodities will vend here, to whom please to be referred.

Our occasions in regard of adding some necessary building to the house, will require two carpenters and two bricklayers. Those which were lately sent for hence are reputed very honest men, which if procurable will be very useful to us.

One Mr. Thos. DuPlessis, a French gentleman of quality that came over with Sir Abraham Shipman, with whose death he lost his hopes of preferment, having served several years in His Majesty's service and having resolved before this alteration to go home by the first, having to that end obtained Captain Gary's leave and passport recommendatory, upon his desire to us expressed we have given him leave to take his passage on the ship.

We have taken out of the Constantinople Merchant 251 plates of copper and 2 hhds. of alum, which we hope shortly to dispose of to advantage.

Ramsimar (Rámchandra Shenvi) the Portugal scrivani (clerk) is so necessary for his knowledge of all the affairs of the island by his so long residence here, that we are forced to make use of him, desiring your approbation.

Now we are near the conclusion. We find we want the Company's Seal, wherefore please at your convenient time to afford us one, which is all we have time for at present to trouble you with. We shall conclude with our hearty prayers that God would give a blessing to all our labours and that his goodness may successfully crown all our endeavours, which we shall never be wanting in to approve ourselves. Your Honour's faithful and most humble servants—John Goodier, H. Young, Tho. Cotes.—Bombay, September 28th, 1668.

P.S.—The list of the soldiers, above promised, is not sent because of the shortness of time we could not conveniently muster; therefore crave your Honour's excuse, and for the Bantam we shall despatch it with all expedition, resolving for the future to be more punctual.—J. G., H. Y., T. C.¹

In the following year (1669) the Court appointed Sir George Oxinden to be President at Surat with a Council of eight, Mr. Gerald Aungier, Mr. Mathew Gray, Mr. Thomas Rolt, Mr. Henry Young, Mr. Streinsham Master, Mr. Charles James, Mr. Phillip Gyfford, and Mr. Alexander Grigby, five of whom were constantly to reside at Surat, particularly Mr. Aungier, Mr. Gray, and Mr. James. Bruce notices this as the first example of a regular constitution with checks in the Company's Foreign dependencies.²

When the Court of Directors took into consideration the report of the Presidency of Surat on the events which had attended the

Chapter I. History.

Transfer Details,
1668.

President and
Council, Surat,
1669.

Court's Orders,
1669-70.

¹ Commissioners to Surat, 28th September 1668, Bombay Gazette and Times of India of 10th November 1892, from Birdwood's Records at the India Office.

² Bruce's Annals, II. 252-253. Sir George Oxinden died on 14th July 1669 and Mr. G. Aungier succeeded him as President at Surat. Bruce Annals, II. 261.

**Chapter I.
History.**

**Court's Orders,
1669-70.**

taking possession of the island of Bombay, and the appointment of Captain Young to be Deputy Governor, they came to the following resolutions. With respect to the building of vessels for the defence of the island, they appointed Mr. Warwick Pett to proceed to Bombay and to construct two vessels, for which equipments and stores would be sent on the ships of the season, explaining that their reason for appointing Mr. Pett was his practical knowledge of ship building, in which he could instruct the settlers to the advantage of the island. They next appointed Captain Smith and Captain Toldery, two of the officers commanding the military at Bombay, to act as engineers who were to employ under them such persons in the garrison as might be qualified to assist in constructing and repairing the fortifications, being of opinion that professional men could not be obtained in England without large salaries and that they probably might expose the Company to heavy charges from the speculations into which men of this description usually lead their employers. The Court also intimated to the Presidency of Surat that any application to the Crown of Portugal for redress would be hopeless, and therefore that the Deputy Governor and his Council must endeavour to strengthen the island so as to prevent obstructions from Thána and Karanja, and to retaliate by exacting customs from the Portuguese till they could bring them to a reasonable accommodation of trade.

On the subject of the claims of the Portuguese to lands on the island, the Court ordered that it should be ascertained whether the lands belonged to the Crown of Portugal or to individuals in 1661, the date of the cession, and that all acquisitions posterior to that date must be held to have proceeded from an imperfect right. Still, as it would be imprudent to delay strengthening the fort or building the town, the presidency were authorized to purchase the lands in the immediate vicinity of the fort, provided the expense did not exceed £1500. The Deputy Governor was also instructed for the improvement of the island, to encourage plantations of pepper, and manufactures of the cloths which had formerly been brought from the neighbouring continent, and, if possible, to render such cloths a fabric of the island. The inhabitants were to be allowed a moderate toleration; but the claims of the Jesuits, though admissible by the Portuguese usages, were not to be held valid in an English settlement.¹

**Young's Report,
1669.**

In 1669, Mr. Young, the Deputy Governor of Bombay, reported to the Court that the fortifications were improved; that the garrison required a supply of recruits and accommodation for the soldiers and the families of settlers who had arrived in the ships from Europe; and that application had been made by the Sidi of Rájápur (Rájपुरी) for an asylum at Bombay in case he should be obliged to abandon Rájपुरी to Shiváji. The Deputy Governor submitted that as Rájपुरी had formerly been deemed an object of importance to the Company, because, with a small European garrison, it could hold

¹ The Court to the President and Council of Surat, 2nd August 1669 and 17th February 1670. Bruce's Annals, II. 254-256.

out against any attack either of Shivaji or the Moghal, it might be prudent, under the present circumstances, to get possession of it, as it would place the Company's trade and shipping in a better situation than they were at Bombay or even at Surat.¹

Before the close of 1669 Mr. Aungier who had become doubtful of the prudence of Mr. Young's administration of Bombay, recalled him to Surat. Mr. Aungier instructed the other Commissioners to take charge of the island till he should himself arrive and promulgate the civil and military regulations sent by the Court. He was of opinion that it would be dangerous to entertain the proposal of the Sidi of Rájpurí to protect him at Bombay, as this might offend the Moghal and be followed with disastrous effects to Surat; he therefore recommended the Council at Bombay to give evasive answers to the Sidi's applications and to lay aside the project of obtaining possession of Danda Rájpurí, though it might afterwards become a subject of consideration. The Deputy Governor Mr. Young resigned his office on the 13th November 1669 to Mr. James Addams and five Commissioners, and embarked with his family for Surat.²

A dispute between the Dutch and the Portuguese attracted the notice of the Governor of Surat who suspected that the English had been parties to the dispute and that the scheme of the Europeans was to ruin the trade of Surat by seizing on their junks and withdrawing to Bombay. This suspicion obliged Mr. Aungier to remain at Surat till he could despatch the ships for Europe. He directed one of them to touch at Bombay and receive from the Commissioners a full report for the Court on the state of the fortifications and docks, and on the reinforcements required for the garrison. This report stated that the stock had been employed in providing investments, but that the expenses incurred for building the fort at Bombay to render it inaccessible to a European enemy, would require a separate fund from that intended for the provision of the investment. The supply of special funds could alone render the island a secure residence for native traders and manufacturers.³

In 1669 Captain Henry Young who had been Deputy Governor of Bombay was accused of many irregularities. At a consultation on the 27th November 1669 the Surat Council decided that Bombay was the most convenient place for the investigation.⁴ In January 1670 it was concluded that Mr. Charles James and Mr. Alexander Grigby should accompany the President to Bombay to assist him in Council.⁵

Chapter I. History.

Mr. Young
recalled,
1669.

Want of Funds,
1669.

Young's Trial,
1669-70.

¹ Bombay to the Presidency of Surat, 4th August, 6th and 16th October, and 2nd November 1669. (Surat Letter Book, Vol. LVIII. pages 123, 148, 151, 153.) Bruce, II. 268.

² The Presidency of Surat to the Commissioners at Bombay, 1st November 1669. Bombay to Surat, 15th November 1669. Bruce, II. 269.

³ The Presidency of Surat to the Court, 26th November 1669. Bruce, II. 269-270.

⁴ Twenty-one charges were brought against Mr. Young. The trial ended with an order that he should be taken on shipboard and sent to England. See Anderson's English in Western India 97-98, and Bombay Consultation dated 22nd January 1669 (should be 1670) in Surat Fact. Diary 1 of 1660-1696.

⁵ Surat Consultation 2nd January 1670, Surat Fact. Diary 1 of 1660-1696.

Chapter I.
History.
 President Aungier
 in Bombay,
 1670.

President Aungier embarked at Surat on the 11th January 1670. On his arrival at Bombay, after investigating the accusations against Captain Young, Governor Aungier published the Company's regulations for the civil and military administration of the island. He formed two Courts of Judicature; the inferior court to consist of a Company's civil officer, assisted by native officers, who were to take cognizance of all disputes under 200 Xeraphins (Rs. 145); and the superior court to consist of the Deputy Governor and Council to hear appeals from the inferior court, and to take cognizance of all civil and criminal cases. The decisions of the superior court were to be final, and without appeal, except in cases of the greatest necessity. Both courts were to meet regularly once a week. He next reduced the military establishment from two to one company, but made provision for the supernumeraries till this small establishment should be brought into form. He appointed a supervisor of the fortifications, and an accountant to keep regular books of the expenditure. Without receding from the principle he modified the exemption from taxes for five years, recommended by the Court, to encourage the merchants and manufacturers, by continuing the old customs on the produce of the island, on cocoanuts and coir used as cordage, and on wine, arrack, opium, and tobacco; he exempted bullion and the goods specified in the Court's order from all customs; and, to cover the loss of revenue, imposed a port-duty of one per cent. The result of a survey of the land showed the land revenue had been over-rated by not deducting the large proportion claimed and retained by the Jesuits. On the other hand the amount of the lesser inland customs had been under-rated. When put up to sale they produced £200 more in 1669-70 than in the preceding year. With regard to the projected town, the expenses incurred in erecting the fort had rendered it a subject for future consideration. As the claims for rights to lands near the town had been numerous, he had removed the fishermen to some distance, and intended to build houses on the ground where their huts stood. It would require time to adjust the foundations of the rights to lands before houses for the settlers and merchants could be erected.¹

In February 1670 as the Governor had shortly to return to Surat, it was resolved that in regard of his great abilities and experience in the management of affairs, Mr. Mathew Gray should be Deputy Governor and Commander-in-Chief; Mr. Ph. Gyfford, Accountant and Second in Council; Mr. Thomas Colts, Customer of Máhim; Mr. Robert Barbor, Customer of Bombay; and Mr. John Martin, Secretary or Register to the Council. That in military affairs Captain John Burges and the rest of the Commission officers be called to Council and that in civil matters Mr. Sterling be assistant in Council.²

¹ Presidency of Surat to the Court, 30th March 1670. Bruce's Annals, II. 271-272.

² Bombay Consultation, 12th February 1670, Surat Factory Diary 1 of 1660-1696. On his return to Surat on the 11th March 1670, Mr. Aungier found the town in a great alarm from a threatened invasion by Shiváji. Bruce, II. 272.

Before leaving Bombay (February 1670) the Governor decided to make use of a resident on the island a Portuguese by name Simao Serrao, a man well read in the civil and imperial laws and one who by his experience and practice in the laws and customs of the Portuguese was ably qualified to do the Company effectual and good service in discovering their just right and privilege. The Deputy Governor was to make use of Simao as occasion presented for the common benefit, rewarding him as he shall merit and the Council deem convenient.¹

He also decided that the Company's proposals concerning the building of wharfs docks and cranes being a work of time should be reserved to future consideration. As to the suggestion that the Company should make Bombay a free port for five years he desired the Council seriously to consider whether this grant would answer the end the Company aimed at and bring trade to the port, and if so whether considering the smallness of the Company's quick stock in India and the great charge they were at in raising the fortifications they could afford to make the experiment.²

At Surat the affairs of Bombay continued to engage President Aungier's attention. The Surat Diary for 28th October 1670 details a consultation on letters received from Bombay. After serious debate it was resolved that the Deputy Governor and Council's proceedings touching the altering the price of rice, raising a breastwork upon the wall of the fort, and setting up the gates, be approved; that Robert Kirby, now carpenter of the ship Oxinden, be ordered to repair to Bombay for the service of the Company's affairs there; and that certain idle bricklayers be turned out.³

On the 10th January 1671 the President resumes in a letter to the Court of Directors: Now we are on discourse of your island Bombay, we humbly recommend to you certain rude proposals which have offered themselves to our thoughts tending as we hope to render the colony useful in some measure to England, and in a condition to bear its own charge. We entreat you to receive these proposals under your debate and what part thereof you shall in your wisdom determine worthy to be put in practice, please to strengthen us with sufficient power or instructions that your orders may be the more fully obeyed. Your ships George and Charles—the former whereof we expect suddenly from Queda and the latter now lying in on freight for Persia—are weakly manned, having lost most of their men by mortality. These we have supplied from Bombay. Hereafter for the better manning of your shipping, as also the brigandines or frigates to be built and the hoys, we humbly propose that it would be necessary to require all the Commanders of the shipping you send to these ports to bring out supernumerary men according to their respective burthens at the owner's charge; that so they may leave some spare

Chapter I.

History.

Portuguese Legal
Remembrancer,
1670.

Should Bombay
be a Free Port,
1670.

Aungier's Proposals
for Bombay,
1670.

¹ Bombay Consultation, 12th February 1670, Surat Fact. Diary 1 of 1660 - 1696.

² Bombay Consultation, 6th February 1670, Surat Fact. Diary 1 of 1660 - 1696.

³ Surat Consultation dated Swally Marine, 28th October 1670, Surat Fact. Diary 1 of 1660 - 1696.

Chapter I.
History.
Aungier's Proposals,
1671.

men behind them by which means your ships will be the better supplied without charge to you. Some mates and masters for such frigates as shall be designed to be built for the use of your island Bombay will also be wanted.¹

As intimated in the above letter of January 1671, the President and Council at Surat submitted the following proposals touching Bombay Island :²

That in regard the general charges of the island, now that the customs are given free and the seized lands restored, are great and do far exceed the revenue, therefore to the end that the sole burthen of the charge may not light on the Company only, seeing they reap no benefit thereby, it seems reasonable that a general tax or assessment be enordered on the respective inhabitants over and above the present *foro*, which is only a kind of quit-rent and very inconsiderable.

That the said tax be proportioned not only towards defraying the charge of the garrison but also all other general charges of what nature soever, to wit :

(1) Drawing a line of fortification for the new town to be built.

(2) Building a mould and docks for shipping when it shall be thought fitting.

(3) Building a fair common house, wherein may be also appointed chambers for the Courts of Justice, warehouses or granaries for corn and ammunition, as also prisons for several offenders.

(4) Salaries or wages for Public officers, to wit :

- | | |
|--|-------------------|
| a. Governor, | } and Assistants. |
| b. Deputy Governor, | |
| c. Treasurer, | |
| d. Accountant, | |
| e. Council, | |
| f. Secretary, | |
| g. Judge of the Courts of Judicature and officers. | |
| h. Procurator General and his clerks. | |
| i. Public Notary. | |
| j. Sheriff or Chief Constable and officers. | |
| k. Other necessary officers. | |

(5) Building of six galleys or brigandines for the guard of the port and for convoys.

That the said tax or assessment be appointed and commanded by public order from the Honourable Company to their Governor and Council, who must be required to levy and proportion it in such nature as may be least burthensome to the people and may

¹ Surat Government (Messrs. Aungier, Gray, James and Grigbie) to the Court of Directors, Swally Marine, 10th January 1671, Surat Fac. Out. Letter Book 1 of 1630-1673, 202. Forrest's Home Series, I. 44-45.

² Surat Fac. Out. L. B. 1 of 1630-1673, 217-227. Forrest's Home Series, I. 51-56.

not discourage strangers from coming to live with us. That it be levied only on land and not on any goods or merchandise, the rather for that the land bears no charge at all, nor hath done since it was in the English possession, notwithstanding the great security and freedom they have enjoyed. Whereas formerly, under the Portugal Government, they were forced to make often subsidies and free donations towards bearing the public charge of the State of India. An example whereof occurred the year before the possession of the island was granted to the Honourable Company, when Captain Gary, then Governor, did demand supply of the *povo* or inhabitants, who willingly offered Rs. 12,000 towards building the frigates and other charges, which it seems was not received.

Chapter I.

History.

Aungier's Proposals,
1671.

That a Public Register or Chamber of Accounts be appointed wherein all the present revenues and profits of the island as also the general charges of the government shall be entered. And that the said accounts be committed to the trust of certain Commissioners, men fearing God and of honest reputation, for preventing any fraud or embezzlement of the public stock, and that a true and exact balance be drawn every year of the said accounts, and that whatsoever the income or revenue of the island falls short of the general debts or disbursements, be levied on the people in such a manner as may be best accommodated to their ease and satisfaction.

That an excise be set on all drinks and strong liquor.

For the encouragement of Trade :

That interest be settled and reduced to nine per cent. and that all manner of extortion be prohibited on severe penalty.

That liberty be granted as a particular privilege to those that inhabit on the island of Bombay to trade not only to all these parts of India, but also to the ports and islands of the South Seas, Bantam not excepted ; provided that no English freemen do settle their families and trade in those places where the Company's Factories are settled, nor deal in any of the Company's commodities.

That companies or fellowships be erected for the better and more able carrying on of any trade, and that certain privileges and immunities be granted to the said societies for their greater encouragement.

That for the greater advance of trade the Company would please to give order for the lending out certain sums of money to the said societies and other honest merchants, they paying interest for the same and giving sufficient securities either in land pawns or otherwise for making full satisfaction. This course and policy was practised formerly by the Dukes of Florence with very remarkable success, to the raising the trade and much enriching the Port of Leghorne and consequently to the great increase of their customs and revenues.

That for the greater security of the port against Mallabars, Savgonas (Sanganians?) and Arab pirates, certain sea laws to

Chapter I.
History.
Aungier's Proposals,
1671.

established for encouragement of privateers to go out in search of said pirates, to whom the Company may lend the frigate, or other vessels which they build on certain conditions, namely, the said vessel or frigate to have so many shares of what prizes shall be taken and the rest to be divided among the adventurers according to their respective proportion, the ship $\frac{1}{3}$ rd, provision $\frac{1}{3}$ rd, the men $\frac{1}{3}$ rd.

That encouragement be given for artificers and handicraftsmen of all sorts to come out and live on the island with their families, who must be bound to settle on the island, or at least to continue so many years there. To whom for the first year or two the Company may allow whole pay for their present maintenance till they are settled in their way of trade, and that afterwards the Company may allow them but half or quarter pay, they having means to live and maintain their families by their trades. And in case Englishmen are not to be persuaded there, that the Company would please to invite and encourage artificers and handicraftsmen of all other nations to settle there with their families, provided they be of the reformed religion. The handicraftsmen which are chiefly wanting are husbandmen and gardeners who understand planting and improving of grounds, the ground of Bombay being apt to receive and bring forth any seed or plant whatsoever when the times and seasons of planting are sufficiently understood; weavers both of silk and cotton, who in a short time may procure to themselves a very comfortable livelihood; carpenters for building of houses as well as ships who are much wanted and much esteemed; smiths who also are much wanted; gunsmiths and locksmiths, armourers, bakers, cooks, shoemakers, tailors, dyers, barbers, button-makers, ribbon-weavers, butchers, haberdashers of small ware, and others.

That there be encouragement for the building of ships and vessels, that is, a particular privilege in the customs or otherwise for so many years, provided that after being built they be not suffered to be sold to other place, but to be employed in voyages for ten years or more, and that when any such vessels are sold to other parts double custom be paid for them according to the value of the ship.

That no English freemen be suffered to leave the island but with the license and consent of the Governor and Council, and that if he design to make voyages abroad, he give in security to return at such a time to the island after expiration of the voyages, otherwise a fine to be forfeited to the Company.

That for the encouraging good husbandry, by preventing the vain and immoderate excess of apparel, as also for the greater consumption of our own native manufactures, a standing law be established by the Honourable Company that no apparel or outward garments, to wit tunics, vest, doublet, breeches, be used or worn by any Christian inhabitants on the said island, those of the Eastern Church excepted, of what quality, nation, and condition soever, but such as are made of English manufactures or brought out of England in our own shipping whether of silk wool or cotton.

The grounds and reasons for establishing this so necessary an order, and the good consequences and advantages which will accrue therefrom, are so obvious as well to the Company as to the inhabitants, that they need not be enlarged on. And for the better supply of the island with English manufactures that the Honourable Company would please to send out yearly such quantities of serges, perpetuanoes, shaloons, and other light and cheap stuffs such as are usually worn in England in the summer times, as also all sorts of fashionable silks according to the mode of England, which may be sold at reasonable prices for the greater encouragement of the inhabitants to wear them; and for the better confirmation and continuance of this law that certain fines and penalties be inflicted on any whomsoever, whether English or other, that shall attempt to make breach thereof.

That for the greater decency of the military order all the soldiers, as well officers as others, be required to wear red serges or perpetuanoes only in the summer time, or red cloth in the winter, which shall be afforded them at reasonable and cheap rates from the Company's warehouse, to which end the Governor, Deputy Governor, and the rest of the Council be advised to give the soldiery encouragement by their own example.

That in regard the seas adjacent and belonging to the island do afford great quantities of fish, not only for the supply of the island but for trade into the neighbouring ports, whereof neither the Government nor the inhabitants in general receive little or any benefit by reason of the evil management thereof, at present being committed wholly to the Kolis, that the Honourable Company would please to order some ordinance to be established for the encouragement of shipping, either by free customs for a certain time or some other privileges, and also would please to send out some fishmongers with their families with rules for erecting a company of fishmongers that better order may be observed therein.

In order to preserve the Government in a constant regular method free from that confusion which a body composed of so many nations will be subject to, it were requisite that the several nations at present inhabiting or hereafter to inhabit on the island of Bombay be reduced or modelled into so many orders or tribes, and that each nation may have a Chief or Consul of the same nation appointed over them by the Governor and Council whose duty and office must be to represent the grievances which members of any of the said nation shall receive from the Christians or any other, as also to answer for what faults any of the said nation shall commit, that the offenders be brought to punishment and that what duties or fines are due to the Company may be timely satisfied. His office may be also to arbitrate and determine all controversies which may arise between said nation, in case the parties are so agreed, otherwise they are to be brought before the Judge of the Courts of Judicature. Further, the duty of said Consul must be to make an exact toll-book or register of the said nation, principally the number of persons inhabiting and settled with their increase, as also the voyages coming in and going out, together with what arms or

Chapter I.

History.

Aungier's Proposals,
1671.

Chapter I.

History.

Aungier's Proposals,
1671.

ammunition they bring in or carry out, which toll-book or register must be yearly sent in to the Governor or his Deputy Governor and Council as well for security as for an orderly exact knowledge how the island increaseth or diminisheth in trade and inhabitants. Now as to the choice of these Consuls, it seems necessary that they be chosen yearly or at most every third year; that at their election they take an oath of fidelity, in such terms as the Honourable Company shall please to impose on them; and that such who merit well from the Honourable Company by good service, advancing of trade inhabitants or shipping, or bring any considerable profits and emoluments to the island, be rewarded by some particular honours and specimens of the Honourable Company's favour towards them, that others also may be invited to deserve in the same nature.

For the more constant and secure supply of the island with corn grain and provisions of all sorts, that a stock be employed yearly, either of the Company's or of the island's, for the supplying the island with wheat, rice, butter, oil, wood and other provisions, which being bought at the best hand and in the cheapest times, may, as occasion serves, be distributed and sold to a reasonable profit, reserving always such a store as shall be judged necessary to supply the garrison in case of danger for three years at least. To which end sufficient and secure granaries must be built in several places to reserve said store from loss, embezzlement, putrefaction, and therefore ought to be entrusted to able and conscientious men who may be obliged to render a strict account thereof to the Governor and Council every month or at most every three months on severe penalty to be inflicted in case of default.

That persons of honest report be appointed to visit the shops of the *Moodys* or victuallers which sell all sorts of provisions by retail, to oversee and examine the quality of said provisions of what sort soever it be that it be good and wholesome in its kind. And if on examination it proveth not good, to take it away and burn it and also lay some severe fine on the offender. And further that set prices be appointed on all provisions regulated in weight and measure according to justice and the public good and encouragement of the inhabitants.

That English weights and measures be appointed by public authority to be alone used on the island and all others prohibited, to which end that standard weights and measures be sent on purpose out of England by the next ships.

Whereas hitherto for want of sufficient number of able Englishmen qualified thereunto, we have been forced to serve ourselves of the native Portuguese for Justices, Constables, and other public offices, especially in the Lower Courts of Judicature, who not understanding the English language, the proceedings of the said Courts, as also of the Upper Courts, have been hitherto of necessity done in the Portuguese language, which is not only dishonourable in itself but also exposes the government and proceedings of said Courts to many inconveniences: Wherefore for the preventing

thereof it is indispensably necessary that all proceedings in said Courts of Judicature be done altogether in the English language. For the better management whereof that the Company would please to send out yearly a convenient number of persons well qualified for said offices whose charges and salaries must be paid out of the fees fines and amerciaments (pardons) which shall arise from the said Courts, which will be a good livelihood for them, so that they be not any charge to the Company, having freedom to trade to improve their stocks to the most advantage. This will be a means to strengthen the English interest on the island, which at present is low and weak, and consequently not so much esteemed by the natives as it ought to be.

Whereas, for want of English women, many of the English and other Protestant soldiers sent out, do marry with Portuguese mestices (half-caste women), natives of the island, who are Roman Catholics, by which means the children of the said Protestants are through their father's neglect brought up in the Roman Catholic principles to the great dishonour and weakening the Protestant religion and interest: Wherefore for the preventing the evil consequences which may in time accrue therefrom, that the Company would please not only to encourage the sending out of English women, but also to establish a standing order that the children of all Protestant fathers be brought up carefully in the Protestant religion, though the mothers thereof be Roman Catholics, and that severe penalties be inflicted on all offenders, especially on the Padres who shall endeavour to baptise the said children or any way attempt to inveigle or entice them away from the Protestant faith.

That the Company would send out some men who understand the making of redlead, which being of great expense in these parts would turn well to account, not only in consumption of great quantities of lead, but confining the manufacture thereof solely to the island of Bombay, where it might be sold much cheaper and employ Englishmen thereon. The Moghal government of Surat is so jealous hereof that, notwithstanding all our endeavours for these three years, we cannot procure any person that understands the making redlead to go to Bombay, nor can we get any from other places, and therefore it were necessary they were sent from England.

That for the greater encouragement of manufactures either of silk or cotton on the island, public liberty be granted to all persons to bring in cotton weavers and silk weavers on their accounts, for the employing their own private stocks. And that what goods they shall make proper for Europe markets, the Company may buy them at certain reasonable rates to be agreed on whereby they may have a competent livelihood, and that in case the providers of said goods shall desire rather to dispose of said goods abroad, and can have a better price from others than from the Company, that they be left at liberty to dispose of them to their most advantage.

That all Englishmen whatsoever, whether in the Company's service or freemen, as also all others of the reformed religion, marry-

Chapter I. History.

Aungier's Proposals,
1671.

Chapter I.

History.

Aungier's Proposals,
1671.

ing on the island of Bombay, do bind themselves on their marriage to live on Bombay ten or seven years at least, during which time they must not be suffered to transport themselves for England on any pretence whatsoever, unless immediate orders shall come from the Honourable Company in England to license their departure, and this on the forfeiture of a considerable penalty on all who shall offend herein.

For the more strict observation of all laws and ordinances already made or hereafter to be made by the Honourable Company for the island of Bombay and for the more regular and exact payment, keeping an account of all fines forfeitures and amerciaments due to the Honourable Company on any account whatsoever, that a certain person be appointed of honest reputation having the power and office of a Recorder, whose duty must be to take care that all penal laws are put in execution and all forfeitures fines and amerciaments received from all without respect of persons, and to keep an exact register thereof to be sent the Company every year; the said Recorder also may have the office of an Escheater to escheat condemn and seize to the Company's use all lands houses and tenements, which in time either by the failing of the lives of the present incumbents or possessors or otherwise shall accrue by right in law to the Honourable Company.¹

The Mahájan's
Petition,
1671.

Another scheme for the advantage of Bombay in which at this time (1671) Governor Aungier interested himself was the settlement of Surat Baniás in Bombay. It appears that the Mahájan or committee of the Surat Bania community desired the assurance of certain privileges before risking the move to Bombay and that the Company had given a general approval to the Mahájan's proposals. On the 10th January the Surat Council wrote to the Company: The Mahájan or Chief Council of the Baniás have been much satisfied with the answer which you were pleased to give to their petition sent you by the ship Samson touching their privileges in Bombay.² It seems they have determined once more to trouble your Honours with a letter which they have ordered your broker Bhimji Parákh to write, representing their desires that the said privileges may be confirmed to them under your great seal, for which their request they give you their reason and ground in their own letter which they have sent us to be transmitted to you and now goes in your packet by ship Falcon. The argument they use to strengthen their request seems to have some weight. They say the Honourable Company are perpetual and their ordinances always of force, but their President and Council are mutable, and the succeeding Presidents and Councils do often alter what their predecessors have granted, on which score they hope your Honours will be pleased to grant their petition. As to our judgments hereon, we humbly offer that we cannot see any detriment can accrue to you thereby, rather a considerable advantage may follow; and as to the latitude and

¹ Surat Factory Out. L. Book 1 of 1630-1673, 217-227. Forrest's Home Series, I, 51-56.

² The petition, the privileges, and the answer, referred to in this extract, have not been traced.

extent of what privileges you shall afford them, it must be totally referred to your own wisdoms however you shall please to determine in this matter. We judge if your Honours would please to favour them with a line in answer to their letter, it would be a great comfort to them and no disadvantage to your interest.¹

A despatch from the Surat Council dated 3rd February 1671 informs the Company that their island Bombay, and their factories of Kárwár, Billiapatam, and Calicut, are in a happy and orderly posture.²

About the same time suspicions aroused at Agra in consequence of the reported despatch of a French fleet clouded the prospects of any rapid development of Bombay. On the 10th January 1671 the President and Council at Surat addressed the Court on the necessity for caution and forbearance. They wrote: The noise³ which the French fleet made in the Court at Agra has caused the Moghal to send down another governor with 2000 horse, being the same that was governor five years since by name Sháístikhán. He formerly was a great friend to us, and now promises fair. Still we expect some trouble from him in regard that some ill disposed officers of Surat last year, failing the great presents from us which they expected, have given the Moghal strange information concerning your island of Bombay, so that we judge it necessary to temporise a little at present and make as little noise of Bombay as may be, that we may the better prevent a storm which otherwise may be raised. For though we little concern ourselves for any danger to your island, where the Moghal's force cannot come near us, yet we know it is in this governor Sháístikhán's power to bring great disturbance to the body of your trade which lies in this country. This we judge most safe and consistent with your interest to avoid by all prudent and lawful ways we can contrive, as the state of your affairs stands at present. We take due notice of the wise caution which you give us to keep a fair understanding with the Moghal government of Surat and not to think of leaving our settlement here: We declare unto you that we are so far from having any thoughts of leaving Surat that we judge it your interest to continue as firm a settlement and large a trade as ever, notwithstanding your island of Bombay. For seeing your trade is so much enlarged of what it was, there will be a necessity not only to continue these good ports wherein we are settled, but also to find out more for the better vent of the great quantities of goods which you send out, and provisions of the cargazoons which you enordered for Europe, and though our eyes and thoughts are as sincerely fixed on

Chapter I. History.

Condition,
1671.

Measures at
Surat,
1671.

¹ Surat Government (Messrs. Aungier, Gray, James, and Grigbie) to the Court of Directors, dated 10th January 1671, Surat Fact. Out. L. Book 1 of 1630-1673, 206-7. Forrest's Home Series, I, 46-47.

² Surat President Mr. Aungier and Council to the Court of Directors, 3rd February 1671, Surat Fact. Out. L. Book 1 of 1630-1673, 211.

³ The letter from which this extract is taken is incomplete as the pages in the manuscript record extending over the seven years ending 1671 are missing. The Court's letter to which this is a reply has not been traced.

Chapter I.

History.

Measures at
Surat,
1671.

the raise of your island of Bombay as becomes us, yet we do not approve of over-hasty proceedings, nor shall we ever advise you to use force or engage in fatal quarrels with your neighbours to attain that end.¹

The Despatch continues: Your President had determined with some counsel to take his passage on those ships for your island of Bombay, having many matters of no mean importance to act there. But as circumstances now stand with this new fierce Governor Shāistikhān, who hath already begun to trouble our neighbours, and particularly the French whom he threatens to turn out of Surat, we do not judge it prudent to offer him occasion of offence by leaving the town so immediately on his arrival, but rather to stay till matters are a little more quiet. We intend, God willing, to go down by the *Advance*, by which time we trust your concerns here (at Surat) will be placed in a fair posture in order to your next year's investment. However, we have now sent a good supply down to Bombay of goods and treasure for defraying your great charge there at present.²

Bombay the
Chief Seat,
1671.

On the 3rd February the Surat Council wrote: Your President had prepared himself to take his passage on the *Advance* frigate for Bombay. He had in a manner taken his leave of the governor Shāistikhān, who was well consenting thereunto, when on a sudden news came that Shivāji was near Surat with an army of 15,000 men. This put the Surat city in a great fright, and made us prepare for defence. This new governor also hath bestirred himself more prudently than any of his predecessors, beating down all houses without the wall, which before was a shelter for the enemy and ordering strict watch at the gates to keep in the inhabitants who were running out of the city. He also sent a civil message to your President, desiring that he would lay aside the thoughts of going to Bombay at present. That he could not answer for his departure as things now stood, nor would it be well taken by the Moghal king. His argument being reasonable your President thought good to condescend thereunto and the rather for that you have a considerable estate under our charge, which he cannot leave in danger. Wherefore we have determined to send away the *Advance* with all speed possible, hoping to despatch her in a few days after the *Charles*. And for that it has unfortunately happened that for two years together your President has been hindered from going to Bombay to his own trouble and no small detriment to your island, we have thought it our duties upon serious consideration of your affairs to offer you our humble advice, that it seems now consistent with your interest to settle your chief government on your island of Bombay and to that end you would please to order your President to reside there constantly, except

¹ Surat Government (Messrs. Aungier, Gray, James and Grighie) to the Court of Directors, dated Swally Marine, 10th January 1671 in Surat Fact. Out. L. Book 1 of 1630-1673, 200-201. Forrester's Home Series, I. 44.

² Surat President and Council to Court, 10th January 1671, Surat Fact. Out. L. Book 1 of 1630-1673, 206. Forrester's Home Series, I. 46.

extraordinary emergencies may require his repair to Surat or elsewhere. And this we presume you may do without any discomposure to your affairs at Surat which will be well supplied by Mr. M. Gray and your present Council. As to Bombay, we judge it will be an assured way to confirm your interest and increase the trade more speedily, for all strangers will be the sooner invited to live with us; and the English freemen at Bantam and Masulipatam will be the better persuaded to settle there with their families and estates; many on your President's invitation being prepared to go thither; whereunto we entreat that your Honours would also please to enjoin all freemen in the said places to repair with their families thither.¹

Whether as Governor Aungier seemed to be aware his absence from Bombay was injurious to the good government of the island or from some other untraced cause, the latter part of 1671 was a time of disorder in Bombay. On the 23rd April 1672 the Surat Council wrote to Bombay: Whereas we are given to understand that Captain John Burges hath of late behaved himself with much rudeness and disrespect to the Deputy Governor and as appears by the attestations of several credible persons sent unto us hath uttered several discourses tending to the great dishonour and contempt of the Honourable Company's authority and Government: Upon due consideration of the evil consequence which may accrue from such disorders, we do hereby for the present disannul and make void the commission which we have given the said Captain Burges as Captain of one of the Foot Companies and do suspend him from all command over the soldiery and from his office and place in Council. We do further require you the Deputy Governor and the rest of the Council that you cause the said Captain Burges to be committed a prisoner to the Marshal and there to be kept till the Governor shall arrive or till order shall come for his trial. And for the better preventing any disorder which may happen among the soldiery, we require you to keep it very private and to take a convenient time to put it in execution to wit when Captain Shaxton's company hath the command of the watch, when summoning the said Captain Burges to Council, you may then publish and put in execution this order causing the guards to be ready to prevent any mutiny that may arise, and afterwards you are to publish this our proclamation which we here send you for the better reducing the soldiery in good order and government. During the suspension of Captain Burges we order that Lieutenant Langford do command the said Company requiring him with Ensign Adderton and the rest of the officers that they keep the soldiers under their command in due obedience and respect to the Deputy Governor.²

Other disorders took place soon after. On the 16th May the Surat Council wrote to Bombay: For the trial of those notorious mutineers that tore the proclamation and opposed the execution of

Chapter I.

History.

Bombay the
Chief Seat,
1671.

Mutiny
in Bombay,
1672.

Disorders in
Bombay,
1672.

¹ Surat President and Council to the Court of Directors, 3rd February 1671, Surat Fact. Out. L. Book 1 of 1630-1673, 214-216. Forrest's Home Series, I. 49-50.

² Surat to Bombay, 23rd April 1672, Surat Fact. Out. L. Book 1 of 1630-1673, 258. Forrest's Home Series, I. 62-63.

Chapter I.
History.

*Disorders in
Bombay,
1672.*

justice on the wench you caused to be shaved and set on an ass, let a jury be empannelled; whom if they find guilty of mutiny let them be sentenced, condemned, and executed according to the 3rd Article of the Honourable Company's laws for the preservation of the peace and suppressing of mutiny, sedition, and rebellion.¹

In 1672 Bombay continued dependent on Surat for cash and supplies. On the 6th April the President promised to bring down with him the Rs. 5000 Bombay desired, as likewise a recruit of limewater and liquor for the Fort's use.² On the 29th August 1672 the Council wrote to Bombay: We have now consigned to you by the Phoenix ketch in moneys, and stores, for the use of the island to the amount of Rs. 24,503, the cost of the Hunter frigate included; for all which be pleased to give our account credit. We should have sent you now the cost of the ketch which being more serviceable for the use of the island than for our occasions here, we have by your order turned her over to the island account. The ketch now belongs to the island.³

*Dull Trade,
1672.*

As regards trade 1672 seems to have been a contrast to its prosperous predecessors. In spite of Shivaji's alarms even the lead market was dull. On the 22nd October the Surat Council wrote to the Company: All your lead lies dead. Lead is the king's commodity, and he has such great supplies of it that he wants it not. It was the last month (September) before we could procure any money from this governor for the last year's lead and for this Rs. 35,000 yet remain due. All our broadcloth and other woollen manufactures are not at all in request. No merchants adventure on them. Of the last year's remains here, up at Agra, and other places, are quantities sufficient to supply these countries this year. So much that finding it to bear a price, so greatly to your loss by its sale in gross, we had concluded to keep your warehouses open and retail it. But since your Honours have sent out but little treasure this year, and your other goods are unvendable, necessity together with your order will force us for your reputation and honour to dispose of the woollens the best we are able, to clear as much of our debts as we can, to prevent the spreading of that cancer which insensibly eats out the profits of your stock. If we shall also add to these your losses the considerable sums which your island Bombay hath drawn from us and still draws, since the delivery and restoration of the lands, your Honours will conclude that from such stocks as you send us we shall never be able to clear you from interest, bear the charges of your island and factories, and return your ships full laden with such commodities as you require. We are sensible of an insupportable burden, should any miscarriages happen which God divert. And in regard we are thus far engaged for your Honours' interest, and know not what event the war may produce when we have procured goods sufficient for lading home your

¹ Surat to Bombay, 16th May 1672, *Surat Fact. Out. L. Book 1 of 1630-1673*, 261. Forrest's Home Series, I. 64.

² Surat President and Council to Bombay, 6th April 1672, *Surat Fact. Out. L. Book 1 of 1630-1673*, 248.

³ Surat to Bombay, 9th Aug. 1672, *Surat Fact. Out. L. Book 1 of 1630-1673*, 292.

this year's shipping, we shall advise with your President and put a stop to your investments until we shall hear further from you per viâ Aleppo.¹

Meanwhile President Aungier's departure from Surat for Bombay had been put off from month to month. On the 23rd April 1672 the Surat Council wrote to Bombay : Our last unto you was of the 6th current when we advised the President's intentions to go to Bombay and the jealousy we had of some hot service from this young and furious governor who had succeeded according to our expectation. For the President by six several messages sent in the most civil manner by the Vâknavis Shawbandar, that is the chief customer (or Customs Collector) and other persons of quality, represented to him the effects of your order, the unreasonableness of his pretended jealousy, and the just grounds of the President's desire, withal declaring that he would return in September. Still no argument, reason, or intercession prevails with him. Having understood by the broker that the governor demanded a round sum of money for his license to the President's departure, we took into consideration the injustice of his demand and the evil consequence which would accrue to your affairs should we consent thereunto. We therefore resolved not only to give him no money, but also that the President should write him a letter (for he will not be visited by any of the Christians) and in the said letter give him leave to understand that in regard he was a servant and under obedience to order he must obey. But that at the same time as he is a free merchant and no slave or prisoner and as he discharged the part of a friend in so often giving the governor friendly advice and desiring his consent which seeing the governor would not grant he was determined to go without it. To this effect the President wrote the governor a letter couched in civil terms of which your Honours will judge when you see the copy which is entered in the Consultation Book. In answer to this letter about 3 of the clock the same day being the 19th current, the governor sends about 2000 soldiers, horse and foot, whereof part entered and possessed themselves of the house, the rest guarded all the streets and lanes about it, forbidding wood, water, and all manner of provisions and abusing and beating our minister who accidentally being abroad was coming in. Afterwards the governor demanded all our small arms and our trumpet which were sent him and to all this force we showed not the least return of violence but suffered all patiently, treating the commander of the soldiery with much civility. About six at night the governor sends the broker Bhimji Pâraikh to demand money from us to compound the business. We sent him answer that we had given him already more than we had given to any governor, that we were not in any fault and would pay him nothing. On this he forces from the broker Bhimji Pâraikh Rs. 500, threatening to seize his house, estate, wife and children if he did not pay. The broker being affrighted pays him the money declaring withal it was his

Chapter I. History.

President unable
to leave Surat,
1672.

¹ Surat to the Company, 22nd October 1672, Surat Fact. Out. L. Book 1 of 1630 - 1673, 301 - 302. Forrest's Home Series, I. 70.

Chapter I.

History.

President unable
to leave Surat,
1672.

own, not the Company's. At length it seems the governor being ashamed of what he had done, betwixt eight and nine at night recalls all his soldiers, returns all the arms and the trumpet and leaves the house free. The next morning the President sent Mr. Gray with the rest of the Council to the Shawbandar and the eminent merchants of the town to declare to them the force which was put upon us; showing the letter which the President wrote the governor and withal gave them to understand that as we were in no fault so if any evil did ensue thereupon they must not blame us. The merchants did all bear witness of our innocence and cried shame of the governor's injustice. Since this the governor seems sorry for what is past; still though he is outwardly civil, he will not hear of the President's going down to Bombay. The French and Dutch are in the same case with us, to whom he hath not showed so much open violence but forces money from them. A few days since he took 40 *mans* copper from the Dutch besides their great present, before he would suffer their commander to go down to Swally. To all the merchants in the town he useth such tyranny that they are so discontented that it is believed he will not long stay. We know not what the issue of this business will be. We trust in God in the conclusion no evil but much good will accrue to your settlement both here and at Bombay. This will be effect of time, patience, resolution, and a provident care to provide for unexpected accidents, in all which we beg God's gracious assistance to direct and prosper us in all the difficulties which we shall encounter in your affairs.¹

On the 9th May as the Governor of Surat still refused to let the President go the Surat Council wrote to Bombay: As the Governor of Surat has positively manifested and declared his resolutions of not suffering the President to embark for Bombay until he has received order from the Court, which cannot arrive time enough for the President to go down before the rains which are at hand, we think good to order that you give us a large account of the posture of affairs with you that we may give such necessary instructions as may tend to the well governing of the island until it shall please God the President can with safety to the Company's affairs leave Surat; for the effecting whereof no opportunity shall be omitted, for we are very sensible his presence is very requisitely necessary for the promoting the Company's interest on the island.²

President's
Instructions,
1672.

A week later (16th May 1672) the Council wrote: Yours of the 1st May came to our hands on the 10th by the arrival of the Phoenix ketch who had a tedious passage to us, making it eleven days ere she anchored in Surat river. In your said advices we are to our trouble given to understand the unparalleled affront used to the Honourable Company's authority and likewise the seditious practice committed by these irregular spirits, that like flies will never leave fluttering

¹ Surat President and Council to Bombay, 23rd April 1672, Surat Fact. Out. L. Book 1 of 1630 - 1673, 253 - 255. Forrest's Home Series, I. 60 - 61.

² Surat to Bombay, 9th May 1672, Surat Fact. Out. L. Book 1 of 1630 - 1673, 260, Forrest's Home Series, I. 63.

about the candle till they have burnt their wings and leave a noisome stink behind them. To redress these and many other exorbitances the President was so desirous to pass some time with you. But it pleasing God to divert his well grounded resolutions by the untimely arrival of this avaricious governor who by no means will hear of the President going to Bombay until he hears from Court, we have thought good to give you what instructions we have concluded at present necessary for your government, expecting an answer to ours of the 9th instant, a large account of affairs with you that we may further debate thereon.

In the first place, in respect we find your Council is not complete according to the Company's order, we have thought good to order that there be of Council the following persons:

The Worshipful Phillip Gyfford, Deputy Governor, Captain John Shaxton, Henry Chowne, James Addams, Stephen Ustick, George Wilcox. Mr. Wilcox being at present here we have thought necessary to appoint to his assistance Mr. Saml. Walker, intending he shall succeed Mr. Wilcox in a short time, as we have designed the said Mr. Wilcox for another employment. The Council being thus settled we doubt not but by God's blessing and your prudent management of affairs things will be kept in due order in the future.¹

Not many days later, apparently about the 22nd May, the President obtained leave to go to Bombay. He settled his deputy in Surat with the rest of the Council and went down to Swally to embark on his ship the Loyal Oxinden. The voyage was one of some peril. In a letter of the 19th June to Fort St. George the Surat Council wrote: At such a season of the year it cannot, with the south-west monsoon so close at hand, be remembered any ship on this coast ever adventured forth. Still so many urgent occasions for settling the affairs of the island called the President thither that no consideration could divest him from running the greatest hazards to serve our Honourable Masters. Indeed by spending those rains there he will do them very acceptable service in settling Courts of Justice, in the restitutions of the Jesuits' lands, and in reducing our people to a more orderly government. God preserving him he will leave Bombay next September in a happy tranquillity. On the 26th May² from such advices as we had we despaired of his safety. Now we are most happy with the good news of his and other friends' safe arrival on the island the 7th current after they had encountered many dangers.³

Of Governor Aungier's work in Bombay no details have been traced in the Secretariat Records. That much which had gone crooked was set straight appears from references in the Surat Diaries. On the 20th July the deputy President of the Surat Council wrote to Bombay: We have perused the general letter to

Chapter I.

History.

President's
Instructions,
1672.

Bombay Council,
May, 1672.

President Aungier
goes to Bombay,
May, 1672.

Mr. Aungier in
Bombay.

¹ Surat to Bombay, 16th May 1672, Surat Fact. Out. L. Book 1 of 1630-1673, 260-261. Forrest's Home Series, I. 64.

² By mistake 26th current.

³ Surat Council to Fort St. George, 19th June 1672, Surat Fact. Out. L. Book 1 of 1630-1673, 269.

Chapter I.

History.

Mr. Aungier in
Bombay.

the Honourable Company and the results of your Council since his Honour's arrival on the island and find many and very important affairs to the establishment of the peace, security, and traffic of the island despatched in a short time.¹ On the 22nd October in forwarding reports from Mr. Aungier to the Company the Surat Council wrote: On the 17th current we received advices from the President and his Council in Bombay directed to your Honours, which accompany these. They have discoursed to you in brief the state of your island.² We assure you in the short time which your President has resided there, the island is much improved, courts of judicature, and many other important affairs settled, the Almighty blessing his endeavours which are wholly bent to make that your colony happy and flourishing. We shall find what further time he shall spend there will be very advantageous to your interest in the far greater improvement of that place.³

The declaration of war between England and Holland (1672) prevented Aungier's return to Surat. In a letter to Bantam of the 31st January (1673) the Surat Council wrote: Since the latter end of May last our President hath been in his government of Bombay. He had returned to us in September last had not the war broke out. But his presence by animating the people being so absolutely necessary and the great good he hath done by establishing the English laws and Courts of Judicature and still doth in strengthening the island, is of such force that he prefers his honours in maintaining the place before any other interest.⁴ So thoroughly had his activity secured the island that in the spring of 1673, the Dutch attempting a surprize, found the fort so well guarded, and everything in so good a condition that they immediately gave over the enterprize. From that period, each day showing its great importance the residence of the Governor was fixed at Bombay and the several factories on the coast of Malabár and in the Persian Gulf became dependent on that Presidency.⁵

Aungier's Defence
of Bombay,
1676.

The special charges incurred in making Bombay safe against European attack were followed by the natural heartburnings over the payment of the bills. On the 17th January 1676 in reply to a letter of censure the President and Council of Surat wrote: The earnest desire we have to please your Honours in all things made us glow at the perusal of your first clause, wherein you are pleased to blame us for disbursing your estate, keeping your goods unsold, not clearing of your debt at interest, and in particular you blame your President for the great charges expended and the

¹ Surat Deputy President to Bombay, 20th July 1672, Surat Fact. Out. L. Book 1 of 1630 - 1673, 279.

² The President sent his letter about Bombay to the Company through his Surat Deputy President and Council. No copies have been traced in either the Bombay or Surat records.

³ Surat Deputy President and Council to the Honourable Company, 22nd October 1672, Surat Fact. Out. L. Book 1 of 1630 - 1673, 300 - 301. Forrest's Home Series, I. 69.

⁴ Surat to Bantam, 31st January 1673, Surat Fact. Out. L. Book 1 of 1630 - 1673, 269.

⁵ Historical Account of the settlement and possession of Bombay by the English East India Company (1781), 5 - 6.

grandeur he used on your island Bombay. As to the first we cannot see wherein we have given you any cause of offence, in regard that moneys disposed at Bombay or any other factory in the course of your trade cannot be said to be disbursed seeing you have returns from the said places. We have not in our time settled any new factories without your order; nor do we keep any of your goods unsold but what we cannot possibly put off; nor can we have any the least pleasure or design to keep you in debt, there being nothing that afflicts us more or prejudiceth your trade more than debt hath done.¹

As regards Bombay the President wrote: Fame hath aggrandised the expense of Bombay more than really it is. The gross sum at first sight may seem heavy, whereas considered in parts with the reasons of them it will appear otherwise. This will be seen in the following heads to omit others of lesser note:

1. The charges caused by war were inevitable and indispensable reduced as low as could be contrived, and ceased with the first news of peace.

2. The moneys expended in public appearances were, by serious debate in Council, made suitable to the decency and advantage of your affairs free from vanity or superfluity and ended also with the same reason that produced them.

3. The sums laid out in building the fort itself were no more than the security of your interest required. They were husbanded to the best, your President having added little thereunto and only finished some part of what others had begun.

4. What is disbursed on the outworks is no charge in the least to you, being defrayed by the merchants' free donation of one per cent given on that account to which it is ordered to be charged.

5. The outbuildings for houses, warehouses, granary, mint-house and court of judicature were also judged absolutely necessary by your Council and such as you cannot be without. Yet if you shall not approve thereof your President offers to take them to his own account provided you will please to allow him reasonable rent for the time they have been employed in your service and give him leave hereafter to improve them to his best advantage.

6. That as your charge was increased somewhat by your President's detainure on the island so the revenue was much more increased thereby. For whereas in pursuance of your order for restoring the lands seized by the King's Governors the Commissions appointed for that affair, being abused by misinformations, had surrendered up almost all the said lands and thereby reduced the revenue to about Xs. 40,000 per annum before your President's arrival, you do now find (blessed be God) not only that affair well established but your public revenue in that and other

Chapter I.

History.

Aungier's Defence
of Bombay,
1676.

¹ Surat President and Council to the Company, Swally Marine, 17th January 1676, Surat Fact. Out. L. Book 2 of 1675-76, 24.

Chapter I.

History.

Aungier's Defence
of Bombay,
1676.

respects advanced to Xs. 1,00,000 per annum as doth appear by the particulars mentioned in our instructions to your Deputy Governor and Council, and we hope it will not only continue as it is but be considerably augmented in time.

To conclude our answer to the clause : we do in all meekness entreat your Honours to entertain a more favourable construction of our services that we may for once rejoice in your benignity and serve God and you in our several stations with comfortable apprehensions of your good eye towards us and we do profess a resolved obedience to all your commands and humble regard to your authority over us, a sincere love and desire to promote all your just and wise undertakings which we pray God Almighty to prosper.¹

The Company seem to have taken objection to Governor Aungier's proposal that Bombay not Surat should be the President's headquarters. In the same letter (17th January) the Council wrote to the Company: The arguments you are pleased to communicate to us for your President's residing rather at Surat than Bombay are of such weight that we lay our hands on our mouths and have not to answer but by obedience. Your President doth most cheerfully receive your commands herein. You may please to remember that it was the necessity of your affairs to accommodate the disturbances then on the island and put in execution those important orders from you which called him thither. The war and defence of your island and people from the enemy kept him there so long. Now we hope things are reduced to such a composure and your government so prudently managed by your Deputy Governor and Council that there will be no need of his return.²

Court's
instructions
touching Bombay,
1676.

As regards the management of Bombay the Council continued: We observe your several prudent orders touching your government of the inhabitants in general, the encouragement of trade, retrenchment of your charges in time of peace, touching the inconveniences of havens and docks, treaties and correspondence with our neighbour governments, and particularly with the Portuguese (who in truth are our worst neighbours), touching the free planters, building of houses and your several concessions to your servants and directions regarding the manure of the ground with fish, touching Captain Gary's petition and improving the manufacture of calicoes, extending the lands of Alvaro Pires de Tavora and other particulars whereunto we shall pay due obedience.³

Armenians,
1676.

On the 17th May 1676 the Council wrote from Surat to Bombay on behalf of certain Armenians a class of merchants who during the previous fifty years had begun to take a leading part in the trade of Western India. The Council wrote: These are at the entreaty of Khoja Karakuz and other Armenians concerned in the ship St.

¹ Surat to the Company, Swally Marine, 17th January 1676, Surat Fact. Out. L. Book 2 of 1675-76, 30.

² Surat to the Company, Swally Marine, 17th January 1676, Surat Fact. Out. L. Book 2 of 1675-76, 28.

³ Surat to the Company, Swally Marine, 17th January 1676, Surat Fact. Out. L. Book 2 of 1675-76, 28.

Francisco that is lately put into Bombay. As they have been very importunate with us to write in their affair, we do desire you to countenance and assist them as merchants with boats and other necessities for the lading their goods as also with convenient warehouses to protect them from the rains, you making such prudent contracts with them as to the customs and other duties as shall seem most beneficial to the Honourable Company and the repute and advantage of their port and island which we commend unto you.¹ Ten days later (27th May) the Council wrote regarding the same merchants: You have done well to spare the merchants the Company's warehouse and to treat them civilly. They tell us they are to pay Rs. 400 for hire of the warehouse which we would have charged to the credit of the East India House. In regard we have here some dispute with Khoja Minaz touching his debt to the Company and the owners of the ship are at difference at present which will require some time to be decided, we would have you put a stop to all business belonging to the ship and to forbid them carpenters or any caulkers or any other assistance whatsoever till you hear further from us and not to suffer the ship go out of port or any goods to be laden upon her. You may signify to the *nocquedah* (*nakhuda*) that the reason of the prohibition is because Khoja Minaz doth not comply with his contract.²

They continue on the 11th July: We write these at the request of Khoja Minaz and other Armenians belonging to the ship St. Francisco, on whom whereas we formerly ordered you to lay an embargo and not to assist her with carpenters caulkers or any other necessities she might stand in need of in regard to some disputes which were then depending between Khoja Minaz and us touching satisfaction (in some part) for his debt, he having lately paid us Rs. 10,000 in hand and given us great encouragement that we may receive another considerable sum in a short time; we therefore would have you recall the said embargo and treat them as friends and afford them all the assistance they can reasonably desire from you. They complain very much unto us that the Customers or customs' farmers are pressing them for the payment of anchorage which is a duty the merchants of Surat are strangers to. We would not have the Customers over-importunate with them but suspend their demands until they hear further from us lest it should prove of bad consequence to the Company's interest here. Also we would have you send us that clause in the custom-house articles whereby they lay claim to this duty and privilege of anchorage and what sum this annual imposition may amount to and how much was allowed to the customs for Abdul Gaphur's ship when she wintered at Bombay. Also send us your opinion whether you judge it conducing to the Company's interest to keep up that demand of anchorage on the ships that come accidentally and for security into the port, or else totally to let it fall, for we find it gives offence to merchants and owners of ships which may

Chapter I.
History.

Armenians,
1676.

¹ Surat to Bombay, 17th May 1676, Surat Fact. Out. L. Book 2 of 1675-76, 127.

² Surat to Bombay, 27th May 1676, Surat Fact. Out. L. Book 2 of 1675-76, 129-130.

Chapter I.
History.
Armenians,
1676.

cause more prejudice to the port than the benefit thereof may amount to, which is all we call to mind at present worthy your advice.¹

A week later (17th July) the Surat Council again address Bombay in favour of the Armenians: We lately wrote you a letter of recommendation in the behalf of Khoja Minaz and Khoja Delaune desiring your assistance to them in the fitting up of their ship. Since then they have again earnestly importuned us to bespeak our kindness to them and particularly in reference to the carpenters for which they are in very great want. These therefore are to desire you that you use your best endeavours to supply them with carpenters and if carpenters are not procurable on the island that you use your interest to send for them from Bassein Thána or Bándra. See you fail not in this. Also if they desire any further assistance or want any of the Company's stores or anything the island can furnish them with, let them be supplied for their money. Khoja Minaz and Khoja Delaune were with us this day and complained of the trouble they received from your Customers' demand of anchorage. Though they were importunate yet we would give them no positive answer till we hear further from you. They have also laid a very severe charge against Captain Birkin and desire leave to prosecute him at law to have justice of him which we cannot deny. We hope that Captain Birkin hath not deserved ill of them as they represent. We would have you write us how the case stands between them. In the meantime let their business be so despatched that the ship may proceed timely on her voyage.²

On the 26th August the Council resumes: This day Khoja Minaz and Khoja Delaune, Armenian merchants owners of ship St. Francisco, were with us making their complaints against Captain Francis Birkin who hath arrested their ship and entered into a process at law against them upon account of defamation and slander cast out against him by the Nocquedah of said ship. This process we have perused and think his suit very unreasonable and prosecuted rather for vexation than any justifiable grounds. As the said Khoja Minaz and Khoja Delaune desisted from any further demands on him so soon as they had a right sense of the business, it will cause an ill name and disrepute to the Honourable Company's port and island to have any ship detained there upon such an idle score. We therefore would have you endeavour to compose all differences and disputes between him and the Nocquedah. If you find them obstinate and unwilling to comply, then let them try out their quarrel by law. And if Captain Birkin hath any charge of validity to impeach the owners with, we think good that he apply himself to us here who shall seek to do him justice. But by no means let him go about to disturb or hinder the ship's voyage which will not only be a loss to the owners, but to many other particular merchants that hold freight on the ship.

¹ Surat to Bombay, 11th July 1676, Surat Fact. Out. L. B. 2 of 1675-76, 158-159.

² Surat to Bombay, 17th July 1676, Surat Fact. Out. L. B. 2 of 1675-76, 160-161.

Also they have again made known their grievance by reason of the Customers' demands of anchorage. Such demands upon serious consideration we have thought good to let fall for reasons formerly given you when Abdul Gaphur's ship wintered in Bombay. We therefore would have you make up the business this year with the Customers as well as you can, and in the future we require that you make an exception in that article of anchorage so that no vessel with three masts belonging to the port of Surat shall be liable to pay any such duty.¹

On the 22nd September the Surat Council writes to the Company: Your President hath been confined to his bed near three months by a dangerous flux, but by God's mercy is now in fair hopes of recovery. Your Deputy Governor of Bombay is brought up to Swally in a very weak condition. He has desired our leave to change the air for some time in hopes of his recovery. In his absence Mr. John Petit with the rest of the Council surviving do manage the affairs of your island, to whose assistance we shall appoint some of your servants to supply the vacant places in Council so soon as our leisure will admit.²

During the year 1676 the Company seem to have had under consideration the question of the transfer of Bombay from the King to their charge. The refusal of the English Court to accept Cooke's settlement of the English and Portuguese claims and the belief that a settlement so unfavourable to English interests had been due to Cooke's corruptness seem to have resulted in an inquiry from the Company as to the instructions brought and the action taken by the representatives of the King in 1662. On the 11th November 1677 the Bombay Government wrote to Surat: Mr. Gary has procured for us copies of His Majesty's instructions to Sir Abraham Shipman and Sir Gervase Lucas, which go herewith. Mr. Gary never saw any plot of the island, neither does he know of any brought over but thinks that in the agreement with our King for the delivery, the islands of Sálsette Bombay and Karanja were likewise intended. John Petit also does remember that in 1662 the Earl of Marlborough did send Captain Arnold Brown and some others round the island of Sálsette by way of Bassein to sound all the way and take full cognizance of all places. Captain Brown will be the Company's best informer in this business.³

In spite of its advance under Governor Aungier many hindrances to the development of Bombay remained. On the 24th January 1677 the Deputy Governor and Council of Bombay wrote to the Directors: Our rents were not much increased last year, though something they were. Our chief rent, the custom, is farmed for Xs. 27,000. We speak it to our great grief that whilst we are so encompassed with the Portuguese and Shiváji on all sides, we

Chapter I.

History.

Armeniana,
1676.

President
Aungier III,
1676.

Company desire
Bombay,
1676.

Condition,
1677.

¹ Surat to Bombay, 26th August 1676, Surat Fact. Out. L. B. II of 1675-76, 183-184.

² Surat to the Company, 22nd September 1676, Surat Fact. Out. L. Book 2 of 1675-76, 201. Forrest's Home Series, I. 103.

³ Bombay to Surat, 11th November 1677, Sec. Out. L. Book 4 of 1677-1687, 66. Forrest's Home Series, I. 140.

Chapter I.
History.

Condition,
1677.

cannot expect our trade greatly to increase. The reason of the flourishing trade of Surat and other sea ports is this: Merchants bring their goods from other countries in shipping, land them and transport them up the country for sale or sell them to other merchants who do the same. Again, merchants buy inland goods without molestation, any custom, or much charges and bring them freely down to port where is always shipping ready for all parts of India. At present the egress and regress for merchants up the country from Bombay is totally obstructed. The Portuguese islands of Karanja and Sálsette almost surround us, and they are ever exquisite seekers of all ways imaginable to do us mischief, envying as we suppose the sudden prosperity this place is risen to. The cheapest nearest and best pass up the country is by Thána where formerly they took 3 per cent of all goods which passed by. Now for the sake of only Bombay they have raised the rate to 10 per cent which is equivalent to a total forbidding of all goods to pass. Likewise all timber for shipping and houses of durance, which we may call the oak of India, grows up at Kalyán-Bhiwndi and must necessarily pass by Thána where they take 33 per cent custom. They have this year forbidden all rice to be transported to Bombay, and do often put excessive excises upon even herbs and fruit and hens which poor people bring over at Bándra. In this and most other things their malice shoots much short of their intention, for, thanks be to God, we have always provision in abundance, our island being commonly rather a granary of corn than otherwise, from whence it is transported to Rájpurí Goa and other places, and it shall be our care never to see the island unprovided of provisions. We could find other ways to pass up the country with little trouble were there peace between the Moghal and Shiváji, or that the Moghal would take all this country about us. For 'about two days' journey up the hill between the Moghal's and Shiváji's dominions lies a perpetual seat of war. No merchants can pass without apparent hazard of being plundered, so that we cannot expect merchants should land their goods here without knowing where or how to dispose of them. We often wonder how so considerable a custom could be annually raised, and we can attribute it to nothing but the justice freedom and security people enjoy here above other places. Many families of Bráhmans, daily leaving the Portuguese territory, repair hither frightened by the Padres, who upon the death of any person force all his children to be Christians. Even some of the chiefest who still live at Bassein and others build them houses here, therein placing their wives and children against a time of danger. We have hopes time will settle these parts in peace, that merchants may be induced to bring down their rich goods from the country, the custom of one of which ships would amount to what is received here in half a year. For in respect of situation and convenience this port has the advantage of Surat Goa and all the ports on the whole coast. Goa lies so far down below the great places of Gujarát, Dilly (Delhi), Barhánpur and Aurungabad, where the great glut of goods which supplies Europe and all India is made that

it is very chargeable bringing down goods thither. Then Surat is one of the worst roads in India and extremely dangerous in the freshes and by the distance the transport of goods up the river to Surat is very chargeable. Whereas Bombay lies in an excellent latitude for the whole trade of India, and is a most excellent harbour, winter and summer, which is a great inviter of merchants, and for a small charge we will run up a stone causeway from the fort almost to the mint without, in which ships may at any time lie ashore, careen and mend or lie there the whole year with as much safety as in a dock. Upon the country being in peace and our landing our Europe goods here, merchants would easier be persuaded to transport them from hence than from Surat, and though the same custom was taken at landing them on the main as at Surat, yet all that was transported in shipping to foreign parts would be so much custom gained to your Honours. But these are happinesses *in posse*, and to be prayed for.¹

During the years between 1676 and 1680 the chief foreign sources of trouble at Bombay were the 'haughty neighbours' the Portuguese; the Malabárs, that is the pirates of the Malabár coast; and the Sidis of Janjira or Danda Rájpuri.

The origin of the friction with the Portuguese was in 1676 the murder near Bándra of a Serjeant Southerland. In March 1676 President Aungier wrote from Surat to Bombay: We are sorry for the death of Serjeant Southerland inhumanely murdered by the Portuguese in cold blood in their own countries. We require you still to demand satisfaction and justice for the said murder and send word to the Padre Superior of the College of Bándra that seeing the said murder was committed in their jurisdiction we expect justice from them, for such bloody violences cannot be put up without satisfaction.²

A second cause of disagreement was the protection given in Bombay to a Malabár vessel pursued into the Bombay Harbour by the Portuguese. A letter from the Surat Council to the Malabár Coast Factories dated 23rd March 1676 describes how a large Malabár vessel bound from some port on the coast to Broach, encountered off Diu a Portuguese vessel who would have made prize of her. She resolutely resisted and fought them four days together. At length, finding them too powerful for her, she was forced to disburthen herself of some part of her lading and came into Bombay under the command of the fort. The Portuguese vessel pursued her as far as Karanja. There the Captain went in his boat to Bombay and from thence took a handole (*andov*, a kind of litter) and went to Bassein, acquainting the Captain General of all that had passed. He immediately in a hot passionate humour raises 500 or 600 men (and orders the raising more) and comes as far as Bándra and sends word to the Deputy Governor that the Malabár vessel was their prize and requires her speedily

Chapter I.
History.
Condition,
1677.

Portuguese
Troubles,
1676.

¹ Mr. J. Petit and Council at Bombay to the Court of Directors, Bombay, 24th Jan. 1677, Sec. Out. L. Book 4 of 1677-1687, 6-8. Forrest's Home Series, I. 120-121.

² Surat to Bombay, 27th March 1676, Surat Fact. Out. Letter Book 2 of 1675-76, 95. Forrest's Home Series, I. 85.

Chapter I.

History.

Portuguese
Troubles,
1676.

delivery, or he would invade the island. To this the Deputy Governor replied that it was contrary to all law and justice, and that he could not answer it to his superiors if he should deliver her up; and as to invading the island, they should make such convenient provision to withstand him as they judged most necessary, let him come when he would. Since this the Captain General is reported to have returned very calmly without achieving anything but reproach and shame, being mightily despised by the Portugals in general for his rashness. The letter further notes that at their first coming into the port, the Deputy Governor sent a boat off to know what the Malabár craft was; but the Malabárs would not let them come on board. Then he sent two or three more boats well manned carrying English colours. So soon as the Malabárs knew themselves to be under the English protection, they forthwith surrendered, weighed and came nearer under the fort where they now remain.¹

In a letter to Bombay a few days later (27th March) President Aungier writes: Through the whole story of the late controversy between you and the Portuguese touching the Malabár vessel, we cannot but observe the ridiculous pride and vanity of the Portuguese in threatening and mustering forces for war on so light and unjust an occasion, and the seasonable prudent and courageous opposition which you made against them. This opposition we do well commend and approve, declaring had you done otherwise or yielded in the least to the Portuguese in their unjust demands, you would have been brought under severe censure. Therefore we require you boldly and manfully to oppose all such proud vain-glorious and malicious attempts which the Portuguese may design against you. Return words with words, design with design, violence with violence, embargo with embargo. And let them and all your neighbours know publicly that we value not their friendship nor fear their enmity. And in regard we understand that some Padres were more busy than became them in this affair in casting out evil slanderous reports to the encouragement of the inhabitants, we require you to give a strict account what Padres they were and what they did, and particularly of that Jesuit Padre at Parel and the Padres at Máhim that we may give such directions as are necessary therein for the preventing the mischiefs they may do us. If you know any of the inhabitants that did seem to side with the Portuguese in this affair, give us notice of their names; and if anything of proof can be made against them, we would have you proceed severely with them.²

In letters of the 12th and 14th April the Surat President writes: We perceive the Portuguese bravado is passed over with an impatient protest which we presume was done only in point (of) honour

¹ Surat to Malabár Coast, 23rd March 1676, Surat Fact. Out. Letter Book 2 of 1675-76, 74. Forrest's Home Series, I. 84-85.

² Surat to Bombay, 27th March 1676; see also Surat to the Company, dated Swally Marine, 7th April 1676; Surat Fact. Out. Letter Book 2 of 1675-76, 95, 105: Compare Surat to the Chief and Factors at Bantam, 3rd April 1676, Surat Fact. Out. Letter Book 2 of 1675-76, 98. Forrest's Home Series, I. 85, 92.

to salve the Captain General's credit. Had they any sufficient or just cause of complaint they would have delivered their protest in writing and not by word of mouth. You have not done amiss to answer it as you did; we presume they will be wiser and understand themselves better hereafter. In the meantime if you have raised any men (of which you give us no account though we hear you have) we require you immediately to discharge them and not put the Company to needless expense.¹

The incident closes with the remark from Surat to the Directors, 22nd September 1676: Since our last the Portuguese have been quiet and have not offered us any disturbance on Bombay, the Viceroy having disowned the proceedings of the Captain General.²

A third cause of friction was the erection of Portuguese custom-houses at Bándra and Trombay. Regarding this the President, on the 17th October 1676, addressed Bombay as follows: We observe what you write of the Portuguese erecting new custom-houses at Bándra and Trombay, and little wonder at it, for we expect no better from them. We wish you had not wrote to Emanuell Saldanha, the Captain General, about it. You gave him thereby occasion to make reflections and to glory in his little acts of mischief and which is worse to discover the weakness and wants of the island. It would be impertinent and import little to protest against him, seeing he may lawfully execute his own authority in his own jurisdiction. Your best remedy is to slight it, and take no notice of such malicious practices, but overlook them and laugh at them with a pleasant scorn. And to the end the island may be always supplied with a sufficient quantity of corn and especially of batty we hereby give you order that you buy upon the Company's account 2000 morahs of batty at the cheapest rates and at the best time to keep in store for supply of all emergencies. For the laying up and good keeping whereof you have a storehouse already built by the custom-house, with which corn you may supply the markets in time of necessity, taking care at the next convenient season to lay up a store in your granary again and keep it always fully supplied, and you must take care to commit the charge of the said granary to some careful and honest man. Our grand design in appointing this storehouse is for supply of the garrison in case of any sudden surprise of war with Shiváji or the Portuguese or other Europe nations. Therefore fail not to go speedily in hand with it, for we know not how soon the face of things may alter as well in Europe as in India, and if you want any assistance from us in this affair let us hear from you.³

In the same letter President Aungier refers to a fourth cause of disagreement in the following terms: We have perused the Viceroy's letter to you touching the Padres run away from Goa.

Chapter I.

History.

Portuguese
Troubles,
1676.

¹ Surat to Bombay, dated Swally Marine, 12th April 1676, Surat Fact. Out. Letter Book II of 1675-76, 110 and 14th April 1676; Ditto, 114. Forrest's Home Series, I. 94.

² Surat to the Company, 22nd Sep. 1676; Ditto, 200. Forrest's Home Series, I. 103.

³ President Aungier to Bombay, 17th October 1676, Surat Fact. Out. L. B. 2 of 1675-76, 231-232. Forrest's Home Series, I. 106-107.

Chapter I.
History.

Portuguese
Troubles,
1676.

For that we have been sensible of some inconveniences caused by such vagabond Padres who leave their cloisters on purpose to lead licentious lives in Bombay and besides are apt to encourage the people to all disorder and disaffection to the English Government, we think good that if such Padres are upon the island, you give them convenient notice to repair to Chaul or where else they please to dispose of themselves, for that we are not well satisfied with their continuance in Bombay.¹

In their letter of the 24th January 1677 to the Court of Directors the Bombay Government thus summarises these disagreements: We have before took occasion to speak of the bad neighbourhood we enjoy from the Portuguese. In the month of April last (1676) from a small beginning there had likely to have succeeded a quarrel between us and them of no mean consequence. It happened that one of their frigates gave chase to a merchant's ship of Calicut who making his escape came for shelter under our fort. The Captain of the frigate demanded the delivery of the ship to him. Upon our refusal he makes his complaint to the Captain General of Bassein Manoel de Saldanha, who being of a fiery nature, apprehended so great an affront in it that he immediately came hurrying to Bándra with about 1000 men. We may say so many in number, but for service just only fitting to run away upon looking an enemy in the face, being taken up from the plough and the palmars (palm trees). So aggravated and resolved he seemed to be that he made public protestations never to return without our surrendering the vessel or an equivalent satisfaction. There happened to be some Englishmen at Bándra who went over to buy some necessaries, whom one of his Captains fell foul of, beat them cruelly, and killed Serjeant Southerland. The Captain General indeed disowned the action. However being performed by his ministers, we could do no less than demand satisfaction for the murder and affront. The then Deputy Governor (Gyfford) lay desperately sick of a flux and hectic fever; so that John Petit went up to Máhim taking with him a division of the garrison companies, the militia of Bombay with 100 Bhandáris and about 100 Moors of the island which with the militia of Máhim amounted to about 500 men. The Captain General finding our readiness to receive him, and that his menaces had not operated to that height as he imagined, became something calmer. His demands were first for the delivery of the ship to him, pretending she was his lawful prize having almost taken her, and that we ought not to protect the enemies to the Crown of Portugal. We in answer laid before him by many arguments how contrary it was both to reason justice and the custom of all Europe to deny protection to the vessels or subjects of any prince in amity with our King as the Zamorin then was. The Captain General long persevered in his demands, offering many weak reasons for his justification. Finding us resolute in our determination and that small effects were to

¹ President Aungier to Bombay, 17th October 1676, Surat Fact. Out. L. B. 2 of 1675-76, 232 - 233. Forrest's Home Series, I. 107.

be expected either from his threats or force, he descended to desire of us to keep the ship in our custody till he could write to the Viceroy and we likewise advise our President at Surat. This we likewise told him we could not consent to. For by what pretence or reason could we make prisoners of our allies or how could we justify ourselves to the Zamorin for such an action. We said we had always the President's order to do no injustice; so that it was desiring us to break one order to wait for another. Finding nothing would prevail with us he was at length contented as a poor salve to his credit to desire only of us that we would not send any frigates out in her convoy and that he would send to the Viceroy for his order herein and in the meantime their frigate should ride without to await her motion. All this could not hinder him from being derided of all strangers for his bravadoes and effectless threats and protestations, and even condemned of folly and rashness by the Portugal Fidalgos and all the Padres. In the meantime we forgot not to demand satisfaction for the death of Serjeant Southerland and beating our men, for the which and for what other damages might accrue by this his unjust proceeding, we drew up a protest against him. For your Honours' more particular satisfaction we herewith send copy of the said protest with all the papers which passed between us.¹

The troubles with the Cota or Malabár Pirates dated from 1670. In February 1671 the President at Surat writes to Bombay: We congratulate your success against the two Malabárs that were at Tull (Thal). Let Ensign Adderton know from us that we esteem of his good service well, and shall encourage him accordingly. We confirm your promise made to those that went out against the Malabárs, of allowing them half, although the custom is but one-third part. We know not what to determine concerning the slaves; only would have them valued and remain on the Company's account, and let the moiety of their value be paid to the adventurers, and let the slaves be made to work at the fort, care being taken that they do not run away. For encouragement of the soldiers hereafter, we have made it a standing order, that whatever (booty is made), one-third part thereof shall be allowed them. This is to continue till further order from the Company unto whom we have written effectually concerning this matter. We hope in very few months to send you down a fine frigate for the greater security and credit of the Port of Bombay. And if you can build a frigate or two at Bassein at any reasonable rates we would have you procure them, concerning which pray advise us with all speed possible.²

The pirates at Cota took an Englishman in a Daman vessel. The Englishman demanded ransom of Mr. Bourcher, and as he refused to give it, the pirates basely set the captive against a tree and lanced

Chapter I.

History.

Portuguese
Troubles,
1676.

The Malabárs,
1670-1677.

¹ Bombay to Directors, 24th January 1677, Sec. Out. L. B. 4 of 1677-1687, 11-13. Forrest's Home Series, I. 122-123.

² Surat to Bombay, Feb. 1671, Surat Fact. Out. L. B. 1 of 1670-1673, 231. Forrest's Home Series, I. 57.

Chapter I.
History.

The Malabarra,
1670-1677.

him to death.¹ Preparations were promptly made to punish these insults. On the 27th June 1677 the Bombay Council wrote to the Surat President: 'The Scipio and all the Company's ships shall be ready fitted in August for any voyage shall be appointed them. We are of your Honours' opinion that it will be highly necessary, both for the benefit and honour of the Company that Alle Rája and the pirates be made sensible of those affronts put upon us. We suppose the charge will not be great. Here is the Revenge and Hunter who will hardly get freights and are at a standing charge to the Company, the commanders all the officers and some seamen being continually kept aboard them, that we believe they will not stand in above Rs. 100 or 150 a month more being at sea than now haled up and suppose those two ships and two *machvats* will be sufficient. Besides if the design be managed with discretion, the prizes they take may for the greatest part defray the charges. 20 files of soldiers in all will be sufficient, or, if we cannot spare them, 16 files will serve. For officers to command the soldiers we have choice sufficient. But there will want an able prudent person to command in chief who has had experience of India, for the business will not be to go down and make what havoc destruction and slaughter can be effected but as your Honour rightly observes, there must be respect had to time to come and the carrying on a more free and honourable trade in those parts for the future. In one hand the sword and in the other an olive branch, and if possible to obtain that excellent point of making love and fear together which may be effected by avoiding general cruelties or the total ruin of any one place; by making those the mark of our anger, who to the knowledge of all people have plainly affronted us; by being extraordinary civil to all those who have still been our friends, and to manifest our intention of embracing all honourable proffers of peace, whereby we may hereafter live unmolested in our trade. Your Honours are better able to pitch upon a fitting person to manage this design than we. The Scipio may be very useful, though she stay not long there. But we think it very necessary the Hunter be sent down in the beginning of August, otherwise she will never meet with Alle Rája's ships from Mokha and in the meantime our recruits will come from England and we can fit up the rest.'²

Sidi's Fleet
at Bombay,
1676.

Meanwhile one of the most difficult questions in Bombay continued to be the Sidi's request, supported by the Moghal Government of Surat, to be allowed to winter that is to pass the rains (June-August) in Bombay. On the 14th April 1676 the Surat President wrote to Bombay: We are sorry the Sidi's fleet is come again to trouble your port. The Moghal governor of Surat has not made applications to us in the least concerning the fleet wintering at Bombay. If he doth press very earnestly and will not be

¹ Bombay to Surat, 3rd April 1671, Sec. Out. L. B. 4 of 1677-1687, 28. Forrest's Home Series, I. 130.

² Bombay to Surat, 27th June 1677, Sec. Out. L. B. 4 of 1677-1687, 36, 37. Forrest's Home Series, I. 132, 133.

denied, we must govern ourselves the best we can for the Company's interest. In the meantime we require you positively and in plain terms to declare to the Sidi that you will not permit his wintering there. If he talks of staying at Bombay or at Mázgaon you must tell him that it shall never be permitted, seeing he and his men have already been so chargeable to the island. Nor is he a person to be trusted on shore. Therefore if he doth desire it you must not grant it except you are sure he will go on board again in a day or two. Nor must you suffer his men to go ashore armed or too many at a time for the preventing of any mischief that may ensue. However we would have you be very civil in your discourses and arguments to the Sidi and all the officers, representing the unreasonableness of their requests, the trouble which we have already sustained, and the evil consequences that may follow. Also fail not to supply them with what they may want—wood, water, and provisions. And let them have no just complaint against you in that matter, but suffer none of their vessels to hale on shore by any means if you can prevent it. This order we would have you resolutely and strictly observe till you hear further from us, for being at Swally we know not yet how things will go. We intend to start to-morrow for Surat where we shall understand more of the Moghal governor's mind whom we will dissuade by the best arguments we can from desiring the Sidi's fleet to winter in Bombay. If he will not be otherwise satisfied, we shall in a few days send you such directions as shall be necessary for your future government.¹ A week later (April 21st) the Surat Council resume: 'To this day the governor of Surat hath not applied himself in the least to us touching the wintering of the Sidi's fleet. Wherefore we would have you continue to prosecute our former directions and not permit them to winter in Bombay. Be careful you be not overcome with their subtleties.'²

Six weeks later a change in Surat compelled the President to alter his orders preventing the Sidi wintering in Bombay. On the 9th June 1676 the Council addressed Bombay: We have already wrote you a letter in recommendation of Sidi Kásim who is now made governor of Danda Rájpurí and captain general of the armada against Shiváji, in place of Sidi Sambal turned out. Shaistikhán, governor of Surat, hath commanded the said Sidi Kásim to make what haste he can to his charge and in pursuance thereof hath with some importunity prevailed with us to permit his wintering on the island of Bombay till the monsoon serves to transport him to Danda Rájpurí. He carries with him about 200 peons for his guard on the way, fearing some encounter from Shiváji's forces. We were very unwilling to admit so many troublesome people on the island but our governor here being very importunate with us and having expressed a respectful regard

Chapter I.

History.

Sidi's Fleet
at Bombay,
1676.

Sidi Kasim
in Bombay,
1676.

¹ Surat to Bombay, 14th April 1676, Surat Fact. Out. L. B. 2 of 1675-76, 114-115. Forrest's Home Series, I. 94-95.

² Surat to Bombay, 21st April 1676, Surat Fact. Out. L. B. 2 of 1675-76, 118. Forrest's Home Series, I. 95-96.

Chapter I.

History.

Sidi Kásim
in Bombay,
1676.

and favourable assistance to our Honourable Masters' interest and promising to signify this and other our good services to the king of Delhi we have thought good to gratify him herein. This day Sidi Kásim came to take his leave of the President declaring his great obligations for the kindness received and promising all offices of friendship on his part, and whereas the President put him in mind of unruliness and disorderly proceeding of their men formerly, he assures us that he will now take such strict care in governing his soldiers and keeping them in order that there shall not be the least occasion of complaint hereafter.

Wherefore conforming to our former letter of recommendation, we desire you to treat the said Sidi Kásim with all civility and to accommodate him with such lodging during his stay either at Mázgaon or Bombay as you can conveniently provide. We judge Mázgaon will be the best place for the soldiers to quarter in that they may the less meet or internix with our men for the preventing of quarrels between them. As for Sidi Kásim himself if he desires a house or some lodging at Bombay, you may grant them to him. Also at his departure you may assist him with what boats are necessary for his transport to Danda Rájpuri. It is reasonably expected that he should pay the charge, for we would not have you put the Company to more expense than necessity or the prudent laws of civility requires. At the same time in outward respect and kindnesses you may use such freedom and obliging discretion as becomes the friendship we receive from the king and his subjects and consists with the interest of our Honourable Masters. When he departs the island, we would have you procure his letter to the governor of Surat manifesting the kindness and friendly assistances he hath received in behalf of the king's affairs during his stay on the island.¹ Though in consequence of these orders Sidi Kásim perforce was allowed to winter in Bombay, apparently the directions and warnings quoted above sufficed to relieve Bombay of its troublesome and dangerous guest Sidi Sambal.

Sidi Sambal
warned from
Bombay,
1677.

Early in 1677 Sidi Sambal seems to have been allowed to bring his fleet to Bombay and to stay in the harbour. In April, in consequence of an application from him to be allowed to pass the monsoon in Bombay, Mr. Aungier, the President, wrote to Bombay: This evening we received a very formal letter from Sidi Sambal, wherein after many vain pretences he entreats our leave to winter at Bombay himself with all his men and his fleet and accordingly would have us recommend him unto you. This we will by no means consent unto in regard we plainly perceive his intentions are not for Danda Rájpuri but he lies hovering with his fleet about the island. We cannot at all recommend you in that you have connived at his continuance on the island thus long and never given us any account thereof, that our orders might have arrived to you more seasonably. However we do now require you first in fair terms to declare

¹ Surat to Bombay, 9th June 1676, Surat Fact. Out. L. B. 2 of 1675-76, 132-133.

to him that it is contrary to His Majesty's, the Honourable Company's, and Our orders to permit him or his men or his fleet to winter on the island; and therefore he must prepare himself to be gone with all the expedition that may be. If you see he will not be satisfied with this but obstinately continues on the island, you must then by public proclamation require all people belonging to the Sidi's fleet to depart the island and prohibit all the inhabitants of the island after three days to sell to any of the Sidi's people any sorts of provisions or come near their houses or hold any correspondence with them, for we will not permit him to winter on the island, and if he stays it shall be at his own peril, and you must declare that he thereby will utterly break friendship with us. This you may declare to him from us who desire your speedy performance of our orders and answer hereunto.¹

Meanwhile a grievously foolish and unjust action by an officer in command of one of the boats sent against the Cota pirates strengthened the position of the Sidis in claiming to winter in Bombay. On the 22nd April 1677 the Deputy Governor and Council of Bombay write to Surat: Our Malabár *machva* whom we sent out in chase of Malabárs was commanded by Ensign Thorp who off Danda Rájpuri met one of the Sidi's boats. Our *machva* put out no colours so the Sidi's boat pursued her very near, supposing her to be a Malabár or one of Shiváji's boats. Then our men put out their colours and showed themselves. Upon this the Sidi's boat was going away; but our boat spoke to them to come aboard and held up a musket at them to make them come. When they had come on board our men asked the Sidis why they pursued them; the Sidis answered we took you for Malabárs. Upon this Ensign Thorp seized two coolies, tied their hands behind them, and hoisted them up and threatened them till he made them confess they heard the captain say he was resolved to take our *machva*. This confession Ensign Thorp thought was sufficient. He took away all their arms and what money they could find and keeping the captain and two men more prisoners, carried them away down the coast, and let the boat go. There was likewise a great packet in which the boatmen pretend are letters for Bahádur Khán, the governor of Surat, and your Honours; besides several letters for persons on this island and for the Governor and Factor of Bassein in Portuguese, all which he carried down with him. The two Sidis at Danda Rájpuri demanded justice of us for robbing their boat and taking their men prisoners pretending Rs. 2600 was lost in ready money and cloths. We made very strict examination but could find out no money but about Rs. 40 which the Ensign had secured. This we proffered them but they refused it. For Ensign Thorp's crime in taking and robbing one of our friend's vessels contrary to our orders and instructions we took away his commission from him. The boatmen would not accept of the money which was proffered them, but are gone to

Chapter I.

History.

Sidi Sambal
warned from
Bombay,
1677.

Foolish Seizure
of Sidis,
1677.

¹ The President Mr. Aungier and Council to Bombay, dated Surat, 30th April 1677, Surat Fact. Out. Letter Book 3 of 1677-1700, 34.

Chapter I.
History.

Sidi Sambal
in Bombay,
1677.

Danda Rájpurí to complain afresh, and whether they will complain to Bahádúr Khán and the governor of Surat we know not.¹

It seems probable that this unfortunate misconduct so weakened the position of the Surat President that he was forced to abandon his intention of refusing Sidi Sambal's request to be allowed to winter in Bombay. On the 7th May 1677 the President addressed the following letter to Bombay: On the 30th April we wrote you by express to use your endeavours by all fair means to persuade Sidi Sambal to retire from Bombay. We said we could not permit him to winter there for the reasons then proposed. It seems your care had prevented us and you had given your express orders to him to depart. In this you did very well. Only we wish you had done it more effectually sooner in the year that he might have had no pretence to have stayed or that you had given us advice sooner that we might have made provision accordingly. Whereas till it was too late we were totally ignorant thereof. Upon the summons which you have given him, he immediately despatched a boat to the Surat governor by seadesiring him to interpose the king's authority and his interest with us, without which we would never consent. Upon this the governor sent a message unto us entreating us in the king's name to permit the fleet to winter in Bombay and that Sidi Sambal might remain on shore in regard to his sickness. After due advice and considering of the state of the Company's affairs here, we esteemed it not prudent to displease the king and the governor for the reasons which are obvious to you. We accordingly sent our broker to the governor to represent to him the Company's express order to the contrary and the inconveniences which they might sustain and have sustained by the Sidi's wintering in Bombay and to desire the governor that he would send express orders to Sidi Sambal and the fleet that they might observe these following orders: That Sidi Sambal should keep but 50 men on shore with him and that the rest of the soldiers should be either discharged or kept on board their ships and not allowed to come on shore without the Deputy Governor's license: Further, that Sidi Sambal and Sidi Kásim should take care that their men give not the least offence to the Government or to any of the people of the island and if they did that they should be severely punished. This the governor esteemed very necessary and hath given his orders accordingly to Sidi Sambal which we send you here enclosed under the governor's seal together with its copy for your perusal desiring you to observe it accordingly.

Now we understand that Sidi Sambal resides at the East India House where like the hedge hog he hath nestled himself and liking his lodging intends to stay there whether we will or no. As you will read in the copy of his letter it is one of our conditions with the Surat governor that during next rains Sidi Sambal shall stay in what place the Deputy Governor and Council shall think fit to appoint him. Our opinion is that it is not con-

¹ Bombay to Surat, 22nd April 1677, Sec. Out. L. B. 4 of 1677 - 1687, 30 - 31.

venient to permit so many strange soldiers to be so near the fort all the rains, but that Mázgaon would be a more proper place for them. We offer this as our advice and do not give it as a positive order. Still we do require you to consider well thereof and having a strict regard of the charge and trust committed to you to give such directions in this affair as shall most tend to the security of the fort and island and peace of the inhabitants, treating the said Sidi Sambal's affairs and his people with such civility and reasonable assistance as they may expect from you.¹

Meanwhile the Bombay Council were doing their best to be rid of Sidi Sambal. On the 2nd May 1677 they write the following letter to the Surat Council: We have with much ado prevailed with Sidi Sambal to embark to-morrow. But he intends to stay aboard three or four days in expectation to obtain your Honour's license for his wintering here, having sent express by sea and land for that purpose.² On the 18th May they write: We have by us two of your Honour's unanswered of the last of April and 12th May. We did what was possible to get Sidi Sambal out, next to plain force and firing at the fleet, which we know not how would be resented at Surat. We have daily for these two months told him absolutely that he must not winter here and he always beguiled us with protestations that he would be gone this day and that day till the fleet was not able to stir. They must now winter here except we will force them out to be all lost. But he himself has promised faithfully to go overland and that he will set out to-morrow morning if not be it at his own peril for we could by no means suffer him to stay here.³

In the same letter, after the arrival of the Surat letter of the (7th) May the Bombay Council add: Just at closing there came your Honour's of the (7th) May with a letter for Sidi Sambal which we sent him. We shall be careful punctually to comply with your Honour's orders and shall acquaint the Sidi therewith to-morrow. We are of your Honour's opinion that Mázgaon will be the fittest place for him which we suppose he will willingly condescend to, he having often professed much.⁴

On the 6th July 1677 before the Bombay letter reached them, forced by the necessity of keeping on good terms with Surat authority, the Surat Council write: Sidi Sambal being put out of his employ and the command of the king's fleet conferred on Sidi Kásim who is now in Danda Rájpurí, Sidi Kásim hath ordered his *vakil* Mahmud Hasan to send down to Bombay 150 men under the command of Subhán Kuli. We commend his men unto your courteous usage, and do desire you to show them all the respect and civility you may with convenience, and gratify them on all reasonable requests. At the same time we caution you to have an

Chapter I. History.

Sidi Sambal
in Bombay,
1677.

¹ Surat to Bombay, 7th May 1677, Surat Fact. Out. L. B. ■ of 1677 - 1700, 36 - 37.

² Bombay to Surat, 2nd May 1677, Sec. Out. L. B. 4 of 1677 - 1687, 33.

³ Bombay to Surat, 18th May 1677, Sec. Out. L. B. 4 of 1677 - 1687, 33.

⁴ Bombay to Surat, 18th May 1677, Sec. Out. L. B. 4 of 1677 - 1687, 34.

Chapter I.

History.

Sidis in Bombay,
1677.

eye over them that they may commit no riots or disorders to the disturbance of the peace of the island and suffer not more than . . . men to come on shore at a time.¹

On the 27th June 1677 the Bombay Council brought to the notice of the President at Surat the sort of difficulty which the presence of the Sidi in Bombay entailed upon them. Lately a Bráhmaṇ and two or three more came over from Batty proffering their service to the Sidi, and promising if he would employ them they would bring him some prisoners of quality. Sidi Sambal was willing to embrace the offer, but yet so cunning not to appear in the action that he would not furnish them with any of his own boats or men. So they hired a Bombay fisher-boat and soldiers from the island and went over to Batty and brought thence four Bráhmaṇ prisoners, being the principal men of the place, and put them aboard the Sidi's ship.² It was not long before we had a message from the Subhedár of Chaul, complaining of the unneighbourly abuse we had suffered to be done to him even by the inhabitants of Bombay, demanding the restitution of those prisoners, and threatening, if this were not performed, no stick of wood or anything else would be suffered to be brought from the main to Bombay and that the friendship between us was broken. We immediately sent to the Sidi taxing him severely with this unfriendly dealing, but he pleaded ignorance to all. However we got the prisoners from him whom we freed. We likewise got the Koli who was mukádam of the boat and ten more of the rogues, dwellers on the island, who were all condemned to be hanged, but we pardoned eight and executed three. Those eight are the Company's slaves whom we shall put aboard the Europe ships to be sent to St. Helena, with a Bhandárin who was condemned for felony whose life we pardoned likewise.³

At the close of the rains (9th October 1677) the Bombay Council laid before Surat the evils attending the Sidi's, especially two rival Sidis', presence in Bombay. They wrote: It is now several years that the Sidi's fleets have used this port as a place of refreshing and retreat on all occasions, with how much trouble to the Government and dissatisfaction to the inhabitants, your worships have been but too well acquainted. A few months past Sidi Sambal received orders to surrender the fleet to Sidi Kásim. For several months he made demurs because his wife and children and his family were detained in Danda Rájpurí. These he received four days ago, and promised to deliver up the fleet excepting one of the great ships which he intended to keep to carry himself and his soldiers to Surat. Sidi Kásim being impatient of having part of his fleet detained from

¹ Surat to Bombay, 6th July 1677, Surat Fact. Out. L. B. 3 of 1677-1700, 51.

² Like the phrase The Corlahs (Anderson, 68; Orme's Oriental Fragments, 198) the word Batty meaning alluvial lands seems applied to villages along the west or Alibág shore of the Amba river or Nágothna creek. At the same time the Batty of the Records may be Orme's Abita (Ditto, 109) that is Apta ten miles north of Pen.

³ Bom. to Surat, 27th June 1677, Sec. Out. L. B. 4 of 1677-1687, 37-38. Forrest's Home Series, I. 133.

him and instigated by that unadvised Subhán Kuli who came from Surat about three months past with 150 men to assist him, ere we were aware of it, did on Sunday last march up with all his force to Mázgaon where Sidi Sambal resided. We immediately sent Captain Keigwin with a guard of horse to keep the peace. Ere he could arrive they had begun the skirmish, and so obstinate were they, especially Sidi Kásim, that they were parted with much difficulty having shot four of the Company's horses, whereof one is dead and another in great danger, though it pleased none of the troopers were hurt. Upon this we immediately sent for Sidi Kásim to the fort, and having expostulated with him the affront he had put upon the Government and the bad retaliation he had made us for our extraordinary civilities to him, we disarmed all his soldiers except himself and two or three more and ordered him in four or five days' time to send all his soldiers off the island excepting some few servants for his attendance. The like we did to Sidi Sambal excepting those guards which were for the defence of the ships. We suppose this accident will so arm your worships' resolutions as never to concede the wintering of the fleet here again nor to suffer any great number of men to remain on the island armed. We suppose it would be of great consequence that your worships made timely complaint of these outrages, not only to the governor of Surat, but even to the king himself, and demanded large satisfaction for the death of our horses and the disturbance of the peace of the inhabitants and hindrance of our trade, merchants being frightened from coming hither by such hostile acts. We send this cossét (carrier Gujaráti *kásad*) on purpose to give your worships timely notice that the Sidis might not be beforehand with a false representation of the action.¹

A fortnight later (October 21st) the Bombay Council continue: We have at length induced the two Sidis to an agreement so that Sidi Kásim is contented to surrender up Sidi Sambal's wife and children and Sidi Sambal is contented to surrender up the armada, so that Sidi Sambal in four or five days intends to embark on one of two great ships and go for Surat, and then Sidi Kásim will go on board of the fleet. We were willing to be mediator in this business that we might be rid of them both. And if we respect the good and quiet of the island, we have reason to wish they may never come here again except it be for a month's time to refresh and then be gone. Sidi Sambal had an excellent horse killed in the broil, which he values at a great price; for which and all other damages he demands satisfaction of us; for he pretends his hands were bound up from taking his own satisfaction. We must needs say he was very obedient to our orders, and has lived at Mázgaon all this rains so contentedly and quietly that we have not been troubled with any complaints of him. So that when your worships demand satisfaction of the Moghal king for our horses and other

Chapter I.

History.

Sidi Troubles,
1677.

¹ Bom. to Surat, 9th Oct. 1677, Sec. Out. L. B. 4 of 1677-1687, 53-54, Forrest's Home Series, I. 136-137.

Chapter I.
History.

Gujarát Baniás
in Bombay,
1677.

damages, Sidi Sambal's damages may likewise be demanded or that they make him satisfaction there.¹

In March 1677 the General and Council in Surat communicated the following instructions regarding the settlement of Gujarát Baniás in Bombay: We do send you several articles offered unto us by Nima Párahk, an eminent Bania belonging to the city of Diu, touching his own, or some of his sons or vakils, settlement on the island of Bombay. This we have not thought good to grant until we have first advised with you and taken your opinion thereon whether they are consistent with the present state and good of the island, and therefore we desire you seriously to weigh each particular article and advise us your opinion thereon. He hath further requested that ten *mans* of tobacco may be allowed him free of paying any duty belonging thereunto, but to this also we have deferred giving no answer until we have received your opinion which we desire may be sent us so soon as you can with convenience. We desire you not to let these articles or Nima Párahk's name to be published as yet in regard the noise of it coming to the Portuguese's knowledge may cause no mean prejudice to him and little advantage to us, for we have already often experimented upon the effect of their bad neighbourhood.²

Whereas Nima Párahk, an eminent Bania merchant of the city of Diu, has expressed his desire to settle with his family and trade on the island of Bombay, from the fame which he has heard of the Honourable Company's large commerce, upright dealing, justice, and moderation to all persons that live under the shadow of their Government; and in order thereunto has requested a patent from us, under the Company's seal, containing certain favours which he begs in relation to liberty and security in the exercise of religion, trade, property, and reputable residence on said island: We, the President and Council for the said Honourable Company, have thought good, in regard to his eminent worth and good report, to grant him the following privileges:

1. That the Honourable Company shall allot him so much ground in or near the present town free of rent as shall be judged necessary to build a house or warehouse thereon.

2. That he with the Bráhmans or Vers (*Gors* or priests) of his caste shall enjoy the free exercise of their religion within their own houses without the molestation of any person whatsoever; that no Englishman, Portuguese, or other Christian, nor Muhammadan shall be permitted to live within their compound or offer to kill any living creature there, or do the least injury or indignity to them, and if any shall presume to offend them within the limits of their said compound, upon their complaint to the Governor (at Surat), or Deputy Governor (at Bombay), the offenders shall

¹ Bom. to Surat, 21st Oct. 1677, Sec. Out. L. B. 4 of 1677-1687, 56-57, Forrest's Home Series, I. 138.

² Surat letter from the President Mr. Aungier and Council to Bombay, 22nd March 1677, Surat Fact. Out. Letter Book 3 of 1677-1700, 22-23.

be exemplarily punished; that they shall have liberty to burn their dead according to their custom, also to use their ceremonies at their weddings; and that none of their profession of what age, sex, or condition whatever they be, shall be forced to turn Christians, nor to carry burthens against their wills.

3. That he and his family shall be free from all duties of watch and ward, or any charge and duty depending thereon; that neither the Company nor the Governor, Deputy Governor or Council, or any other person, shall on any pretence whatsoever force them to lend money for public or private account or use any indirect violence or ways to that effect; but that they shall with all freedom enjoy their properties, estate, and goods without any molestation.

4. That in case there falls out any difference or suit in law between him or his vakil or attorneys or the Baniás of his caste, and any other persons remaining on the island, the Governor or Deputy Governor shall not suffer him or them to be publicly arrested dishonoured or carried to prison, without first giving him due notice of the cause depending, that he or they may cause justice to be done in an honest and amicable way, and in case any difference happen between him or his attorney and any Bania of their own caste, they may have liberty to decide it among themselves without being forced to go to law.

5. That he shall have liberty of trade in his own ships and vessels to what port he pleases, and come in and go out when he thinks good, without paying anchorage, having first given the Governor or Deputy Governor or Customer notice and taken their consent thereunto.

6. That in case he brings any goods on shore more than he can sell on the island within the space of 12 months, he shall have liberty to transport them to what port he pleases, without paying custom for exportation.

7. That in case any person be indebted to him, and also to other Baniás, and be not able to pay all his debts, his right may be preferred before other Baniás.

8. That in case of war or any other danger which may succeed, he shall have a warehouse in the castle to secure his goods, treasure, and family therein.

9. That he or any of his family shall have liberty of egress and regress to and from the fort or residence of the Governor or Deputy Governor; that they shall be received with civil respect and be permitted to sit down according to their qualities; that they shall freely use coaches, horses, or palanquins and quitasols (that is barsuns or umbrellas) for their convenience without any disturbance; that their servants may wear swords and daggers, shall not be abused, beaten, or imprisoned except they offend, and that in case any of his kindred or friends shall come to visit him or them from any other ports, they shall be used with civility and respect.

Chapter I. History.

Gujarát Baniás
in Bombay,
1677.

Chapter I.

History.

Gujarāt Baniās
in Bombay,
1677.

10. That he and his assigns shall have liberty to sell and buy cocoanuts, betelnuts, *pán* or betel-leaves, and any other commodity not rented out without any molestation on the island.¹

On the 3rd April 1677 the Deputy Governor of Bombay replied: According to order we have considered the articles of Nima Párah Bania, which if we rightly understand we do not apprehend any prejudice in their concession, the most of them being what the meanest enjoy.

The first is very easy, the Company having vast ground enough, and we daily do the same to Baniās and others who come to inhabit here. As to the second, the free exercise of religion is permitted to all with the use of their ceremonies at weddings and feasts, the Baniās always burning their dead without molestation. Neither do we permit any person to kill anything near the Baniās, who all live by themselves, much less can any person presume to enter into anybody's house or compound without the owner's license; and, for forcing people to turn Christian against their wills, the whole world will vindicate us; neither are any persons forced to carry burdens against their wills. No Bania, Bráhmaṇ, Moor, or such man is obliged to watch or ward or other duty, but if any person buys an oart or warge (*váda*) he is bound on every alarm to send a musquiter. But if he possesses no land no duty is exacted, so the article may be granted to Nima, and when he goes about to buy any land he may be acquainted with that small incumbrance thereon.

The 4th article is indeed a privilege, but no more than Girdhar, the Moody and some others have, which does not in the least exempt them from the hands of the law or justice, but does only ask that justice be done respectfully, which he need not doubt of, and for matter of differences among themselves there is already his Honour's patent authorising them to decide such things.

As to the 5th, the great anchorage of a rupee per ton is wholly taken off. There remains only a small one of a rupee for every 100 tons, which is so inconsiderable a matter that we do not believe he will stick at it. If he does, it will amount but to a small matter being only for his own vessels that the Company may easily allow it.

The 6th, if we rightly apprehend it, is no more than what all people enjoy, who are so far from paying custom at exportation of their own goods that they pay none for what goods they buy. But if he intends his goods must pay no custom at landing nor none at exportation of what he cannot sell, it will be so great a loss to the Company, they having farmed out the customs for two years, that the benefit of his settling here will, we believe, not countervail it, till it comes into the Company's hands again.

As to the 7th, our law is such that if a person be indebted to several men, whosoever gets a judgment first in Court will be paid his full debt, but no man can be aggrieved at that, nor can any

¹ Accompaniment to Surat letter dated 22nd March 1677, to Bombay, in Surat Fact. Out Letter Book 3 of 1677 - 1700, 24 - 25. Forrest's Home Series, I. 111 - 113.

creditor have any pretence to what is once paid, and when judgment is given it is already paid in law, so that he is no longer proprietor of it. But when a person is indebted to two men and the first sues him and upon that the second comes in and sues him too, with what justice can we pay all the debtor's estate to the second creditor. Only of this he may be assured that all justice shall be done him with speed according to our law and the party forced to pay the full debt if able, and lie in prison for the rest till he pleases to release him, which we suppose may well content him.

As to the 8th, in case of war all persons of quality have liberty to repair to the castle and secure their money and other things of value. Not that I suppose he intends to fill up the castle with gruf (coarse) goods; but for money, jewels, household stuff, cloth goods of value, that take up small room, he may bring what he pleases and may have a warehouse apart allotted for himself and family.

The 9th and 10th we may join together, they being only to fill up the number. They are plain optics to show the nature of those they live under, which, when they have experimented our Government, themselves will laugh at us, enjoying more freedom than the very articles demand, for the meanest person is never denied egress and regress upon respectful notice given, and for horses and coaches and the like he may keep as many as he pleases and his servants be permitted to wear what arms they please, a thing common to all. Nothing is more promoted by us than the free liberty for buying and selling which is the load-stone of trade.

That last thing he asked of having 10 *mans* of tobacco free of all duties is the most difficult thing of all, for the farmers will ask a vast deal to grant such a license, it being a very great profit they make in the sale of 10 *mans*, so that we know not which way this article can be condescended to, but in this your Honours can judge better than us.¹

In reply on the 26th April the Surat Council write: We observe your answer touching the articles proposed by Nima Párahk Bania in order to his settlement on Bombay. When we come again to treat with him thereon, we hope so to moderate the affair that the island shall not receive any the least prejudice thereby, and we do not question but wholly to put him by his request of 10 *mans* of tobacco which he would annually receive or bring on the island free of all duties.²

A letter of the 19th March from Bombay to the Court of Directors remarks that it would be a very grateful thing to the whole city if their Honours would be pleased to send out a great clock and a large bell as these would not only be very satisfactory but also very useful to all.³

Chapter I.

History.

Gujarát Baniás
in Bombay,
1677.

Large Clock and
Bell Wanted,
1677.

¹ Bombay to Surat, 3rd April 1677, Sec. Out. Letter Book 4 of 1677-1687, 25-27. Forrest's Home Series, I. 129-130.

² Surat President Mr. Aungier and Council to Bombay, 26th April 1677, Surat Fact. Out. Letter Book 3 of 1677-1700, 31. Forrest's Home Series, I. 113.

³ Bombay to Court, 19th March 1677, Sec. Out. Letter Book 4 of 1677-1687, 22. Forrest's Home Series, I. 126.

Chapter I.

History.

Aungier's Death,
June 1677.

In June of this year (1677) the Company's interests in Western India sustained a serious loss by the death of President Aungier. The Surat letter of the 30th June to Bombay states: It hath pleased God to our great sorrow after a tedious sickness to take out of this life our worthy President, Gerald Aungier, who deceased this morning between 4 and 5 of the clock, of which we thought good to give you this timely notice that you might prevent all innovations or disturbances upon the island. For the better government of its affairs we herewith send you a copy of a clause of the Honourable Company's letter bearing date the 22nd February, wherein you will find that they have made provision in case of the decease of the Honourable Gerald Aungier and Mr. Matthew Gray that they have given full power and authority to three or more of their Council of Surat to act as commissioners in the management of their affairs in these parts of India. Therefore, until the rest of the Council can be conveniently called hither to consider and determine what shall be necessary and consistent with the Company's interest for the more ample establishment of their affairs, we think good to confirm Mr. John Petit, our worthy friend, in the management of the affairs on the island to act (with the advice of the present Council of Bombay) in as full power and authority as he could or might do by virtue of the commission given him by our late Honourable President. We hereby require all persons, inhabitants on the island, of what quality and degree soever to obey and observe his orders accordingly, and we do commend to your care the preservation and good government of the island that all things may be continued in such form and order as at present they are established, observing for the future such directions as you shall from time to time receive from us, and we desire you to strengthen us with your advice and counsel in anything you shall find conducing to the Company's interest.

Our thoughts are now taken up in giving orders and directions for the decent burial of the defunct whom God willing we intend to inter on Monday next in such manner as the time and place will admit.¹

In reply on the 11th July 1677 the Bombay Council wrote: We cannot rightly express the reality of our grief at the perusal of the deplorable news of the death of our late noble President. Multiplicity of words may multiply the sense of our loss, but cannot depaint its greatness and the knowledge we have of the true worth and integrity of his successors. It shall be our continual prayers for a blessing on your great affairs.²

A letter from Bombay dated 22nd October 1677 notes that Mr. Rolt was confirmed President in the room of Mr. Aungier.³

Mr. Rolt
President,
1677.

¹ Surat, Messrs. C. James and Cesar Chambrelan to Bombay, 30th June 1677, Surat Factory Out. Letter Book 3 of 1677-1700, 46-47. Forrest's Home Series, I. 116.

² Bombay to Surat, 11th July 1677, Sec. Out. Letter Book 4 of 1677-1687, 39. Forrest's Home Series, I. 133.

³ Bombay to Mr. Walter Clavell, 22nd Oct. 1677, Sec. Out. L. B. 4 of 1677-1687, 60.

Between 1670 and 1680 the Records contain references to the result of the suggestion that respectable Englishwomen should be encouraged to come out and settle in Bombay. In January 1671 the Surat Council refer the Directors to the petition of one John Simpson a matross (under-gunner (German *matrose* sailor) of Bombay who had desired that the Court would please to give leave for his wife and family to come out on the next shipping. Touching this matter the Council add: We humbly refer you to his own petition which will be presented to you.¹

In December 1675 the Surat Council wrote to Bombay: We have considered the request which the gentlewomen have made to you, touching their allowance for one year and the reason they allege concerning it. Though we are willing to gratify them in any thing that lies in our power and do believe what they say concerning Mr. Lewis to be probable yet we declare we cannot dispose of our Masters' estates without their order. They must therefore excuse us if we do not gratify their desire. But whereas you say some of them are in so mean a condition that they cannot subsist without help, in such case and no otherwise, we enorder that you allow either 6 or 8 pardaos (pagodas) a month to those that are in real necessity that they be preserved from want which withal they must understand as an act of charity from the Company in respect to their want. Those who are able we expect should provide themselves. And whereas you give us notice that some of the women are grown scandalous to our nation religion and government, we require you in the Honourable Company's name to give them all fair warning that they do apply themselves to a more sober and Christian conversation, otherwise the sentence is this that they shall be confined totally of their liberty to go abroad and fed with bread and water till they are embarked on board ship for England.²

Needy
Englishwomen,
1675-76.

Next month in writing on this subject to the Directors the Surat Council say: The gentlewomen and other women brought out these two last years have given us some trouble demanding the former allowances which you were pleased to grant to others, namely one year's diet if they were not married before the year expired. They pretend they were sent out on the same condition and that so much was declared to them at the India House by Mr. Lewis. Notwithstanding this we have refused to put you to that charge, declaring we had no order from you. This hath caused some discontent among them; only we have thought fit to assist those who are more objects of charity to keep them from perishing for want of sustenance. We beseech you that your orders may be hereafter clear touching such persons the better to prevent mistake.³

With regard to the order that no Europe ships were to call at Bombay, on the 17th February 1677 the Bombay Council wrote to

¹ Surat to Directors (10th January 1671), Surat Fact. Out. L. B. 1 of 1630-1673, 203. Forrest's Home Series, I. 45.

² Surat to Bombay, 18th December 1675, Surat Fact. Out. L. B. 2 of 1675-76, 13. Forrest's Home Series, I. 74.

³ Surat to Directors, 17th January 1676, Surat Fact. Out. L. B. 2 of 1675-76, 31.

Chapter I.
History.

the Directors : It is now effectless to tell your Honours the great disappointment the whole island lies under by the Europe ships not touching here. What is past cannot be recalled and we must be contented with our lot.¹

In 1677 (28th February) the Factors at Calicut wrote: The rogues of Cota are grown worse than ever. They lately killed one Englishman by name Isaac Watts for no other reason than because he would not turn Moor. They lately surprised John Chase and Nathaniell Meriton by land in their way to Dharmapatan. Our hopes are that your Worship and other friends of Bombay will in time abate their pride, confound their devices and severely chastise their insolences which would much rejoice us.²

Embarrassed
state of Bombay,
1681.

In the following years the management of Bombay continued full of difficulty. In 1679 Shivaji's admiral took possession of the island of Kenery (Khanderi) at the south entrance to Bombay harbour. After a vain attempt by the English supported by the Sidi of Janjira to dislodge the Maráthás some Bombay troops occupied the smaller rock of Henery (Underi) between Kenery and the main land. Shortly after the English were forced to retire from Henery.³ In January 1682 the Surat Council wrote to the Directors: The administration of the island of Bombay has been the most difficult as well as the most embarrassing part of our duty, on account of the occupation of the barren rocks of Henery and Kenery by the troops of Shivaji and of the Moghal; the obstructions to trade by the Portuguese; and, above all, the general impression that Sambhaji Rája, the successor of Shivaji, was following up the plans of his father and adding on every limit of his dominions to his extensive empire.⁴

Bombay,
1682.

In 1682-83 the revenue of Bombay had increased, being this season calculated to exceed the two preceding years by 4700 Xeraphins. It was doubtful whether it would yield this amount at the next sale, or farming, in March 1683, because Sambhaji continued in possession of the island of Kenery, and had ten or twelve armed galivats (*galbats*), which interrupted the trade; and because the Moghal fleet resorting to Bombay had exposed the garrison to attacks and danger. These powers, from the situation of Bombay relatively to their dominions, had kept the island in a constant alarm, the Hunter galley being the only armed ship left to protect the trade and settlement. Any scheme of the Bombay or Surat Council for the forcible recovery of Henery was made impracticable by the receipt of a letter from the Court dated 22nd April 1682 reminding the President of the Company's determination

¹ Bombay to Directors, 17th February 1677, Sec. Out. L. B. 4 of 1677-1687, 16. Forrest's Home Series, I. 124.

² Calicut to Bombay, 28th Feby. 1677. Surat Fact. Out. L. B. 11 of 1677-1700, 26. Dharmapatan, three miles north of Tellicherry, appears in the Brihat Samhitā (XIV. 14) of Varāha Mihira (A.D. 505) as an island whose people traverse the three seas of lapis lazuli conch-shells and pearls. A. M. T. Jackson, I. C. S.

³ Sir G. Birdwood's Report on the Old Records of the India Office, 1891, 83.

⁴ Surat to Directors, 23rd January 1682. Bruce's Annals, II. 472-473.

to have no war about Henery-Kenery and adding, 'all war is so contrary to our constitution as well as our interest that we cannot too often inculcate to you our aversion thereunto.'¹

By these events the relations between the Government of Bombay, Sambhaji, and the Moghal had become most embarrassing and precarious. With Sambhaji it was expedient to temporize on account of his power extending over those commercial stations on the Malabar Coast from which the principal part of the investments of pepper and cardamoms were drawn, as well as over several of the stations under the Presidency of Fort St. George particularly Porto Novo. The power of the Moghal commanded the provinces in which the principal portions of the Surat investment were collected. These alarms were increased by the Sidi's fleet and troops being too strong to be resisted by the soldiers of the garrison now reduced to less than 100 Europeans, who were daily murmuring at the price of provisions, which their pay could not afford. Under these circumstances a reference was made to the Court for instructions and aid.²

Apparently in reply, early in 1683, the Court of Directors wrote : After much charge and the wasting of many years in vain attempts, we have (we hope) at length thought of methods to make Bombay a place of considerable trade and business :

1. We have ordered the ship Charles to unlade her cowries there or so many of them as our President and Council at Surat shall give order for and to take in there such homeward lading for England as our President and Council shall think fit.

2. We have ordered the ship we are now despatching for Tonqueen in her homeward voyage to return through the straights of Mallaca to Bombay and there unload and fill up with what our President and Council shall provide beforehand to lie in the stores and give order for the shipping aboard her.

3. We have written to our President and Council to order such of our ships as he shall think fit that go down to the Coast of Malabar and India to return to Bombay and there disperse those goods among any of our ships that he shall appoint to take in their loadings at that place.

4. That in order thereunto, if he finds it not prejudicial to our service, he should send from Swally one of our small ships with bales of goods to fill up any bigger ship or ships he shall appoint to take up their full loading at Bombay.

5. In the foregoing particulars you will see we have referred much to the discretion of our President and Council at Surat. This is most necessary, seeing they are in the head of our business and so near the place ; and the more in regard our President hath been our Deputy Governor in Bombay and to give him his due the best that ever set foot upon the island since the English had it.

Chapter I. History.

Bombay,
1682.

Court's Orders,
1682.

¹ Pub. Dept. Court's Letters, Vol. 1 of 1681-1685, II. Bruce's Annals, II. 488.

² Bombay to Directors, 22nd September 1682 and 8th January 1683. Bruce's Annals, II. 488-490.

Chapter I.

History.

Court's Orders.
1682.

6. And now we have opened you a way we hope your own ingenuity will find out other mediums of meliorating the commerce of that place.

7. We hope to have a considerable trade from China in a few years and have ordered an experiment to be made for settling a trade at Canton. Although we do but now begin to order our ships to return to Bombay from thence, we do intend hereafter, when you have once a good store of pepper by you and some other proper goods for sale in China, to order our Europe ships bound for China which did usually stop at Bantam to sail directly from hence to Bombay and fill there with pepper and other proper goods of Surat and those ports. Next year you may expect our China ships shall start from as well as return to Bombay in the same manner as they have hitherto done from Bantam. The consequences of this change will be exceedingly advantageous to the island which we must hope to find our share of in the increase of our customs and other revenues. Otherwise it will be detrimental to our stock, because Bantam is the nearest port to China, and pepper and rattans to fill up our ships are cheapest there.

8. There go four factors on this ship at the salary each of £15 a year. The chief, Mr. Standley, we would have sent to Surat. The other three you may detain at Bombay if you have occasion to employ them there and the President and Council do not otherwise direct.

9. Since business is likely to increase with you, it will be absolutely necessary that you have just, faithful, sober, and diligent men for the godown-keepers. And, though they be never so good, we would have our Deputy Governor as oft as his business will permit to see after them himself and observe how our business is managed in the godowns and frequently inspect their books and accounts.

10. Bombay hath been so monstrously out of order and over-grown with riot, prodigality, carelessness and folly, that though in his time Mr. Child did as much as we could hope for towards a reformation in so short a time, yet such was the obstinance of the matter contracted by expensive and vicious habits that it was too perverse and hard for him to correct at once. But he having laid the foundation of a more frugal and careful managery, you will be infinitely to blame if you do not perfectly finish that which was with more difficulty begun by him. This of the two is far the easier task there being in government as well as in mechanics a great truth in that old adage *facile est inventis addere*.

11. That in going through with the work of retrenchment and reformation you may remove all old incorrigible lumber out of the way, we have given full authority to our President and Council at Surat that whoever in their judgment and consciences they shall find unfit for our services, they turn out in a summary way without the formality of tedious, impertinent, chargeable

examinations, attestations, certificates, letters or other trumpery as was used in the case of Mr. Petit to no purpose, long experience having convinced us of this certain truth that wherever things go generally ill, expenses great, despatches slow, accounts confused, debts standing out, the instruments are certainly nought though none better furnished with volumes of attestations and certificates.

12. And therefore if there be any on Bombay in our service that are riotous, unfaithful or negligent, fail not without favour or affection, anger or prejudice, to give impartial notice of them to our President and Council at Surat, who, we doubt not, will ease you of such burdens.

13. We have now by the Scipio advice of a war between the two kings of Bantam, which confirms us in our resolution of ordering all our China ships to return to your place and have written to our President and Council at Surat to provide and have in readiness in the godowns the value of £20,000 sterling by January or February 1683 in proper goods of India to be put on board such ships as we shall send out next summer to complete their loadings at Bombay and sail directly from thence to China. But if some of you do not become more serious and careful in our business and in your own conversations we shall have cause to doubt you will not be capable of managing so great a trust and such weighty affairs as we shall have to transact upon that island hereafter. We shall suspend our judgments till we see how well you will acquit yourselves this year.

14. We shall send you out by our ships thirty young English soldiers with a Lieutenant, one Thomas Child, who is allied to our President at Surat; he hath been a Captain of foot in the King's service and hath likewise had command at sea; him we intend in the room of Lieutenant Nicolls but not to be of the Company. These thirty soldiers we intend to fill up your company but not to make any increase of officers.¹

On the 15th August 1683, in communicating to Bombay the important news of the grant of a fresh charter the Court wrote: We send you enclosed an authentic copy of a new Charter granted us by His Majesty under the great seal of England, for the suppressing all interloping and interlopers, of which we shall write you more largely by our ships. In the meantime we do hereby appoint our Deputy Governor of Bombay to be our Judge Advocate there, and to put all the powers granted us by the said new Charter into full and perfect execution.²

On the 7th April 1684, before the news of Keigwin's revolt had reached them, the Court wrote to the President at Surat: We have chosen Dr. St. John Doctor of the Civil Law to be Judge of the Admiralty Court in the East Indies and of all our maritime affairs there, to be erected in pursuance of His Majesty's additional charter of the 9th August last (1683) at the salary of £200 a

Chapter I.

History.

Court's Orders,
1682.New Charter,
1683.Admiralty
Court,
1684.

¹ Court to Bombay without date (1682), Public Department Letters from the Court, Vol. 1 of 1681-1685, 32-34. Of this letter four pages are missing.

² Court to Bombay, 15th Aug. 1683, Pub. Dept. Court's L. Vol. 1 of 1681-1685, 55.

Chapter I.

History.

Admiralty
Court,
1684.

year, and to have the accommodation of his own diet at the Governor's table at Bombay, but all other accommodations for himself and his two servants are to be at his own charge and to take place at the Governor's table as second. We therefore order and direct that a convenient place be assigned him for holding the Court of Admiralty, and that you appoint such officers as are necessary to attend that Judicature which is designed for proceeding against all interlopers and private ships and persons trading in the East Indies or to or from the East Indies, contrary to His Majesty's Royal charter granted to us. For the honour of our nation and more perfect information of all persons that are and shall be concerned in the proceedings of that judicature, we do expressly order and direct that the whole process of that Court be carried on in English and not in Latin in all the Commissions, Acts, Constitutions, and sentences thereof, and that you do take care that a table of fees be agreed on and published for all processes, writs, summons, adjudications, sentences and decrees and all other things that are or shall be passed in the said Court and to all officers attending the same, which are not to be exceeded, upon some moderate penalty to be therein inserted and published. His Majesty hath been pleased upon our approbations of him to grant Dr. St. John a commission under the great seal of England to the purpose aforesaid. For which also he hath our commission under our larger seal, a copy whereof we herewith send you, and he is from time to time to transmit unto you, as also to represent unto the Deputy Governor and Council of Bombay an impartial account of all his proceedings, as Judge of the said Court. But all other judicatures upon our said island are to remain in the same condition and order they now are and under the management of the same persons, until you receive our further orders after we have an account from you of the good deportment of the said Doctor.¹

Interlopers,
1684.

About the same time (April 1684) it was found that the ships of interlopers instead of taking in their cargoes at a British port, went to Ostend, and took in Europe produce on British capital, and thence proceeded to India. On discovering this project, the Court applied to the King, who ordered a man-of-war to intercept them, but two of their vessels escaped. Instructions were therefore sent to the Company's agents to seize their ships and goods.²

On the 3rd October 1684 the Court wrote to Surat: We are very sensible that the interlopers have given you great trouble, and have

¹ Court to Surat, 7th April 1684, Pub. Dep. Court's L. Vol. 1. of 1681-1685, 87-88. This Court was to be held at Bombay, as being a possession acquired by the Crown and by it vested in the Company in full property. It was to consist of the Judge and two merchants—Company's servants. The Judge was to take cognizance of and to try examine and decide on all cases regarding the interlopers or private merchants who might attempt, contrary to the King's orders and in violation of the Company's exclusive privileges, to trade or establish factories in the countries within their limits. Court's letter to Surat, 7th April 1684; Company's commission to Dr. St. John, 7th April 1684; King's commission to Dr. St. John, 6th Feb. 1684. Bruce's Annals, II. 497.

² Bruce's Annals, II. 522.

been a great interruption to all our business, but are fully satisfied that our President and Council are worthy men and have served us faithfully and as well as any men could have done under so many disappointments.¹

On the 16th November 1683 the Court again state: We are now much set upon the improvement of that our island of Bombay and do esteem it a place of more consequence than we have formerly done. We cannot imagine but a wise and prudent Council might promote or create a trade there in a place so admirably situated and so full of people.²

In the same letter the Court administer the following caution: The increase of our people at Bombay must necessarily increase our revenue if you be careful to make the most of it. With a little ingenuity you may find out other ways to augment our revenue, which we require you to make your study and endeavour as much for the sake of your common country as your employers. It is a vain and idle imagination for any man to think the English nation can ever be as considerable in India as the Dutch until we are as wise as they in creating and thrifty management of revenues in places conquered, fortified, or possessed. This necessary providence the Dutch have improved and refined to such a degree at Batavia as to make that place render to the Company clear annually £90,000 sterling (as we are informed), more than all the great charge thereof.³

In April 1684 the counsels for the improvement of Bombay are repeated: We are now much more concerned for the improvement of Bombay. We were concluding it to be a place that may stand us in mighty stead in case of a war with the Dutch or that the Moghal governors should go and affront us as they did last year in the Bay. We would, therefore, have you keep that island always in a strong posture of defence and our soldiers strictly to their duty and in the constant exercise of their arms. You should set your wits effectually on work to create some considerable manufacture upon the island that may augment the number of the inhabitants whom we would have modelled into trained hands under English or other officers, as you shall see cause, and make of them one or two regiments or more as their numbers will hold out. They should be exercised in arms one day in every two months or as often as you shall think may be convenient. You need not always waste powder at such exercise, but teach them to handle their arms, their facings, wheelings, marching, and countermarching, the first ranks to present, draw their triggers together at the beat of the drum, and

Chapter I. History.

Court's Orders,
1683.

Thrift Enjoined,
1683.

Improvement
of Bombay,
1684.

¹ Pub. Dept. Court's Letter, Vol. 1 of 1681-1685, 94.

² Court to Bombay Deputy Governor and Council, 16th November 1683. Pub. Dept. Letters from the Court, Vol. 1 of 1681-1685, 59.

³ Court to Bombay Deputy Governor and Council, 16th November 1683, Pub. Dept. Court's Letters Vol. 1 of 1681-1685, 60. The capture of Bantam by the Dutch led to the declaration of the Court that in future they would consider Bombay as an independent English settlement, and the seat of the power and trade of the English nation in the East Indies. The resolution was incompatible with the retrenchments, civil and military, ordered in the two last seasons (1681-1683). Bruce's Annals, II, 497-498.

Chapter I. History.

Ships to be
stationed at
Bombay,
1684.

fall into the rear for the second ranks to advance as is often used with learners in our artillery ground. Still sometimes they must be used to firing, lest in time of action they should start at the noise or the recoil of their arms.¹

In the same letter the Court state: The ships Return, Formosa, Tywan, and other of our country vessels will now all belong to your President. We would have their station or home to be Bombay for the security of our island. Notwithstanding it will import us much that you keep them voyaging constantly upon short trips for rice or pepper, especially when you apprehend the island not to be in danger. Otherwise the charge of those ships may eat out a great part of our stock, which we hope our President and Council's prudence will prevent. They will take care likewise that the new military titles which we have now conferred upon our President Governor and Second of Bombay, shall make no increase of charge to the Company.²

Advantages
from Rice Trade,
1684.

The Court continues: We promise ourselves by the trade of rice besides the profit of it, the following great advantages³:

1. Our ships that used to lie idle in Swally Hole will by that means be earning us something towards the charge of their demurrage.

2. Our island and bay will be the better secured by the constant resort of so many English ships to and from it, as this trade will occasion, which before was managed by boats of no force.

3. By the store the Company will always have kept of rice and paddy, the island will be secured from famine in case of any sudden breach or affront from your neighbours.

The truth is it is imprudent for the Government of so populous an island to be at any time unprovided of half a year's store of rice or paddy for all the inhabitants. Or to attempt any considerable thing till their fortifications are all strong and completely finished, their guns and carriages all firm and fixed, their companies of soldiers full and kept to strict order and discipline, and the guards exactly set and relieved every day as if an enemy were in port. This we require of our Deputy Governor to be constantly performed, and when your emulators see you in such a posture, they will not be so apt to affront you as they have been, for though the old maxim was *pax quesita bello*, peace may as well be preserved and obtained by being in a formidable and strong posture of war and defence as by war itself.⁴

Company's
Estate
at Bombay,
1684.

The Court continues: Though on this occasion we will not absolutely order it, we think fit to recommend it to your prudence, whether it be not convenient at all times to keep the greatest part of our estate and stores of pepper or other goods at Bombay. For

¹ Court of Directors to the President and Council at Surat, 7th April 1684, Public Dept., Vol. 1 of 1681 - 1685, 77.

² Court to Surat, 7th April 1684, Pub. Dept. Court's L. Vol. 1 of 1681 - 1685, 80.

³ In the same letter, 7th April 1684, the Court ordered soldiers and weavers to be paid partly in rice at Company's price and partly in money. Pub. Dept. Letters from the Court, Vol. 1 of 1681 - 1685, 81.

⁴ Court to Surat, 7th April 1684, Pub. Dept. Court's L. Vol. 1 of 1681 - 1685, 82.

you see we are resolved so far as in us lies to make it impregnable; and we hope it may be much more healthful hereafter, when the drowned lands are drained as we hope they may by that method we have now propounded.¹

By what we wrote you last year you will see we are resolved upon the defence and improvement of Bombay in another manner than ever we were heretofore. Your letters this year intimating the encroachment of the Moghal's governors, and the repeated affronts of the Portuguese, give us farther cause to hasten you in the building of such bastions as are wanting and in the prosecution of those other methods for the improvement of that place which (we) then gave you.

Besides which we are now resolved that for the future at least one-half of our Europe shipping shall load home directly from Bombay not outgoing at all to Surat or Swally. We therefore do hereby order you from Surat and the Coast of Malabár and India to make such a provision of all sorts of goods to lie ready imbaled at Bombay, that what upon good deliberation we have now resolved may certainly and effectually be complied with.²

In other despatches the Court instructed the President to temporise with both Sambhaji and the Moghal. With Sambhaji by an application for permission to re-establish the Factory at Rájápur; and with the Moghal by presents to the governor of Surat, to prevent his taking alarm from the removal of part of the Company's goods and shipping from that port.³

On the 2nd July 1684 the Court wrote: Though our business is only trade and security, not conquest which the Dutch have aimed at, we dare not trade boldly, nor leave great stocks the year about in any country where we have not the security of a fort. For this cause we are now lessening our trade at Surat and drawing our concerns more to Bombay. For the same cause likewise

Chapter I. History.

Bombay
Defences,
1684.

Transfer of
Commerce to
Bombay,
1684.

Trade and
Conquest,
1684.

¹ Court to the Surat President and Council, 7th April 1684, Pub. Dept. Court's L. Vol. 1 of 1681 - 1685, 86. No details have been traced of the method referred to.

² Court to the Surat President and Council, 2nd July 1684, Pub. Dept. Letters from the Court, Vol. 1 of 1681 - 1685, 91.

³ Court to the Presidency of Surat, 18th April and 2nd July 1684, Bruce's Annals, II, 523. In the same year (1684) a despatch contains the following reference to the Persian trade: We very well like the Persian minister's proposals for English ships to be constantly employed between Persia and India. We shall this year spare you shipping enough that you may employ two constantly in that trade, if you find you can do it to our advantage. And we do hereby leave it to your discretion to make such an agreement for us as you shall think fit which we will take care to perform. First it will be requisite that some end were made with the Persian for the great arrears of customs they owe us. These we have ordered Sir Thomas Grantham to demand of them as soon as he shall arrive in the Gulf of Persia, and in case of refusal to right us by reprisal upon the king of Persia's subjects for which purpose we have fully instructed him. Of this we do not send you copies nor any copies to our agent and council of Gombroon that they and you may much more justly plead ignorance. In case the Persian should resent anything, Sir Thomas Grantham shall do in the Gulf in pursuance of those orders we have given him. Thus much of that affair we thought necessary now to impart to you that you may the better provide for the security of our estate in Persia and all other places subordinate to your Presidency. Court's letter to the Surat President and Council, 7th April 1684, Pub. Dept. Letters from the Court, Vol. 1 of 1681 - 1685, 85 - 86.

Chapter I.
History.

Capt. Keigwin's
Revolt,
1683.

we are enlarging our fortifications as well as our trade at Kárwár.¹

While these directions for the improvement of the position of Bombay and the development of its trade were on their way to India the revolt of Captain Keigwin, the Commandant of the Bombay garrison, had removed the island from the control of the Company's officers and nominally handed it to the King of England. The main cause of Keigwin's revolt was the measures which for some years had been in favour of abridging the charges of Bombay, and particularly the military expenses. The officers both in their rank and pay had been placed lower than they had formerly been and the militia had been so much reduced that not only discipline had been relaxed but the authority of the officers over the men was at an end. Discontent, bordering on disobedience, could not be easily repressed and an incident only was wanting to kindle this discontent into a revolt. Captain Keigwin applied for subsistence money, there being no Company's table as formerly. After much altercation between him and the Deputy Governor, he was allowed money to the extent of 25 rupees a month, but in case the Court should disapprove of this allowance, it was to be refunded. Thus the plan of abridging the charges of the officers entrusted with the defence and protection of Bombay was unhappily carried to the extreme of ordering the half allowance paid for diet to Captain Keigwin to be refunded. This parsimonious measure produced the discontent and probably the revolt of the garrison.²

Captain Richard Keigwin, who commanded the Company's garrison at Bombay, assisted by Ensign Thornburn and others, on the 27th December 1683, seized on Mr. Ward the Deputy Governor and such Members of Council as adhered to him, assembled the troops and militia, annulled the authority of the Company by proclamation, and declared the island to be immediately under the King's protection. The garrison, consisting of 150 English soldiers and 200 topasses, and the inhabitants of the island, elected Captain Keigwin to be Governor, and appointed officers to the different companies, with suitable rank, and civil officers, storekeepers, and harbour-masters, declaring, that if their servants would acknowledge the King's government as proclaimed, and did not interfere with the administration of it, the Company might proceed in their trade without molestation. Keigwin took possession of the Company's ship *Return* and the *Hunter* frigate, and landed the treasure amounting to between 50,000 and 60,000 rupees, intended for the investment at Kárwár, which he lodged in the Fort, and published a declaration that it should be employed only for the defence of the King's island and government.³

Capt. Keigwin's
Measures,
1684.

The first measure taken, after the revolt, was a proclamation by Captain Keigwin, requiring the inhabitants to take the oaths of allegiance to the King and to renounce their obedience to the Com-

¹ Court to the Surat President and Council, 2nd July 1684, Pub. Dept. Letters from the Court, Vol. 1 of 1681-1685, 92.

² Bruce's Annals, II. 512-513, 522-523.

³ Bruce's Annals, II. 512.

pany. With this proclamation the whole of the garrison, militia, and inhabitants readily complied; the troops from an expectation of relief from the grievances of which they had complained, and the inhabitants from the usual expectations held out to mobs of relief from taxes. To such a height did this frenzy proceed that the crews of the Company's ships, sent first with commissioners and next accompanying President Child to Bombay to prevail on Captain Keigwin and his adherents to return to their duty, instead of being disposed to act offensively against the revolvers, caught the prejudices by which they were instigated and could not be entrusted in the most necessary services which the commissioners and afterwards the President and his Council thought might be effectual for the restoration of order and legal authority.

Captain Keigwin and his associates then addressed letters to His Majesty and to the Duke of York, expressive of their determination to maintain the island for the King till his pleasure should be known, and enumerated the causes which had imposed upon them the necessity of revolt either to prevent the island being seized by Sambhaji who was in possession of Karanja, or by the Sidi or Admiral of the Moghal who with a numerous naval force lay near it, each having in view to expel equally the King's or the Company's forces from a station of which both for a number of years had been jealous, and each afraid that the other might anticipate him in acquiring. Captain Keigwin and the conspirators next represented to the Court of Committees that the selfish schemes of Sir Josiah Child in England, and of his brother Mr. John Child the President of Surat, of whom Mr. Ward, the Deputy Governor of Bombay, was an instrument only, had been the real source of their conduct; adding that both the garrison and inhabitants were determined to preserve the place in its allegiance till the King's pleasure should be conveyed to them.¹

Chapter I.

History

Capt. Keigwin's
Measures,
1684.

¹ Bruce's Annals, II. 513-515. During this crisis (January to September 1684) Captain Keigwin sent Captain Gary to Sambhaji Raja and succeeded in negotiating a treaty for free trade in his dominions. He also procured an order for the payment of 12,000 pagodas due to the Company. This service, he represented in a letter to King Charles II., the Company had neglected, or perhaps could not have effected. He added that the garrison of Bombay consisted of 505 men in full allegiance to His Majesty; that the island was supported by its own revenue; and that none of the Company's money, seized on the ship return, had hitherto been made use of. These events embarrassed trade, as the natives could not distinguish between those who had usurped power and those who really were the representatives of the English nation or the Company—an evil which necessarily arose from seeing the subjects of the same country assuming the distinctions of King's and Company's servants, unintelligible to those who could only judge from appearances and from power. In this situation President Child and his Council made every exertion to prepare an investment of Surat goods, pepper, cardamoms and indigo, for the Company's ships and to despatch them for Europe that the home sales might be as little injured as possible by the convulsed state of this seat of their trade and its dependencies. A factory was established at Tellicherry under instructions to avoid offending the French who had a house of trade at that port, because the arbitrary proceedings of the Dutch in monopolizing the whole of the pepper trade, and the depression of the Portuguese settlements from their war with Sambhaji, required conciliatory measures with the French to induce them to transfer their house at Tellicherry to the Company. Letters from the Presidency of Surat to the Court, 10th 16th and 26th April and 1st May, and to the Secret Committee, 26th September 1684, Captain Keigwin's letter to the King, 15th September 1684. Bruce, II. 536-537.

Chapter I.**History.**

Action taken by
Surat President,
1684.

When the President and Council of Surat were informed of this unexpected and dangerous revolt, they appointed three commissioners (Mr. Zinzan, Mr. Day, and Mr. Gosfright) to proceed with three of the Company's ships to Bombay and endeavour by promises of pardon and redress of grievances to persuade the revolvers to return to their duty to the Company. After fruitless conferences for a month, in which every expedient was tried on the part of the commissioners and refused on the part of Captain Keigwin and his adherents, they were satisfied that persuasions and threats were equally unavailing. On the 31st January 1684 President Child arrived off Bombay with three more of the Company's ships, the three which came with the commissioners having been at different times in this month despatched to England with the Company's investments. The commissioners remained on board a country vessel, while President Child held conferences with Captain Keigwin and repeated promises of pardon and redress of grievances. This offer also was unavailing, for the animosity of Captain Keigwin and his adherents was directed against the President and his brother Sir Josiah Child, to whose influence they ascribed not only the sufferings which had driven them to the measures which they had taken but all the evils of which they and the greater part of the inhabitants of the island complained.

Mr. Child returns
to Surat,
1684.

After consultations which continued till the month of March 1684 and after duly reflecting that he had no military force which could reduce the island to obedience, and that the crews of the ships so far favoured the revolvers that they would not act offensively against them, it was determined to despatch to England the three Company's ships with their cargoes estimated at above one million of rupees, and to station two confidential persons at the island of Kenery and two at the Portuguese settlement at Vesáva, and by permission of the Sidi and of the Portuguese Governor to employ boats, whenever ships might appear in the offing, to direct the Captains not to go into Bombay harbour but to proceed directly to Swally. Under these circumstances the President and his Council returned to Surat, leaving the island of Bombay in the possession of the revolvers.¹

Besides the want of force, military or naval, another not less strong motive rendered necessary this conduct on the part of the President and his Council. The interlopers had for years been increasing. During the present season they had been more numerous than in any former year. Strong apprehensions were therefore entertained, either that the revolvers had been instigated by the agents of the interlopers, or that, could force have been employed, a connection between Captain Keigwin and these adventurers would be formed

¹Bruce's Annals, II. 515 - 516. It appears that the President with his Council had returned to Surat on the 7th March 1684 and employed every expedient to induce the revolvers at Bombay to return to their duty, and had been so fortunate as to retake the Company's ship Return sent by the revolvers to Mr. Petit, the chief of the interlopers at Surat—a proof that the opinion which the Presidency had formed respecting the connection between the interlopers and the revolvers was well founded. Bruce's Annals, II. 536.

(for they had frequently reported that a new East India Company had been instituted in England in whose employ they were), and that the interlopers would assist the insurgents and get possession of the island.¹

As soon as advices of the revolt at Bombay arrived and information was received that Captain Keigwin had addressed letters to the King and to the Duke of York, attempting to explain away a public crime by the necessity of preserving the island in its allegiance to the King and to save it from becoming a conquest to Shivaji or the Moghal, the Court appointed a Committee of Secrecy with powers to make application to His Majesty and to concert such measures as might be advisable for the recovery of the place.²

In a letter to Surat of the 3rd October 1684 the Court observe: We are very sorry for the ill news of Bombay. For reducement thereof, we have by His Majesty's command appointed a Secret Committee consisting of the Governor, Deputy Governor Sir Benjamin Bathurst, Sir Jeremy Sambrook, and Mr. Joseph Herne, whose orders touching that affair you are to pursue as effectually as if they came from ourselves as you will perceive by an order of Court of 6th August 1684.³

The Secret Committee stated in a report to the King, dated the 15th August 1684, that from the period when their charter and privileges had been renewed, their officers and soldiers had enjoyed encouragements superior to those which the Dutch granted to their troops; that the pay and allowances of an English soldier were greater than those of an inferior Dutch officer; that their President and Governor, so far from cruel and oppressive conduct towards the garrison, had on all occasions manifested every indulgence compatible with the duty of rendering the revenues equal to the charges of the establishment; that since the island had been transferred to the Company, they had expended the large sum of £300,000 on fortifications and improvements, had constructed an excellent harbour to become the resort of the English trade, and in the preceding season 1683-84 had embarked 70 soldiers to St. Helena and two complete companies to Fort St. George; that they had authorized the President to engage five companies of native troops to serve at Bombay; and that the source of the rebellion could be traced to Mr. Petit and Mr. Bourcher, two of the Company's civil servants who had been dismissed for encouraging the interlopers, of whom they now had become the leaders and

Chapter I. History.

Secret
Committee,
1684.

¹ Letters, papers, commissions, and instructions from the Presidency of Surat relative to the island of Bombay; Report of Commissioners, 30th November, 29th and 30th December 1683, and 1st, 5th, 6th, 7th, 10th, 14th and 30th January 1684. Account of the revolt at Bombay, January February and March 1684. Address from the revolted, and Captain Keigwin's letters to His Majesty and to His Royal Highness the Duke of York, 25th January and 23rd February 1684. Correspondence between President Child and the revolted in the month of February 1684 (Indian Register Office). Bruce's Annals, II, 512-517.

² Bruce's Annals, II, 523-524.

³ Court to the Surat President and Council, 3rd October 1684, Public Department, Court's Letters Vol. I of 1681-1685, 94.

Chapter I.
History.

Secret
Committee,
1684.

had made application to the Moghal to obtain privileges for a Factory at Surat similar to that of the Company; that these proceedings tended to seduce the Company's garrison, who had become instruments in the interloping projects as appeared in the reasons assigned by the revolvers for their conduct; and thus the evil (in their own language) "had outrun the remedy"; for they had revived the question (contrary to the prerogative of His Majesty) whether a grant from the Crown, without the authority of the Legislature, could give exclusive privileges to the East India Company? And that the revolt had been also encouraged by the Company's not having power (as appeared in the former cases of Sir Edward Winter at Fort St. George, and at Bombay and St. Helena) to seize and bring to trial their servants for disobedience and insubordination. The Secret Committee therefore prayed His Majesty that the rights and powers of the Company might be clearly defined; that a commission might be issued under the Great Seal for restoring the island of Bombay to them; and a pardon offered to the revolvers, with the exception of the four principals—Captain Keigwin, Ensign Thornburn (who had been the chief ring-leader), Captain Adderton, and Lieutenant Fletcher; and that His Majesty would issue a proclamation ordering all interlopers to leave India under severe penalties.¹

King's Orders,
1684.

So far as regarded the reduction of the island of Bombay to the Company's obedience, this request was immediately granted. An order issued under the Sign Manual to Captain Keigwin and his associates to deliver up the island to the Presidency of Surat or to such persons as the Company might appoint to receive it. A commission under the Great Seal, dated the 25th August 1684, was also directed to President Child, to the members of the Councils at Surat and Bombay, and to the commanders of the Company's ships, empowering them to receive the island from Keigwin and his associates, and to offer a general pardon to all (except the four ringleaders) who should within twenty-four hours after notice return to their duty.

Court's Orders,
1684.

Under these commissions President Child was appointed Captain General and Admiral of the Company's sea and land forces; Sir Thomas Grantham Vice-Admiral; and the senior commander of the Company's ships Rear Admiral; with orders to assemble the fleet and such forces as they could muster at Surat (the men having been instructed in the use of small arms during the voyage), and to proceed to Bombay where they were to intimate the King's commands to Keigwin and require him to surrender the island. In the event of Keigwin's refusal, he and all who might adhere to him were to be proclaimed rebels and traitors; a Council of War was then to be assembled to concert measures for acting offensively, and to offer rewards for apprehending the principal mutineers, that is Rs. 4000 for seizing Captain Keigwin, Rs. 4000 for Ensign Thornburn, Rs. 2000 for Captain Adderton, and Rs. 2000 for

¹ Report from the Secret Committee of the East India Company to King Charles II., 15th August 1684, in Bruce's Annals, II. 523-525.

Lieutenant Fletcher and Rs. 8000 to be distributed, according to rank, to such persons as might signalize themselves in the service, with assurances to those who might be wounded, of a suitable provision by the Company, or, in the event of their being killed, of an allowance to their families.

The Court by a subsequent application to the King obtained an order for Captain Tyrrel with His Majesty's ship *Phoenix* to accompany the fleet and to command under the President in the reduction of the revolted island. If Captain Keigwin should refuse to deliver up the island to President Child, or to any of the Company's officers, Captain Tyrrel, who commanded the King's ship, was authorized to accept the surrender and re-deliver the island to the Company. This service being performed, he was to continue in India with the *Phoenix* at the Company's expense for one season, and to be employed under the directions of the President and Council in capturing the vessels of interlopers, receiving half of the Company's moiety of such seizures for his encouragement in the service.

The instructions given by the Secret Committee to the President and Council of Surat were in substance to try every expedient to induce the revolted islanders to surrender, and to employ force only on their obstinately refusing to deliver up the place, still however keeping to His Majesty's orders of excepting the principal mutineers. In the event of a general pardon having been granted before the arrival of those orders, the four ringleaders were to be strictly watched, and, in case of any farther attempts by them, they were to be brought to trial for their first act of rebellion, and if found guilty, to be executed, that an example might be made to prevent future revolts. In the event of their resisting till the orders arrived they were to be tried as rebels and traitors.

For the better preservation of the island in obedience to the King and to the Company, the seat of the Company's government was to be removed from Surat to Bombay where the President and Council were to reside, and a force of three English companies to be maintained with such number of native troops and militia as the President might deem it expedient to employ.¹

On the 3rd October 1684 the Court of Directors wrote to the President in Surat: Though we have been in a hurry of trouble and confusion and forced to please every body during the competition of the interlopers and the rebellion of Bombay, yet we hope the arrival of this and our following ships will put our General and Council into such spirit and our affairs into such a flourishing condition that good discipline may be restored again as well in our

Chapter I.
History.

Court's Orders,
1684.

Secret
Committee's
Instructions,
1684.

Court's Orders,
1684.

¹ Order under the Sign Manual to Captain Keigwin to deliver the island of Bombay to the Company, 23rd August 1684; Commission from the King to the President and Council of Surat and Bombay for taking possession of the island of Bombay, 25th August 1684; instructions from the Secret Committee of the East India Company to the Commissioners, 25th August 1684; letter from the Secret Committee to the Presidency of Surat, 26th September 1684; Commission to Captain Tyrrel of His Majesty's ship *Phoenix*, 23rd October 1684. Bruce's Annals, II. 526 - 528.

Chapter I.**History.**Court's Orders,
1684.

factories as in our garrisons, that our General and Council may countenance and prefer such as in adversity stood faithful true and zealous to our interest, and may discountenance and debase all those they found false cold or as we usually say hollow-hearted towards our interest. We persuade ourselves that you will find upon this ship's arrival in all our commanders officers and seamen a more hearty vigorous and active spirit for the ruining of all interlopers and their adherents than you have formerly discovered in them, it being manifest now to all unbiased men that it is not this Company only that such ill-minded men wound but the honour and interest of their King and country. If Bombay be again in our possession, we would have you pursue all those methods for its improvement and security that we advised you in our last year's and in the former years' letters, by such steps and graduations as you shall find most advisable for our service. To this purpose let extracts of all those letters of what relates to Bombay be written out that our General may take them with him thither and read them in our Council of Bombay, that all our Council there may take notice of them, and by bearing the purport of them in their minds, may be always thinking of the most proper means conducing to those ends.¹

Capt. Keigwin
Surrenders,
1684.

In all their reports on the revolt the President and Council at Surat ascribed it to the instigation of the interlopers and to the restless disposition of the soldiery. After Sir Thomas Grantham's arrival at Surat, the 16th October 1684,² the first subject of deliberation between Mr. Child the Surat President and his Council, Dr. St. John³

¹ Court to the President and Council at Surat, 3rd October 1684, Public Department, Letters from the Court, Vol. I of 1681 - 1685, 97.

² Before they were aware of the revolt, the Company had fitted out a large ship, the Charles the Second, carrying between 60 and 70 guns, under the command of Sir Thomas Grantham, who was also invested with a King's Commission, and to have a vote in the Council at Surat, while at the port. The object of this equipment was to recover if possible the English Factory at Bantam; or if that should be found impracticable, to proceed to the Gulf of Persia, and there, by the appearance of force, to endeavour to re-establish the Company's rights at Gombroon. Bruce's Annals, II. 539 - 540.

³ Dr. St. John arrived at Surat as Judge Advocate under the Commission from His Majesty on the 15th September 1684. His Commission was published and the Court erected in the King's name at Surat on the 17th September 1684. To give it greater authority to overawe the revolted at Bombay, they were informed that their case would come under the cognizance of a King's Judge, and be tried in a more summary manner (whatever might be the result of the revolt) than if their conduct should become matter of judicial investigation and decision in England. On this occasion Dr. St. John drew up a very able report, which he addressed to the King and Council on the general state of the Company's affairs and the particular causes of the revolt at Bombay. On the first of these subjects he represented that the aggressions of the Portuguese and Dutch had been so great and so long continued, that it was impossible the English trade could continue in India for three years, unless His Majesty should adopt effectual measures for restraining their proceedings, and protecting his rights, and those of his subjects, in the East Indies. On the second, that is on the revolt at Bombay, after an attentive examination of the conduct of President Child who during the twenty-five years he had been in India, had maintained a steady loyalty to his king and country, and an uninterrupted probity and activity in his administration of the Company's affairs, Dr. St. John stated that the rebellion of Bombay had arisen from the depredations and crimes of the interlopers, with whom Captain Keigwin was intimately connected, whom he termed the "Oliver."

and Sir Thomas Grantham, was whether they should employ force or persuasion to induce the commander of the interloping ship Bristol to deliver up that vessel and cargo to Sir Thomas Grantham. As the commander refused, Sir Thomas did not think himself authorized either by his commission or his instructions from the Company to employ force. Disappointed in this expedient, it was next resolved that Sir Thomas Grantham should proceed to Bombay where he arrived on the 10th November 1684. With promptitude and spirit he landed without any attendants and demanded a conference with Captain Keigwin, the result of which was that Keigwin agreed to deliver up the fort to him as a King's officer on the 12th November, on condition of a free pardon to himself and to his adherents. Some difficulties arose on the following day with the garrison, one of the soldiers of which, had he not been prevented by Lieutenant Fletcher one of the ringleaders in the mutiny, would have shot Sir Thomas Grantham. For a few days therefore the revolvers were again possessed of the island. In this interval Mr. Zinzan, who had been appointed by the President to be Deputy Governor of the island, arrived with Mr. English and Dr. St. John as Commissioners from Surat, and the island was formally surrendered on the 19th November 1684 by Captain Keigwin to Sir Thomas Grantham as bearing a King's commission, and by him immediately transferred in the King's name to Dr. St. John as the King's Judge by whom it was delivered to Mr. Zinzan as the Company's Governor till the arrival of the President.

The money which Keigwin had taken out of the ship *Return* was delivered to Sir Thomas Grantham, without having been embezzled; but the revenues of the island had been expended, the amount of which was to become the subject of a subsequent investigation. The new Deputy Governor, Mr. Zinzan, by advice of Dr. St. John ratified the general pardon which had been promised by Sir Thomas Grantham, and Captain Keigwin went on board the *Charles the Second* under his protection, with the intention of proceeding to England where he arrived in July 1685.¹ Sir

Chapter I.

History.

Capt. Keigwin
Surrenders,
1684.

and Protector of the Island of Bombay" and who though he used the King's name and authority in his proceedings, had, on a full examination of all the facts, been influenced solely by predatory and rebellious motives. Dr. St. John therefore gave it as his advice to the King and Council to appoint President Child to be the King's Lord Admiral in India, with full powers to seize and bring to justice the interlopers of every description. He concluded with repeating that unless the Portuguese and the Dutch should be prevented from carrying into execution their fixed project of expelling the English from their trade and factories, and unless the interlopers in England as well as in India should be suppressed, the trade between England and the East Indies could not continue for three years. General letter from the Presidency of Surat to the Court, 26th September 1684. Letters from Dr. St. John, Judge at Surat, to His Majesty and the Privy Council, dated Surat, 20th September 1684; and his Official Report on the Revolt at Bombay, dated Surat, 23rd September 1684. East India Papers in the State Paper Office Nos. 272, 273. Bruce, II. 538, 539.

¹ On this Sir Thomas Grantham's ship *Charles the Second* was sent at the same time a very large cargo of pepper estimated at Rs. 4,35,700 that the freight might reward an officer whose loyalty and fidelity to the Company, the Presidency and Dr. St. John in their letters to the King and to the Duke of York acknowledged in the strongest and most honourable terms. During these transactions (March to November 1684), the President, Mr. Child, remained at Surat occupied in providing

Chapter I.
History.

Thomas Grantham was knighted for his services in suppressing this mutiny.¹

As a recompense to those officers who had remained faithful to the Company, it was deemed expedient to form the two companies of infantry at Bombay into three, and to give commissions to officers on whose fidelity the Deputy Governor could depend.²

Punishments,
1685.

On the 7th January 1685 the Court of Directors wrote to Surat: Let Mr. Watson, that scandalous Chaplain at Bombay, have no salary from us from the time of his rebellion, nor any other officers there as near as you can, without incurring a new hazard until you are firmly settled in your government; and let Mr. Watson know he is no more our servant; banish him the island and let him take care to pay for his own passage home, and provide yourselves of another chaplain for Bombay out of some of our ships if you can meet with any so much to your satisfaction as you have at Surat in the room of Badham deceased.³

At this time (1685) Bombay was represented in point of allegiance to be of a rather doubtful description from so many officers remaining on the establishment who had been concerned in the revolt, and who, from their having received pardon, were again becoming insolent, and creating apprehensions in the Presidency of Surat of a new mutiny. Under such circumstances the President could only temporize till fresh instructions and additional force should arrive to enable him to bring the whole under his obedience or under a defined and regular subordination.⁴

The Portuguese,
1684.

In connection with the disputed levy of tolls and their other disagreements with the Portuguese the Court's despatch of the 7th April 1684 contained the following instructions: We send you with this a book of the whole transactions that have formerly passed concerning the injury of the Portuguese at Bombay, the result whereof (as you will see) is that the Company are required by His Majesty to forbear and refuse the payments demanded at Thána and Karanja, and even to resist the same in the best manner they can, which if you have hitherto forbore by reason of the

the investment for the Company's shipping and for Sir Thomas Grantham's ship and making every possible effort to despatch them with full cargoes. This he accomplished with much difficulty, the Dutch having harassed the trade at Kárwár and along the Malabar Coast, and the Portuguese during the whole of the revolt having conducted themselves in an unfriendly manner. Bruce's Annals, II. 540-542.

¹ Sir George Birdwood's Report on the old Records of the India Office (1891), 23.

² Letters and papers from the Presidency of Surat to the Company relative to Bombay; Sir Thomas Grantham's letters on the same subject, 23rd and 30th October, 3rd 12th and 29th November, 8th and 9th December 1684, 6th and 13th January 1684-85. Original letters from Sir Thomas Grantham to His Majesty, notifying his arrival in England, with Captain Keigwin as prisoner, 21th July 1685. East India Papers in the State Paper Office, Part II. No. 20. Bruce, II. 540-542.

³ Court to the General and Council at Surat, 7th January 1685, Public Dept. Court's L. Vol. I of 1681-1685, 100.

⁴ Letters from the President and Council of Surat to the Court, 31st January, 16th and 23rd February 1684-85. Letter from the Deputy Governor of Bombay to the Court, 5th February 1684-85. Letters from Dr. St. John to His Majesty and to the Duke of York in favour of Sir Thomas Grantham, dated Bombay 27th January and 5th February 1684-85 (East India Papers in the State Paper Office, Nos. 274, 275). Bruce, II, 542-543.

weakness of your garrison, we having now strengthened you, do hereby require you to put His Majesty's said order into full execution. And if you find there be occasion for it, you may keep Sir Thomas Grantham's ship at Bombay for your assistance until this controversy about the customs of Thána and Karanja be amicably composed between the Viceroy of Goa and yourselves. But you must by no means consent to pay any more customs at either of those places, although you may (if the Vice-King of Goa approve thereof) agree to a suspension of the customs and of all acts of violence on both sides, until this matter be determined in England by His Majesty and the Portugal ambassador. If the Portuguese should upon your refusal take any of your small vessels, we can give you no better direction in such a case than to follow the letter of His Majesty's Royal Charter to us, the clauses whereof in relation to such occasions as these are truly recited in Sir Thomas Grantham's Commission under the Company's seal.¹

In August 1686, with reference to Portuguese claims to lands in Bombay, the Deputy Governor Mr. Wyborne wrote to Surat: As to the Padres of Bándra and others that belong to the Portugal nation, notice is given to the Chief Justice who will take care that no such estates be anyways alienated. But this will be of ill consequence. For if the inhabitants of this island be hindered from attaching one another's estates, they will never pay their debts and one will starve the other. We therefore pray your further directions as to the inhabitants of the island, who are most under the nomination as Portuguese. As to the damages sustained by the Portuguese in our time we shall take care to give your Excellency account, but as for the time past all that we can find are in the several books which are at Surat. If after a further examination we find anything material we shall advise you thereof.²

In August 1686 in consequence of instructions from Surat the ship Hunter with an eight-oared pinnace was sent to ride before the fort of Máhim.³ This brought the Captain of Bassein with three companies of foot to Bándra to whom on the 15th September the Deputy Governor of Bombay addressed the following letter: Understanding that you are come to Bándra with some forces, I have thought fit to visit you with this letter to acquaint you that I do not intend anyways to molest or trouble your country or government. The cause of the frigate's coming and lying at Máhim is only to force vessels to pay their ancient dues and customary customs at Máhim which is my Lord and Master the King of Great Britain's just due and right, and I design no other ways or matter by what I have done. Sir, as I have given you an account of what I design by sending the frigate to lie at Máhim, so I desire you to let me know your design in coming down to

Chapter I. History.

The Portuguese,
1684.

Portuguese
Claims,
1686.

¹ Court to Surat, 7th April 1684, Pub. Dep. Court's L. Vol. 1 of 1681 - 1685, 84.

² Bombay Deputy Governor Mr. Wyborne and Council to the Surat General and Council, 13th August 1686, Sec. Out. Letter Book 4 of 1677 - 1687, 6 - 7. Forrest's Home Series, I. 144.

³ Bombay to Surat, 13th August and 18th September, Sec. Out. L. Book 4 of 1677 - 1687, 6, 20.

Chapter I.**History.**

Portuguese
Claims,
1686.

Bándra with your forces. Pray let me have your speedy answer. I am resolved what in me lies to maintain a good and firm friendship and correspondence between the Crown of England and Portugal, but I will not part with anything that is my Master's due.¹ Three days later (18th September) the Deputy Governor reported: The Governor of Bassein and his officers are all gone again. We do not hear of any preparations that they are making, but we keep a good guard at Málim and shall endeavour to make that port secure. At present it is very weak.²

Danish Fleet
off Bombay,
1687.

Early in 1687 the appearance of a Danish fleet off the Thánn coast caused anxiety in Bombay. On the 18th January Bombay wrote to the Directors: Since our last to your Honours the King of Denmark has made war with the Moors all over India, and has already taken sunk and plundered four eminent ships of the merchants belonging to Surat. Two they burned and one they have kept to their own use. The fourth they have sent in here (Bombay) with their goods, and detained their merchants and commanders on hostage for near Rs. 7000 on board the Admiral. We hear the Danes will not stir hence until they have restitution for the wrongs done them at or about their factory of Tranquebar. This noise has put the Moghal's fleet into a tattered and distracted confusion.³ On the 24th March the Bombay Council wrote to the Commander of the Danish ships: We desire you as you are our friends by reason of the near alliance of the two crowns of England and Denmark that you would not cruize too near our island, it being a great hindrance to our trade, our merchants being fearful of going to sea whilst you lie so near.⁴

Sidis and Shiváji,
1686.

The success of the Sidi in capturing several Marátha or Shiváji forts in 1686, by disturbing the balance of power, caused considerable uneasiness in Bombay. On the 6th October the Bombay Council wrote to Surat: The Sidi having taken some forts from Sambháji Rája and in one of them a very great gun, the Sidi's officers residing here have been with our Deputy Governor to borrow four hawsers and two capstans and two large blocks to get the said gun transported to some other place. As yet the Deputy Governor has put him off saying he has no gear. But the Moors are very pressing on him to command the gear from the Modi and from the ships. This he will avoid to do till he hears from you. If your Excellency pleases that it shall be done, pray advise us that we govern ourselves accordingly.⁵

A few days later the Bombay Council resumed: We send this to acquaint you that we are credibly informed that the Sidi after

¹ Bombay Deputy Governor Mr. Wyborne to the Portuguese Captain General of the North, 15th September 1686, Sec. Out. L. Book 4 of 1677-1687, 17. Forrest's Home Series, I. 146.

² Bombay to Surat, 18th Sept, 1686, Sec. Out. L. Book 4 of 1677-1687, 20.

³ Bombay to Directors, 18th January 1687, Sec. Out. L. B. 4 of 1677-1687, 51-52.

⁴ Dep. Gov. Mr. J. Wyborne and Council to Commander Danish ships, 24th March 1687, Sec. Out. L. B. 4 of 1677-1687, 69.

⁵ The Deputy Governor and Council at Bombay to His Excellency and Council at Surat, 6th Oct. 1686, Sec. Out. L. B. 4 of 1677-1687, 27.

having had such success at Danda Rájpurí and other places, is resolved to attack Cundry (Kenery). If he do, it will infallibly be resigned to him by treachery, and may prove of ill consequence to this island. This we think fit to advise your Excellency, praying your directions about it, whether or no you think it fit to send a man to the Rája to propose to him to give the said Cundry into our hands till he becomes master of his country and then to return it to him again; or any other proposal that you shall think fit which must be done speedily, or not at all, for certainly the Sidi will have it. Pen is certainly in danger of being lost.¹ As to the Sidi's people we shall do as directed.²

In spite of the wars the trade in firearms seems to have been dull. On the 13th November (1686) Bombay writes to Surat: The iron guns lie at present on hand, not having disposed of many occasioned by the great noise of the Sidi's victory over Shiváji which puts a stop to the merchants' traffic at present.³

A few months later Bombay writes to Surat: Several of the Sidi's boats are come from Undry (Underi) and say they are bound for Surat with an account to the Moghal governor that Sidi Kásim will not leave Danda Rájpurí and Underi, saying that he has enough to do with Sambháji's men who are numerous in those parts. We give little credit to that pretence, but keep double guards all round the island and do not fear any thing that these people can do to us.⁴

About a month later (21st February) they continue: Sidi Kásim is come from Danda Rájpurí to Undry (Underi). We are informed he has besieged a small fort called Cullanee at the mouth of Nagan river (the fort of Kolába off Alibág) and it is thought he will be master of it. If so, he will cut off all commerce from Cundry, which island will fall into his hands for want of provision. What the event of it may be God only knows.⁵

Four days later they write: This comes to acquaint your Excellency that yesterday we were certainly advised that Sidi Kásim who had besieged Cullanee, had raised his siege and was gone for Rájápur in search of Sultán Egbert (Akbar), the Moghal's son, so that we hope he will not disturb our neighbours any more this year.⁶

Shortly after a welcome message was forwarded to Surat: Last night came a messenger from Sidi Kásim who brings news that the said Sidi had landed at Jetápur (Jayatápur) by Rájápur and that Sambháji's party met him and killed 400 of his people and the Sidi himself had received four wounds and escaped very narrowly of being killed or taken. He lost four of his galivats. This we thought fit to

Chapter I.

History.

Sidis and Shiváji,
1686.

¹ Bombay to Surat, 18th October 1686, Sec. Out. L. B. 4 of 1677-1687, 30. Forrest's Home Series, I. 147.

² Bombay to Surat, 31st Oct. 1686, Sec. Out. L. B. 4 of 1677-1687, 31.

³ Bombay to Surat, 13th Nov. 1686, Sec. Out. L. B. 4 of 1677-1687, 32, 33.

⁴ Bombay to Surat, 17th January 1687, Sec. Out. L. B. 4 of 1677-1687, 50.

⁵ Bombay to Surat, 21st Feb. 1687, Sec. Out. L. B. 4 of 1677-1687, 65.

⁶ Bombay to Surat, 25th Feb. 1687, Sec. Out. L. B. 4 of 1677-1687, 66.

Chapter I.
History.

Pirates,
1686.

acquaint your Excellency. The Sidi is said to have gone to Danda Rájpurí, but of this we are not sure.¹

On the 6th October 1686 Bombay wrote to Surat: Last night Captain Oglethorpe arrived here from Maskat, who lets us know that two pirates in the Gulf of Mokha have done great mischief being manned with all nations. One of them wears English Colours and the other Dutch Colours, and each has a sloop to attend him.² On the 2nd December, in consequence of the presence of pirates on the Thána coast, the Bombay Government issued the following order to Captain Rathband: Recently on the receipt of advice that certain Sanganian pirates, lying and cruizing between this and Surat, had taken vessels bound to this port to the great loss of the inhabitants here, several Moors have been with us to desire the ship Hunter to convoy their vessels so far as Daman, or as we shall think fit. We therefore enorder you immediately after receipt hereof to weigh anchor and make the best of your way to Máhim river's mouth, where, when you arrive, fire a gun. Such vessels as come to you in order to their lying to Surat, you are to convoy so high as Daman, taking a list of what vessels go under your conduct and bring to us. We would not have you go any higher than Daman unless you hear of any pirates between that and Surat river's mouth which we must leave to your discretion strictly requiring you to make the best of your way back to us.³ This action was approved by the Council at Surat.⁴ A letter from Bombay to Surat dated 26th January 1687 shows that even this precaution was not sufficient. The Bombay Council write: We send this to acquaint your Excellency that yesterday morning we were advised by some Moormen that were taken by three Arab ships that cruize off St. John's and between that and Bassein, pretending as we are told, to look for the Danes' men-of-war. These Arabs had taken out of a fleet or *káfla* that were under Captain Rathband's convoy, six grabs and four *shihars*, some of which did really belong to Bombay and most of the rest had passes from this island. But having Portuguese passes as well as ours the Arabs would not believe that they did belong to Bombay saying if they could be well assured they did belong to our nation, they would not meddle with them. The Hunter and Hoy as we are informed, were fair by them, but never spoke with them. The Arabs giving some of the men their liberty who came to us and advised us what had happened, we sent out the Right Honourable Company's *machva* to cruize after those ships with letters from our Deputy Governor and from the Arab that is with us, and two of his men, and hope they may get the vessels and goods clear. This has made Volup Venny (Valubh Veni) the rendeir (or farmer) of the customs very uneasy finding that no vessels can pass un plundered by one sort of nation or other. We do humbly pray your Excellency's directions what to

¹ Bombay to Surat, 8th March 1687, Sec. Out. L. B. 4 of 1677-1687, 71.

² Bombay to Surat, Sec. Out. L. B. 4 of 1677-1687, 27.

³ Bombay Order to Capt. Rathband, 2nd Decr. 1686, Sec. Out. L. B. 4 of 1677-1687, 72, 73. ⁴ Bombay to Surat, 1st Jan. 1687, Sec. Out. L. B. 4 of 1677-1687, 44.

do in this case. The customs of this island will be infallibly ruined if those ships cruize long on this coast.¹

On the 5th February the Bombay Council continue: This conveys the complaints of several Bania and Moor inhabitants and merchants of this island that have sustained great losses by three Arab ships belonging to Cong (apparently Congoon on the Persian coast of the Persian Gulf: Low's Indian Navy, I. 335 note †) taking two *shibars* and a grab laden from this port. They bring with them several attestations of the value of their cargo with complaints to the governor of Surat and do expect some satisfaction, hearing there is in Surat river an Arab ship and considering they are our subjects and bring by their trade customs to the island. They rely on your Excellency to stand their friend. This we thought safe to advise your Excellency of.²

The Bombay correspondence contains the following references to the great plague which wasted Western India between 1686 and 1696. Towards the end of 1686 the Bombay Council write: We have abundance of men sick and many of them die. We are finishing the account of His Majesty's ship Phoenix but by reason of some of her men lying sick in the hospital, and we know not how God will deal with them, cannot close the account to send up, which, as soon as we can, shall be done.³

On the 29th December 1686 the Council wrote: Enclosed is a list of the English deceased since our last to this instant with those that are living. The mortality this year has been so exceedingly violent we shall much want recruits by all opportunities. The chiefest reason that can be given is the absolute want of good Europe medicines that should have been yearly sent out fresh. Here have been none from your Honours since 1682-83, which puts us to use the country physic and serves only to augment the charge of the garrison and does men more harm than good. For a supply of what is necessary we now send a list or invoice here enclosed under the hand of the Chief Surgeon and an account of what is wanting and necessary to the relief yearly of the stores and marine.

This letter closes with a suggestion which is perhaps the origin of what is now one of the chief branches of the import trade of Bombay. Many of your Honours' ships take in store of ballast in their outward bound voyage. Now in lieu of ballast if you please to send out about 10 or 20 chaldron of sea coals for the use of the smith's forge, it may in a year's time save a great part of what is expended in charcoal which burns away like dirt, and does little service for any great work that must be made for the garrison's use.⁴

Chapter I. History.

Pirates,
1686.

The Plague,
1686.

Want of
Medicines,
1686.

Coals,
1686.

¹ Bombay to Surat, 26th January 1687, Sec. Out. L. B. 4 of 1677-1687, 55, 56. Forrest's Home Series, I. 154.

² Bombay to Surat, 5th February 1687, Sec. Out. L. B. 4 of 1677-1687, 54. Forrest's Home Series, I. 155.

³ Bombay to Surat, 18th October 1686, Sec. Out. L. B. 4 of 1677-1687, 29, 30. Forrest's Home Series, I. 147.

⁴ Bombay to the Court, 29th December 1686, Sec. Out. L. B. 4 of 1677-1687, 41. Forrest's Home Series, I. 148.

Chapter I.

History.

Female Tourists,
1686.

One or two references may be added to two domestic matters, the order not allowing women to go on voyages and the order against gambling. Regarding the order about women Bombay wrote to Surat on the 14th December 1686 : We will show the women that came down to us all the civility we can. Wild Goose and his wife, the Deputy Governor has thought of putting to look after the hospital in the room of a topass that now is in it, which may be a comfortable livelihood for them and cost our Right Honourable Masters only a soldier's pay. For the future we shall not permit any woman to go on voyages.¹

Gaming,
1686.

On the 2nd December 1686 the Deputy Governor and Council at Bombay note that they have set out an order prohibiting any officer or soldier from playing for above 5 Xs. on severe penalty. This, they add, angers some people, but gaming ruins more.²

On the 25th April 1687 they continue : Yesterday we despatched a *patamar*³ to acquaint your Excellency of the arrival of the ship Emerald which came into this port the 23rd instant at night. The Commander and chief mate brought out their wives with them but perusing your Excellency's of the 8th December 1686, find your positive order to let none of our countrywomen voyage to and fro in ships, in obedience to which we have kept them here on the island.⁴

Europe Ships,^a
1686.

In 1686 delay in the arrival of the Europe ships caused uneasiness. On the 29th December the Bombay Council wrote to Surat : This comes by express to acquaint you of the arrival of ship Charles the Second, Captain Jonathan Andrews, who came to an anchor off Henry-Kenery this morning and is just now come on shore. She sailed from Plymouth, which was her last port, the 18th May past and arrived Calicut the 29th November, called at Kúrwar and brought up Mr. John Walsall. We are taking ashore the soldiers that are aboard her and some gunpowder but shall not detain her an hour after that is out. We immediately dispecced this *patamar*, knowing the news of the ship's arrival will be a joy to your Excellency after so many months' expectation of an Europe ship. The Captain informs us that there were several ships bound to those parts that sailed before him. In his company was the Modena and Ruby sloop, both which he lost the day after he sailed from St. Jago. God of his infinite mercy send them to arrive your Excellency safe. We now hope the greatest part of your Excellency's troubles are over, and that we shall see the Right Honourable Company flourish in spite of all their enemies.⁵

The Maráthás,
1687.

In March 1687 the Bombay Council wrote to Surat : We have received a letter from the Peshwa concerning the ambassador that was constantly employed between Sambháji Rájá and us. He says that the old one is dead and that there is a new one made. He would

¹ Bombay to Surat, 14th December 1686, Sec. Out. L. B. 4 of 1677-1687, 37, 38.

² Bombay to Surat, 2nd December 1686, Sec. Out. L. B. 4 of 1677-1687, 37.

³ The *patamar* (*páthmar*) was generally a Bráhman. Compare Commentaries of Albuquerque, II. 73.

⁴ Bombay to Surat, 25th April 1687, Sec. Out. L. B. 4 of 1677-1687, 79.

⁵ Bombay to Surat, 29th Decr. 1686, Sec. Out. L. B. 4 of 1677-1687, 39, 40.

have us send a boat for him to come and converse with us but that is only to get a *peshkash* from us as being a new made officer. We humbly pray your Excellency to give us your directions how to act in those cases that if for the future any ambassador or great messenger should be sent to us by Sambláji or great princes, how we shall treat them and what presents we may make them and how they and their retinue shall be maintained. We have put off sending for this man at present in expectation of your Excellency's coming.¹

Of the policy initiated by Sir Josiah Child and attempted to be put in practice in Surat and Bombay after the suppression of Keigwin's revolt, by which the rule of the sea was to be transferred from the Moghals to the Company, no record has been traced. The attempt ended in failure. On the 27th of February 1690 Aurangzeb passed an order granting the English leave to trade. The terms of this order were humiliating. The English had to admit their fault, crave pardon, pay a heavy fine, promise that they would go back to their old position of simple traders, and dismiss Child 'the origin of all the evil.' Before this pardon was granted (14th February 1689) the Sidi fleet and army had invaded Bombay, gained possession of Máhim, Mázgaon, and Sion, and held the Governor and the garrison as if besieged in the town and castle. The treaty with the English contained an order to the Sidi to withdraw from Bombay. But the English did not regain possession of Mázgaon, Máhim, and Sion till the 22nd of June 1690.² So weak were the defences of the island and so powerless was the garrison reduced by pestilence to thirty-five English, that, in Mr. Harris' opinion, if it had not been for the jealousy of Mukhtýár Khán the Moghal general, the Sidi might have conquered the island.³

In 1690-91 on the death of Sir John Child, Mr. Harris was proclaimed Governor of Bombay, and Mr. Cooke and shortly after him Mr. Weldon Deputy Governor. After recapitulating the intelligence of the evacuation of the stations occupied by the Sidi's forces and fleet, the new Governor and Council wrote: The ruinous and neglected state of the fortifications had encouraged the Sidi to make the attack, and to disembark his troops without the Moghal's orders. Had the fortifications been sufficiently strong to prevent his landing, more favourable terms would have been obtained than were granted by the *Phirman*. In fact such was the defenceless state of the island that the conquest of it was prevented more by the jealousy of Mukhtýár Khán of the influence which the reduction of it would have given to the Sidi than by the power of the garrison to defend it. To prevent the recurrence of similar dangers, the Governor pointed out the necessity of additional fortifications. He urged that a walled town should be built with ramparts to defend it, which would induce the monied merchants or traders to live under the protection of the English; that by such

Chapter I. History.

The Maráthás,
1687.

Bombay,
1690.

¹ Bombay to Surat, 1st March 1687, Sec. Out. L. B. 4 of 1677-1687, 68.

² Bombay Gazetteer, Thána. XIII. Part II. 480-481. Bruce's Annals, II. 550-642.

³ Bombay Gazetteer, Thána. XIII. Part II. 480-481. Bruce's Annals, III. 94. The Jesuits had been active in helping the Sidi. As a punishment their lands in Bombay were seized. Ditto, 95. The Bombay Secretariat papers seem to contain no reference to these disasters.

Chapter I.**History.**Bombay,
1690-1694.

an influx of inhabitants the revenue would be increased; that the merchants' stores would become a security for their residence, and enable the Governor to carry his orders into effect; and, in general, would re-establish the Company's power in the island, and confirm their government over the inhabitants. He next described the weak state of the garrison, which, from a pestilential disorder, was at this time reduced to 35 English soldiers. They had a sufficient number of topasses but their military services could not be depended on. They could be employed in raising the additional fortifications, but not trusted to defend them. He stated that during the war the Council had employed, with considerable effect, a number of black soldiers. Among these, as they could not with safety be dismissed, they had divided the uncultivated lands for their maintenance--the Company to receive one moiety of the produce. An additional stock, and a supply of civil servants, both for Surat and Bombay, would therefore be required, and a large reinforcement of recruits to render the European part of the garrison efficient. Having thus explained the general circumstances of Bombay, the Council signified that the Jesuits on the island had been active during the invasion of the Sidi in promoting his views. The Governor had therefore seized on all the lands owned or occupied by Jesuits. He had deferred any final decision on the subject till the arrival of the President from Surat who would judge of the claims of those people and restore their lands to such of them as could exculpate themselves or would confirm the right of the Company to such portions as had been the property of the guilty. This measure, however expedient, might, it was feared, induce the Portuguese to attack Bombay. The island should therefore be kept in as good a state of defence as was practicable. It was at the same time resolved to fortify, as well as their means would allow, Retorah in the queen of Attinga's country, and to erect buildings at Tellichery, that they might bring to Bombay a proportion of produce from the Malabár Coast or render the investments not wholly dependent on such goods as could be purchased at Surat.¹

For several years after their invasion leave to land on the island seems to have been refused to the Sidis. In September 1694 Government issued the following order to Lieutenant Haumer: The Sidi's people have obtained leave to buy what quantity of coir they have occasion for as also for some small quantities of corn and other provision for their own use, there being five of their galivats coming up to Máhim. These are to enorder you to let the people belonging to them come on shore as formerly about the forementioned occasions.²

In December 1694 the Government authorised Ráma Kámáti to let and to farm all the oarts and batty ground belonging to those Moormen that assisted the Sidi Yákutkhán when he invaded the

¹ Bruce's Annals, III. 93-96.

² Order to Lieut. James Haumer, Bombay Castle, 12th September 1694, Sec. Out. L. B. 5 of 1694-1696, 12.

island and to make the best advantage he could thereof for the use of the Right Honourable East India Company.¹

The 1694 records contain two notices of a timber trade between Bombay and the North Thána coast. On the 17th November 1694 the Bombay Government wrote to Mr. Aislabic: Captain Lund is coming up in the sloop to convoy the timber boats to Daman. Before he proceeds, receive of the owners of all the great boats 10 Xs. and the small 5 Xs. For all others that shall go under his convoy Ráma Kámáti hath written to Narsáji Purvoo (Parbhu). On the same account you must take them to your assistance in this affair.² In December 1694 the following order is issued to Sergeant Eason: On receipt hereof make the best of your way with the bonny boat (Dutch fish boat is the English bum boat) under your command to Umbrasary (Umarsádi) and there stay till a man comes from Ballfare (apparently Balhár or Balsár) to advise you that the 15 or 16 boats of timber belonging to Merji Nána and Rustam Káka are ready to sail. The three men that accompany this you are to take in the boat with you and put them ashore at Umbrasary from whence they will go overland to Ballfare. These well know you are to take all possible care of the boats and make what despatch you can with them towards this place.³

The following examples occur (1694-95) of the practice of granting strangers of distinction and others permits to travel by the Company's ships:

These are to enorder you to receive on board the bearer Deudates, an Armenian, with two chests and a box and transport him to Surat.⁴

Receive on board Neury and Diodator (two Armenians) and transport them to Surat, they paying the charge of their transport.⁵

Receive on board Yearmamood an Armenian and transport him to Surat, he paying the charge of his transport.⁶

These are to enorder you to receive on board two Turks with their necessaries and also two parcels of treasure belonging to them and transport them to Surat.⁷

These are to enorder you to receive on board seven Arabs two women and one boy and transport them to Surat. You are to allow them water and to take care none of your people abuse them.⁸

These are to enorder you to receive on board such Moormen with their necessaries as Girdhardás shall come with, who being on board,

Chapter I. History.

Timber Trade,
1694.

Permits to
Merchants,
1694-95.

¹ Order of 21st December 1694, Sec. Out. L. B. 5 of 1694-1696, 27.

² Bombay to Mr. Aislabic, 17th November 1694, Sec. Out. L. B. 5 of 1694-1696, 22.

³ Bomb. Order to Serjt. Eason, 29th Dec. 1694, Sec. Out. L. B. 5 of 1694-1696, 28-29.

⁴ Sir John Gayer's order to Capt. Abm. Roberts, Commander of the ship Resolution, Bombay Castle, 31st August 1694, Sec. Out. L. B. 5 of 1694-1696, 10.

⁵ Sir John Gayer's order to Capt. Josiah Hoster, Commander of the ship Defeuce, Bombay Castle, 18th September 1694, Sec. Out. L. B. 5 of 1694-1696, 14.

⁶ Sir John Gayer's order to Captain Abm. Roberts, Commander of the Ship Resolution, Bombay Castle, 18th September 1694, Sec. Out. L. B. 5 of 1694-1696, 14.

⁷ Sir John Gayer to Capt. Lewis James, Commander of the ship Emerald Frigate, Bombay Castle, 18th January 1695, Sec. Out. L. B. 5 of 1694-1696, 31.

⁸ Government order to Capt. John Brown, 27th August 1695, Sec. Out. L. B. 5 of 1694-1696, 54.

Chapter I.

History.

Permits to
Merchants,
1694-95.

wind and weather permitting, weigh the anchor and make the best of the way to the port of Chaul where the said Moormen being landed, return with all expedition to us.¹

These are to enorder you to repair on board of the Right Honourable Company's sloop with your men and make the best of your way with Habshi Hakim, a Moorman, and his people for Underi. When you have conveyed him safe return with all expedition to me.²

These are to enorder you to permit all the Fakirs on board the country ship to come ashore; likewise let them bring ashore five horses.³

King's Charter,
1693.

In 1693 the grant of a fresh charter gave new vigour to the direction of the Company's affairs. On the 27th October 1693 the Directors wrote to Surat and Bombay:

After a multitude of conflicts with the interlopers and their adherents and all others that have envied or emulated the Company's former prosperity, we have obtained of their present Majesties King William and Queen Mary a charter of confirmation of our present and all our former charters and are in possession of it, under the great seal of England, bearing date the 7th instant. Of this charter we shall send you copies by our shipping and think it fit that before that comes to your hands, upon receipt of this letter you should make such solemn public intimation of it to the natives as is usual upon such occasions.⁴

Special Vigour,
1693.

We have also, the Court continue, to acquaint you that we have obtained license from Her Majesty and Council for the sending out of twelve ships for India this year. Some of these will be ready to take in goods the beginning of the next month, being by charter party obliged to be ready to sail from Gravesend by the 20th November now next coming and out of the Downs by the 20th December now next coming. All our first departing ships we design according to ancient custom and the propriety of the season for the coast and bay except the Dorothy which is designed for China. They add: Besides the full number of the said twelve ships we propose to send if we can two more purposing to drive the trade full, until we have replenished our warehouses which is the ultimate and never failing cure of the English itch of interloping. Upon the grant of our new charter we have personally engaged by bond to their Majesties that we will send out this year to the value of £150,000 in commodities of the growth and production of England that being thought to be an affair that will be very grateful to the approaching Parliament. This we hope may confirm their Majesties' charter to us, the East India trade having been these last five years so much and so long the subject and debate of all councils of the

¹ Sir John Gayer and Council to Capt. Henry Lund, Bombay Castle, 28th October 1694, Sec. Out. L. B. ■ of 1694-1696, 19.

² Sir John Gayer's order to Serjt. Eason, Bombay Castle, 5th December 1694, Sec. Out. L. B. 5 of 1694-1696, 25.

³ Govt. order to Mr. Thos. Lawrance, Bombay Castle, 11th May 1693, Sec. Out. L. B. 5 of 1694-1696, 45.

⁴ Court to Surat and Bombay, 27th October 1693, Sec. Out. Letter Book ■ of 1694-1696, 5-6.

nation that noblemen and gentlemen have much improved their understanding therein.¹

A few months later (January 1694) the Court wrote: Since our trade is now settled we hope on a surer foundation than ever it was since Englishmen went first to the Indies, we shall return to our ancient custom of sending the lists of what goods are most vendible here.²

The prosperity which the Directors looked for in consequence of the grant of a fresh charter was delayed and their plans thwarted partly by the hostility of the French but mainly by the enmity of the rival English interloping traders and merchants some of whom started a rival company and others took to piracy.

Since 1671 when a fleet arrived at Vesáva and their shallops sounded round the island of Carajaw (Karanja) and about Máhim the French had caused no alarm to Bombay.³ On the 20th September 1694 the Bombay Government wrote to Captain Abraham Roberts of the ship Resolution:

We require you wind and weather permitting to weigh your anchor and set sail making the best of your way for Surat river's mouth. Where being arrived send the packets herewith to the Right Honourable Company's President and Council at Surat, and from time to time while you are there and for your sailing from thence observe such orders as you shall receive from the aforementioned President and Council. We also require you that you keep your ship always in a good posture of defence and that you keep a very good look-out that if you should happen to discover enemies too strong for you to contend with you may as in your judgment you shall think meet, use all possible endeavours to make your escape either towards Surat or this port or any other place. If you should meet with any ships of the French king or his subjects in your passage or pirates that you esteem yourselves strong enough to encounter with and attack them, we would have you put their Majesties' commission in execution and advise of what you have done either to us or the President and Council of Surat that so you may have the necessary orders from us or them. We do strictly require you and the Defence to keep company in this your passage. And that Captain Joseph Hoster do observe such orders between this and Surat river's mouth for the better keeping company and defence in case you should meet with enemies as he shall from time to time receive from you. We order you to wear the broad pendant at main-top-masthead, and the Defence the usual pendant at main-top-masthead. So hoping you will in all things act for the honour of their Majesties and your country and the interest of our own established Masters.⁴

Chapter I.

History.

Vigorous
Trading,
1693.

French Designs,
1696.

¹ Court of Directors to the Lieutenant-General President and Council of Bombay and Surat, dated London 27th October 1693, Sec. Out. Letter Book 5 of 1694-1696, 6-7.

² Court to Surat, 3rd January 1694, Sec. Out. Letter Book 5 of 1694-1696, 28.

³ Mr. Gerald Aungier and Council at Surat to Deputy Governor and Council of Bombay, 20th Jan. 1671, Surat Factory Out. L. B. 1 of 1630-1673, 209.

⁴ Bombay Government to Captain Abraham Roberts of the ship Resolution, Bombay Castle, 20th September 1694, Sec. Out. Letter Book 5 of 1694-1696, 14-15.

Chapter I.
History.
French Designs,
 1696.

On the 21st January 1696 Sir John Gayer wrote to the Surat President : Fail not to advise us of all motions and designs of the French, who we think are not prepared for such great achievements as has been talked of. We are much inclined to believe that there is no more of their ships come to India than the six in the list you sent us, whose long passage we suppose has broken their measures, for it is our opinion they are bound to Bengal, to which place the season of the year will not permit them at present to go.¹ On the 6th February he continued : Seeing you can have no better information of the French designs, we must await till you can. But fail not to advise what you know to Madras and Bengal by all conveyances and if no other offers by expresses, as we have before wrote you. It is not our opinion that the French have any design against Bombay. If they should, we will be prepared to give them their welcome. We do not think the ship haled on shore at Swally will grow tighter by her lying there.²

Five days later (11th February) Sir John Gayer wrote to President Annesley in Surat : Yours of the 30th past we received the 6th instant which gives us an account of what you could learn of the French designs. They were not so quick as expected but on the 6th instant were seen about two leagues to the northward of Bassein at anchor. On the 9th from Warli our people see four come to an anchor off Vesáva. And yesterday evening three of them came about Malabár Point and at sunset anchored off the point of Old Woman's Island, where they yet remain. The other two we suppose are at Vesáva. These three at anchor here we believe may be the king's ships who probably may lie and cruize some time before the port in hopes of plunder, if they are not frightened away by the Dutch and our ships. This probably will be very speedily, if the news we hear be true. The Captain and Padre of Chaul have both of them letters that advise of twelve sail of Dutch ships off Goa. The letters arrived about a week since but how long they were on the way we do not know. On Sunday last we had advices from Chaul that the Friday before eight ships were seen off Danda Rájpuri. We immediately despatched a boat thither to inform us of the truth of this last report and hope she may return to-day. It is not our opinion that the French have any other design than to cruize in hope of plunder. If they have we hope to give them sufficient cause to repent thereof. As we do not think that the Mokha frigate and the Benjamin can come with safety to this island while the French lie between them and us, we would not have you order them from Swally Hole till you receive further advices from us.³

Four days later (February 15th) Sir John Gayer resumes : Yesterday about 11 o'clock the three French ships that lay at anchor off Old Woman's Island weighed and betook themselves to a light pair of heels. We are informed by our returned boat

¹ Bombay to Surat, 21st Jan. 1696, Sec. Out. Letter Book 5 of 1694-1696, 37.

² Bombay to Surat, 6th February 1696, Sec. Out. L. B. 5 of 1694-1696, 41.

³ Bombay to Surat, 11th February 1696, Sec. Out. L. B. 5 of 1694-1696, 42-43. Forrest's Home Series, I. 158-159.

they had sight of the ships that went in quest of them off Danda Rájpuri, and we are inclined to believe the report true for that by the manner of working they seemed to be in some consternation steering sometimes almost before the wind, then bearing away again, then staying one to speak with another, and at last stood off close upon a wind making all sail they could possibly make. The last news we had of the other two was that they cruized off Vesáva, but now cannot hear where they are. By the aforementioned boat we received a letter this day from Captain Pye and the Commander-in Chief of the Dutch ships. Copy of the former is enclosed. Of the other we cannot send you a copy. By what we understand the Dutch are in want of wood and water and design to put in here to supply themselves. Their want of these we fear will prevent their following the French. Our boat left them almost as high as Chaul. If they do not pursue the French we may expect to see them to-night.¹

Five days later (February 20th) Sir John Gayer continues: We have not been wanting to the utmost of our power and present circumstances to put this island in the best posture of defence we could. And had the French made any attempt against us, with God's assistance do not question but that we should have shewn them cause enough to have repented thereof. We thank you for your designed care to assist us by writing to Captain Edgecomb and Mr. Brown to come down hither with the Mokha frigate and the Benjamin. We also give them thanks for their readiness to comply with your orders had the business been practicable, and for their generous offers of hazarding their lives for the Right Honourable Company's interest.²

On the 10th March Bombay writes to Surat: If your port be open and you hear the coast is clear of French, fail not to send the tobacco the General formerly wrote for hither on the Benjamin yacht (yacht) with all possible speed, for the Right Honourable Company will be sufferers in their rents on this island. As the General before wrote the President, the money shall be immediately remitted you as soon as your advices arrive that the goods are bought.³

Six weeks later (30th April) Sir John Gayer wrote to Surat: We are heartily sorry after so fair an opportunity of an entire conquest of the French, that they should escape untouched. This will keep us in a continual fear about our merchants' shipping in all parts of India. We do not believe the French will now go home empty. If the Benjamin and Mokha cannot come down in safety sooner, they may accompany the Dutch ships. We cannot yet hear where the French are.⁴

Some weeks later the Company's servants captured French pirates and sent them to the Moghal governor at Surat advising him to do

Chapter I.

History.

French Designs,
1696.

¹ Bombay to Surat, 15th February 1696, Sec. Out. L. B. 5 of 1694-1696, 43-44. Forrest's Home Series, I. 159.

² Bombay to Surat, 20th February 1696, Sec. Out. L. B. 5 of 1694-1696, 45.

³ Bombay to Surat, 10th March 1696, Sec. Out. L. B. 5 of 1694-1696, 55.

⁴ Bombay to Surat, 30th April 1696, Sec. Out. L. B. 5 of 1694-1696, 73.

Chapter I.
History.

French Designs,
1696.

them justice as they were true pirates who had actually robbed the ships of his master's subjects.¹

On the 15th September Sir John Gayer wrote to Surat: "Last night we were informed that the day before two ships were seen at a great distance off from Malabár Hill standing to the northward. At the same time one that came from Cundery informed us that he saw a ship yesterday morning at a great distance off from Cundery which having but little wind and that at northward or thereabouts stood in. At 12 o'clock she was got much nearer than in the morning, and at two afternoon so near that he plainly saw she was a ship with three masts. When the person came from Cundery which was about three o'clock, she continued standing in, but we saw her not, neither do we hear anything of her this morning. But we have sent out a boat from Máhim to discover if possible what they are. About three weeks since there was also seen in the offing from Malabár Hill one evening two ships; but it being then thick rainy weather we heard no more of them, neither have we had any account from you since of any ships arriving at Surat from the southward. If your report be true about so many ships being seen, which are averred by sundry persons, we know not what to think they should be except French or pirates. This may occasion us to detain our ships longer than we expected."²

A few weeks later the dangers which Sir John Gayer foreboded from the French fleet were more than fulfilled. On the 15th October 1696 the Bombay Council wrote to the Directors: "We are extremely sorry for the bad news we have in public newspapers overland concerning the Resolution, Defence, Princess of Denmark, Seamour, and Success being taken and for the Henry who it is said being in fight with a French privateer was set on fire which caused her to run ashore in Bantry Bay where she was burnt."³

Other more cheering news was received at the same time. On the 9th October 1696 the Bombay Council wrote to Surat: "With this we send you sundry Gazettes and newspapers for your perusal which return to us when you have read them. In the French Gazette printed in Holland inclosed you will see that our Masters on the 18th November last had actually laden on board their ships 1,200,000 ounces of silver. 'This we hope with the House of Commons voting their establishment by Parliament will put life into the brokers and all also that wish success to our Masters' affairs as well as check their malicious adversaries in their wicked career against them to their lasting shame. On receipt of this and what you had before from us we hope you will instantly lade the vessels and send them to us and that you will be ready with as much other goods as will speedily lade ship Benjamin. There is other news in the papers that

¹ Bombay to Surat, 2nd July 1696, Sec. Out. L. B. 5 of 1694-1696, 103.

² Bombay to Surat, 15th Sept. 1696, Sec. Out. L. B. 5 of 1694-1696, 24.

³ General Sir John Gayer and Council at Bombay to the Honourable the Governor and the Worshipful the Deputy Governor and Committee of the Right Honourable East India Company, 15th October 1696, Sec. Out. Letter Book # of 1694-1696, 56-57.

tends much to the lessening France and groatening the confederates especially our sovereign.¹

On the 13th March 1696 Sir John Gayer wrote to Surat: The Portuguese are preparing some great design. They say it is against Maskat. Whether any thing more will come of it than last year we do not know. Muttabár Khán threatens them very hard with war. This has led to the issue of a proclamation at Bassein for all the out inhabitants to bring their riches into the Fort. One thousand Curumbees (Kunbis) have fled from their country to Guilan (Kalyán).²

On the 30th September 1696 Bombay was visited by a hard gust of wind from the east and south-east with thunder lightning and some rain. The rain not proportional to the want there is of it. The strength of the gust continued not above half an hour and did no harm.³

A letter from the Bombay Council to the Court (15th October 1696) contains the following reference to Anjengo: At Anjengo they have prepared a large quantity of stone and brick, nearly enough we suppose to build the fort and are making what provision of chunam is possible. By this time we believe they have begun to build, but they write that they fear the government will obstruct them by forbidding the coolies to afford any assistance. This we believe they will find true enough if the Dutch *peshkashis* can effect it with the queen or her ministers. For the Dutch do all that in them lies to hinder our fortifying, but we are endeavouring to countermine them by procuring labouring people to send them from hence. They are also in want of a recruit of European soldiers. This we cannot supply them as besides officers we have, well and sick, English French and Dutch, only 27 soldiers on the island. What recruits are on the way we do not know. Regarding this we are under earnest expectation having scarce any left that we can entrust with your Honours' several vessels, nor one to send out in our *machvis* and other boats to secure the navigation of the island which we have often occasion to do by reason of the Shivájis (the Maráthás). We also want a recruit of fire-arms, holbard-drums, ordnance powder and sea coals as we have before advised. Anjengo will also want at least 20 good ordnance and supply of all garrison stores.⁴

The capture of the five ships by the French was a loss of small importance compared with the troubles which had recently gathered in Surat. The excesses of the European pirates by whom the Indian Ocean was at this time infested reached a climax in the robbery in 1695 of the Moghal pilgrim ship Gunsway and other Moghal vessels. In consequence Mr. Annesley the President and the

Chapter I. History.

Portuguese,
1696.

Storm,
1696.

Anjengo Fort,
1696.

Scarcity of
Europeans,
1696.

Pirates,
1696.

¹ Bombay to Surat, 9th Oct. 1696, Sec. Out. L. B. 5 of 1694-1696, 49.

² Bombay to Surat, 13th March 1696, Sec. Out. L. B. 5 of 1694-1696, 57-58. Forrester's Home Series, I. 162.

³ Bombay to Surat, 30th Sept. 1696, Sec. Out. L. B. 5 of 1694-1696, 42.

⁴ Sir John Gayer and Council to the Company, Bombay Castle, 15th Oct. 1696, Sec. Out. L. B. 11 of 1694-1696, 55-56.

Chapter I.
History.

other Company's servants at Surat were all inhumanely used, clapped up in irons and kept close prisoners. The Company's estate was seized and the trade of the port stopped.¹

In September 1696 Sir John Gayer wrote to Surat: We and the Dutch having entered into a correspondence to consult and act jointly in our negotiations with the government about convoy ships, we are not willing you should conclude anything without them. It will be a great breach of friendship on either so to do.² A second letter to Surat shortly afterwards shows that the friendly arrangement with the Dutch came to nothing. Sir John Gayer wrote: We are surprised to hear of so much baseness in the Dutch though we know they are not to be trusted. Yet at this time being under a promise of uniting councils for our mutual interests we could scarce think they would have been so openly perfidious. Now we know how far we are to trust them, still we would have you maintain a correspondence with them. This will be much better than breaking off from them, for by that means they would become implacable and by our difference we should give the enemies great advantage.³

On the 15th January 1696 the Bombay Council sent word to Surat that the ship *Galliot* Vice-Admiral of the Portuguese was foolishly lost on the reef off Old Woman's Island.⁴

In January 1696 Sir John Gayer again writes to Surat: Your agreement with the Dutch to give no passes till matters are better accommodated with the Surat governor we approve of and would have you endeavour a fair correspondence with them and advise the commodore that it is the General's orders you should do so for our mutual interest, it being very unreasonable that all other merchants should have liberty of trade and Europeans be stopped. This night the General received the Commodore's letter which has lain on the road some time by reason of the bearer's falling sick. We have no person on the island that perfectly understands the Persian and English languages, therefore it will be hard for us to understand the contents of his letter, it being written in Dutch. But we suppose the design of it is to engage us with them to do our utmost against the most Christian common enemy (that is France) wherein you may assure him we shall not be deficient.⁵

Surat Troubles,
1696.

Very shortly after on the 6th February 1696 the Bombay Council was able to write to Surat to congratulate the President Mr. Annesley on his release from his irons.⁶

On the 26th February 1696 Sir John Gayer resumes: Our last unto you was the 21st instant by two of our peons who were de-

¹ Sir J. Gayer to Moghal governor of Surat, 31st July 1698, Sec. Out. L. B. 6 of 1697-1699, 21. For the name Gunsway that is Ganja Sawai, see note 2a at the end of the Chapter.

² Bombay to Surat, 15th Sept. 1696, Sec. Out. L. B. 5 of 1694-1696, 23-23.

³ Bombay to Surat, 9th Oct. 1696, Sec. Out. L. B. 5 of 1694-1696, 45-46.

⁴ Bombay to Surat, 15th January 1696, Sec. Out. L. B. 5 of 1694-1696, 35.

⁵ Sir John Gayer and Council to the Surat President Mr. Annesley and Council, 27th January 1696, Sec. Out. L. B. 5 of 1694-1696, 39.

Bombay to Surat, 6th February 1696, Sec. Out. L. B. 5 of 1694-1696, 41.

spatched with your letters from England by ship America. The 23rd instant the General received a particular letter from the President of the 11th with copies of former letters and papers and the Moghal governor's letter to him wherein he writes that he daily expects the king's orders to him for your (Mr. Ammesley's) releasement, and for re-opening our trade, still we hear nothing of the arrival of the said order from you, though from a private person in Surat we are advised it is received.

Sir John Gayer continues: Seeing that the season of the year for the ships' departing to India and Mokha approaches very fast and that time may not permit us to wait longer to hear from you concerning what the governor intends to do with you and the Right Honourable Company's affairs, we have thought good, that you may be in the better readiness, to give you the following orders:

If on receipt of the above orders from the king the governor releases all the Right Honourable Company's servants, and other English, from your barbarous unjust imprisonment, delivers the Right Honourable Company's goods to you to be handed by you to Aga Pirbhái, and opens your trade in all parts, permitting us to export and import, to carry on our investment, bring our goods down from all places where bought as formerly, and delivers you the exclusive Phirman, or gives you a certain promise that it shall speedily be procured and takes care that the charge of our ships shall be defrayed by freight or otherwise: Then we would have you agree with the Dutch and French, if they send any ships along with ours, that a certain number of the country ships be appointed to each nation to wear their colours. When this is done to appoint such Englishmen as you can best confide in, one in a ship, to command each ship that shall be appointed to wear our colours, and give such commanders commissions as if they were in our immediate service. When the Mokha frigate and the Benjamin are well manned, then what English you have more to spare, you may also divide amongst said ships according to their force and burthen, and we hope the French and Dutch will do the same. By your commission you may empower these native boats not only to defend themselves against all pirates, but to take the pirates by force if they offer to molest them. If the Danes should happen to mix with pirates and assault the native boats under our colours we see no reason why we should not act towards them as towards the pirates especially considering that we never heard of any war proclaimed between the Danes and the Moghals or that the Danes managed any other way than piratically. It is also to be considered that we do this not out of choice but necessity to prevent the murdering of all our nation in the Moghal's dominions and the confiscating the Right Honourable Company's estate therein. Obligations must also be given by the chiefs of each nation to each other and to the governor that there shall be no acts of hostility between these ships that go convoy and what others of each nation they may meet with in the term of their voyage. And orders must be given by the chiefs of each nation to show to the commanders of any of their ships they may meet with to prevent mischief. You must also give the comman-

Chapter I.
History.

Surat Troubles,
1696.

Chapter I.
History.
Surat Troubles,
1696.

ders of the Benjamin and Mokha frigate orders as in the above mentioned commission in which it is necessary to insert all the necessities that cause us thus to employ our ships. The commanders of all three nations must have positive orders to join their forces against the enemy whatsoever party is attacked as if they were all of one nation and one head over them, though they may sail as three squadrons with a constituted admiral of each. No squadron should have superiority over the other. But all should consult together at all times for the safe conducting the ships under their charge and the mutual defence of each other. If possible, we would keep the Benjamin to be laden home and send the America in her room, in answer to which write us with all possible speed. The above we have written in hopes all that we have mentioned on the governor's part will be complied with. If he refuses we have no reason to grant what we have promised. Should all things answer our expectation, then we would have you contract with some merchants for the quantity of coffee, myrrh, olibanum, and aloes socatrine mentioned in the list enclosed as you did with Najam Khán Rájábhy on the Rahimi last year, but on as much cheaper terms as you can. This we hope may be easily effected, seeing there is likely to be such a convoy; but we would have the goods laden on our Masters' ship.

In the same letter Sir John Gayer continues: Since writing the above this morning we received advices from Isa Kuli that the king's Hasbul Hukam (or personal order) was sent to the governor of Surat twenty-three days since to set you at liberty and that the Right Honourable Company's affairs should in all circumstances be put into the same condition as formerly, and the other two Europe nations the same, on condition they complied with their obligations. Therefore seeing there is not time left to procure the exclusive Phirman, we would have you endeavour what possible to procure the governor's writing or promise for it, and do your utmost with the governor to procure freight, to defray the charge of our Right Honourable Masters' ships for the voyage.

Enclosed we send you copy of our Masters' general letters from England by ship America. Communicate the news concerning the French to the Dutch director. We have no other news by this ship. Send us an answer to the short general letter from England concerning Captain Andrews that we may return answer to England. We hourly expect to hear from you concerning what the Surat governor intends to do. Care must be taken that the country ships in all things observe the commands of the Europe commanders.¹

On the 10th March Sir John Gayer writes: We rejoice to hear of the enlargement of Captain Brown and Mr. Bendal, but thought long ere this to have received a larger account of such matters.²

A week later (17th March) he resumes: We are surprised that after all our condescension to the unreasonable demands of the Moors, so small though necessary a favour should be denied us as

Convoy
Arrangements,
1696.

¹ Sir John Gayer General and Council at Bombay to Mr. S. Annesley President and Council at Surat, 26th February 1696, Sec. Out. L. Book 5 of 1694-1696, 50-54.

² Bombay to Surat, 10th March 1696, Sec. Out. L. Book 5 of 1694-1696, 54.

the shipping of Captain Pye's provisions. We are no less concerned to hear that our Masters' affairs are still in the same condition they were. In our present circumstances necessity would have forced us to have submitted to such terms as you were about to make with Cawndas (Kahándás) and the horrid bloodsucking Hurcorra (*Harkára* or Intelligencer).

We approve of your letters to Isa Kuli, the Padre, and the governor of Surat, also of what you have wrote the Dutch director. It is our resolution till we see cause to alter it, to give no passes to any of these country ships.¹

On the 30th April Sir John Gayer resumes: As before hinted we are of opinion with you that Isa Kuli hath boasted too much of what he has done and we believe he wants not covetousness. However it is certain he did the Right Honourable Company a singular piece of service in laying the burthen of the piracies on all the three nations. For which reason he ought not to be slighted, though we may delay to gratify his avarice till we see what further occasion we shall have for him. Should we turn him off it may be the next we should make choice of would be of the same stamp with him.² He continues: We are very sorry that the (Moghal) governor continues so obstinate as not to suffer any goods to be exported for the lading our Masters' ships one way or other, when they lie at so great a charge as they do.³

Six weeks later (19th June) Sir John Gayer writes: We would have you use your utmost endeavours with the governor that the Right Honourable Company's money may lie no longer dead, but that it may be given out to provide goods for the expected shipping according to the enclosed list which is copy of what we received from our Masters by ship America. We can see no reason, especially now the governor knows the king's orders concerning us, why he should not consent. We need no argument to press you to this, the time for providing goods shipping so fast is sufficient.⁴

On the 25th June he adds: We can scarce imagine that after the king hath been so well informed of what relates to the Gunsway by the governor of Surat, Abdul Rosa Khán and the Sidi, any impressions should be made on him to cause him to be angry with us, unless for want of a bribe the deceitfulness of his courtiers has imposed on him to discredit what they have written concerning us, which as you write time will discover. So it will of the truth of the Cuttaries' (perhaps *Kattiáris* or Daggerholders that is Bháts or newsmen) report.⁵

On the 8th July Sir John Gayer wrote: We received yours of the 27th past with the enclosed papers, which informs us of your releasement for which we give God thanks and most heartily rejoice. The bearer of this good tidings has proved himself an

Chapter I. History.

Convoy
Arrangements,
1696.

Surat Affairs,
1696.

¹ Bombay to Surat, 17th March 1696, Sec. Out. L. Book 5 of 1694-1696, 58-59. Compare Bombay to Surat, 6th February 1696, Sec. Out. L. B. of 1694-1696, 40.

² Bombay to Surat, 30th April 1696, Sec. Out. L. Book 5 of 1694-1696, 71.

³ Bombay to Surat, 30th April 1696, Sec. Out. L. Book 5 of 1694-1696, 72.

⁴ Bombay to Surat, 19th June 1696, Sec. Out. L. Book 5 of 1694-1696, 99.

⁵ Bombay to Surat, 25th June 1696, Sec. Out. L. Book 5 of 1694-1696, 101.

Chapter I.
History.

Surat Affairs,
1696.

unfaithful messenger, having been almost ten days on his way ; he deserves a reward according to his merits. We hourly expect to hear more largely from you. Now that the governor has released your persons we hope he will release the Right Honourable Company's estate. When this is done we would have you vigorously bend your minds to employing the money you have on investment agreeable to the list you have by ship America that we may be in readiness to lade our expected ships when they arrive.¹

On the 15th October (1696) Sir John Gayer wrote to the Honourable Court of Directors: Your Honours' servants at Surat are still at liberty, and, as they write us, on good terms with the government. We do not yet hear that they will be able to export any goods towards the lading of the Benjamin and Tonqueen (when she arrives) by reason of the clamours of the creditors although there be 5 lakhs of rupees worth as they advise us ready provided. If part of your Honours' eight expected shipping bound to these ports arrive with plentiful stock (which by public newspapers we are informed had 2,100,000 ounces of silver laden the 18th November), then we shall be capacitated to do your Honours the expected service, though it happens very ill that we have yet no advice of their arrival. The season for this year to provide goods being in a manner spent, we have left no stone unturned, but have used our utmost endeavours to gain credit with Aga Pery (Aga Pirbhái) the brokers and all other persons to make provision of goods according to your Honours' orders by ship America. The many repeated promises of sending out large stock for several years and none coming with the industrious labours of the interlopers lately in India and those remaining in Surat lately in your Honours' service to asperse your Honours, have put all people under an impossibility of believing that ever any stock will be sent out to clear your Honours' debts. This with the horrible clamours occasioned by the pirates from all parts which are universally reputed English, causes us to labour in the fire though to small purpose. Besides the Gunsway, the king's ship with others that were robbed last year near Surat, and barbarously used, Abdul Gaphur has since had one robbed of a great sum in the Gulf of Persia; and this day we have news from Mokha of two ships being taken off the Babs belonging to Girdhar and Vardaman your Honours' brokers, one of this island the other of Calicut.² The loss of Girdhar's ship in which was to the amount of Rs. 60,000 has almost broke the little merchants of the

¹ Bombay to Surat, 8th July 1696, Sec. Out. L. Book 5 of 1694-1696, 104.

² Off the Babs is off the Straits of Babelmandeb. Compare *Pirates and Sea Robbers* (1847) p. 112: 'After this Captain Kidd sailed to Bah's key, on a little island at the entrance to the Red Sea.' It was the news of this Mokha fleet, about August 1697, that tempted Captain Kidd, then an honest unlucky Privateer and Pirate-catcher, to turn pirate. A boat brought word of fourteen ships showing English Dutch and Moghal colours. 'We have been unlucky my boys,' said Captain Kidd, 'we'll now make our fortune out of the Mokha fleet.' Four days later the fleet appeared convoyed by one English and one Dutch man-of-war. Kidd soon fell in with them and getting into the midst of them fired at a Moorish ship that was next him. The man-of-war bore down and Kidd not strong enough to contend with them sheered off. Now that he had begun as a pirate Kidd resolved to go on. He crossed to the Malabar Coast and captured a Moorish vessel, making its commander, an Englishman named Parker, join his ship as pilot. Ditto, 113. (Mr. J. Walsh.)

island. It is a considerable prejudice to your Honours for that there was in her 400 'bahar' of good new coffee which was designed to be part of the lading of the Benjamin and Tonqueen.¹

In the same letter Sir John Gayer continues: Though the Moghal governor of Surat spent so much time in writing to the court of Delhi last year concerning the releasing of your Honours' servants and effects and to know what the king would allow the English French and Dutch ships to convoy the Mokha and Jidda fleet that the monsoon was lost to all but five or six ships that got away from Gogha and other ports, yet he is now very pressing for the three nations to come to a conclusion about each sending two ships for convoys this year. Still he will allow but Rs. 15,000 for the charge of a great ship and Rs. 10,000 for the charge of a small one, which he esteems half, besides what freight we can get; terms that both we and the Dutch shall be necessitated to comply with or else no goods can be exported by either since the Dutch have sufficiently felt the stop on trade as well as we, they computing their loss at Rs. 10,00,000. The French seem now to decline giving convoy ships, though they promised it last year. By all that we understand they expect when your five ships that sailed hence in April last (who are now thought to be gone home) arrive in France to give such an account of the stop of their trade that their king will declare war with the Moghal, there being a clause inserted in all the passes that implies as much.²

As we have already, he continues, in several letters wrote to your Honours of the necessity of suppressing the pirates, we shall not enlarge on that subject now. We hope your orders concerning them are on the way towards us. As before they are universally reputed English, the French our enemies, and the Dutch our back friends, industriously helping in blowing up the fire to consume us.³

On the 31st October Sir John Gayer sends to Lieutenant General Higginson the following account of a fresh piratical outrage: 'The broker's ship of this island and Ratanji Bikla the Calicut broker's brother, both under English colours with English merchants, were taken off the Babs by two pirates, one of 13 the other of 14 guns, the next day after they came out from Mokha bound to this island. The pirates set one of the merchants and the cerani (or supercargo) on shore at Aden to sell the ships and cargoes and bring them money for them. As they did not return the pirates burnt both the prizes in sight of them. It is well that about ten ships of this country wintered at Mokha. Had they not it is probable we should again have been embroiled.'⁴

The following year seems to have seen little improvement. On the 16th April 1697 Sir John Gayer wrote: We are sorry to hear of the barbarous outrages committed by those villainous pirates

Chapter I. History.

Surat Convoys,
1696.

¹ Bombay to Court, 15th October 1696, Sec. Out. L. Book 5 of 1694-1696, 51-52.

² Bombay to Court, 15th Oct. 1696, Sec. Out. L. Book 5 of 1694-1696, 52-53.

³ Bombay to Court, 15th Oct. 1696, Sec. Out. L. Book 5 of 1694-1696, 53.

⁴ Bombay to the Honourable Nathl. Higginson, Lieutenant-General of India for Affairs of the Right Honourable East India Company, 31st October 1696, Sec. Out. L. Book 5 of 1694-1696, 83-84.

Chapter I.
History.
Pirates,
1697.

who are become so strong by the success they have had that there is no stirring for any ships but those of Europe and of force. We could wish it were in our power to depress and bring them to their deserved punishment.¹

On the 31st July 1698 Sir John Gayer addressed the following letter to the Moghal governor of Surat: It is now almost three years that for crimes of pirates the Company's servants at Surat were inhumanely used, clapped up in irons, and about eleven months kept close prisoners, the Company's estate seized on and the trade of the Surat port stopped not only to the damage of the English and other European nations, but to the king's and his subjects' great loss. At last Ettámat Khán then governor of Surat and other nobles having made the Delhi king sensible that the robbery was not committed by the people of the English Company but by rogues of several nations combined together, the Surat port was again opened. According to the king's orders at that time I sent two of my Masters' ships (though paid but half the charge) to Mokha in company of two of the Dutch Company's ships to convoy the king's and his subjects' ships to and from that port to Surat. Some days after, fearing the pirates might be numerous and strong, I sent another convoy newly arrived from England. This ship though despatched after the usual season arrived safe at the port and through God's good providence conducted the fleet all home in safety to the great joy and profit of the king and his subjects. Though I have not received a pie from the treasury of the Surat port to defray the charge of this last ship, I have again this year sent two ships on the same voyage in company of the king's ships which I hope through the blessing of God will meet with the same success. Also last year, about the time that the Mokha fleet was expected, I was at the charge of sending out three ships to cruize off Dannuc (Dáhanu) for the better security of the fleet according to your honour's desire. For this I have not been allowed anything towards the cost. Yet notwithstanding all this the ship Quedah Merchant belonging to the English Moody at Surat, coming from Bengal, having goods on board her belonging to Mamud Bankier and others, being taken and robbed by a pirate off Kallequilon, the whole blame is again cast on the English Company, and the king's orders (as I am informed) procured to your honour to demand satisfaction of the President or to send the broker to the court to answer the charge laid against them. Therefore I request that your honour (being as I believe satisfied that this charge is false) will truly represent the matter to the king and your friends at court and petition his majesty that the orders issued, so extremely prejudicial to the English Company who are perfectly innocent of what is laid to their charge, may be revoked, and that their servants, whom you know are no little merchants and subjects of no mean Prince, may be permitted for the future quietly and unmolested to follow the merchandize which your honour is sensible is of great advantage to the king's port and an

¹ Bombay to Surat, 16th April 1697, Sec. Out. L. Book II of 1697-1699.

occasion of the employment of many thousands in his majesty's dominions. To which I shall only add that I have several times written my reasons on the same subject that you lately did advising (my Masters of) the pirates that infest these seas. They returned answer about eleven months since that peace being now concluded with France, they would petition the King to send out some ships of war on purpose to take and destroy the pirates. Which ships, I hope, will arrive by the time the rains is over when I will employ them with all diligence to find out, take, and destroy those villains of sundry nations that rob on the high seas. For the better effecting this I hope your honour will take care that the other European nations trading to the king's port may contribute the assistance which will much facilitate that which has been so long desired that the port may be always open to the pilgrims and that they and the merchants may cross the seas unmolested.¹

On the 31st October 1698 Sir John Gayer gave the Directors the following description of the risks to which the excesses of the European pirates exposed Bombay: We have so often wrote your Honours concerning our great want of supplies of men, that it is needless for us to mention more about it. Still we cannot forbear without unfaithfulness to our trust to acquaint you that your island is exposed to extreme hazard should any orders arrive from the Moghal court to the Sidi to invade Bombay on account of the frequent robberies committed by the pirates, which as we have often advised are universally charged on the English nation. We do maintain a very fair correspondence with the Sidi beyond whatever has been. That to the utmost of his power he is really our friend is manifestly proved by his writing to court in our favour both formerly and in this last juncture of affairs. On this occasion at our request he has written to the Moghal governor of Surat, and all the chief nobles at court beyond what we could have expected even to the hazard of making Maklis Khán his enemy. Yet if orders from the Moghal reach him we must not trust the Sidi further than is necessary to trust a Cofferie (Káfir at that time specially applied to African slaves shipped from Zanzibár) or Moorman, who is the chief noble in these parts, to execute the Moghal king's commands by force of arms and joined with the Moghal governor of Surat. These we confess are very melancholy stories that we are necessitated frequently to write your Honours, but we cannot help it since it is necessary for us to give you a true account of the state of your affairs.²

A letter from Sir John Gayer to the Directors shows that up to the 10th February 1699 the promised pirate-scouring fleet had showed no sign. He writes: We shall be heartily glad that the fleet prepared to suppress the pirates may effect what they are designed for. We hear nothing yet of their being in India.³

¹ Sir John Gayer General to the Moghal Governor of Surat, dated Bombay Castle, 31st July 1698, Sec. Out. L. B. 6 of 1697-1699, 21-23.

² Sir John Gayer and Council to the Court, 31st Oct. 1698, Sec. Out. L. P. 6 of 1697-1699, 140.

³ Bombay to the Court of Directors, 10th (February or March) 1699, para. 72, Sec. Out. L. B. 7 of 1699-1702.

Chapter I.

History.

Pirates,
1698.

Want of Men,
1698.

Chapter I.
History.
Convoys,
1699.

On the 12th January 1699 Sir John Gayer wrote to Surat: The copy of the king's orders in Persian we have not received. If we had it would signify nothing without an interpreter. We suppose the contents of it is as you write that the three nations shall pay Rs. 14,00,000 for what was robbed from Hasan Amidás' ship and give security for what depredations the pirates shall commit. Concerning this we would have you write the Moghal governor that our answer is that we can pay no part of the Rs. 14,00,000 nor give any such security as is required for the future. But as we have protected the Mokha and Jidda fleet two years following from all miscarriage except what hath been occasioned by the pride obstinacy and folly of such as deserted the convoys, so we will endeavour to do the same this year.¹

A month later (10th February 1699) Sir John Gayer wrote to the Court: Although we have performed our part of the contract with the Moors, about sending convoy ships to Mokha, yet they slight all the good services done them, and not only defer giving an exclusive Phirman but deny paying for the ships here; and now their demands are infinitely larger on the three nations English Dutch and French. Considering the East India trade is now established by Act of Parliament, we presume an exclusive Phirman, could it be procured, would signify little, except to exclude the Scotch company. As circumstances are at present, there is no engaging in such an affair.² The unfortunate success of one of their ship captains furnished the Surat governor with an excuse for making the Company specially responsible for Hasan Amidás' losses. On the 20th September 1700, Sir John Gayer wrote from Bombay to the Court of Directors: Captain Louth while he was in the road at Cape Good Hope took a small ship that came in there belonging to New York of about 90 tons named the Margaret, which had been trading with the pirates at St. Mary's and Madagascar. On this vessel were about 15 passengers that had been pirating in these seas in several ships. Amongst these was that grand villain Sivers commonly called Chivers that was commander of the pirates that took Hasan Amidás' ship coming from Mokha about two years since by means of which your Honours have been at considerable expense and your servants involved in a great deal of trouble. This is likely to be considerably increased by Captain Louth's bringing his prize hither, for that the governor of Surat doth expect that we should deliver the ship and all that was in her with the men to them. The money goods and negroes that were in her that came into the captain's hands, he sayeth might amount to about £6000. How we shall get clear of this business we do not yet know for no rational arguments are of force with the imperious Moors. The Captain

¹ Bombay to Surat, 12th Jan. 1699, Sec. Out. L. B. 6 of 1697-1699. In a letter dated 1st February 1699, in the same volume, under Court's orders of 1698, Mr. Colt is appointed President at Surat instead of Mr. Annesley removed, because Sir John Gayer did not like Mr. Annesley's paying anything to the Moghal governor.

² Bombay to Directors, 10th (February or March) 1699, para. 11, Sec. Out. L. B. 7 of 1699-1702.

also says he believes his ship's company may have got amongst them as much as came into his possession which hath caused them to be very fluent of their money on this island and occasions many little base fellows to be scribbling about it to Surat. The forementioned Captain thinks he has done your Honours such a piece of service in this action, though it detained him at least three weeks at the Cape, that he cannot well be sufficiently rewarded for it. We wish he had let them proceed where they were going that they might have received their due reward at home rather than to have filled our prison with twenty-one criminals in a place where we had before a sufficient number of such as would willingly side with such sparks, especially seeing we cannot sufficiently authorize to put the laws in execution against them. Perhaps it was the love of the guinea that put the Captain on this meritorious piece of service to your Honours.¹

In Surat in 1700 the affairs of the Old or London Company were suffering seriously from the attacks and misrepresentations of Sir Nicholas Waite one of their dismissed servants now Chairman of the New or English Company. On the 16th February 1700, Sir John Gayer wrote to the Directors: Captain Hudson will inform your Honours how that Sir Nicholas Waite said he would spend Rs. 20,000, but that he would have your flag at Surat struck. Captain Hudson will also inform you of other of Sir Nicholas' follies which render him little in the eyes of Europeans if not of others. By what we hear Lucas is the person that spurs him on to such rashness to the detriment of the interest of the nation, not considering what the issue may be, so that he may but gratify his malice to your Honours.²

On the 19th November 1700, in the hope of arranging some settlement of Hasan Amidás' claims in support of which the Surat governor had stopped the Company's trade, Sir John Gayer leaving his Deputy Mr. J. Burniston in charge started from Bombay in the ship Tavistock to go to the Surat river mouth.³ The unsatisfactory state of the Company's interests in Surat was probably another reason why Sir John Gayer went to Swally. Under the unscrupulous manœuvring of Sir Nicholas Waite the head of the New or English Company the Old or London Company had lost favour in Surat. Stories of a grand embassy to the great Moghal in the interest and at the charges of the New Company and the assertion that the Old Company had only one year more to run enabled Sir Nicholas Waite to form a strong party in Surat. In December 1700 the month after Sir John Gayer's arrival at Swally, the Surat President of the Old Company Mr. S. Colt wrote to the Council at St. George: Sir Nicholas Waite gives us a great deal of trouble here by means of the government. He has charged us with

Chapter I. History.

Capture of
Chivers,
1700.

Rival President,
1700.

¹ Sir John Gayer and Council at Bombay to the Court of Directors, Bombay Castle, 20th September 1700, Sec. Out. L. Book 7 of 1699-1702.

² Sir J. Gayer and Council to the Court of Directors, 16th February 1700, para. 24, in Sec. Out. L. Book 7 of 1699-1702.

³ Deputy Governor J. Barniston to Combroon, 28th November 1700, Sec. Out. L. Book 7 of 1699-1702, 3.

Chapter I.

History.

Rival President,
1700.

piracy to the Moghal and his governors and has stirred up the merchants of Surat to prosecute us for their losses to the pirates from the year 1685 until October 1698 to the amount of upwards of 80 lakhs of rupees. To secure mischief to us he has acquainted the king governor and officers that the King of England has ordered him to inform them that our Right Honourable Employers are to expire like unto a dead man on the 29th September 1701. Therefore if they suffer us to depart this empire before all demands upon us are satisfied, no other English would be liable to answer for us. By such practices and very large expenses he has procured our trade to be stopped and our persons confined to the town for near these 4½ months past. But God be thanked we have at last got the restraint upon both taken off and are lading the Loyal Merchant upon which His Excellency Sir J. Gayer is come to Swally, which we hope will be effected in a few days.¹

Sir William
Norris at Surat,
1700.

On the 26th December Sir William Norris the Ambassador sent out by the New Company made his entry into Surat. He was conducted by the governor, his son, the Hurcorra (*Harkāra*) and other officers from Roan (*Rānder*) (a place about two miles out of town), to the governor's house, where they left him, the governor's soldiers accompanying him on to Sir Nicholas' house. He presented the governor with one of his best palanquins and 1000 gold mohors, to the governor's son he gave 500, and to the Vāknavis (newsman) and Harkāra (intelligencer) 150 each—a fine reward for the good company he had of them. He is designed to Court in (a few) days. We believe he has little to maintain his expense, and Sir Nicholas' abilities are but mean. What supplies he can afford him will be very slender. The next day Sir William Norris sent a summons to His Excellency Sir John Gayer and all English in or about Surat to come and hear his commission read.²

Sir John Gayer
Prisoner at Surat,
1701.

In January 1701 hot disputes are mentioned between President Colt of the Old Company and Sir Nicholas Waite.³ On the 5th February 1701 orders from Delhi and from the Emperor himself reached the governor of Surat. On the 8th about midnight the governor sent his son out of the gates with upwards of one hundred men. This was not done so secretly but the old Factory had notice from the Secretary their friend and President Colt advised Sir John Gayer thereof and reached his hand at Swally before morning. At Swally the Meer (Amir) appeared early in his usual hunting tent and sending notice thereof to Sir John Gayer then in bed he immediately arose and invited the Meer within the impaileur of the lodge. As the Meer excused himself Sir John went out towards him. On this the Meer's men being directed, secured Sir John and his grenadiers. They then entered the lodge and obliged the Lady Gayer to rise out of the bed, and carried

¹ Mr. S. Colt, President and Council to Fort St. George, 3rd December 1700, Surat Fact. Out. L. Book 3 of 1677-1700, 128-129.

² Surat President Mr. Colt and Council to Fort St. George President Mr. Thomas Pitt, 31st December 1700, Surat Fact. Out. L. Book 3 of 1677-1700, 131-132.

³ Bombay Deputy Governor and Council to the Court of Directors, 17th January 1701, Sec. Ont. Letter Book 7 of 1699-1702, 21.

her Mr. Somaster and others, to accompany the General to Surat before the Tavistock's people had notice or could come ashore to their rescue. Being brought over the river in an open boat the lady was put into a hackery covered with a cloth and carried to the governor's, where with Sir John and others she was confined to one room. Some hours later the governor sent for President Colt, who going with two of his Council kept company with Sir John in the prison. This triumphant act, as it is esteemed of the Meer, was written that night to the Emperor to the no small dishonour of the old Company's General of India, that need not have been surprised if had thought of that trust reposed in him and will not now easily be permitted going out of Surat before the whole demands of that Company are adjusted.¹

On the 14th February on hearing of Sir John Gayer's and President Colt's imprisonment the Deputy Governor and Council at Bombay wrote to the Surat Factory: Yours without date we received the last night by the *machva*. It was no small surprise and trouble to us to find the General with the rest of our Right Honourable Masters' servants fallen into the hands of the barbarous and treacherous Moors. By this it cannot be expected but our affairs in these parts will greatly suffer till matters be regulated at home between the two Companies. We do sincerely and heartily wish that those false aspersions and malicious proceedings of the new Company's agents here to the prejudice of our Masters will meet with that reward and punishment which they justly deserve. Sirs, we thank you for your advices and desire the continuance of the same from time to time. For this purpose we have sent this small boat to attend you with four of our garrison topasses, not caring to trust any of our Englishmen, fearing they should be trepanned, or wilfully desert. We hope your next will bring us better tidings, at least that they permit the General to reside in the factory. We shall take the necessary care for the preservation of the island, and discharge our trust with all faithfulness and diligence as you may imagine, trusting to no false heathens or others of the new Company's servants, who most certainly have a hand in the present treachery. We hope you have secured all the goods that were at Swally on board the ship Tavistock, which will be a most acceptable piece of service to our Masters.²

With this the Bombay Council sent the following letter to Sir John Gayer: The day before we designed to despatch the brigantine with her enordered pepper to your Excellency we had advices from Mr. Daniel Dubois and Captain Martin of the fatal accident happened to your Excellency in falling into the hands of the barbarous and treacherous Moors. We therefore think it not convenient to send the said brigantine but have taken her pepper on shore with a design to alter her according to your

Chapter I.

History.

Sir John Gayer
Prisoner at
Surat,
1701.

¹ Bombay to the Court, para. 21. Forrest's Home Series, I. 227.

² Deputy Governor J. Burniston and Council (Messrs. W. Aislaby and B. Stacey) of Bombay to Mr. Daniel Dubois and Capt. Mathew Martin at Surat, 14th February 1701, Sec. Out. Letter Book 7 of 1699-1702, 29.

Chapter I.

History.

Sir John Gayer
Prisoner at
Surat,
1701.

Excellency's directions if time will permit, for we must keep all our vessels in readiness for fear of any design against the island. We do not reply to your Excellency's last, not knowing but this may be intercepted by the infidels or others of our adversaries. We hope we shall speedily hear from your Excellency of your enlargement and that they permit of your residing in the factory. Trusting in God for your releasement in His due time and that the new Company's agents may meet their deserved punishment for so basely insinuating the heathens against all law and justice to the prejudice of our Masters' interest. We shall take due care in the preservation of the island, not trusting to any of the false and perfidious barbarians nor the new Company's servants.¹

Next day (15th February) the Bombay Governor issued the following order to Lt. William Shaw: 'The treacherous Moors having on the 9th instant surprised our General and carried him with others of our Masters' servants to Surat, is caution enough for us to be on our guard, not knowing their evil and treacherous designs. Therefore take care that you and all under you be on your defence, trusting to none of those barbarous heathens; and that good watches be kept both day and night, advising us immediately if any thing more than ordinary should happen which God forbid. They add: We received two of yours by the Gentu soldiers ordered down, whom we returned to their respective posts about 11 o'clock that day. We would have you see what of them can be brought to use fire arms and send us a list thereof. We shall take care to supply them with what we can, if they have not their own, only the snbhedárs of each company must be obliged to see the fire arms returned. We would likewise have you send for the vereadores and the chief fazindárs, and raise the militia making the necessary officers of the former as is most fitting and as they can most agree among themselves, sending us a list of them. They are obliged to find their own arms and ammunition. If they have none at present let us know what may be wanting, which they must expect to allow for hereafter.²

On the 22nd February the Bombay Council wrote to Surat: We have ready and well manned a fleet of seven vessels. If his Excellency thinks fit we shall send them to the river's mouth with one of the Council to wait his orders. All due care shall be taken of the island, being prepared to defend it against any assaults.³

Sir John Gayer
Released,
1701.

On the 28th February, gladdened by the news of Sir John Gayer's release, the Bombay Council write to Surat: We heartily rejoice for the good news, and we render all due praise and thanks to Almighty God for your release from so close a confinement, and that it hath pleased Him to make our innocence appear and the wicked designs of our malicious adversaries in their true colours

¹ Deputy Govr. J. Burniston and Council at Bombay to the General Sir J. Gayer President and Council at Surat, 14th Feb. 1701, Sec. Out. L. B. 7 of 1699-1702, 30.

² Bom. Gov. Ord. to Lt. W. Shaw, 15th Feb. 1701, Sec. Out. L. B. 7 of 1699-1702, 31.

³ Bombay Deputy Govr. Mr. Burniston and Council to Messrs. Ephraim Bendall and John Robinson at Surat, 22nd Feb. 1701, Sec. Out. L. B. 7 of 1699-1702, 33.

before the face of the heathens. Now Sir Nicholas may have time to look into his actions strictly examining himself and at last say: "O what have I done!" May the shame and infamy to which he most maliciously exposed his fellow-subjects together with all other his undigested politics fall heavy on his head, being but the just reward for such evil ministers. We hope with your Excellency that the general certificate sent to court attested by all the eminent merchants may meet with the desired effect to the confusion of our enemies.¹

A letter of the 22nd March 1701 from the Bombay Council to the Kárwár factory gives details of what happened during Sir John Gayer's confinement: Having this opportunity by a *shibar* bound to Goa, we are chiefly to advise you of our late troubles since the 9th of the past month. His Excellency, my Lady, and several other gentlemen that were with him at Swally, were surprised by the governor's son of Surat, with a retinue of about 50 horse and foot, and hurried up to Surat as prisoners in a disgraceful manner and there committed to the governor's house. This was done by an order from the Delhi court, procured by Sir Nicholas Waite, the *harkára* of Surat, and others of his bellish crew. In the time of his Excellency's confinement at the governor's house, being about fourteen days, several councils or *adálats* were held. All the officers with the eminent merchants of the town were summoned as likewise Sir Nicholas. To Sir Nicholas the governor said, I have now performed the king's order which by your justification and promise of doing great matters was procured in seizing the General. Comply with what you have written and promised the king, and I will deliver the General into your possession. After several debates and evasions of Sir Nicholas, he at last denied what he had caused the *harkára* to write, and in a manner everything else. So that the merchants derided him for his perfidious baseness, and drew up a writing of our innocence, signed by them all and also that rogue the *harkára*, and sent up to the king which we hope may procure milder orders and better treatment for the future. You will doubtless have a more full account of these transactions by return of your peons, who wait his Excellency's answer which so soon as received they shall be despatched to you. They have all been at the factory ever since the 22nd last month but there is a guard of peons set without the gates which the governor says cannot be taken off till further orders from the king.²

Nine months later (31st December 1701) the following Consultation is entered in the Surat Factory Diary: Since our last the governor has forced the payment of the amount there advised from the Dutch and Old Factory. The first are still confined and the latter shut up. The governor a few days past sent for Sir John Gayer, pretending to see him out of kindness, when in truth it was

Chapter I.

History.

Sir John Gayer
Released,
1701.

Demands
against Old
Company,
1701.

¹ Bombay Deputy Governor and Council to Sir John Gayer, General and Council at Surat, 28th February 1701, Sec. Out. Letter Book 7 of 1699-1702, 35.

² Bombay Depy. Govr. to Kárwár, 22nd March 1701, Sec. Out. Letter Book 7 of 1699-1702, 43-44.

Chapter I.

History.

Demands
against Old
Company,
1701.

to deliver him and the Council into the hand and charge of the *kotwāl*. The *kotwāl* gave a receipt for their persons, and in his custody the chief broker continues prisoner, the governor threatening, if he delivers not a faithful account in three days of the surplus which appears by their entries in and out at the custom house to remain in the country, to force him to turn Moor. It is said within this nine days the Emperor has sent down an irrevocable order signed by the Prime Vazir, published the 29th instant, for the Old Factory satisfying all demands upon them. If sufficient assets are not found the factors are to be ignominiously expelled the country, the Emperor directing the Sidi or Admiral to seize Bombay that is so slenderly garrisoned, that if attacked it will be easily carried. All this, they add, might have been prevented had the Factory employed their talent for the true interest of their Masters which has suffered more by their impolite and untoward heat, breaking through sacred promises and trusting to their unlimited power for corrupting all that gold will allure in the whole managery of their affairs. They might have compounded and thereby established a friendship with these inhabitants for less than has been given to the governor for not executing the several orders for payment upon them and for defeating the embassy vainly projected for expelling your Honours out of Industān. In which last God be praised, they and their adherents being infallibly disappointed, will in favour to themselves assuredly charge all that can be invented for destroying most valuable to man. In such discouraging circumstances are we for preserving your Honours being obliged to join with their mysterious and incumbered stock having not yet found any reason to suspect these proceedings can embroil your affairs when your Phirman are delivered (though most Europeans Jews and Gentiles are against that course), governing all our actions with those principles of virtue that our word is with whom (we enjoy) credit beyond what we dare make use of as affairs stand in Europe.¹

Portuguese,
1700.

During 1700 and 1701, while the chief interest and excitement centred at Surat, the Bombay Council passed through a time of trouble and alarm. Besides misunderstandings with the Sidi and frictions with the Portuguese the Marāthās were unusually aggressive and Arab pirates played so bold a part against the Portuguese as to introduce a new element of danger. On the 16th February 1700 Sir John Gayer the General at Bombay, wrote to the Directors: For that she had not their pass, the Portuguese have taken a small ship belonging to some country merchants and carried her into Goa. Of this vessel an Englishman that did belong to Captain Say was master and had goods. The man and his goods Commodore Littleton when at Goa required the Viceroy to deliver him. And because he did not, as we have heard, gave him threatening language in his letter as if he would take one of their ships if he met with any for satisfaction. Afterwards between Goa and this place he met in

¹ Surat Consultation, 31st December 1701, Surat Factory Diary 2 of 1699-1707, 187-188, Forrest's Home Series, I, 229-230.

the night with a Portuguese *machva* bound to Goa with a great many letters and papers for the Viceroy. This *machva* in the night firing some guns, though for what reason the Commodore knew not she being about two or three miles distance from him, gave her chase in the morning, supposing her to be a Shiváji or Malabár pirate. But it proving very little wind, he sent his boats armed to her with the King's colours flying in his barge's head. Notwithstanding which the Portuguese, taking as we suppose the man-of-war to be pirates, discharged a volley of small shot at the barge. Upon this the barge fell astern to the long boat and towed her up and then boarded the *machva* and took her. In the skirmish one of the Commodore's men was killed and two or three wounded and about 10 of the Portuguese wounded. When the Commodore came hither he brought this *machva* with him and would have left her here, but we would not concern ourselves with her. At last he delivered her to the people that he took in her and sent her to the Captain General of the North for the Portuguese, with his letter to him, giving an account of the transaction. This business and the threatening message of the Commodore to the Viceroy hath so enraged the Captain General, who is very lately come to his station, that he hath raised and armed a great number of men and fitted out about 50 *machvás*, as we are by all sorts of people informed, to invade this island. The *machvás* last night were all seen off Máhim where it is reported they are designed to land. We can scarce believe they will be guilty of so rash an action, though it is certain as we have heretofore advised your Honours their exorbitant pride and insolence prompt them almost to anything. About five days since they fired two shots at one of your *machvás* as she passed by one of their small forts to the northward, though she had her colours flying. Since then they have stopped all provisions from coming to the island. All this puts the poor inhabitants into such a consternation that they think of nothing but flying off the island to save their little, for fear they should lose all as they did when the Sidi landed. By this your Honours may perceive that if a course be not taken some way or other to correct the unparalleled pride and insolence of these Portuguese, no merchants of any worth will ever settle on Bombay whereby to increase its revenue. On the contrary it will go less daily by reason of the inhabitants fears from the Portuguese Moors and Shivájis, against whom they are sensible we have not strength to defend the island, though we may the fort. Should those vain rash Portuguese invade the island, we will do our utmost to repel them. But as we have formerly advised, we are in great want of small arms and hand granadoes, great quantity thereof being embezzled in the war, and small recruits come out these last seven years. We also want ■ supply of English powder.¹

Five days later (February 21st) Sir John Gayer resumed: In our last we advised your Honours of the threats of the Portuguese

Chapter I.

History.

Portuguese,
1700.

¹ Letter from the General and Deputy Governor and Council at Bombay to the Court of Directors, 16th February 1700, para. 23, in Sec. Out. L. B. 7 of 1699-1702.

Chapter I.
History.
Portuguese,
1700.

who with the *machvás* anchored the 15th instant off Máhim river. Next day they stood in pretty near this road and afterwards proceeded to their armada lately come from Goa, which lay off at anchor before Chaul, all according to their accustomed pride vanity and folly breathing out threatenings against this island. At night seven sail of Arabs appeared before Versiva (Vesáva). Next day they landed a number of men (how many we know not) at Manora a little to the southward thereof, and burnt several of the Portuguese aldeas or farms. This put the Portuguese twenty times faster on the run to this island for shelter than they by their threats had caused the inhabitants of the said island to fly to them. Next day the Arabs assaulted Vesáva fort and took it, presently putting the Portuguese of all sorts to the sword. This hath possessed them with such a panic fear that several thousands of the inhabitants of their country are fled hither with the Padre Superior of Bándra and several Europeans in offices of trust, leaving that place for the Arabs to destroy without resistance. The Arabs fearing they shall meet with opposition have not hitherto been so courageous as to attempt Máhim. These last three days we have not heard of any action on one side or other. If the Arabs would follow the stroke they might be master of all Sálsette in two days without any considerable opposition from the Portuguese though but the day before the Arabs' invasion the Portuguese were so proudly conceited of their opinionated valour that they had almost divided Bombay in their imaginations amongst them. The Arab ships still lie before Vesáva which makes the Portuguese think that they are fortifying that place more strongly in order to their holding it. The Portuguese armada consisting of two ships, one about 40 the other 28 guns, with two ketches of about 14 guns each and two galivats of about 6 guns each, with about 40 boats of war and about 100 merchants' small vessels lie at Chaul without endeavouring anything that we yet hear of to the relief of their country. Neither do we hear that their new vain proud Captain General makes any provision by land to oppose the Arabs. If the Arabs should fortify Vesáva to that degree as to keep the place, they will be ill neighbours. If care be not taken by the Europe nations to correct their piratical growing insolence, in a little time they will be formidable in these seas as they daily increase their number of shipping of considerable force and entertain all rascally deserters of Europeans of all sorts.

We have put this island into the best posture of defence we can, though it is not our opinion that they will at this time assault us. Still, if they are not checked in their career, the commodiousness of the harbour for the winter will hereafter induce them to endeavour to gain it. Though the place they have now in their possession will harbour any of their ships in the river clear of all danger, but the going in and out is difficult. We have received no letters from Surat these thirteen days; therefore suppose the Portuguese have intercepted all both from them and us.¹

¹ Bombay to the Court of Directors, 21st February 1700, Sec. Out. L. B. 7 of 1699-1702.

Some months after Sir John Gayer left for Surat. In January 1701 the Deputy Governor of Bombay sent him the following : Lieutenant Shaw advises us that the Portuguese have placed guards at Bándra and over against Sion, hindering provisions from being brought over, or our inhabitants that are there to return. Of this there is no real certainty as yet. We believe it only a bounce as usual from those proud and beggarly people. Their pretence for this action is that we are spies and keep a *machva* and bonny boat abroad to advise their enemies the Shivájis and Arabs of their strength. This their foolish jealousies and fear together with their arrogance and pride will at one time or other prove fatal to them. If we hear of any further certainty of this, or that they should proceed to any acts of hostility, we shall use the necessary diligence to prevent such their evil designs and have a watchful eye over them.¹

A week later, on the 30th January 1701, the Deputy Governor of Bombay issued the following order to Lieut. Shaw : Mr. Aislable is gone to Máhim, from whom you will receive the necessary orders concerning the smack and *machva* having sent Serjeant Moore and nine topasses to be employed in them as shall be thought fit. We have ordered both of them to lie on the side over against Curlee (Kurla) Block House at the usual place as formerly, which we suppose both this and Boatswain Wright are acquainted with to prevent the Portuguese blocking up the passage of the river and to protect such boats as belong or others that are coming to the island with batty. We have likewise ordered Mr. Wright if on occasion of the Portuguese committing any acts of hostility, of which he cannot timely advise us, to follow your orders and do you forthwith advise us thereof. In case there be any numbers of batty boats coming to the island, we have ordered Boatswain Wright with the *machva* to weigh anchor and sail in company of them to protect them from the Portuguese.²

A week later (5th February 1701) the Deputy Governor wrote: The Portuguese still continue to impede all manner of provisions coming to this island. Various are the reports given out on this account. The chief reason, as we can learn, is occasioned by their armada which is at present at Bassein and Vesáva, doing what they are accustomed to do whilst they are there. We suppose when they are gone there will be free passage as formerly. They are bound as we hear for the Gulf of Persia. He continues : About ten days ago the Portuguese from their block house at Curley (Kurla) fired several small shots at boats coming over to this island with rice to command them thither. This being a thing unusual and to prevent their blocking the passage of the river we sent to Sion the smack and small *machva* to lie over against the said block house. They were ordered to secure the passage of the river, and convoy

Chapter I. History.

Portuguese
Obstruction,
1701.

Cruizing near
Kurla,
1701.

¹ Bomb. Dep. Govr. Mr. John Burniston and Council to Surat, 23rd January 1701, Sec. Out. L. B. 7 of 1699-1702, 23.

² Bombay Govt. to Lieut. Shaw, 30th January 1701, Sec. Out. L. B. 7 of 1699-1702, 26.

Chapter I.

History.

Cruizing near
Kurla,
1701.

in all such boats as are bound hither without giving any manner of occasion of offence, but to defend themselves if assaulted. Since which we have not heard of any further firing.¹

A fortnight later (22nd February 1701) the Deputy Governor resumes: The Portuguese flourish is over and provisions are brought to the island as formerly.²

On the 9th August the Deputy Governor addressed Lieut. Shaw: This evening the Deputy Governor received a letter from Alvaro Muzello wherein he writes that the Portuguese inhabitants of the Cassabi of Máhim were alarmed with a notion of a parcel of Shiváji galivats being abroad (as they feared) with a design upon this island. It being now the time that they venture out, you are hereby ordered to direct (for the present) such as were the militia before the wars to watch for the better security of the island and its inhabitants.³

On the 26th August Lieut. Shaw received orders requiring him upon no account except in his own defence to discharge any one or more of his great guns at any boat that shall pass up or down Máhim river, at the same time advising him to prevent any infringement of Bombay privileges or any defrauds in the customs or disrespect, and promising very speedily to send one of the large *machrás* to lie and cruize in the said river. This order Lieut. Shaw was directed to observe. When the *machra* was with him he was, without any blood being shed, to cause all boats that passed up or down the said river to pay the customary duties except the King of Portugal's own boats which he was to let pass without interruption.⁴

On the 29th November this order was issued to Corporal John Mitchell: These are to order you to weigh your anchor and having received on board Captain Stacy's son-in-law, make the best of your way to Robin the Butcher's island, hearing the Portuguese have been there and cut down several trees. Examine into that matter, then return and bring an account thereof.⁵

Portuguese
and Arabs,
1701.

Two years later (January 1704) the following details are given of an engagement between the Portuguese and Arabs: The 22nd in the evening the Portuguese, being seven capital ships, weighed in the road, berthing themselves opposite to the same number of Arabs. About four o'clock the Portuguese began to assault the Arabs very briskly. They fought an hour at anchor, and, night coming on, the two greatest of the Arabs cut, and making the best of their way out to sea, were pursued by all the Portuguese

¹ Bombay Deputy Governor and Council to Surat General Sir John Gayer and Council, 5th February 1701, Sec. Out. L. B. 7 of 1699-1702, 27.

² Bom. to Surat, 22nd Feb. 1701, Sec. Out. Letter Book 7 of 1699-1702, 3-4.

³ Bombay Govt. Order to Lieut. W. Shaw, 9th August 1701, Sec. Out. L. B. 7 of 1699-1702, 70.

⁴ Bombay Govt. Order to Lieut. W. Shaw, 26th August 1701, Sec. Out. L. B. 7 of 1699-1702, 74-75. Forrest's Home Series, I. 167.

⁵ Bombay Deputy Governor and Council to Corporal John Mitchell, 29th November 1701, Sec. Out. L. B. 7 of 1699-1702, 103. Forrest's Home Series, I. 168. For the name Robin the Butcher, see below note 5a at the end of the Chapter.

The rest of the Arabs endeavoured coming over the bar into the river. The seven Portuguese chased the two largest of their ships that they pretend slipped them in the night and went their way down the coast. The Catherin relates the largest of the Arabs was at one time battered by five Portuguese that got nothing but shame and dishonour by the bargain, making no better use of such a favourable opportunity for destroying them, three of the Arabs' capital ships being then in the river.¹

The following are instances of the ferry convoy and other petty civilities by which the Bombay Government strove to keep on good terms with both Sidi and Marátha. Orders issued on 17th July 1701 to Mr. Duuren: Permit ten of the Shivájis belonging to their galivat to come on shore to dinner, but let none of them bring arms with them.²

To Ensign William Moore, the 3rd August: On receipt hereof repair on board the Right Honourable Company's double masted *machua* and carry her to the Custom House Bay where you must wait the coming out of the passage boat which you are to convoy as far as the mouth of Trombay, there being a Moghal's officer on board. Having conducted him thither return with all expedition.³

To Mr. Bartlett, the 20th September: On receipt hereof, having all your men on board, with the eleven of the Sidi's people and your five Cowries (*khárvís* or seamen) whom we have ordered on you, weigh your anchors and make the best of your way to Ondry where being arrived, land the foresaid people with all convenient speed and without anchoring if possible. That being done, make the best of your way hither again. But forasmuch as you are not thoroughly acquainted with the passage, we would have you refer to your tindal as to carrying the vessel into that port and bringing her out again.⁴

To Mr. George Ward, Master of the Benjamin yacht (yacht), the 24th March 1702: On receipt hereof the Sidi being on board, wind and tide permitting, weigh your anchors and make the best of your way to Ondry. Being there arrived you are to land him with all convenient speed and then to make the best of your way back again to this port. While the Sidi is on board let him be treated civilly.⁵

To Mr. Lott of the Josia, the 3rd April: On receipt hereof the Goosherdars (probably Gazbardárs that is rod or mace bearers) and their people being on board, and wind and tide permitting, weigh your anchors and make the best of your way to Danda

Chapter I.
History.

Convoy Orders,
1701.

¹ Surat Council, 25th January 1704. Forrest's Home Series, I. 266.

² The Secretary Mr. Warring by order of the Deputy Governor to Mr. Van Duuren and Mr. Hartley, dated Bombay Castle, 17th July 1701, Sec. Out. Letter Book 7 of 1699-1702, 65.

³ Bom. Gov. Order to Ensign W. Moore, 3rd August 1701, Sec. Out. Letter Book 7 of 1699-1702, 69.

⁴ The Deputy Governor and Council to Mr. Richard Bartlett, 20th September 1701, Sec. Out. Letter Book 7 of 1699-1702, 83.

⁵ Bombay Deputy Governor and Council to Mr. George Ward, Master of the Benjamin Yacht, 24th March 1702, Sec. Out. Letter Book 7 of 1699-1702, 144.

Chapter I.
History.

Convoy Orders,
1702.

Rájpuri, taking under your convoy and charge the boat that your necessities and lumber are on board of. Being arrived at that port, land the said Goosberdars with all expedition. That being done make as speedy return as possible. While the Goosberdars are on board let them be treated civilly.¹

To Captain Ward on the 9th May: These are to order you to receive on board Devaon (Diwán) Abdul Gaphur and his people with their necessities and transport them to Ondry. Likewise goes with you one of the Sidi's boats whom you are to take under your convoy; also take the two-masted *machvás* to accompany you. When you have seen them safe ashore return with all expedition.²

Maráthás,
1700 - 1701.

During the whole two years (1700 and 1701) both Maráthás and Sidis required constant watching. On the 28th November 1700, very soon after Sir John Gayer had left Bombay, the Deputy Governor wrote to Surat: We shall according to your Excellency's orders hasten the fitting the smack and two *machvás*. In the meantime we think of sending out the *machra* and bonny boat to cruize between Bassein and Máhim to bring in what merchants' vessels they shall meet with, the Shivájis having as we are informed taken two boats belonging to the island since your Excellency went.³

Coast-Guarding,
1701.

On the 28th December (1700) they resume: We continue the bonny boat and *machra* cruising and have not since heard of any acts of hostility committed by the Shivájis on any vessels belonging to the island. They have returned the two *shibars* with the cargoes taken before your Excellency went hence. The smack is launched and with the two *machvás* shall be fitted with all expedition. She will be sufficient for cruising and convoys. And we shall use our endeavours with the merchants to pay sufficient convoy money to defray the charges of all.⁴

In the same letter Mr. Burniston notices: Captain Colliere met in his way with eight sail of Ara's. As they showed no colours at first he obliged one of them by firing a shot thwart his forefoot to send his boat on board and give an account who they were. They told they were bound to Diu.

He adds: We shall not molest the Shivájis if they do not molest us, keeping always cruisers out to oblige them to civility.⁵

Maráthás,
1701.

On the 13th March 1701, the Deputy Governor of Bombay wrote to Sir John Gayer in Surat: The Maráthás are become our enemies as appears by their taking several vessels belonging to the island. At the same time they came in here pretending to make satisfaction for what they formerly robbed and to restore what was

¹ Bom. Gov. to Mr. Charles Lott, Master of the Josia Brigantine, Bombay Castle, 3rd April 1702, in Sec. Out. Letter Book 7 of 1699-1702, 147.

² Bom. Gov. Order to Captain George Ward, 9th May 1702, Sec. Out. Letter Book 7 of 1699-1702, 165.

³ Bombay to Surat, 28th Nov. 1700, Sec. Out. L. Book 7 of 1699-1702, 1-2.

⁴ Bom. to Surat, 28th Dec. 1700, Sec. Out. Letter Book 7 of 1699-1702, 12.

⁵ Bom. to Surat, 28th Dec. 1700, Sec. Out. Letter Book 7 of 1699-1702, 13, 15.

lately taken. We find all a mere pretence and only to bring further trouble on us as your Excellency and Council will see by Sidi's letters which we herewith remit together with our answer. We assure your Excellency we have not permitted the Maráthás to carry the least thing from hence nor of late to stay in the port that we may not give the Sidi any disgust. Of two evils it is best to choose the least esteeming it better. If forced to be at variance with either, it is best to quarrel with the Maráthás, though we shall do our endeavour to keep fair with both. The Portuguese take the opportunity to do us all the unkind offices that may be, as we are informed. While Droab (Dorábji) was with the Sidi, he caused his Portuguese *Sirwan* (escrivan) or writer to read the Captain of Chaul's letter then received. The Captain acquainted him that the Shivájis had little or no powder or ball in Kolába, but he knew from whence they would be supplied and that boats were gone for it, meaning to Bombay, as the Sidi told Droab. We also hear that while one of the Subhedárs from Cundry was here one Manoell Morais De Carvalhios came to Máhim to treat with the said Subhedár. On what account we cannot as yet learn, but in a day or two shall be able to further advise.¹

A fortnight later (26th March) the Bombay Deputy Governor wrote to the Court: The Sidi and the Shivájis have had several skirmishes of late. The Sidi with a considerable force both by sea and land, hath laid siege to a small fort called Kolába (off Alibág) within four or five leagues of this port. He hath assaulted and endeavoured to scale it, but without success, being forced to retreat with the loss of a great many men as reported. This loss hath so aggravated him that he sticks not to lay the cause of his ill success on us, writing a very peremptory letter falsely accusing us with assisting his enemies with ammunition. Our ill neighbour the proud and beggarly Portuguese is not wanting on such occasions to do us all unkind offices. He is the person that insinuated the Sidi into a belief hereof, but we have undeceived him and made it appear to the contrary to his satisfaction. The Shivájis are in reality friends to none, but as pirates and rovers take all vessels they can overpower. These disturbances have occasioned us to be on our guard and prepared to receive any that shall presume to any attempt.²

Two days later (28th March) Mr. J. Burniston, the Deputy Governor, writes to Surat: At present there is no right understanding between the Sidi and Shivájis. In the latest skirmish the Sidi as reported hath had a considerable loss, though by his letters to us (Bombay Governor) which go herewith, giving an account of the action, he pretends the contrary. He hath been very urgent with us to send a chyrurgeon to dress his wounded men saying he would bear all charges and look on it as a great favour done to the king his master. Dr. Thompson proffering his service we consented to his going, who desired we would spare the black fellow that assists

Chapter I.

History.

Maráthás,
1701.Fight with Sids,
1701.

¹ Bom. Deputy Governor Mr. Burniston and Council to Sir John Gayer and Council at Surat, 13th March 1701, Sec. Out. Letter Book 7 of 1699-1702, 42-43.

² Bombay to Court, 26th March 1701, Sec. Out. Letter Book 7 of 1699-1702, 46.

Chapter I.

History.

Fight with Sidis,
1701.

in the hospital for two or three days in case he should have occasion to make any amputations ; that there was none to be got here that knew how to assist so well as him ; and that Dr. Skinner had no cause to complain of our ordering any of his assistants away as he did not need them at that time, having but three sick in the hospital. The Deputy Governor ordered Mr. Forbes to write Dr. Skinner a note, copy of which we here remit. His most scurrilous answer, also remitted, shows the pride and factiousness of that vain man of whom we could give a larger character of his abuses and disobedience to Government making him sensible of them, but thought it more fit for crimes of the nature to wait your Excellency's orders.¹

Sidi at Kolába,
1701.

In the same letter the Deputy Governor adds: The Sidi still continues his siege without doing any great matters at Kolába. We shall be watchful to give a warm welcome to the Shivájis or any others who may presume to attempt any thing on this island.²

Customs Rules,
1701.

On the 29th August 1701 Lieut. Shaw has these orders to prevent the evasion of customs dues: Herewith comes one of the Right Honourable Company's *machvais* manned as usual to whom you must give orders to constrain any merchants' vessels that shall endeavour to evade it to come to the custom house and pay the usual duties there. When the weather is fair, let her every now and then go out and cruize off the river's mouth, but let her not fail of returning again every time she goes out to her station in the river ere night. She is to remain with you to be employed as above mentioned until we shall order to the contrary.³

Coast-Guarding,
1701.

Other orders issue from time to time to keep a watch on suspicious Marátha Arab French and other vessels. To Mr. Mercer on the 8th October 1701: On receipt of this repair on board the Right Honourable Company's Sittée and having all your men and provisions on board, and wind and tide permitting, weigh your anchors and make the best of your way out of the harbour. Between the mouth of the harbour and the point of Malabár Hill you are to cruize till we shall order the contrary. If within the bounds and time of your cruize you should happen to meet with any Shiváji or other boats that have taken any boat or boats belonging to this island, you are to endeavour to retake it or them. This you may effect without much trouble. For if you chase them we doubt not but they will let such prize or prizes go rather than pretend to stand the brunt unless they know themselves strong enough to cope with you, which if you perceive you must not be so rash as to run the vessel or yourselves into danger. Likewise if in your said cruize you should spy any ship or ships in the offing and can discover what it or they be without hazarding the safety of your boat and men which you must on no account do, make the best of your way into the road and acquaint us therewith. Fail

¹ Bombay to Surat, 28th March 1701, Sec. Out. Letter Book 7 of 1699-1702, 48.

² Bombay to Surat, 28th March 1701, in Sec. Out. Letter Book 7 1699-1702, 51.

³ Bom. Gov. Order to Lt. Shaw, 29th Aug. 1701, Sec. Out. L. B. 7 of 1699-1702, 76.

not, if possibly you can, of returning into this road every night and of bringing the vessel to anchor in or nigh her usual berth. You are not to molest the Shivájis upon any account whatsoever otherwise than as before directed.¹

To Lieut. Shaw on the 20th November 1701: We received both yours this afternoon. According to the account given you by the Serjeant of the *machva* Raols we believe them to be Arabs' ships which you may have further notice of by to-morrow. Meantime see and call the militia together that you may be ready on any occasion if they should make any assault on the island to receive them and defend yourselves. Give order likewise to all the outworks at Warli to be on their duty, keeping a strict watch taking the Gentu soldiers off from the work they are about. And see and order them as you think most convenient that they may not be surprized. Powder shall be sent you to-night and what else you want let us know. You must supply the militia. We now send you our small fleet which place between Warli point and Bándra. If the Arabs should offer to come into our river resist them, or if they should be landed on our island before our fleet arrive, then let the fleet go where the Arab boats are, and use their utmost diligence to cut them off. By no means offer to board them lest they should overpower our vessels. Send the small *machva* to see what further discovery they can make, but be sure they take care not to run in danger. We send up Ensign Moore to your assistance. Be sure to let us hear from you as often as occasion offers. By the fleet we send you two barrels English powder, a thousand musquet balls, five hundred flints, and fifty cwt. of match. If the Arabs should come with a great fleet of boats, which they commonly do on such occasions and some very large that carry five or six guns and a great many men, then let our fleet weigh and retire under protection of the fort. But keep firing on them as we retire and take the opportunities of destroying said boats if they should land.²

To Lt. Shaw on the 25th November 1701: We have ordered this night our three *machvás* to anchor in the Back Bay, hearing a large fleet of the Shivájis are out. In case they meet with no Shivájis, then in the morning to make the best of their way to Máhim. On their arrival we would have you order the Sittee with you to join with them, and proceed as far as Vesáva and then return to their usual berths if they meet with no opposition. We likewise order you to deliver powder and ball to the militia and order them to be in a readiness in case of any alarm. We would have you keep a man at Vesáva to advise the transactions of the Shivájis, of which give us due intelligence.³

To Mr. Ward on the 12th August 1702: On receipt hereof uncover the vessel, hoist her yards and top masts, bend all her sails, load all her guns with shot and cartridge, and put her in all respects in the great readiness and best posture of defence you can.

Chapter I.

History.

Coast-Guarding,
1701-02.

¹ Bom. Gov. to Mr. John Mercer, 8th Oct. 1701, Sec. Out. L. B. 7 of 1699-1702, 81-82.

² Bom. Gov. to Lieut. Shaw, 20th Nov. 1701, Sec. Out. L. B. 7 of 1699-1702, 96-97.

³ Bom. Gov. to Lieut. Shaw, 25th Nov. 1701, Sec. Out. L. B. 7 of 1699-1702, 100.

Chapter I.
History.
 Coast-Guarding,
 1702.

The ship that was seen to the northward for six or seven days past came yesterday in the evening about the point of Old Woman's Island. It is as we are informed a French ship. She is now riding at anchor off this harbour.¹

To Mr. Charles Lott, the 25th August 1702: On receipt hereof, the weather being fair, weigh your anchors and sail out as far as the reef of Old Woman's Island. Between which and this road cruize till the flood is made, with which you must return to your usual berth here, unless in the evening you shall see any boats at the outermost fishing stakes. In such case you are to bring the vessel to an anchor as near the stakes as conveniently you can. Continue there all the night, if the weather will permit you with safety so to do, to protect them from molestation from the Shivájis or others, returning next morning to inform us what occurrences you shall have met with.²

To Lt. Shaw, 19th December 1702: When the *machva* goes out a cruising, order her not to go far off and not to go near any large vessel she may see, unless they know her full well to be no enemy but to belong to this island, for that we hear Kánhoji Angria with a grab and ten or twelve galvets is abroad to the northward.³

To Lt. Shaw, 22nd December 1702: This accompanies one of our matrosses and five European sentinels to go on board the *machva*, who on their arrival, put on board her, and give Corporal Mitchell orders, wind and tide permitting, to weigh and stand out early to-morrow morning to cruize between Vesáva and the point of Malabár Hill to observe as far as possible the motion of Kánhoji Angria and his fleet. If they shall attack or take any vessels bound to this port, order Corporal Mitchell to use his utmost endeavour to defend or redeem the captures; but on no other account to molest the Angriás unless they assault him. In such case he is to do them all the damage he can. What ammunition she will now have occasion for more than is on board her, you must supply her with; an account of which send us and the same quantity shall be returned you from this garrison.⁴

Pass for Country
Music,
 1695.

Among the civil or domestic orders of these years the following may be noted: To Ensign Shaw, the 8th April 1695. These are to enorder you when any Callimbines and Bunderines (Kunbis and Bhandáris) which live in the addas (vadis or gardens) come to you for a chit to have the country music that you give them one without taking anything from them. Likewise you are to take notice that the Serjeant of Sion is ordered to give chits to those people that live near to his post. You are to give no chit for the country music on the Sabbath day. Similar order to Serjeant Swan.⁵

¹ Bom. Gov. Order to Mr. George Ward, Master of the Benjamin Yatch, 12th August 1702, Sec. Out. L. B. 7 of 1699-1702, 183.

² Bom. Gov. Order to Mr. Charles Lott, Master of the Josiah Brigantine, 25th August 1702, Sec. Out. L. B. 7 of 1699-1702, 186.

³ Bom. Gov. to Lieut. Shaw, 19th Dec. 1702, Sec. Out. L. B. 7 of 1699-1702, 215.

⁴ Bom. Gov. to Lieut. Shaw, 22nd Dec. 1702, Sec. Out. L. B. 7 of 1699-1702, 216.

⁵ Bom. Gov. Orders to Ensign W. Shaw and Serj. Swan, 5th April 1695, Sec. Out. L. B. 5 of 1694-1696, 41-42.

Of domestic difficulties the Deputy Governor reports the following to Surat and to the Court in November 1700 and March 1701: On the 24th instant (November 1700), in the evening happened a very unlucky passage between Mr. Enoch Walsh and Mr. Ralph Hartley, the latter being wounded in three places. These at first we did not know but might prove mortal. But by God Almighty's providence he is finally recovered and the doctor says there is no danger. Mr. Walsh is close prisoner in one of the chambers over the prison in the fort, where he shall continue till your Excellency's further pleasure is known concerning him, as likewise about Mr. Hartley.¹

On the 27th March they write: Mr. Thomas Woodford one of your Honours' factors that came out in the *Thomas* and was employed in your Custom House here for the receiving of the revenues, proved very unfaithful in squandering and making away a considerable sum of your Honours' cash as appears by the enclosed account. He did clandestinely leave the island and was absent about two months, but returning we secured him and is at present under confinement in the garrison. We should have sent him home by the ship but that there were too many such ordered on her.²

On the 28th March they resume (to Surat): As to Hall, had there been any hopes of reclaiming him by being reduced as your Excellency is pleased to direct, we should have done it. But as he is a restless factious and turbulent spirited man ever promoting and carrying on his rascally designs he would be always seducing others to be confederates with him. Therefore as you were pleased to leave it to us, we thought it with submission much better to be rid of such a scabby sheep that he might not infect the flock. So have sent him home on the *Twistack*.³ In the same letter they continue: Mr. Harbin is reclaimed and diligent in business, promising never to be guilty of such errors in future. We hope now Mr. Walsh and other factious persons being gone, we shall find more quietness. If any prove disobedient and disturbers to the Government, we shall not fail to advise well knowing your Excellency will order them their due deserts.⁴

The wished-for quietness does not seem to have come. On the 26th August on a report from Lieut. Shaw that a Proclamation had been torn down by some person unknown, the Deputy Governor regretted there should be any person on this island so disrespectful to Government as to tear a Proclamation. Since there is and that so high a misdemeanour may (if possible) be duly rewarded, Lieut. Shaw was ordered to give public notice that any person that shall discover the said offenders shall be liberally rewarded.⁵

On the 19th September 1701 in consequence of the robbery of several Moormens' houses orders were issued that no Cofferies

Chapter I.

History.

Domestic
Difficulties,
1700.

Disturbance
in Bombay,
1701.

Robberies,
1701.

¹ Bombay Deputy Governor and Council to Surat, 28th November 1700, Sec. Out. L. B. 7 of 1699-1702, 2.

² Bombay to Court, 27th March 1701, Sec. Out. L. B. 7 of 1699-1702, 46.

³ Bombay to Surat, 28th March 1701, Sec. Out. L. B. 7 of 1699-1702, 47.

⁴ Bombay to Surat, 28th March 1701, Sec. Out. L. B. 7 of 1699-1702, 49.

⁵ Bom. Gov. Order to Lieut. Shaw, 26th August 1701, Sec. Out. Letter Book 7 of 1699-1702, 74. Forrest's Home Series, I, 167.

Chapter I.
History.

that is Zanzibar slaves be permitted to go off the island, either at Máhim Warli or Sion.¹

The 1702 records contain notices of three matters of some interest, the improvement of Máhim fort in June, the celebration of the accession of Queen Anne in early November, and late in the same month a severe hurricane. Of the improvement of Máhim fort the following details are preserved in a consultation of the Surat Council dated 12th June 1702 :

Máhim Fort,
1702.

About the beginning of last rains (1701) the governor of Surat having given us cause to suspect that he had a design to invade Bombay, we ordered the Deputy Governor and Council to consult with the engineer and commission officers about adding some strength to the little fort at Máhim with all possible speed, allowing them to spend three thousand Xeraphins thereon if need required it. Now after they had made some progress herein they wrote us that it would cost more than we had allowed them to bestow on it. In answer to which we wrote that though it did, they should use all possible diligence to finish it. When we thought it had been near done, they sent us a model of what they designed to erect, noting how far the work was carried on and how much it had and would cost. The sum expended was Xs. 3397, and the work was not more than one-sixth completed. At all this we were extremely surprised, but they laid the blame on Mr. Van Duuren who made such an erroneous computation. Now we were not only surprised at the extraordinary charge that it would amount to, but that the work was not above one-sixth part done, which we designed for an immediate strength to the island, in case it should be invaded by the Moors or Portuguese, with whom we had reason to expect a breach and that speedily. Another thing that troubled us much was our fear that in time the sea might wash part of it away, and then so much money would be ill bestowed. However, seeing they had gone on so far and that it would add great strength to the island when finished and greatly augment the custom of Máhim, we ordered that if they could be assured that it would be in no danger from the sea, they should use all possible diligence to get it finished.²

Queen Anne,
1702.

In the matter of Queen Anne's accession on the 4th November 1702 Lt. Shaw received the following orders : The enclosed is copy of the proclamation for Queen Anne by which do you about the hour of 10 to-morrow morning proclaim her at Máhim in public, the militia and all your garrison soldiers being under arms, and all the eminent merchants and inhabitants of the Cassaby assembled. As soon as the proclamation is read, give three Hussaees. Then cause

¹ From Gov. Orders to Lieut. Shaw and Serjeant Barlow, 19th September 1701. Sec. Out. L. B. 7 of 1699 - 1702, 79. Lieut. Shaw was in charge of Máhim Warli and Sion ports and forts and Serjeant Barlow of Mázgaon port. See page 71 of the same volume. Captain Mitchell George was in charge of Dongri fort (11th August 1701) When he became sick he gave over charge to Ensign William Sheppard.

² Surat Consultation, 12th June 1702, Surat Fact. Diary 3 of 1701-4, 31. Forrest's Home Series, I. 241.

the militia to fire three volleys, and then discharge as many of your great guns as conveniently you can. In the evening perform the usual solemnity for the day by making a bonfire.¹

About three weeks later all the small boats of the island are said to have been destroyed by a furious storm.² On the 30th November the Bombay Government issued the following orders to Lieutenant Shaw: All the Right Honourable Company's mango and such like trees blown down in the late hurricane, you are to take under your care preserving for the Company's use such part of them as may be fit for timber. The rest we would have you sell to the chunam makers at the best rate you can, it being good wood for their use.³ About a fortnight later a second order issued: Sell what you can of the Right Honourable Company's palm-trees that were blown down; also of the jack trees that are not fit for plank, but such as are, preserve for that use.⁴

The first main division of Bombay history closes with the union of the Old and New Companies. Notice of the union and details of the articles which had been accepted in London on the 1st January 1702 reached Surat in December 1702. A Consultation at Surat dated the 9th December records the following details: The 4th instant late at night, received letters dated the 12th October from the President and Council of the Coast, inclosing 21 articles for a union agreed between the two Companies in January 1702, the same confirmed by a letter they received by the *Colchester* from the Court of Directors dated the 10th January last (1702) (copy of which likewise enclosed), informing them that the general Courts of both Companies (English and London) had *unanimously* agreed upon a union, which was then being drawn into form by Council, and would be completed in a little time. Resolved in Council next day 5th December that copy of the said articles and letter (being the first notice we had received from any factory on the other side and to this day no general Europe letters) should be fairly transcribed and enclosed in a private letter. Sir Nicholas Waite was then desired to write Sir John Gayer (a letter) to be delivered him by the Secretary. Sir John Gayer accordingly published in their factory the purport of the said union the same or the day after he had received it from us. Then their chief broker and an eminent Persian merchant told the governor the certain union of both Companies. Sir John Gayer also explained a new General and Council were coming out upon the next ship, and that the new factory was to embark away. He therefore desired leave for himself and Mr. Colt to go down to Bombay to repair the Castle and other damages sustained by the late violent storm promising when finished they would return.⁵

Chapter I. History.

Storm,
1702.

Union of the
Companies,
1702.

¹ Bom. Gov. Order to Lieut. Shaw, 4th Nov. 1702, Sec. Out. L. B. 7 of 1699-1702, 202.

² Surat Diary, 8th Jan. 1703, Surat Factory Diary 4 of 1702-1704, 74.

³ Bom. Gov. Order to Lieut. W. Shaw, 30th November 1702, Sec. Out. L. B. 7 of 1699-1702, 210.

⁴ Bom. Gov. Order to Lieut. W. Shaw, 15th Dec. 1702, Sec. Out. L. B. 7 of 1699-1702, 214.

⁵ Sir Nicholas Waite and W. Proby's Consultation at Surat, dated 9th December 1702 and 19th January 1703, Surat Factory Diary 4 of 1702-1704, 20-21, 88.

Chapter I.
History.

Union of the
Companies,
1702.

The Surat Diary of the Old Company contains the following entry dated 25th May 1704: This morning Vanmálidás came and acquainted us that the New Company's broker Rustam had been with the governor and told him that all the Old Company's servants were turned out; that Sir Nicholas Waite was made chief; that the ship arrived at Bombay was consigned to him, and that the Old Company had given the Queen of England one or two lákhs of rupees to make their peace. When the governor asked him whether he might with safety cause us to deliver the money that we had seized of Abdul Gaphur's, Rustam said Yes, make them deliver. Sir John Gayer is nothing now, he cannot stop the port or do it any mischief. All the power now is in my master's hand. The said Rustam told the governor he must secure Sir John Gayer and the Old Company's servants to be answerable for the security paper and the many lákhs of rupees the town merchants had been robbed by the pirates. And all demands or debts that any people might make upon the Old Company's factory he must make them give satisfaction, for his master would not be answerable for any thing.¹

The Surat Diary contains the following entry regarding an enquiry made on the next day the 26th May: This day about 12 o'clock we were ordered by the General President and Council to go to the governor's house and answer such questions as should there be put to us relating to the settlement of the united trade according to their instructions to William Mildmay and the broker. Accordingly we went and were seated in a public place with the *diwán* (the governor being in his private apartment), who at first coming asked several indifferent questions and despatched several persons to call the New Company's people. After some time Mr. Jeremiah Bonnel and Mr. Edward Crowe came just as the governor was coming out of his apartment to go to prayers. In the yard the governor asked which was the New Company's people and which was the Old. He then bid the *diwán* sit down and examine into the papers and business we came about. William Mildmay bid Vanmáli to ask the *diwán* why the governor sent for us. He answered, To ask to whom that ship belonged that was lately arrived at Bombay. William Mildmay said it belonged to the united trade of both Companies. Then who was Chief and General? I answered Sir Nicholas Waite and John Gayer. Then who was President of Surat? I answered Sir Nicholas Waite. Then the *diwán* turned to Mr. Bonnel and Rustam their broker and asked them what they had to say. Mr. Bonnel said he was come there to talk with the governor not to the *diwán*. Then the *diwán* asked us if we had brought the papers from the Company to prove Sir John Gayer was General. William Mildmay said we had brought no papers, neither would we ever show our Masters' orders to them, and since Mr. Bonnel would not answer to his questions we would not answer to any more neither, and desired liberty to go home. After

¹ Surat Diary (of Sir John Gayer and Messrs. Stephen Colt and F. Rendall) dated 25th May 1704, Surat Factory Diary 3 of 1701-1704, 151. Forrest's Home Series, I. 266-267.

some time this was granted upon promise that we would come again at five o'clock if sent for.

In the evening we were sent for again by the governor, where we found Messrs. Bonnel and Crowe discoursing with the *diwán*. So soon as we came the *diwán* asked us again to whom that ship belonged that was arrived at Bombay. We answered we had told him before to the united trade of both Companies. Then who was General and Chief; I answered, Sir John Gayer was General and ordered to reside at Bombay. Who was President of Surat? I answered Sir Nicholas Waite. Mr. Bonnel in Portuguese bid Rustam tell the *diwán* Sir John Gayer was General, but it was but for three months. If he did not clear all the demands that were upon the Old Company in that time, Sir Nicholas Waite was General, and must go down to Bombay. William Mildmay was asked if that was true. He answered that if it pleased God Sir John should die or any unforeseen accident should happen to him in that time so that he could not go to Bombay, then Sir Nicholas Waite was General. But as to clearing all the Old Company's accounts before he went, there was no occasion, for there would be those of the Old Company's servants left that would take care to pay what any one could justly demand of them. Then the *diwán* asked if neither of them could go, who was General then. We said his Worship Burnistoun, the present Deputy Governor. We desired to know upon what occasion all these questions were asked us, to which no answer was given. Then Mr. Bonnel pulled out of his pocket the Honourable English Company's seal and laid it before all the company and asked if William Mildmay could deny that to be the Company's seal, and whether the letters that now came were not sealed with it. William Mildmay said he could not deny but that it was, and the letters were sealed with it as by agreement between the two Companies in England when they united. Then Mr. Bonnel opened the indenture of union in a page turned down, clapped his hand upon it, and asked if we could deny the Old Company being turned out and the trade brought under the management of the New which that and the seal testified. William Mildmay said he did not deny anything contained in those writings, neither had he any orders to answer to such questions, and asked the gentlemen the reason of their bringing these things upon the stage. At this time (we stated) we had been sufficiently depressed already: had they a mind to bury us quite under ground. Mr. Bonnel said he followed his orders, we might follow ours. Mr. Crowe made answer, You may thank yourselves for it: all this comes upon you through the message that was sent by Sir John to Sir Nicholas that he designed to acquaint the governor of the settlement. Vanmáli told William Mildmay the *diwán* asked if Sir John went away, who was there left so great as to give answer for what demands might come upon the Old Company. William Mildmay said he knew well enough there was sufficient to satisfy all just debts that any one had upon us, therefore what matter who was left. He might give the *diwán* what answer he pleased, those there would be left that would take care that none should be sufferers on the Old Company's account.

Chapter I. History.

Union of the
Companies,
1704.

Chapter I.

History.

Union of the
Companies,
1704.

Then we were all carried before the governor. Here we were again asked who was General and who President, to which we answered as before. The seal was again shown to the governor. What else passed there was in Moores, which William Mildmay did not understand. Therefore John Brangwin gives a deposition apart. But Usher Beag (Asa Beg) was ordered to put a guard upon the General (Vaumálidás refusing to be his security) and came home with us in the coach to see it done, and ordered fifty men to follow him to the factory. To this we can make oath.—(Signed) William Mildmay, Secretary, and John Brangwin, Senior Factor.¹

In spite of the advantages secured by the union of the two Companies affairs in Surat were far from prosperous. In June 1703 and again in January 1704 the Directors called on their Councils in Surat and in Bombay to consider how best the whole trade could be centred in Bombay: Whether the merchants might not by some means be united to come and take up their residence in Bombay, or whether the transfer could be effected in any other way.² On the 4th June 1703 they wrote regarding Bombay: We will grudge no tolerable charge to make every part of the island defensible against any invasion, and to render it healthful, and invite inhabitants to reside on it.³

Bombay,
1706.

In spite of the Directors' efforts life in Bombay seems to have been by no means agreeable. Two years later (January 1706) in a letter to the Court, Sir N. Waite the Deputy Governor of Bombay, gives the following details of the island: We are only eight covenant servants including the Council and but two that write, besides two raw youths taken ashore out of ships, and most of us often sick in this unhealthful depopulated and ruined island.⁴ Three months later (18th April) he continues: We are now seven on the island and some of us greatly indisposed, and but six commission officers two of which often sick, and under forty English sentinels, a particular true state of Bombay.⁵

Three weeks later (9th May) he writes: We are six including your Council and some of us often sick. It is morally impossible without an overruling Providence to continue longer from going under ground if we have not a large assistance.⁶

Nine months later (23rd January 1707) he moans: My continued indisposition and want of assistance in this unveryhealthful island has been laid before the managers and your Court. Yet I esteem

¹ Surat Consultation dated 26th May 1704, Surat Factory Diary 3 of 1701-1704, 153-155. Forrest's Home Series, I. 267-268.

² Directors to Surat and Bombay, 12th January 1704, Compilation of Standing Orders, Vol. I of 1715-1721, 109.

³ Directors to Bombay or Surat, 4th June 1703, para. 39, Compilation of Standing Orders, Vol. I of 1715-1721, 141.

⁴ Sir Nicholas Waite to the Court, Bombay Castle, 31st January 1706, Surat Fact. Diary 2 of 1699-1707, 396.

⁵ Sir Nicholas Waite to the Court, Bombay Castle, 18th April 1706, Surat Fact. Diary 2 of 1699-1707, 397.

⁶ Sir Nicholas Waite to the Court, Bombay Castle, 9th May 1706, Surat Fact. Diary 3 of 1699-1707, 399.

myself bound in gratitude and I will briefly inform what material occurs till I leave this place or the world.¹

One reason why the early years of the eighteenth century were unprosperous in Bombay was that the union of the Companies in 1702 was only formal. So strong had been the rivalry between the two Companies and so opposed were the private interests of their servants that for several years, though outwardly hid, distrust and rivalry continued fresh and active. Though 1702 is the date of formal amalgamation, opposing interests were not united till 1708. During these six years (1703 - 1708) occasional skirmishes at the outposts sometimes grew so warm that there was danger lest the war should be renewed. As the instructions from home to live in peace and quietness were positive, neither party ventured openly to disobey them. Sir Nicholas Waite, who had pertinaciously endeavoured to prevent a union and to persuade the directors of his own Company that it would be to their detriment, as soon as he heard that his remonstrances were unheeded and that a union would certainly take place, wrote and assured the directors of his resolution 'to obliterate all past heats' and to hold friendly intercourse with Sir John Gayer and his Council. The communications between the two Chiefs and their Councils never went beyond formal civility. There was constraint on both sides; nor did either place any reliance upon the good dispositions of the other.² Probably neither party understood its own circumstances, certainly not the circumstances of the other. The difficulty of arriving at a complete agreement was enhanced in India by the rival interests of their servants which gave rise to incessant bickerings. At last the representatives of the two Companies consented to appeal to the Earl of Godolphin, Lord High Treasurer of England, who after a most patient investigation of the questions in dispute published on the 29th of September 1708 his famous award. From that date the two Companies became in fact as well as in style 'The United Company of Merchants of England trading to the East Indies.'³

Chapter I.

History.

Union,
1708.

¹ Sir Nicholas Waite to the Court, Bombay Castle, 23rd January 1707, Surat Fact. Diary 2 of 1699-1707, 401-402.

² Diary of the English Company's Factory at Surat, 7th Feby. 1703. Anderson's English in Western India (1854), 166.

³ Anderson's English in Western India (1854), 176.

Chapter I.

History.

Rāma Kāmāti,
1720.

Union of Companies (1708) to French War (1744).

SECTION I.—MILITARY AND POLITICAL.

Perhaps the subject of keenest local interest in Bombay during the first half of the eighteenth century was the discovery of the treasonable dealings with Angria carried on by a Brāhman named Rāma Kāmāti, one of the leading Hindus of Bombay. In 1720 after long inquiries the matter came for formal trial. A Consultation of the Bombay Council dated 26th February 1720 records the following entry: The President lays before the Board translation of several papers and letters containing several informations of Rāma Kāmāti having unlawfully and treacherously held and carried on a correspondence and trade with Kānhoji Angria both before and since the present war to the great dishonour and prejudice of the Right Honourable Company. All which are now read, and for methodical proceeding against him, it is ordered that Messrs. Walter Brown, John Courtney, Owen Phillipps, and John Horne collect and draw up from the said informations a regular charge and lay the same before the Board with all convenient speed; that till we can bring him to a trial, his moveable effects be secured under the Company's seal;¹ that the receiver of the revenues take charge of the tobacco farm; and that the veradores of Bombay and Mahim take care of his carts and those of the Right Honourable Company rented to him. The aforesaid papers likewise giving us some reasons to suspect that Dalba Bhandāri has been an accomplice with Rāma Kāmāti in carrying on the said correspondence, resolved that a guard be immediately set on Dalba's person and goods till we can examine farther into this affair.²

A Consultation of the 7th March continues: Conformable to an order of Council of 26th ultimo the charge against Rāma Kāmāti, consisting of seven articles drawn up by Messrs. Brown, Courtney, Phillipps, and Horne are now read with the respective proofs to each article as entered hereafter—Ordered that the Secretary deliver Rāma Kāmāti a copy of those articles in English signed by him, together with their translation in Portuguese, and require that he prepare to answer to the said charge before this Board on Thursday the 17th of this month (March 1720).³

The seven articles of charge were as follows: Articles of treason and other high crimes exhibited by the Honourable C. Boone Esquire President and Governor of Bombay and Council on behalf of the Right Honourable United Company of Merchants of England trading to the East Indies, against Rāma Kāmāti Brāhman inhabitant of Bombay, for several offences done and committed by him the said Rāma Kāmāti, by advising abetting and assisting the enemy Kānhoji Angria, whereby he hath endangered the safety and welfare of the said Right Honourable Company by endeavouring to introduce the enemy into the said island in order to subvert and extirpate the English and their Government thereof and to seize and bring into great peril the person of the said Honourable the Governor:

¹ Details of his trial are given in MS. Selections, Vol. 86 of 1720.² Bom. Gov. Consultation, 26th Feby. 1720, Pub. Diary 1 of 1720, 18.³ Bom. Gov. Consultation, 7th March 1720, Pub. Diary 1 of 1720, 20.

Chapter I.
History.

Ráma Kámáti,
1720.

1. That in or about the month of December in 1717 when the said Governor and President was in treaty with Kánhoji Angria for the delivery of the ship *Success* belonging to Govardhandás, late broker to the Right Honourable Company, which had been some short time before taken up by the said Angria, he the said Ráma Kámáti wrote a letter to Angria advising him that the said ship did not belong to the English or any of their dependants but to some merchants in Surat and that therefore he need not deliver her up without a considerable ransom.

2. That in October 1718 after the breaking out of the war, he the said Ráma Kámáti wrote a letter¹ to the said Angria telling him of the preparation and readiness of the English fleet to proceed against him and particularly that it had been resolved in Council at Bombay to make a descent on the island of Cundry (Kenery) on the 17th of said month and withal advising him the said enemy to be on his guard and lay in provisions and a sufficient number of men and warlike stores for the defence of the said island of Cundry.

3. That in or about the same month of October 1718 he did intercept or cause to be intercepted a letter written by the directions of the Portuguese General of the North to the Honourable Governor and President of Bombay intimating an inclination in the Portuguese to enter upon a treaty for joining their forces to the English for the more vigorous carrying on of the war against Angria; which letter he not only kept from the knowledge of the said Governor and President but privately sent to the enemy with another from himself containing further advices on that occasion.

4. That the said Ráma Kámáti did counsel and advise the said enemy to attempt and invade the island of Bombay with armed force and to seize the person of the Honourable Governor thereof, laying down a plan of the time and manner for putting in execution the said wicked purpose.

¹ Letter from Ráma Kámáti to Angria, 12th October 1718: To the opulent and magnificent as the sun, valorous and victorious, always courageous, the liberal, prudent, and pillar of fortitude, the essence of understanding, the protector of Bráhmans, defender of the faith, prosperous in all things, honoured of kings above all councillors, Senhor Kánhoji Angria Sarqueel—Rámáji Kámáti, your servant, writes with all veneration and readiness for your service, and with your favour I remain as always. Our General here has resolved in Council to attack and take the fort of Cundry, and thus it is agreed to environ the said fort the 17th October, and the armada powder and ball and all other necessaries for war are ready. I therefore write your honour that you may have the said fort well furnished. As for the side of Rájpuri, I have spoken to and agreed with Ali Náik Lokandi that they of Rájpuri shall not help either party: thus I have given this notice. I do not write more; only beg that you will retain me in your favour. Bombay Government MS. Selections, 86 of 1720.

Another letter from Kámáti to Angria runs: This is to let your honour know that the Portuguese of Passcin have wrote to our Chief which letter is concerning you and therefore Dalba Bhandári has sent it to you by which you will understand everything. Dalba Bhandári and myself are with one mind, the least of all your servants, and we assure you on our part we shall never be wanting in your service. We further advise you that our chief is always both day and night at Parel and he has no power in his company only his own chamber servants; and for this reason we write you that by night you may send six or seven galivats who landing will gain a victory without doubt. Upon the whole your honour is a prudent man. When you have read this letter we desire you would keep it and not put it in the office, neither the others at present. I do not write more, always hoping for your protection. Dated the 22nd of 'Suffar.' Bombay Government MS. Selections, 86 of 1720.

Chapter I.

History.

Rāma Kāmāti,
1720.

5. That he did carry on an unlawful trade and commerce with the said enemy at several times, notwithstanding the known orders and proclamations to the contrary, and particularly in batty which he purchased in Angria's country during the war, as also some wool and pota-hes which he sent with his grandson-in-law Garru Sinay (Ghāru Shenvi)¹ to the enemy's country and received turmeric in return thereof.

6. That about the month of November 1718 the Honourable President and Governor thought fit to put into his hands the immediate care and command of all the fighting sepoy's which were then to be employed against the enemy; when the better to carry on and effect his malicious designs and purposes, he secretly endeavoured to intimidate and discourage them from the performance of their duty to the Right Honourable Company; and particularly when Antonio Francisco D'Costa, subhedār of a company of sepoy's, spoke of an offer made to him by the chief officer of Mopont under Angria (perhaps Mohopāda above Panvel) for the delivery of that fort, he received the notice thereof with coldness and neglect, and was further told by Druga (Durga) son of said Rāma Kāmāti, not to be too busy in such matters, lest he meet with the fate of Antonio D'Mello and be sent to St. Helena.

7. That on a rumour of a discovery of these practices, the said Rāma Kāmāti being apprehensive of the consequences, did in the month of December 1719 remove and convey off the island to Thāna or elsewhere, part of his moveable estate and particularly 14 chests of treasure. All which matters and facts charged in the several articles before-mentioned are proved and made out by living witnesses now on the spot and the certificates of other persons, together with letters of the said Rāma Kāmāti, directed to the said Kānhoji Angria, contrary to his duty and obligations. Whereby he appears to be the principal author of the war and the occasion of its so long continuance by thus secretly and wickedly combining with the enemy against the dignity and interest of the Right Honourable Company and the liberty and life of their Honourable Governor and all the English inhabitants of the said island.²

This day (24th March 1720) being appointed for the trial of Rāma Kāmāti, the President being informed that some persons have promised to make a further discovery of the treasonable practices committed by Rāma Kāmāti and Dalha Bhandāri provided a pardon may be secured to them—Ordered that the Secretary draw out a proclamation to that purpose.³

The following is an abstract of Rāma Kāmāti's answer to the seven articles exhibited against him: In the preamble is nothing material more than that the defendant asserts the witnesses are all brought over to swear against him by bribes, fair promises, threats and punishment for which reason their evidence ought not to be taken and insinuates his former good services deserve better treatment. In answer to the first article he says the charge is of no significance as his giving notice

¹ Public Diary 1 of 1720, 22-23. Apparently this should be 'his grandson-in-law's father.' See MS. Selections, Vol. 86 of 1720, 2 and below page 147 line 28.

² Pub. Diary 1 of 1720, 22-23.

³ Bom. Gov. Consultation, 24th March 1720, Pub. Diary 1 of 1720, 28.

to Angria could be of no advantage because as soon as he has taken any ship or vessel, he immediately makes a strict inquiry who she belongs to of the officers and others abroad and is perfectly well acquainted with every individual ship belonging to Surat for which reason he adds it would be folly in him to send such advices. In his defence to the second article he alleges that when our fleet came before Cundry the fort was so ill provided with men and ammunition that the enemy ran the risk of throwing succours of both into it after it was besieged by us. From this he infers that the enemy would of course have taken better care in furnishing the garrison (which was so weak that even the women were obliged to assist in the defence of it) had he given the notice he is charged with. He further adds for his justification that it was he who first told the Governor of the weakness of that place and after the Governor was gone thither he desired Mr. Parker to confirm the same by writing to his Honour which he thinks is a sufficient proof he is not the author of these letters. Touching the third article he alleges there is no proof the letter mentioned in his accusation was delivered to him and seems to insinuate there was no such letter sent. To clear himself of the charge in the fourth article he pleads his former good services and the many obligations he lies under to the Right Honourable Company and the English nation in general and to the Governor in particular which would make it the highest ingratitude imaginable in him to be guilty (even in thought) of such a piece of cruelty and thinks it would be a great folly to attempt such a thing considering how well the island is guarded by several stout frigates and forts and a number of good English officers. As to the fifth article he denies to have had any dealings with Angria during the war and says the Governor gave Garru (Gharu) Sinay leave to come hither to celebrate the marriage of his grand-daughter and that what goods he carried with them were bought publicly during the cessation of arms and were only designed to defray his charges which he looks on as no crime. To invalidate the charge in the sixth article he alleges that if Antonio Francisco D'Costa had any such offer made him, it is probable to believe he would have revealed it to the Governor or Captain Stanton who was his commanding officer and not to the defendant. He therefore thinks that a sufficient reason to conclude it was not communicated to him and further adds that all the sepoys were not under his command, some of them (the Pattancees) being under the direction of Umerji. He defends himself from the charge of the last article by insinuating that the three letters mentioned in the other articles are all false, because they were not his own handwriting. He concludes with saying it is easy for those who can forge letters to make a false seal also. He repeats that his accusers have made use of bribes threats and fair promises to procure evidence against him. He humbly hopes that what he has represented and his former good services will induce the Board to clear him from the charges laid against him, urging it is highly improbable he would trust a secret of such importance to any body else when he was able to write himself.¹

The following is the reply to Rámáji's answer: His assertion in the preamble that the witnesses were all brought over to swear against him by bribes and threats is a reflection on the justice of this Board and ought to be looked upon as a reproach and no testimony since he has

Chapter I.

History.

Ráma Kámáti,
1720.

¹ MS. Selections, 86 of 1720.

Chapter I.

History.

Rāma Kāmāti,
1720.

not brought one single proof of it. (1) His answer to the first article is only a bare denial and evasion of the charge without bringing any evidence to clear himself of it. (2) The enemy's neglecting to follow his advice is no manner of proof that he did not send it nor against the evidence of the person that wrote it. (3) The oath of Govinji (who wrote this letter) is proof enough of the 3rd article. (4) His former good services (for which he has been well rewarded) are not a sufficient reason to believe that he is not guilty of what he is now charged with, when we have a letter under his own seal and owned by the person who wrote it by his direction. (5) His alleging the goods were carried off the island during the cessation of arms is a mistake because there was no cessation of arms at all. (6) That Antonio Francisco D'Costa did not tell the Governor nor Captain Stanton, can never be esteemed a sufficient proof that he did not tell Rāmāji especially since Captain Stanton swears he the prisoner owned to him that Antonio Francisco D'Costa had told him so and Captain Stanton was at that time gone down the coast. (7) His answer to the last or 7th article is foreign to the purpose and we have a cloud of witnesses to make good the charge contained in it.¹

In the diary of the 11th April 1720 the entry occurs: Rāma Kāmāti was this day found guilty of high crimes and misdemeanours as by the trial will more fully appear.² The Board ordered that his person be confined in prison during life and his estate forfeited to the Company.³ In the diary of the 29th April 1720 the following occurs: Published a proclamation requiring all persons that have any demands on Rāma Kāmāti to lay their claims before the Court of Judicature in ten days from this date. The President having a demand on Rāma Kāmāti for Rs. 12,791 qrs. 3 and res. 22 directs this minute to be made of the same.⁴

Dalba Bhandāri,
1720.

The indictment against Dalba Bhandāri was prepared on the 13th May 1720, on which date the following Consultation is recorded: The Secretary by the President's order having prepared an indictment against Dalba Bhandāri, the same was now read as follows. Dalba Bhandāri,—You stand indicted of several high crimes and misdemeanours by you done and committed contrary to your duty and allegiance to the Right Honourable Company and the known order and proclamations of their Honourable Governor, by advising and persuading the inhabitants of this island to take their passes of the enemy Kānhoji Angria during the present war and concealing a treasonable correspondence which was carried on by Rāma Kāmāti with the said enemy Kānhoji Angria in or about the month of December 1718, whereby you have as much as in you lay endangered the safety and welfare of this His Majesty's Castle and island Bombay, the estate and prerogative of the Right Honourable Company, and the life and liberty of the said Honourable Governor and all the other English inhabitants there. What do you say? Are you guilty of this charge or not guilty? But it being late we defer the examination thereof till the afternoon.⁵

¹ MS. Selections, 86 of 1720.

² Bom. Gov. Diary, 11th April 1720, Public Diary 1 of 1720, 37. Forrest's Home Series, II. 4.

³ MS. Selections, 86 of 1720.

⁴ Bom. Gov. Consultation, 29th April 1720, Pub. Diary 1 of 1720, 42.

⁵ Bom. Gov. Consultation, 13th May 1720, Pub. Diary 1 of 1720, 66.

Dalba Bhandári being called in, the indictment against him was read (13th May 1720) in the English and Portuguese languages. He pleaded not guilty and said the President was his witness, and related a long story of his services in the time of the troubles with the Portuguese and lately in adjusting the articles of peace with (Angria's) agents, which he was told was foreign to the present purpose. Copy of his charge in Portuguese being delivered him, he was to prepare to answer to the same tomorrow morning (14th May 1720). But behaving himself disrespectfully, he was checked for it and ordered to withdraw.¹

Next day the Consultation resumes: This meeting being appointed to go on with the trial of Dalba Bhandári, he was called in and told by the President that his behaviour yesterday was very unbecoming; that he was now a prisoner and called upon to answer to a heavy charge; that everything he had to offer in his own vindication should be heard with all the patience imaginable, but that it became him to carry himself more respectfully to the Board.²

Then the President proposed (14th May 1720) to the Board the issuing out a proclamation for quieting the minds of the people and granting a full pardon to all persons who hitherto have been concerned with Rámáji and Dalba Bhandári in their treasonable practices against the Government, provided they return to their duty and obedience and behave themselves as faithful subjects for the future (Ráma Kámáti and Dalba Bhandári excepted), which was approved and agreed to. Ordered the Secretary to prepare the same against the afternoon for our approbation.³

The diary of the 16th May 1720 has this entry: The proclamation of granting grace and free pardon to all persons that had been concerned with Ráma Kámáti and Dalba Bhandári in carrying on a treasonable correspondence with the enemy Kánhoji Angria was this day (16th May 1720) published according to the order of Council of 14th instant.⁴

On the 20th June 1720 the entry occurs: It being necessary that some person should be appointed to dispose of the effects and settle the account of Ráma Kámáti—Resolved (20th June 1720) that the Secretary do take the charge upon him and make a report thereof to the Board; ordered that he get everything ready for the sale of Rámji's effects on Monday next (27th June 1720), and that he give public notice thereof accordingly and likewise settle his account with all convenience.⁵

On the 4th July (1720) the following is recorded: There being a large warehouse 86 feet long in the bazar belonging to Ráma Kámáti, with an upper room over it which last will be very proper to hold the Court of Judicature and which the President has caused to be valued by Major Vane and the master carpenters and bricklayers who report it worth Rs. 6000. And as that is much less than we can build a proper place

Chapter I.

History.

Dalba Bhandári,
1720.

¹ Bom. Gov. Consultation, 13th May 1720, Pub. Diary 1 of 1720, 69.

² Bom. Gov. Consultation, 14th May 1720, Pub. Diary 1 of 1720, 69.

³ Bom. Gov. Consultation, 14th May 1720, Pub. Diary 1 of 1720, 72.

⁴ Bom. Gov. Diary 16th May 1720, Pub. Diary 1 of 1720, 74. Forrest's Home Series, II. 12.

⁵ Bom. Gov. Consultation, 20th June 1720, Pub. Diary 1 of 1720, 90.

Chapter I.

History.

Rāma Kāmāti,
1720.

for the court to sit in, besides the benefit of the warehouse—Resolved that we purchase it at that price on the Right Honourable Company's account, and that the upper room be fitted up for that use and that the two per cent fines levied on persons cast in the court shall be applied in part of payment thereof, and the warehouse may be appropriated as a granary for batty or other goods, which we sometimes stand in need of.¹

On the same day this report was considered: Letter from Messrs. B. Midford and J. Horne to the Honourable C. Boone President and Governor and Council, dated Bombay 29th June 1720—Pursuant to an order of Council of the 13th instant we have carefully examined the valuation of Rāma Kāmāti's cocoanut orchards and batty grounds made by the vereadores and mhatārās of Bombay and Māhim. On the strictest inquiry we find they have valued them after the usual custom of this island, which is not to reckon anything for the wells walls or other fruit trees, and that they are really worth Rs. 37,989-0-53 as will appear from the account of particulars herewith delivered. We verily believe the Right Honourable Company will be no sufferers by taking them at that price.²

The above report of Messrs. Midford and Horne of their examination of the valuation of Rāma Kāmāti's cocoanut orchards and batty grounds, amounting to Rs. 37,989-0-53, was now (4th July 1720) read. After some debate, agreed that we take them on Company's account, and the accountant is hereby ordered to bring them on the books accordingly.³

A Consultation of the 13th August contains the following: There being two warehouses near the Custom House belonging to Rāma Kāmāti for the hire whereof the Right Honourable Company pay Rs. 24 per month as granaries, and the same having been valued at Rs. 2750—Resolved that we purchase them at that price on our Honourable Masters' account in consideration of the continual occasion we have for them and that the interest will not amount to the hire.⁴

The same Consultation continues: Ambaidās Takidās and Santari Govardhan presented a petition in behalf of Dalba Bhandāri, requesting he may be allowed a further time of four months for the payment of his fine of Rs. 6000 and his former debt of Rs. 1493-2-37, setting forth that he is not capable of paying it soon, and offering themselves for the security thereof. After some debate on the affair it was resolved that as the fine we have laid on him is considerable and that if we make a sale of his estate (agreeable to a former order of Council) the money cannot be soon collected, that their request be granted with this proviso that if it be not paid by that time, they shall pay the interest thereof from this day (13th August 1720).⁵

Proposed action
against Angria,
1720.

In the same year (1720) Mulla Muhammad Ali, the great Surat merchant whose ships had been carried off by Angria's vessels, addressed the Bombay Governor with the object of arranging a league against Angria. He takes notice of Angria's being possessed of several forts

¹ Bom. Gov. Consultation, 4th July 1720, Pub. Diary 1 of 1720, 97. Forrest's Home Series, II, 20. ² Pub. Diary 1 of 1720, 102. ³ Pub. Diary 1 of 1720, 97.

⁴ Bom. Gov. Consultation, 13th August 1720, Pub. Diary 1 of 1720, 125.

⁵ Bom. Gov. Consultation, 13th August 1720, Pub. Diary 1 of 1720, 125.

and countries whereby he is become the terror of the seas and that therefore it is necessary now to destroy him or else he will become so powerful it will be impracticable. He advises he has the king's orders to represent to his Honour the affairs of Ahmadabad Surat and other parts as well as his own, and desires his Honour to advise him whether he shall make known to his majesty the insults and robberies of Angria and procure a *Hasbulhukam* to Sidi Yakutkhán and the Nabob of Surat to make war against the said enemy, Yakutkhán to attack him by sea and Sou (Sháhu) Raja Subha of Kalyán to invade him by land. He continues: If his Honour is so pleased he will also procure orders to his Honour and to the Portuguese to unite for this effect until Angria is destroyed and he believes his Honour will not be wanting in what is agreed to. Yet he is not the only person who desires this, there being many others and that they may be the better persuaded he desires his Honour to write to our people in Surat to assure them of the same. He says farther he very much desires and believes that his majesty will send the said orders and that his Honour will gain a great name and fame in the execution of this and desires an answer.¹

One Shaikh Islám Khán addressed another letter to a similar effect: I have lately heard that Angria has taken some ships of your Honour's, of Muhammad Ali's, and of some other merchants and that he commits his piracies on the seas without restraint and thereby disturbs and hinders trade. It is therefore now necessary to chastise him concerning which I have spoken to Mr. Hope (Chief at Surat), who will write your Honour what I told him. On receipt of the answer I will represent in a good manner to the king the method that the said pirate may be totally ruined and I hope in God it will be done in a few days. Concerning the best manner for doing it your Honour may consider of and write me.²

At a Consultation on the 6th September 1720 the President acquainted the Board this meeting was summoned to let them know he had set on foot an expedition against Angria; that he had appointed Mr. Walter Brown to go Commander-in-chief of the same; and that for the greater secrecy in carrying on this affair he has thought fit (agreeable to our Honourable Masters' directions) to pitch upon Messrs. John Braddyll and Walter Brown with himself to be a secret committee for managing thereof. Resolved that the President and Messrs. John Braddyll and Walter Brown or any two of them, the President being one, be a secret committee for managing the present expedition against Kánhoji Angria, and all the land and sea officers and others concerned are to observe and follow their orders and directions as fully and effectually as if signed by us all.³

Chapter I.

History.

Proposed action
against Angria,
1720.

War
with Angria,
1720.

¹ Translation of Mulla Muhammad Ali's letter abstracted, Public Diary 1 of 1720, 92. Forrest's Home Series, II. 18. Of the great fortune and power of this Mulla Muhammad Ali details are given in the Stat. Acct. of Surat, Bombay Gazetteer, II. 110-111. The founder of the family in Surat was Abdul Ghafur not Jáfár as there stated (p. 110 note 2). The suggestion he was a Bohora is also incorrect. The family claim descent from the Arab house of Zabid. They are still known as *Panchásicálás* or Eighty-fivers a reminiscence of their great fort-building and treaty-making ancestor's fortune of 85 *lakh*s of rupees.

² Translation of Shaikh Islám Khán's letter, Pub. Diary 1 of 1720, 92. Forrest's Home Series, II. 18.

³ Bom. Gov. Consultation, 6th September 1720, Pub. Diary 1 of 1720, 135.

Chapter I.

History.

War
with Angria,
1720.

On the 10th September the President and secret committee signed Mr. Brown's instructions as Commander-in-chief of the expedition against Angria.¹

On the 15th October the *Defiance*, *Elizabeth*, and a galivat from our fleet before Gheria brought the President two letters from Mr. Brown, dated the 2nd and 10th instant, and abstract of one dated 7th (not come to hand) advising that he had landed a detachment of men who had killed a good number of the enemy with very little loss on our side; that the prahm was carried within pistol shot of the fort and that the enemy kept continually firing on her which she returned as briskly. Also that he had sent some vessels up the river with orders to burn all the enemy's shipping they could not bring away, which they executed very well having burnt to the ground two large ships and seven smaller vessels without any loss. He likewise advises that the prahm had entirely ruined two of Angria's best grabs which were hauled up close to the fort but that one of her guns bursting not only killed four people on board but gave fire to a gun loaded with partridge on the other side against which lay one of our boats with almost a whole platoon of the black soldiery of whom above half were killed and the rest much wounded, which very much cowed the volunteer sailors. He adds Mr. Taylor advised him Kemp (Khem) Sávant was drawing out an army of 5000 foot and 200 horse that way and that he had sent a subhedár to him to concert measures. Taking the whole into serious consideration, resolved that we send Mr. Brown a reinforcement of soldiery with a supply of ammunition and provisions which the President is desired to advise him of accordingly; and also that if he finds Khem Sávant sincere in his promises of sending so large a force against the enemy that he continue with ours there, otherwise that he return part of our fleet and leave the rest to cruize off the enemy's port.²

Portuguese
Troubles,
1720.

In 1720 the suspicions and ill-feeling between the English and the Roman Catholic priests in Bombay came to a head. A much damaged despatch (para. 107) from the Directors which reached Bombay by the ship *Addison* early in 1720, shows that the Bombay Council had complained of the practice of the Portuguese priests of stirring the Roman Catholics of Bombay to oppose the orders of Government. And that in reply the Directors had brought to notice the success which had attended Governor Pitt's arrangement in Madras under which some class of Catholic clergy whom he could trust were made supreme on the understanding that they would support the Government and keep the Governor informed of any designs of rival clergy hostile to Government interests. At a Consultation dated 13th May 1720 the Governor laid this despatch before the Bombay Council suggesting that in accordance with its advice authority over the Roman Catholics of the island should vest in the Bishop sent from Rome.

The Consultation continues: The Italian Bishop being furnished with proper powers to take upon him the care of the Roman Catholics on this island, the President now proposes to the Board removing the Portuguese Padres agreeable to paragraph 107 of the Right Honourable

¹ Bom. Gov. Diary, 10th September 1720, Pub. Diary 1 of 1720, 137.

² Bom. Gov. Consultation, 15th October 1720, Pub. Diary 1 of 1720, 145.

Company's general letter by the *Addison*. He lays down several ill consequences that have risen from the Portuguese Padres being permitted to reside in Bombay, as reaping the benefit of the labours of our people and carrying it into foreign countries, stirring up the Roman Catholics to sedition, especially when we have any dispute with the Portuguese, by inculcating notions into them that they ought not to fight against their religion, and adding that the prelates of the Portuguese countries seemed so little to regard the priests sent to Bombay that the very scum of the priesthood had been their pastors for some time. He proposes supplying the places of the Portuguese with the said Italian Bishop and some priests of the Carmelite Order now on the island on their swearing allegiance to His Majesty King George, and undertaking that they will not directly or indirectly teach preach or practise anything contrary to the interest or dignity of the crown or of the prerogative of the Right Honourable Company; and that they will in all respects pay a due obedience to the Governor and Council for the time being. This is unanimously approved and agreed to. Ordered that the Secretary provide orders and a proclamation accordingly.¹

Two days later, 15th May, a proclamation was published requiring all the inhabitants of the Roman Catholic religion to pay the same obedience to the Bishop Don Frey Mauricio D'Sancta Teresa and the priests appointed by him as they formerly paid to the Portuguese bishop and priests, and orders were issued to the Portuguese priests to leave the island in twenty-four hours.²

Next day, 16th May, the Italian Bishop Don Frey Mauricio D'Sancta Teresa and the Carmelite priests took and subscribed the following oath before the President: I, Don Frey Mauricio of Sancta Teresa, bishop of Anastatiopolis, Vicar General in the empire of the great Moghal of the island of Bombay and the jurisdiction thereof, do swear upon the holy Evangelists (in which I have placed my right hand) to obey His Most Serene Majesty of Great Britain, and that I will never directly or indirectly teach preach or practise anything contrary to the honour and dignity of the crown of his said Most Serene Majesty or to the interests of the Right Honourable English Company and you. I will pay all obedience to the orders of the Honourable Governor for the time being and will exercise the Roman Catholic religion according to its primitive institution without any alteration. In witness whereof I have hitherto set my hand this day 16th May 1720. Padre Frey Pedro of the most Holy Trinity and Frey Elizeo D' St. Joseph took and subscribed the same oath.³

In consequence of these orders on the 9th May 1720 Luis Gonsalves de Camara Coutinho, Portuguese General of the North, addressed the following letter to the President and Governor: The surprising resolution that your Honour has taken to banish to this side all the parish priests of your island is what I much admire and wonder at, by

Chapter I.

History.

Portuguese
Troubles,
1720.

¹ Bom. Gov. Con. 13th May 1720, Pub. Diary 1 of 1720, 66. Forrest's Home Series, II. 11-12.

² Bom. Gov. Diary, 15th May 1720, Pub. Diary 1 of 1720, 74. Forrest's Home Series, II. 12.

³ Bom. Gov. Diary, 16th May 1720, Pub. Diary 1 of 1720, 74. Forrest's Home Series, II. 12.

Chapter I.

History.

Portuguese
Troubles,
1720.

reason of the weighty charge the Bishop Don Frey Mauritio has taken on him in offering with his assistants to administer the Sacraments, they not having the necessary powers. I consider on this particular that your Honour has been misinformed or moved thereto by some high resentment. This I judge not only from the expulsion of these religious, but from the scandalous manner in which it was done, which I also judge from the assurance given me that your Honour has passed orders that no priest of the Portuguese nation shall come to your island. As I am at present obliged to send two learned prudent priests to treat on this important affair, I hope, on your Honour's consideration of the weighty circumstances thereof, you will permit them to come in your presence and there to dispute and discuss the point of royal patronage and the ecclesiastical jurisdiction with the bishop.¹

One reason for the suddenness and strictness of the orders forcing all Portuguese priests to leave Bombay was the treasonable dealings between the Portuguese and the Maráthás, of which the traitor Ráma Kámáti had been the medium. A week before his letter regarding the expulsion of the Portuguese priests the Captain of the North had (the 12th May) addressed the following to the Governor of Bombay on the subject of Ráma Kámáti's trial: I am very sorry the news of Antonio Felloe's imprisonment has reached your Honour, it being the consequence of his infamous practice for which he justly merits the confinement he is under, as well as the further punishment which will be inflicted on him. This rigorous proceeding does not arise from his going to your island with my leave, though he had it not so full as to accuse any person falsely, yet I was ignorant for what he was sent, neither did I believe he would be full of such villany. His handwriting and the signing of his name show your Honour the falsity of his accusation against Ráma Kámáti, it being him alone that seeks Kámáti's ruin. I have also the goldsmith that falsified the seal, bribed or induced by some other means to do it by those who wished to satiate their revenge. I am also not ignorant on what account the boat belonging to your island went by Thána to Kalva under the pretence of buying horses, but trust that your Honour did it only to obtain the pure truth. I was not so careful to (warn) you of these practices, for I ought not on any account to consent that a person under my jurisdiction should enter into or be concerned with such like calumnies. What I have signified to your Honour I can prove from authentic papers. But for the little interest I have in the freedom of the said Kámáti, I only procure punishment for those who have wrongfully meddled herein. I am concerned I cannot comply with your Honour's pleasure in the release of this subject, I having given (charge) of him to Goa. In all other things I am ready to serve your Honour being with great respect.²

To these two letters the Governor Mr. Boone replied on the 23rd May: I little expected to have received from your Honour an expostulation on the justice of my proceedings against the parish priests late of this island, much less to have my conduct thereon

¹ Pub. Diary 1 of 1720, 77-78. Forrester's Home Series, II. 14.

² Pub. Diary 1 of 1720, 77.

questioned, as you have pleased to do in your letter of the 31st May 1720 N. S. Yet being resolved as much as in me lies to prevent a misunderstanding and to cultivate the friendly correspondence I have always desired to hold with your Honour, I shall, as a fresh instance thereof, acquaint you that this proceeding was not only the just effect of their own misbehaviour and the earnest longings of the people in general but also a strict command from my superiors, agreeable to the orders of my sovereign Lord King of Great Britain who is supreme in all causes and over all persons resident on this island. To this I presume your Honour is no stranger though you have thought fit to make mention of another royal personage which I have no power to admit or suffer to have any control or jurisdiction here, and my resolutions hereon are strictly conformable to the articles stipulated by the two sovereign crowns on the delivery of Bombay as your Honour may perceive by the enclosed copy of the article of the treaty of marriage. Whoever insinuated to your Honour that those priests were sent ignominiously or scandalously off the island have represented that action in a very injurious manner. The guard that attended them on that occasion was to prevent a disturbance, which one of them endeavoured to raise in the minds of the people whom he indiscreetly strove to stir up to sedition. As this circumstance has been unfairly represented to your Honour, so I find a misconstruction is passed on other parts of the resolutions I have taken. I will, however, assure your Honour I never meant to hinder any of the people of your nation or subject to you having free access to this island and residing as long as they think fit more especially such as shall be (conformable to the) limitation that I cannot permit them to (neglect, namely not to gainsay) Bishop Don Frey Mauritio in the rights and privileges I have lately invested him with here. That is a point all determined and justly due to his learning and integrity. Of the powers he has for this purpose received from Rome, he will by my permission send a copy to the Archbishop of Goa.

I had fully purposed to have written an answer to your Honour's letter dated 22nd May, N. S., in relation to Captain Antonio Felloe and shall here give you the trouble I designed your Honour on that subject. It is your pleasure to pronounce Râma Kâmâti an innocent man and in some measure to reflect on my proceedings towards him which as it is not agreeable to the gallant character your Honour bears in the world, might well excuse my silence in that particular both as it relates to affairs of a foreign state, and seeing that you condemn an action to which your Honour is a stranger. However, such is my desire to oblige you and defend my own reputation that I affirm to your Honour you are misinformed and Kâmâti must indeed have had both artful and potent friends to induce your Honour to a contrary belief. The circumstances of the seal and Captain Felloe's information are but a small part of his charge. I had good reason to be offended with his conduct and to cause an enquiry thereof to be laid before me and upon manifest proofs passed a sentence, which I am convinced the offender himself thinks mild and much less than his demerit. What your Honour has written me on these subjects inclines me to say thus much, and I hope you will be of opinion with me that to say more on either side cannot be necessary or

Chapter I.

History.

Portuguese
Troubles,
1720.

Chapter I.
History.
Portuguese
Troubles,
1720.

agreeable. I have chose to put this in English to prevent mistakes which might otherwise happen for want of a thorough knowledge in the Portuguese language. However I transmit herewith its translate.¹

The reply of the Bassein General to this letter of Governor Boone's was the issue of an order forbidding the passage of supplies from Portuguese territory to Bombay and enjoining the arrest of any British subjects entering Bassein limits. In consequence of these orders on the 6th June 1720 Governor Boone wrote to the General of the North: I am advised of the orders your Honour has been pleased to publish for prohibiting the bringing to this island any manner of provisions or any person to come over. Though contrary to the amity between both nations I shall not at present trouble myself to enquire into the cause that moved your Honour to this proceeding. The usage several workmen (who were returning from this island to their own habitation) met with from your guard at Bándra by beating them and forcing them into the passage boat again with the loss of their goods and at the risk of their lives are actions both unjustifiable and dishonourable, and the denying our people and *patamars* a passage to and fro in your Honour's territories is inconsistent with the friendship aforesaid. I therefore hope your Honour will issue (orders) for a free passage to our people and liberty to transport to (Bombay) two cows which were bought at Báleg hát and are detained at Thána, otherwise I shall be obliged to enter on (reprisals).²

Next day (7th June) the President acquaints the Board that he was informed the Portuguese had stopp'd several of our *patamars* and that if it was true and they continue such unreasonable practices he intends to forbid their fishing in Máhim river, which is approved.³

In reply to the Governor's letter of the 6th, the Bassein General wrote on the 9th June: I do not doubt but your Honour has notice of my orders for prohibiting the transportation of all sorts of refreshments and people going to your island, and it is certain the continuance of friendship between both nations must be by a reciprocal correspondence. I acknowledge it is not necessary for your Honour to enquire at present the cause of this proceeding, because you are not ignorant of it, and without affairs return to their usual channel I will not alter any of the least of my dispositions. I am sorry for the extravagance committed at Bándra. The Serjeant who did it has been well chastised and broken. To avoid the like for the future, I have despatched my orders that no person whatsoever belonging to your side shall be permitted to land; and this will be the better complied with, if your Honour stops the passage boat on your side, which will not then be of any use at all. As your Honour governs absolutely in your island, I do the same by the powers my superiors have vested me with in the countries under my jurisdiction; therefore your Honour ought not to wonder at your *patamars* and the people of your island being hindered a passage through them. The same you ought to understand of the cows which you say were bought at Báleg hát. There being done on your side

¹ Pub. Diary 1 of 1720, 78-79. Forrest's Home Series, II, 14-15.

² Pub. Diary 1 of 1720, 87-88.

³ Bom. Gov. Consultation, 7th June 1720, Pub. Diary 1 of 1720, 84.

actions unreasonable in the highest degree, I find these but a reciprocal return. And as I suppose your Honour remembers the last paragraph of your letter of the 24th May 1720, wherein you insinuate that for us to write more cannot be necessary or agreeable, I do not doubt that your Honour will agree with me that since what I proposed on that particular was rejected, writing any further on the matter we are now treating of will be unreasonable.¹

At a Consultation on the 13th June, after reading this letter, the President also acquainted the Board that Mr. Courtney wrote him yesterday that the Portuguese Kolis at the fishing stakes in Málím river told the persons he sent for the Welgate (that is local Maráthi *helget* guard-pay a word still in use for presents to sepoys) that the English would receive payment no more, for there would be a guard to keep them off. Upon which he had given Mr. Courtney orders to send for it as usual; and that if any one offered to insult our people, he should keep a galivat ready to protect them; which is unanimously approved. The President then added, in his opinion the proceedings of the Portuguese would give occasion for a rupture.²

On the 23rd June the President laid before the Board a letter he received this morning from Mr. Courtney advising him that some Moormen belonging to this island who swam over from Sálkette last night told him that about 14 days ago (9th June 1720), at Daman they met one of our *palamars* going to Surat who acquainted them that as they were going to Madras with letters from hence they were stopped at Bándra, had their letters taken from them, and both the letters and themselves sent to Bassein, where they were imprisoned some time and what money they had taken from them. At length they were whipped and set at liberty without having the letters returned.³

On the 30th June read a short letter from our Chief and factors at Surat, advising several of our *palamars* were returned, being afraid to come into the Portuguese country on information that they should be confined. Among the rest were the *palamars* we despatched for Madras the 1st ultimo (May 1720), who informed them they were put under a guard at Bándra and sent to Bassein, where after examination their letters were taken from them and they confined four days, after which they were released without having their letters restored. Wrote to our Chief and factors at Surat enclosing copy of our last.⁴

The 5th July the Portuguese still continuing their prohibition and having been so unmannerly as to stop our *palamars* and take their letters from them, the President proposes issuing out a proclamation requiring all persons who live in other parts and have estates on this island to repair hither with their arms in the term of twenty-one days on pain of having their estates confiscated to the Right Honourable Company. Also that all persons who have any money goods or effects

Chapter I.

History.

Portuguese
Troubles,
1720.

¹ Pub. Diary 1 of 1720, 88. Forrest's Home Series, II. 16-17.

² Bom. Gov. Consultation, 13th June 1720, Pub. Diary 1 of 1720, 86. Forrest's Home Series, II. 16.

³ Bom. Gov. Consultation, 23rd June 1720, Pub. Diary 1 of 1720, 92-93. Forrest's Home Series, II. 18-19.

⁴ Bom. Gov. Consultation, 30th June 1720, Pub. Diary 1 of 1720, 95. Forrest's Home Series, II. 19.

Chapter I.**History.**

Portuguese
Troubles,
1720.

belonging to any of the inhabitants in the Portuguese territories do give in an account thereof to the Secretary within the said term. This is approved and agreed to. Ordered that the Secretary prepare a proclamation accordingly.¹

This day (6th July 1720) was published the proclamation requiring all persons who have estates on the island and live in other parts to repair hither in twenty-one days.²

The 21st July 1720 the President received a letter from Mr. Courtney at Mahim advising the Portuguese had erected a gibbet at Bándra. After hearing (one or two) great guns he could see two men hoisted up to the top of the gibbet and let down again three times, after which they fired another gun. When the men who had been served so were come over in a canoe they proved to be D'Chaves and another man, both inhabitants of this island, who were sent hence to give Fernando d'Silvera notice of the proclamation requiring all persons who are inhabitants in other parts and have estates on this island to repair hither on penalty of forfeiting the same. They were very sore and mightily terrified.³

The 30th July the time limited by proclamation for the inhabitants of other parts, who have estates on this island to repair hither being expired and none of them appearing, the Council ordered that the vercadores enter upon and receive the produce of such estates on the Right Honourable Company's account and pay the same into their treasury. And whereas several persons have presented petitions to the President setting forth that they have demands on such estates, ordered that said petitions be delivered to the Chief Justice of the Court of Judicature to be there examined, and that he make a report in writing to the Board for our adjusting the same.⁴

The 30th July 1720, it appearing to the Board that the practice of Portuguese and other foreigners making land purchases on this island has been prejudicial to the Government, it was unanimously resolved that no person who is not an inhabitant on this island shall for the future purchase any estates, and ordered that the Secretary prepare a proclamation accordingly.⁵

The 1st August a proclamation to the above effect was published by beat of drum.⁶

Negotiations
with Kánhoji
Angria,
1724.

In May 1724 the diary records: A letter is received from Kánhoji Angria to the Bombay Government, wishing for a treaty to be made between him and the Government. This being debated, it is the unanimous opinion of the Board that the Englishmen prisoners be first delivered up to us before we enter on a treaty and that the President return him an answer in a style suitable to his rank as follows⁷:

When I acquaint your Honour that I do well remember your commencing to annoy this island in the time Mr. Burniston Governor here

¹ Bom. Gov. Consultation, 5th July 1720, Pub. Diary 1 of 1720, 105.

² Bom. Gov. Diary, 6th July 1720, Pub. Diary 1 of 1720, 108.

³ Bom. Gov. Consultation, 21st July 1720, Pub. Diary 1 of 1720, 115.

⁴ Bom. Gov. Consultation, 30th July 1720, Pub. Diary 1 of 1720, 123-124.

⁵ Bom. Gov. Consultation, 30th July 1720, Pub. Diary 1 of 1720, 124.

⁶ Bom. Gov. Diary, 1st August 1720, Pub. Diary 1 of 1720, 124.

⁷ Bom. Gov. Consultation, 23rd May 1724, Pub. Diary 2 of 1724, 69.

under His Excellency Sir John Gayer, General, then at Surat, you will believe I am no stranger to your proceedings ever since. You must therefore excuse me if I accept not of entering into any treaty with you until you give me a proof of your sincerity by immediately setting at liberty the people of our nation you have with you prisoners taken by you without giving you any offence. When the prisoners are released I shall be ready to receive from you any proposal towards an accommodation you shall think proper to make as well as I shall demonstrate to your Honour you have to deal with one who knows how to return your civility.¹

The 7th August following the President (Honourable Mr. Phipps) reads to the Board Kánhoji Angria's letter to him of the 23rd July² wherein he shows an inclination to treat for exchange of prisoners, proposing for that purpose a person of character to intervene and act as guarantee. There being none among our neighbours who we think will engage in the same that are fit to be trusted, it is agreed that the President write an answer to that part of his letter only concerning the release of our prisoners, that for so many as he shall release of ours, on their arrival here we will release a like number of his.³

The 13th November the President represents to the Board that Sidi Saut of Anjanvel or Dábhól has at sundry times sent off to our vessels provisions and refreshment while cruising off that port and been otherwise very courteous in his advices in relation to Angria; in order to keep him in the like good disposition it is resolved to make him a present of three yards of scarlet cloth, a pair of pistols, and a gilt sword. Directed that the *Port St. George* galley with the *Shark* and *Antelope* cruise between Dábhól and Malabár Hill.⁴

Four years later (15th November 1728) the President acquaints the Board that he has received notice of Sháhu Rája's intention to come and visit his garrisons along the sea coast under the command of Angria and that he is at present within three days of Kolába with a considerable army. Wherefore the Board decide it will not be advisable to deprive ourselves of any of our cruisers so early as we intended by sending them along with the *Prince Frederick* to Mokha, and resolve that the bomb ketch be anew rigged to be sent with a proper detachment on board her for that service.⁵

The diary of the 12th March 1731 has this entry: The Paymaster brings in a list of the sundry widows of the men who were killed in the *Bengal* galley in the late unfortunate engagement with Angria's grabs. We are convinced they are objects of charity and therefore and for the encouragement of others in the service we think it but reasonable to allow Rs. 2 per month to such as have no children and Rs. 3 to such as have, while they continue widows.⁶

Chapter I. History.

Negotiations
with Kánhoji
Angria,
1724.

Presents to
the Sidi,
1724.

Sháhu Rája
near Kolába,
1728.

Engagement
with Angria's
Grabs,
1731.

¹ Bombay Governor and President's letter to Kánhoji Angria, May 1724, Pub. Diary 2 of 1724, 71. Forrest's Home Series, II. 38.

² Correspondence between Angria and Bombay Government, Pub. Diary 2 of 1724.

³ Bom. Gov. Consultation, 7th August 1724, Pub. Diary 2 of 1724, 98.

⁴ Bom. Gov. Consultation, 13th November 1724, Pub. Diary 2 of 1724, 144.

⁵ Bom. Gov. Consultation, 15th November 1728, Pub. Diary 3 of 1727-28, 215.

⁶ Bom. Gov. Consultation, 12th March 1731, Pub. Diary 4 of 1731, 32, 33.

Chapter I.
History.

Help to
Portuguese,
1731-1733.

Two months later, May 1731, an engagement took place with Angria near Surat. A Bombay letter to Surat (9th May) has the following: We read with particular satisfaction your success in intercepting two of Angria's galivats that were loading in your river and bound to Colabby (Kolába) and we are glad to find that the Sidi's *vakil* acted so friendly in this affair.¹

In 1731 the threatening increase of Marátha and Angria power in the decline of Moghal authority led the Portuguese and the English to set their grounds of dissension on one side and to some extent to make common cause against the advance of their common enemy. The 11th April 1731 the President (Honourable R. Cowan) acquaints the gentlemen of the Board that he calls this Consultation to lay before them a request that yesterday he received from the General of the North that the 300 sepoys lately enlisted for the service of this island might be lent him during the rainy season to garrison Thána and Persik for the better defending that pass into Sálsette. He at the same time acquainted them that the Viceroy of Goa had made him the like request in a letter that he had lately received from His Excellency. The said 300 sepoys to be punctually paid by the Portuguese the time they shall remain in their territories. This being taken into consideration and duly pondering of what importance it is for the safety and tranquillity of this island to prevent the Maráthas from getting footing on the island of Sálsette which seemed last rains to be their main intent, and sundry efforts were made by them in order thereto; considering likewise that it is much easier preventing their getting possession than it will be expelling of them if once possessed; and that we have no great occasion for the 300 sepoys at present, as the two brothers, sons of Angria, have divided their forces, the younger being gone to Gheria with four grabs and nine galivats and no more than the usual garrison remaining at Kolába; that our garrison will be reinforced during the rains by the crews and detachments on board the three galleys and two grabs that are to be hauled up: It is agreed that the President comply with the General of the North's request and immediately order the 300 sepoys and their proper officers to be sent to Thána for the defence of that place.²

Two years later (1733) a correspondence with Madras shows how well the Bombay Council were aware that the prosperity of Bombay depended on the continuance of Portuguese rule. The 5th October 1733 the President acquaints the Board that yesterday he received a letter from the Viceroy of Goa complaining that he had certain advice from St. Thomas that the Governor of Madras had publicly prohibited all inhabitants of that place from trading with the Portuguese ship *Europa* that lay at anchor in the road of St. Thomas, and had likewise endeavoured to prevent the other inhabitants of that coast from trading with her. This being so contrary to the amity and good correspondence that subsist between the two nations, it the more surprised him and might be the means of interrupting the same good harmony and correspondence as he found himself obliged to give the like orders for treating in the same manner all English ships coming from that side to Goa and the

¹ Bom. to Surat, 9th May 1731, Surat Fact. Diary 614 of 1729-1732.

² Bom. Gov. Consultation, 11th April 1731, Pub. Diary 4 of 1731, 45-46.

other Portuguese ports on this coast. Desiring the President to apply a remedy to this inconvenience.

Taking the same into consideration as Fort St. George is entirely independent of this Presidency, the only remedy we can think of is that the President write a letter to the Governor of Fort St. George and send him a copy of the paragraphs of the Viceroy's letter concerning this affair representing the ill consequences that may attend the trade on this side from the Viceroy's resentment, which he may probably carry further than at present he threatens; noting that it has been recommended to us by our Honourable Masters to cultivate and keep up a good correspondence with the Portuguese nation in these parts, and that this is the more necessary at present as we are entirely deprived of all manner of provisions from the Sidi's country which is now in possession of the Maráthás and Angria and our chief dependence is upon our Portuguese neighbours.¹

Similarly the records of a few years later (1733-1735) show the Portuguese on more than one occasion anxious to conciliate the English by reducing their tolls on Bombay vessels and goods. A Consultation of the 5th December 1735, notes that in the year 1733 the Portuguese laid a duty of one rupee per *mudu* on all batty exported from their territories which the late President complaining of to the Viceroy of Goa, he was pleased to relinquish. The Consultation continues: And as we do not know of any right the Portuguese have to receive the said duties of one per cent for Thána town wall and two per cent on *jágrí* (sugar) for Bassein on the trade passing through the rivers, while the collecting of them is contrary to the 11th article of the treaty of marriage, the President has prepared a letter to the General of the North, now read and approved, demanding that the said duties be relinquished, and desiring him to give the necessary orders to desist from collecting the same.²

A few days later the President (Honourable J. Horne) acquaints (December 1735) the Board that the General of the North had assured him he had given orders not to collect the duty for Thána town wall and the city Bassein on the trade passing through the rivers to and from this island.³

Three years before this (1732) the defeat of the Sidi by the Maráthás gave the Company an opportunity of attempting to secure the Sidi's important post of admiral of the Moghal and protector of the trade of Surat.⁴ A Consultation of the 7th June 1733 contains the following: The President (Honourable R. Cowan) acquaints the Board that he desired this meeting to communicate to them regarding the revolution that has lately happened in the Sidi's country by the Sháhu Rája's forces in conjunction with those of Angria taking several of the Sidi's forts and the country adjacent, and more particularly on their getting possession of all his fleet. On hearing of the Sidi's defeat the President wrote to Mr. Henry Lowther, Chief at Surat, to endeavour to learn the opinion of Teg Beg Khán, the present governor of that place, on the present posture of affairs and to sound him if by his means a Phirman or grant could be

Chapter I. History.

Help to
Portuguese,
1733.

Portuguese
Duty on Batty
abolished,
1735.

Sidi's Downfall,
1733.

¹ Bom. Gov. Consultation, 5th October 1733, Pub. Diary 5 of 1732-33, 227-228.

² Bom. Gov. Consultation, 5th December 1735, Pub. Diary 8 of 1734-35, 272.

³ Public Diary 8 of 1734-35, 291.

⁴ Bombay Gazetteer, Kolába, XI. 443, and Surat, II. 117.

Chapter I.

History.

Sidi's Downfall,
1733.Needs
of Bombay,
1733.

obtained from court assigning a *jágir* or estate to the Honourable Company for protecting the trade of Surat and this coast since the Sidi, to whom an annual *jágir* of three *lákhs* of rupees has been hitherto paid for that purpose is now no longer in a condition to protect them; and the common enemy by the addition of the Sidi's fleet is become more formidable than ever. To this Mr. Lowther returned for answer that he believed such a thing might be brought about and he would take the most effectual methods to accomplish it. The President had received a further letter from Mr. Lowther under date 26th ultimo (May), importing that the 24th of the same month the governor *Teg Beg Khán* sent for Mr. Lowther and of his own accord proposed to him that, since the Sidi had lost the greatest part of his country with his whole fleet and was thereby no longer in a condition to protect the trade of the coast against pirates and pickaroons, he was no longer entitled to the *jágir* that was annually paid him by the court out of the Surat customs on that account, and as we are most capable of any power whatever in these parts to undertake that affair, if we were willing, he would endeavour by means of his patron *Caundaura (Khán Dúra)* at court to obtain for us a *Phirman* for a certain sum to be paid us annually. To whom the Chief returned for answer that he was obliged to him for the good opinion he had of the English nation and for his good intention towards us, that indeed the Honourable Company had hitherto been the only protectors of the trade of Surat and of these seas and that the Sidi had never the least contributed towards it, notwithstanding the annual *jágir* that was paid him out of the Surat customs for that purpose. This had put the Honourable Company to so great an expense that they were become weary of it and inclined to lessen it by making a peace with the sons of *Angria* who had lately offered them very advantageous terms and as a token of their sincerity had already released all the prisoners which they had taken from us without ransom. However, if he the governor could obtain from court an annual *jágir* adequate to the charges we should be at in protecting the trade, he believed he might be persuaded to come into his measures and put a stop to the treaty of peace that was now on foot with *Angria* and desired he might have leave to communicate to the Governor of Bombay what had passed between them and receive his instructions how to act in this affair. This the Surat governor approved. Taking these advices into consideration and debating thereon, it is observed our marine charges of late years have been very great and are likely to increase by the additional strength the two sons of *Angria* have acquired by their conquest of the Sidi's country. With the Sidi's fleet of grabs and galivats in their possession the *Angriás* are become too formidable to be kept in awe with the small sea force we have at present in our service. So that unless a more effectual and speedy method is taken to put a stop to their growing power, the trade of these seas will become very precarious if not impracticable, and our Honourable Masters will be under an absolute necessity to increase their marine forces for protecting their own trade and settlements on this coast, however grievous and heavy the burthen may be. On the other hand should we succeed in obtaining such a *jágir* as we may reasonably expect from court for protecting the trade of the Moghal's subjects in these seas, it will not only lessen greatly the expenses our Honourable Employers have been at for so long a time,

but it is to be hoped will entirely defray their whole marine charges. We therefore approve the answer Mr. Lowther gave 'Teg Beg Khán in the conference he had with him, and agree that Mr. Lowther be fully empowered and authorized to enter into a treaty with the said governor and bring this affair to a happy conclusion if possible, and that whatever sums of money shall be expended in this service, shall be allowed him on our Honourable Masters' account, not doubting but he will act with the greatest caution circumspection and frugality in an affair where success is doubtful. Yet we can never hope for an opportunity so promising as the present when there is no longer any prospect of the Sidi family being ever again able to make any figure at sea since the Maráthís and Angria are in possession of their whole fleet. Equally little can the Sidis hereafter claim the jágir formerly paid them in consideration of their keeping up a fleet to protect the trade, the only use of which was, when the Sidi was in possession of it, once a year to go to Surat Bar to demand and enforce the payment of their said jágir from the Surat Government without ever minding the trade. As 'Teg Beg Khán has of his own accord proposed to Mr. Lowther that the English should undertake the protection of the trade, we have reason to hope that he will be the more hearty and sincere in soliciting at the Moghal's court the perfecting and bringing to a speedy conclusion this his own scheme and proposal.

The main point will be what sum to insist upon. Though the Sidi had three lákhs of rupees allowed him by the Moghal, we know that the whole sum was never paid him by the Surat governors though they charged it as paid in their accounts with the king. On the other hand when this jágir of three lákhs was allowed the Sidi, Angria and the other petty pirates on the coast were of little consequence to what they are now, and a small force by sea was sufficient to oppose them. Now with the addition of the Sidi's whole fleet of grabs and galivats the two Angriás are become very formidable and will require a considerable marine force to suppress them or prevent their depredations on the sea. Such duties will consequently occasion much greater expense than ever the Sidi was at with his fleet which was seldom fitted out but once a year and that only for two months in the fairest season.¹

Resolved therefore that the President and John Horne, Esquire, be appointed a committee to transact this affair with Mr. Lowther, and that this consultation and all transactions relating to this affair be entrusted to the Secretary and entered apart from the diaries and consultations of this Presidency as some letters will require a speedier answer during this negotiation than will admit of first laying them before the Board. Resolved likewise that a letter be immediately prepared pursuant to this consultation to be sent to Mr. Lowther by *patamar* express.²

A Consultation of the 13th July shows how seriously Angria's successes affected Bombay. The President observes to the Board: The great progress the junction of Sháhu Rájá's forces with those of Angria has made in the reduction of the Sidi's country to their obedience since the

Chapter I. History.

Needs
of Bombay.
1733.

Company to
be Moghal
Admirals,
1733.

Maráthas
Designs on
Underi,
1733.

¹ Bom. Gov. Consultation, 7th June 1733, Pub. Diary 6 of 1733, 1-4.

² Bom. Gov. Consultation, 7th June 1733, Pub. Diary 6 of 1733, 7.

Chapter I.

History.

Marátha
Designs on
Underi,
1733.

death of the Nabob Yákub Khán is more owing to the dissension of the Sidi's officers than to the force of the Marátha arms. However it is certain the Maráthas have got into their possession the town of Rájpurí (or Danda Rájpurí) and a sort of fortress called the Cocree (Khokri opposite Janjira island)¹ with all the Sidi's fleet of grabs and galivats, their guns and warlike stores, and nothing but the fort upon the island in that harbour holds out against them. The strong fort of Ráiri, formerly the chief residence of the Shiváji Rája and others the predecessors of the present Sháhu Rája, has in like manner fallen into their hands through treachery. And we have certain intelligence that another separate body of the Sháhu Rája's forces are ordered to march against Anjanvel and two other of the Sidi's forts to the southward. But a few days since Angria has taken the fort of Upper Chaul belonging to the Moghal and within less than a mile of the city and fortress of Chaul belonging to the Portuguese. He has likewise taken the small fort of Ravani (Revas)² in the river of Pen and the larger fort of Thal situated on the western point of the south land that forms one side of this bay and contiguous to the island and fort of Underi. He is likewise preparing to attack Underi as soon as the weather will permit him to make use of his galivats for that purpose. If he should succeed in that attempt he is entirely master of the south entrance of this port, and it will be impossible for any small embarkations or ships of little force bound to this port to escape his galivats. Consequently an end will be put to the greatest part of our country trade, as all the Sidi's grabs and galivats are given to Sakhoji Angria for his share of the plunder of Rájpurí and he has carried them to Kolába to join the rest of his fleet which now consists of 11 grabs and 25 galivats, besides 4 grabs and 20 galivats under the direction of his brother Sambháji at Gheria.

Succour to
Underi,
1733.

The Consultation continues: Upon this emergency we have been frequently solicited by the Sidi's officers for assistance and succours both from Rájpurí and Anjanvel but more immediately from Underi nearest in our neighbourhood. Even were there no other political reasons for preventing our so far interfering to grant the necessary assistance to all three is not in our power both from the weakness of our garrison and the great distance of the places. But the consequence of Underi's falling into the enemy's possession claims our more immediate consideration, as that will more sensibly affect us both with respect to the trade of this port and the procuring of provisions for the use of the island. These considerations being duly pondered and debated it is the unanimous opinion of this Board that in duty to our Honourable Employers we are indispensably obliged to use our utmost endeavours to prevent the island and fortress of Underi falling into the enemy's hands by succouring the same and preserving it either in the possession of the Sidi or taking it into the possession of our Honourable Masters by the Sidi's consent: Subject to this condition that if the heirs or successors of the late Sidi Yákub Khán should be restored to their country command and authority, and should desire the restitution of the fortress of Underi, the same shall be delivered up to them on their paying the full expense and charge that the Honourable Com-

¹ Bombay Gazetteer, Kolába, XI. 464.

² Bombay Gazetteer, Kolába, XI. 150.

pany may be at in preserving the said fortress with the usual interest thereon at the rate of nine per cent per annum. But should the Maráthás remain possessed of the Sidis' territories without any hopes of the Sidis' retrieving them, then the fortress of Underi shall remain to the Honourable Company as their sole right and property. To put in execution this our resolution it is agreed that we give orders to Captain Thomas Holden, Commander of the *Mary*, to proceed with that ship under his command as soon as wind and weather will permit and come to an anchor as near to the said fortress of Underi as he with safety can with the said ship in order to cover the galivats and boats that we may have occasion to send from hence with men artillery and ammunition to the succour of the said fortress. Agreed that the said succours to be sent at present do consist of 1 lieutenant, 2 ensigns, 4 serjeants, 4 corporals, 40 European musketeers and 60 topasses, 6 nine-pounders, 6 six-pounders, 60 barrels of powder, 100 spare muskets and sundry other stores as per list entered below. Directed that Lieutenant James Inchbird have the command of the detachment and chief direction of this expedition with Ensign James Sterling and Ensign Forbes to his assistance. The President to give the necessary instructions to Lieut. Inchbird particularly inculcating that before any of the artillery or ammunition is landed, he is to take such exact survey of the fortress of Underi and its fortifications as will enable him to frame a judgment whether or no the same is capable of being defended against any attempts that may be made by the enemy through the succours that we may be able to give. If he finds that the fort is not tenable either through the deficiency or irregularity of its fortifications or its too near situation to the mainland on which the enemy may erect batteries sufficient to make a practicable breach in the body of the place, he is not in such case to land any of the artillery or stores before he has made a regular report to the President of the condition or state he finds the place in and received his answer thereupon. Directed that Captain Robert Macneale be sent to the assistance of Lieutenant Inchbird, whose knowledge of the language and customs of the country people renders him the fittest person to treat and transact any affairs with them, and as we have had a long experience of his capacity prudence and fidelity, agreed that Lieutenant Inchbird be directed to consult Captain Macneale on all occasions and that he do not undertake anything of moment without his advice and approbation.¹

The details of the ammunition and stores sent with the detachment to Underi are :

Guns—6 nine-pounders, 6 six-pounders.

Shots—600 round nine-pounders, 200 double-head nine-pounders, 600 round six-pounders, 60 lead grape shot for nine-pounders, and 30 four-ounce shot.

Cohorn mortars—6. Shells for cohorn mortars fixed 300, grenado shells fixed 300, powder horns fixed 12. *Ladles and Worms*—for nine-pounders, 6; for six-pounders, 6. *Sponge staves* fixed— for nine-pounders 12; for six-pounders, 6. *Gunner's bits*—6.

Hand spikes—66. A *gin* with spare blocks and tackle.

Chapter I. History.

Succour to
Underi,
1733.

¹ Bom. Gov. Consultation, 13th July 1733, Pub. Diary 5 of 1732-33, 146-149. Forrest's Home Series, II. 51-53.

Chapter I.
History.

Succour to
Underi,
1733.

Muskets 100, cutlasses 100, cartouch boxes 100, blunderbusses 6, brass musketoons 6, brass pistols 6 pair, harquebusses 12, flints 800, country match 1400 scaines (skeins).

Gunpowder—60 barrels Bombay cannon, 9 barrels fine, 2 barrels Europe cannon. *Balls*—11.

Medicines and hospital stores.

Besides the above there are to be sent with this detachment sundry artificers as carpenters smiths bricklayers and stone-cutters with the necessary implements and such stores as may be wanted after a survey is taken of the island and its fortifications, a particular account of which will from time to time be delivered by the proper persons into the accountant's office.¹

Instructions
to Lieut.
Inchbird,
1733.

Next day (14th July) Governor R. Cowan issued the following instructions to Lieutenant Inchbird: You are hereby appointed Commander-in-chief of the expedition designed for succouring and defending the fortress of Underi against the common enemy with Ensigns James Sterling and Henry Forbes to your assistance, together with 4 serjeants, 4 corporals, 60 European musketeers, 60 topasses, and a train of artillery, provisions and warlike stores according to the list herewith delivered you. You are to sail with the first opportunity of wind and weather with the galivats and other vessels under convoy of the *Mary*, Captain Thomas Holden, Commander, who has orders to bring the said ship to an anchor as near to the island of Underi as he can with safety, the better to cover your landing on the said island with the said galivats and other vessels to secure your so doing from any attempts that may be made by the enemy from their galivats or from the main. As soon therefore as the said ship comes to an anchor, if the tide will permit you, you are to proceed with the galivats and boats under your command to the usual and most commodious landing-place on the said island, taking directions therein from the Sidi's people and boats that accompany you, as they are best acquainted with the place. If upon the *Mary's* anchoring the tide is so far spent that you cannot securely reach the said island, you are to come to an anchor with the galivats and vessels under the guns of the said ship and there wait until a proper opportunity of wind and tide offers for your proceeding to the said island. I doubt not but the ship *Mary* will be able to proceed so far to the southward as to discover whether any of the enemy's galivats are lying at Cundry or not and with the assistance of the four Company's fighting galivats to protect you from their attempts, if there should be any, of preventing your landing as you are above directed. You are to embark yourself and detachment on board the four Company's galivats and to accommodate them in the best manner you can. Upon your arrival at Underi you are to secure the vessels and people as well as you can from any random shot there may be sent by the enemy from Thal or any batteries they may have erected on the main. Then landing yourself with Captain Macneale whom you are upon all occasions to consult in this undertaking as a person perfectly well acquainted with the situation of the place and disposition of the people as well as the disposition of the enemy, and leaving the care of the detachment artillery and ammuni-

¹ Bom. Gov. Consultation, 13th July 1733, Pub. Diary 5 of 1732-33, 150-151.

tion to the two ensigns, you are to go to the fort and deliver my letter to Sidi Balál, the Killedár or governor, which will acquaint him with the design of your coming and the service you are sent on.

You are next, before you condescend to land either your detachment artillery or stores, to make a thorough survey and examination of the island and its fortifications, the number of the guns therein, their qualities and the carriages they are mounted on, the quantity of provisions water and warlike stores, and the number of fighting sepoys so as to be able to frame a perfect judgment whether or no, with the succours you now carry and I may hereafter be able to send, the island is capable of being defended from any attempt that the enemy may make against it. You are particularly to consider the distance it is from the mainland of Thal and the effect that any batteries raised at Thal might have against the fort of Underi. Likewise the depth of water on all sides and how near the enemy's grabs may approach Underi so as to batter the fort by their prow or side guns in such manner as a practicable breach may be effected. More especially you are to consider how the main gateway or entrance is secured and whether or no there is any place upon the island where the enemy may land a body of men sufficient and draw them up so as to make a regular attack without being exposed to the fire of the artillery from the fort so as to frustrate their attempts. From the best information I have been hitherto able to obtain, there is not sufficient depth of water for their grabs to approach near enough so as to do any execution without being at the same time exposed to our galleys and grabs whom they must always expect to watch their motions. If you find that with the assistance you now carry and what hereafter I may be able to send you, the place is tenable, you are then to land your detachment, provision, and ammunition. But if you find that the artillery that is already in the fort and the carriages to mount it on may, by the assistance of the carpenters and smiths that we now send with you, be rendered sufficient for the defence of the place, there will be then no occasion for landing the artillery we now send with you or at least only such part of it as you and Captain Macneale shall judge absolutely necessary.

You are next to send off in the nine galivats belonging to the island and such other boats as you can spare to send hither with the utmost expedition, all the women children old men and other persons unfit for service under convoy of the Company's four galivats, who, under cover of the *Mary*, may see them safely so far in their way to this port as to be out of danger and then the four Company's galivats may return to you for your further orders. If at one trip the nine galivats and your boats cannot transport the whole of the unnecessary people, you may order the boats back to make a second trip so as to clear the garrison of everything but such a number of men as may be sufficient for its defence, which I compute 500 effective fighting men must be at all events.

In my letter to Sidi Balál I have signified to him as my opinion that on the present emergency it will be for his interest and that of the Sidi his master, to hoist the English flag upon his fort and deliver up to you the defence of it with his assistance and that of his present garrison, with this condition that whenever the Sidi thinks proper to demand the restitution of it to him on his affairs taking a different turn than what they seem at present, to promise the same shall be delivered up on the

Chapter I.

History.

Instructions
to Lieut.
Inchbird,
1733.

Chapter I.
History.

Instructions
to Lieut.
Inchbird,
1733.

Sidi paying the Honourable Company the expense and charge they have been and may be at in preserving of it with the usual lawful interest of nine per cent per annum. In case that the Sidi's affair will not admit of reclaiming the said fort, that then the same shall remain to the Honourable Company as their sole right and property, and the garrison of sepoys shall become the subjects of the said Honourable Company and remain in their pay and service at the usual pay that is now paid to the garrison sepoys of Bombay. The hoisting of the English flag and the taking of the island and fortress of Underi into the Honourable Company's immediate protection and defence will convince the enemy that we are fully determined to defend it and support it to the last. This, I flatter myself, that Sidi Balál and all honest Musalmáns will prefer to the giving it up to the Maráthás on their specious but most false promises; believing that we have no other motive in making this proposal but to give a check to the growing insolence of that treacherous set of people, since I shall be much better pleased to see the Sidi's family and his heirs restored to their ancient authority and command in this neighbourhood and in restoring to them the said island and fortress than being at the expense of entertaining it on the Honourable Company's account without any other prospect of advantage than that of keeping it out of the common enemy's hands.

If on your taking a survey of the island you find it impracticable with the succours you now carry and what you are capable of judging we may hereafter be able to send you to defend it either through the deficiency of the fortifications, the contiguity of its situation to the mainland of Thal, and the batteries the enemy may raise thereon against it, or the repugnancy of the Sidi and his people to the conditions under which I propose to give them the present assistance, you are then to forbear the landing of your detachment, artillery, provision or stores until you have made a report to me of the condition and circumstances you find the place in, and wait my answer thereof. If my expectations are answered, as I have no room to doubt they must be, you are then to expedite as much as possible the putting the place in a proper posture of defence and sending hither all the unnecessary people, completing the number of the garrison to what you may think sufficient of fighting men. On so doing you may acquaint Captain Holden of the *Mary* that there is no farther occasion of continuing in his station but that he may return with his ship into Bombay harbour.

The charge of the provisions you are to put under the care of some serjeant or some person of trust and that of the ammunition and warlike stores under another, with the assistance of two lascars who are best versed in those affairs, and each of them is to keep a regular book of receipts and issues of each species to be laid before me as often as required.

Antonio De Mello who goes with you as chief gunner I have advanced to the pay of a quarter gunner for his encouragement. If he exerts himself with as much zeal and fidelity as I know he has capacity in that employment I doubt not but he will deserve the advance.

If at the first and second trip of the boats with the women and children they cannot send off the whole number you may send the

remainder on board the *Mary* when she proceeds to this port, whose commander has orders for receiving them and treating them in the best manner.

Mr. Kellet has sent you six bullocks for your Europeans with which you must make the best shift you can till we can send you more. But I would have you inculcate to them to eat rice and *khichadi* which is more nourishing and wholesome than any flesh meat that can possibly be procured at this wet season. When fair weather sets in we can supply you from time to time both with fresh and salt provisions as you may have occasion. But I believe when you are once settled you will not want more than 20 Europeans and you may return the remainder hither. Of one thing I must put you in mind, immediately to set about making more tanks for water, as many at least as will contain sufficient water for all the fair season. You are no longer to depend on having any water from Thal as formerly, and to send it from hence will be very troublesome. It will be much more easy and less expensive to make tanks to contain a sufficient quantity of water for your garrison the year round.

In the foregoing part of these instructions I have ordered you not to land your detachment and artillery until you and Captain Macneale had talked with Sidi Balál. In case you find that the enemy fire upon your boats and people from Thal side and are likely to do them damage, you may land your people as soon as you can. Or as it is now moonlight, I believe it will be safest going in during the night time, the Sidi's people that sail along with you being sufficient pilots to carry you in either by night or day. Should Sidi Balál of his own accord propose to you his coming hither to discourse with me, you may agree to it. But you are not to propose this to him from yourself.

I have talked with Antonio de Mello, and he assures me that the walls of the fort are very good and that it is not possible for the enemy to do them any damage from Thal. Neither is it practicable to bring any grabs or other vessels capable of carrying a sufficient weight of metal to batter it by sea on any side, because of the foul ground that lies all round at a considerable distance, so that only *shilars* or *galivats* can approach it. And that you with your cohorns may make the enemy very uneasy at Thal if they offer to molest you. However, I would have you very frugal of your ammunition since their firing against you can be of very little consequence.

I am most apprehensive that the Sidi's people will be very dilatory in transporting their wives and families and occasion the *Mary* to tarry longer in her station than I can allow for at this season of the year. You must expedite them as much as possible, and I would only have you keep such a number of sepoy in garrison as you think will be absolutely requisite. I believe you will find the fort is not so large as it has been described and that 300 men will be sufficient. However that I leave entirely to your discretion. I commit you to the Divine protection.¹

Chapter I.

History.

Instructions
to Lieut.
Inchbird,
1733.

¹ Governor R. Cowan's instructions to Captain James Inchbird, Bombay, 14th July 1733, Pub. Diary 5 of 1732-33, 160-165. Forrest's Home Series, II, 54-57.

Chapter I.
History.

English take
over Underi,
1733.

On the 26th July the President acquaints the Board that pursuant to our resolution of the 13th instant (July), the *Mary*, Captain Holden Commander, weighed anchor the 15th of this month and stood towards the island of Underi with four of the Honourable Company's fighting galivats and under their convoy six Thána boats with the detachment artillery and stores sent to the succour of that island. The galivats and boats happily arrived at Underi that evening, but the *Mary* was obliged to come to an anchor five miles distance, the Commander not esteeming it safe this season of the year to approach nearer. Upon their arrival Captain Inchbird and Captain Macneale, according to the President's instructions to Captain Inchbird, went to the Killedár Sidi Balál and delivered to him the President's letter and acquainted him with the occasion of their coming and the succours they had brought. After having taken a survey of the fort which they esteemed tenable, they proposed to the Killedár the hoisting the English flag to which they believed the enemy would pay a greater regard than to that of the Sidi. To this the Killedár agreeing the English flag was accordingly hoisted on the 16th in the morning under the discharge of the artillery of the fort and the galivats. Then the enemy from Cundery and their batteries from Thal began and continued to fire pretty briskly at the fort of Underi for that and several following days but without doing any damage. On the 19th the galivats and boats returned with several families of women and children from Underi and the weather having proved very boisterous for two days before, the *Mary* being no longer of any use where she lay, the Commander slipped his cable, not being able to purchase his anchor and came into port.

At the same Consultation the President likewise acquaints the Board that he had received a letter from the Emperor's secretary of state Shamshad Danla (formerly known by the name of Khán Dára) requiring him in his majesty's name to assist the Sidi in conjunction with the Portuguese in recovering his territories that have lately been overrun by the Sháhu Rája and Angria. To this the President returned answer: If his majesty would defray the whole expense of such an undertaking and send his royal army we should be glad to act in concert with them or with such other forces as may be procured from the Portuguese for restoring the Sidi to his dominions. But that as our business in these parts of the world is trade and not to increase our charges, we keep up such a number of troops only as are capable of defending and protecting our commerce, without interfering with the too frequent quarrels of the neighbouring powers.¹

Treaty with
the Sidis of
Rájpurí,
1733.

At a Consultation dated 11th December 1733, Messrs. Lowther and Dickins being returned from Rájpurí give in their diary of their transactions there and the treaty of alliance concluded with this Government under the seals of seven of the principal governing Sidis. The counterpart signed by the President and Council and sealed with the Company's seal, is to be returned to the Sidis of Rájpurí.²

¹ Bom. Gov. Consultation, 26th July 1733, Pub. Diary 5 of 1732-33, 156-157. Forrest's Home Series, II. 53-54.

² Bom. Gov. Consultation, 11th December 1733, Pub. Diary 5 of 1732-33, 235. For the treaty see pages 286 to 289 of the same diary.

At a Consultation dated 13th September 1734, the President acquaints us that yesterday arrived from Underi 52 prisoners who were taken in an expedition the Sidi lately made up the river of Pen without the President's knowledge or consent and contrary to the articles of agreement between us. The President observes that a great many merchants come hither by the said river from the Ghát country who carry away considerable quantities of goods, and he apprehends if such violences are continued, it will deter the merchants from venturing hither to the no small detriment of our trade. Therefore to convince the said merchants that we do not approve of such proceedings and are inclinable to prevent them, he proposes to return the prisoners to their habitations. This is unanimously agreed to.¹

On the 22nd November 1734, having received advice that Mánáji the younger Angria, had, on a quarrel with his elder brother Sambháji, deserted from Kolába and retired to Chaul, the Council agree in thinking it a good opportunity to endeavour to weaken our enemy's force by keeping up the dissension between the two brothers. With this object the President (Honourable J. Horne) proposes to send Captain Inchbird, who is well acquainted with the tempers of these people, to Chaul to discourse with the said Mánáji on the situation of his brother's affairs. And, if he can, to prompt Mánáji to seize on some of his brother's forts to the northward as this would greatly distress Sambháji, whose whole country depends upon the territories about Kolába for grain. And also, if he finds that Mánáji has a party sufficient in any of the said forts, to give him hopes of our assisting him with what he may want towards becoming master of them and keeping them against his enemies.²

On the 6th December, the President acquaints the Board that Captain Inchbird being returned from Chaul informed him that Mánáji Angria had taken Upper Chaul from his brother Sambháji, that he had about 600 men with him, and had an interest with the people in Kolába and several other of his brother's forts by which he hoped to get them into his possession. But he is greatly in want of money and ammunition which he earnestly solicits to be supplied from hence. We are convinced that it would be a very great advantage to us to keep up the dissension between the two brothers and thereby divide their force. For if Mánáji succeeds in his design on Kolába he will greatly distress his brother, who, for want of a fleet, will not have it in his power to prejudice us, should he hereafter be inclined so to do. It is therefore agreed that for the present we advance Mánáji Rs. 4000 and supply him with the stores desired, being 7 small iron guns, 200 shot, 30 barrels of powder, 20 slabs of lead, 3000 small shot for partridge, and 20 pieces of coarse cloth (*dangri*). That Captain James Inchbird return to Chaul to supply Mánáji with the money as he may have occasion for it and to take all opportunities of spiriting him up to carry on his resentments against his brother.³

In January 1736 the Bombay Council received the following letter from Captain Abraham Anselm and others of the Company's outward

Chapter I. History.

Sidi
Plunderings,
1734.

Help to Mánáji
Angria,
1734.

¹ Bom. Gov. Consultation, 13th September 1734, Pub. Diary 7 of 1734, 158.

² Bom. Gov. Consultation, 22nd Nov. 1734, Pub. Diary 7 of 1734, 217-218.

³ Bom. Gov. Consultation, 6th Dec. 1734, Pub. Diary 7 of 1734, 223.

Chapter I.
History.

*Derby taken
by Sambhaji
Angria,
1735.*

bound ship *Derby*, then prisoners at Angria's fort of Suvarndurg: Our long absence we suppose will be very surprising to you. The occasion is as follows. On the 18th March last (1735) our pilot ran our ship aground on a place in the Swinn called the Mouse. We lay seven hours beating and received so much damage that we were ordered by the Honourable Company into Sheerness where we unloaded and repaired the ship. This detained us five weeks. The 27th April arrived in the Downs, on the 30th April sailed from thence, the 1st September arrived at Johanna and sailed the 13th October, the 26th December at five in the morn (in 17° 50' north latitude about 16 leagues from shore) fell in with four galivats and five grabs belonging to Angria. They attacked us by six o'clock in the morn, having so little wind all day that our ship would neither stay nor veer. They took care we should not bring any guns to bear on them but what we got out of our stern ports which we kept close. By eight o'clock they destroyed most of our rigging, at ten carried the mizen mast by the board at one shot away, the main mast at the same time received two double-headed shots between wind and water abaft which was secured, found two feet water in the hold and still proved leaky. Soon after they lodged two double-headed shots in the foremast. Continued on in our engagement till four or five o'clock in the afternoon. Then thought in vain to proceed, so submitted. Seven of our men were killed, five more had their legs shot off, and many others wounded. There is one hundred and fifteen of us now prisoners with Angria. He seems to insist on peace or no redemption for us which we leave to your Honour's disposition if convenient to restore us who are your Honour's obliged and obedient humble servants to command. (Signed) Abraham Anselm, Robert Cuddon, Christopher Barrow. P.S.—Our Chief Mate Mr. Thomas Rogers received a shot in his thigh, of which he died. We particularise this to your Honour seeing his name is not signed hereto. 10th January 1736.¹

Two days before (8th January 1736) the President had acquainted the Board that he had this morning received the melancholy news of our Honourable Masters' ship *Derby* being taken about twelve days ago (26th December 1735) by five of Sambhaji Angria's grabs and carried into Southern drook (Suvarndurg). He has no other particulars of the action than that all her masts were carried away and several of her people killed. The Consultation proceeds: As it is probable that a light boat may overtake the departed ships before they leave the coast, it is directed that a short letter be immediately prepared to advise our Honourable Masters of this unhappy disaster and that a boat be despatched with it to proceed as far as Anjengo if she does not overtake the ship sooner. The President observes to the Board that by the fatal loss of the *Derby* we shall not have treasure sufficient to provide a loading of coffee at Mokha.²

On the 7th May 1736 the President communicates to the Board a letter received from Caitan deSouza, Captain of Chaul, advising him that one Moro Pant was arrived there with full powers from Sambhaji Angria to treat with us for making peace and had desired him to send down Captain Inchbird to hear what proposals he had to make, intimating

*Sambhaji
Angria's design
for a Peace,
1736.*

¹ Commander Abraham's letter to Bom. Govt. 10th Jan. 1736, Pub. Diary 9 of 1736, 11-12. ² Bom. Gov. Consultation, 8th Jan. 1736, Pub. Diary 9 of 1736, 2.

that this might prove a favourable opportunity for getting away our people prisoners with Angria. Though we have little hopes of coming to an accommodation, yet as our complying so far may be attended with the release of our prisoners who we believe Sambhaji may be tired of keeping, it is agreed that Captain Inchbird be sent on this service as soon as our vessels return from the northward.¹

On the 14th May the President communicates to the Board a letter received (13th May) from Captain Inchbird who on discoursing with Sambhaji's *vakil* found his intended offers for making peace were with design to get master of Kolaba, expecting we shall not assist Manaji in order to prevent the success of that undertaking, desiring that we will send a person down to Gheria, promising also if we come to terms of peace to deliver up the ships and prisoners. But as such a condescension would bring us into contempt with our neighbours and having little hopes that he would long continue in peace with us after he had gained the present point when he would have it in his power more than ever to molest us, the President has drawn out an answer ordering Captain Inchbird to acquaint Sambhaji's *vakil* that we cannot agree to any such conditions; but if his master is so desirous of a peace as he pretends, that he first release all the prisoners of our nation as a mark of his sincerity when we shall be ready to hear and agree to any reasonable terms for making peace. This is approved by the Board.²

On the 27th September the President communicates to the Board a letter received from Sambhaji Angria acquainting him that to show his desire of making peace he had sent fifteen of our people to Chaul; that he had sent Moro Pant to offer what he had further to say on this subject and desired Captain Inchbird might be sent down to Gheria to conclude the treaty. Which being considered, it is observed that Sambhaji's sending fifteen of the sailors to Chaul is but a slight mark of his sincerity; that as we cannot think of making peace while our prisoners are in his hands, it will be needless for Moro Pant to come hither, nor can we condescend so far as to send Captain Inchbird to Gheria. Such a concession would expose us to the contempt of all our neighbours, as Sambhaji would immediately spread a report that the English had sent to beg a peace.³

On the 1st October the President communicates to the Board a letter in answer to Sambhaji Angria's, which is approved. As Sambhaji's messenger Moro Pant is at Chaul, the sending Captain Inchbird to discourse with him may forward the release of our prisoners or at least keep them in heart by letting them see we are not unmindful of them; and we are apprehensive that if they thought we neglected them, many of them would be driven to enter into Sambhaji's service: It is therefore agreed that Captain Inchbird repair to Chaul. And the President communicating such orders as he thinks proper to be given him on this occasion they are approved by the Board.⁴

Chapter I.

History.

Sambhaji
Angria's design
for a Peace,
1736.

Peace with
Sambhaji Angria
not desirable,
1736.

¹ Bom. Gov. Consultation, 7th May 1736, Pub. Diary 9 of 1736, 236.

² Bom. Gov. Consultation, 14th May 1736, Pub. Diary 9 of 1736, 244.

³ Bom. Gov. Consultation, 27th Sept. 1736, Pub. Diary 11 of 1736, 361.

⁴ Bom. Gov. Consultation, 1st October 1736, Pub. Diary 11 of 1736, 365.

Chapter I.

History.

Peace with
Sambhaji Angria
not desirable,
1736.

On the 12th October the President communicates to the Board sundry letters from Captain Inchbird at Chaul who thinks nothing can be done towards the release of the prisoners unless we consent to his going down in our fleet to Gheria. But as we apprehend such a condescension would bring us into contempt with our neighbours, and that if Angria refuses to deliver up the prisoners on the President's signing a cessation of arms, he cannot have any sincere intentions to do so on the bare hopes of commencing a treaty, and has a design in some manner to deceive us. Since therefore we cannot agree to Captain Inchbird going to Gheria it is directed that he return forthwith, one of the galleys now in port being sent to bring him away.¹

English Prisoners
released,
1736.

The Bombay Diary of the 23rd November has this entry: Imported the *Prince of Wales*, *King George*, *Princess Caroline*, *Victoria Rose*, and *Neptune* from off Gheria having on board all the English that were prisoners with Angria (except three who entered into his service), their release having been obtained by Captain James Inchbird's management.²

Angria's Grab
captured,
1736.

In their Consultation of 24th December 1736 the Bombay Government observe: Our cruizers importing this morning from the southward bringing in one of Angria's grabs with a vessel belonging to the sons of Muhammad Ali, inhabitants of Surat, whom they had rescued from the enemy; It is agreed, pursuant to the Consultation of the 19th November 1731, that the value of the said grab, her stores and ammunition, be divided amongst the captors for their encouragement. As to the Surat vessel it is directed that for the present she be put under the care of the marine paymaster, he taking an inventory of what she has on board; concerning whom we shall defer coming to any resolution till we find whether and in what manner the government or the owners at Surat may make demands on her account.

Ordered that the two subhedárs taken in Angria's grab be confined without irons and that they have a full allowance of provisions and that the rest of the prisoners be put in irons and employed on the works with such an allowance of provisions as is necessary for their subsistence.

The President then takes notice to the Board of the promise made by the late President and Council in the above consultation to give Rs. 2000 at their own expense to the captors for every grab of Angria's taken in battle, and leaves it to them in what manner to proportion the same. The several members who were present at that time acquaint the Board that though they signed the Consultation the late President and Messrs. Lowther, Kellett, and Dickinson promised to bear the whole expense. It is observed that though the said gentlemen are all absent, yet as the said promise has been made public on board all our vessels, it would be a great discouragement to the people in general should it not now be complied with. The President therefore in his own name offers to give Rs. 1000 and the rest of the members declining to bear any part of the remainder, it is agreed for the encouragement of our people

¹ Bom. Gov. Consultation, 12th October 1736, Pub. Diary 9 of 1736, 390.

² Bom. Gov. Consultation, 23rd Nov. 1736, Pub. Diary 9 of 1736, 468.

that the other Rs. 1000 be paid out of the treasury on our Honourable Masters' account which we cannot think they will disapprove of.¹

During these years (1734-1736), as a make-weight against the power of Angria, the Bombay Government cultivated friendly relations with Sidi Masut. A Consultation of the 6th December 1734 has the following entry : Sidi Masut represents that the people belonging to his ships have for some time been very uneasy for want of their pay, and requests we would advance him money to discharge the arrears due to them without which he apprehends they will all desert him. He likewise desires a few guns and other stores for the use of his fleet. As we have already been at a considerable expense in assisting the Sidis to prevent the danger that would attend this settlement from their country falling into the hands of the Sháhu Rájá or Angria, in which case we should be obliged to make a very large addition to our force and consequently to our charges, we think it but prudent to endeavour to prevent so great an evil by continuing our assistance to the Sidis, which expense we have a prospect of being repaid out of the money they may recover from the Surat government if by our means they can maintain that part of their country now in their possession. It is therefore resolved that we let Sidi Masut have Rs. 5000 in money and the stores he desires for the use of his fleet.²

On the 10th January 1735 the President acquaints the Board that since his arrival he and several of the members had conferences with Sidi Saut on the state of the Sidi's affairs and the subject of the *tankha* or Moghal pension. That Sidi Saut will listen to no proposal for relinquishing the least part of the grant and seems much dissatisfied at our endeavouring to get it from them, urging that it is all they have to depend on for the support of their country. That Sidi Saut also represented the ill state of their affairs, being indebted to their soldiers and people, and so destitute of stores and ammunition that if we do not continue our assistance to them, they have no hopes of keeping their country out of the hands of Sháhu Rájá; that they intend to proceed to Surat Bar with their fleet for recovering the money due from that government, out of which he promises to pay us what they are already indebted and for such farther assistance as we shall afford them.

The Consultation continues: We are well convinced of the truth of what Sidi Saut sets forth in regard to their poverty and the danger of their country. We greatly apprehend that if we deny them our assistance at this time they may be so far disgusted as to strike up a peace with the Sháhu Rájá by submitting to his yoke (which is the evil we have hitherto been guarding against). Thereby we should not only lose what they now owe us but they would even become our enemies in conjunction with Sháhu Rájá and Angria. Should not this be the immediate consequence, we are certain they would proceed with their force to plunder the country bordering on Pen river which would entirely put a stop to the trade carried on thither from this island. On the other hand

Chapter I. History.

Advance to
Sidi Masut,
1734.

Advance to
Sidi Saut,
1735.

¹ Bom. Gov. Consultation, 24th Dec. 1736, Pub. Diary ■ of 1736, 506-507.

² Bom. Gov. Consultation, 6th Dec. 1734, Pub. Diary 7 of 1734, 223-224.

Chapter I.
History.

Advance to
Sidi Saut,
1735.

we have good reason to believe they will recover a large sum from the Surat government, and that, upon their fleet appearing at the bar, our Chief will be applied to for adjusting their demands which will give us an opportunity of repaying ourselves as far as the circumstances of the Sidis will admit. For these reasons it is agreed to advance the Sidis Rs. 30,000. We hope we shall not be blamed for so doing when our Honourable Masters consider the danger this settlement would be exposed to on the destruction of the Sidis; and that by our assistance they have hopes of maintaining their country and we a prospect of being reimbursed the expense we have been at on that account out of the money they may recover from the Surat government.¹

Shortly after (February 1735) the Councils at Surat and Bombay were further able to benefit the Sidi by helping to settle the quarrel between him and the Moghal governor of Surat that rose out of the seizure by the Sidi of certain Surat vessels to compel the Moghal governor to pay him his allowance as Moghal admiral.²

A Bombay Consultation of the 3rd March contains this entry: Wrote a letter to the Chief and Factors at Surat in answer to theirs of the 22nd February, and directed them, in case our trade should be impeded by the Moghal government on account of the Sidis, to detain such freight belonging to the Moors that might be on board of any English ship. This we judged would induce the merchants to interfere for putting a speedy end to the differences between the governor and the Sidis.³

Mr. Braddyll
sent to Janjira,
1735.

A fortnight later (March 16th) the Bombay Council record the following entry: Imported the *London* sloop from Surat with Mr. John Robinson on board who brought us a letter signed by the Chief and himself, dated 14th from the Bar, advising that the Sidis had carried away the Moors' ships, and requesting us to use our good offices with the Sidis for returning the ships to prevent fatal consequences. The Surat governor has signed an obligation to stand by the decision of the Chief and sundry merchants therein named who intended to have awarded the Sidi a large sum for admiral's arrears; to have settled Sidi Masut in Surat; and to have fixed the admiral's allowance to be paid annually in future. The President acquaints the Board that he has desired this meeting to take into consideration the advices received last night (15th March) and this morning from Surat giving an account of the Sidi seizing and carrying away the merchants' ships which would occasion the ruin of the city if by our persuasion the Sidis were not prevailed on to return them. Debating hereupon, it is observed that as the Surat merchants are jealous of the Sidis they will not consent to pay them any money while their ships and effects remain in the Sidis' hands. Therefore the first step which to us seems necessary is to endeavour to prevail on the Sidis to let the merchants' ships and cargoes be brought into this harbour which we think will in some measure pacify the

¹ Bom. Gov. Consultation, 10th January 1735, Pub. Diary 8 of 1734-35, 38-39.

² Bombay Gazetteer, Surat, II, 118-119; and Kolāba, XI, 444.

³ Bom. Gov. Consultation, 3rd March 1735, Pub. Diary 8 of 1734-35, 85.

merchants as their goods will not be liable to be plundered as when in the Sidis' own port. Mr. Braddyll being nominated to proceed to Janjira to discourse with the Sidis on this occasion, is unanimously approved. And it is agreed to direct him to use all possible arguments for prevailing on the Sidis to let the merchants' ships and cargoes come hither and to engage on our behalf that they shall not be restored to the Moors till the Sidis' demands on the Surat governor are complied with to satisfaction. That he acquaints them with the term offered by the Surat governor and endeavour to persuade the Sidis not to insist on too unreasonable terms, and at the same time to let them know we will use our good offices for obtaining them as large a sum as possible. That he also endeavour to prevail on the Sidis to send Sidi Masut immediately up to Surat Bar to treat with the governor. And as soon as anything is concluded to send advice thereof express to Surat that such of the merchants whose ships are almost in a readiness to proceed on their voyages may take the proper measures so as not to lose the benefit of the season. Directed also that a letter be now wrote to Surat to give them notice of this our resolution and that they acquaint the merchants therewith.¹

On the 27th March the Council record: Received a letter from Mr. Braddyll advising that the Sidis had at last consented to let the ships come hither, but on condition that in case the Surat governor did not comply with their demands and finish their affairs to their satisfaction within twenty days after their arrival at Bombay, they should have free liberty to return with the ships. For our compliance therewith Mr. Braddyll in our behalf gave them an obligation under his hand and seal. He is preparing to sail with the fleet and as the cruizers may be very serviceable, he keeps them to help tow the heavy ships and sends this advice that we may give the proper orders to Surat. The Sidia assured him that the ship's hatchways were all sealed down to prevent pilferage, and he thinks nothing has been landed except some timber which the Sidis very much wanted and its value may be deducted out of the sum to be paid them by the Surat governor.²

On the 28th March: Imported the *Cowan* frigate from Surat with a letter from Mr. Lowther, dated 26th March, owning the receipt of ours of the 22nd. He says that from our endeavouring to get the ships taken by the Sidis returned and his preventing the second Sidi fleet of galivats carrying away the other ships from the Bar, the merchants and people of Surat seem thoroughly satisfied that we have acted a very disinterested part between them and the Sidis. He has communicated our orders to the gentlemen in town and as soon as he has an answer from them will advise us of their proceeding.³

On the 2nd May the President reminded Sidi Sant of the singular services we had from time to time done them. That Underi was still garrisoned by us and that at this juncture our fleet was upon their service at Anjanvel. That by all these means they had incurred a debt to the Company of near Rs. 1,50,000 and that all this was done while there was little hope of their being able to repay the Company in any reasonable

Chapter I.

History.

Mr. Braddyll
sent to Janjira,
1735.

Services to
the Sidi,
1735.

¹ Bom. Gov. Consultation, 16th March 1735, Pub. Diary 8 of 1734-35, 94-96.

² Bom. Gov. Consultation, 27th March 1735, Pub. Diary 8 of 1734-35, 105-106.

³ Bom. Gov. Diary, 28th March 1735, Pub. Diary 8 of 1734-35, 106.

Chapter I.
History.

Grain to Sidis,
1735.

time.¹ As regards the Underi charges the following entry occurs in a Bombay Consultation of the 10th January:² We must remark that though the charge of defending Underi appears on our books to be Rs. 40,785-3-47, the same is no more than we should have been at in our own garrison except for provisions to the soldiers, ammunition expended and guns remaining there, which two latter articles are charged at 50 per cent, and the sum of Rs. 16,275-2-31 for assisting the Sidis wholly arises from stores supplied them at that advance.

On the 23rd August the Bombay Council record: The vessels belonging to the Sidis being about to depart for Rājpurī and their commanding officer having represented that they are bare of provisions and requested us to assist them with a supply we would not willingly disgust them by a refusal at this time as we hope to recover good part of their debt out of the money they may receive from Surat. It is therefore agreed to let them have 50 *mudās* of batty which the warehouse keeper is ordered to deliver to them. The President at the same time acquaints the Board that on receipt of the last advices from Surat he immediately wrote to Sidi Abdul Rahīmān and Sidi Saut to give orders to Surat that the lākh of rupees deposited in our treasury might remain here by which means he is in hopes of recovering that sum for the Company.³

Sidīs at Sion,
1737.

During the next two years (1736-37) their common dread of the Marāthās secured the continuance of friendly relations between the English and the Sidi. One result of these friendly relations was the establishment of a body of Sidi troops at Sion Fort to help the garrison in repelling any Marāthā attack. The inevitable difference of opinion arose regarding the pay due to the Sidi contingent. A Consultation of the 6th May 1737 records the following: The President acquaints the Board that he has several times heard the Sidi people at Sion were uneasy for want of pay. He now lays before the Board a letter from Captain Inchbird at Sion advising him that the Sidi contingent had publicly declared they would not continue without being regularly paid. This being debated, it is observed that we could not well refuse to credit the Sidi's account for the charges of sending and maintaining these people while they continued here. At the same time should we consent to pay them in ready money, it would amount to a very considerable sum as they pretended to ask much greater pay than our own people. While from the unruly disposition of the common people and the little obedience they have shown to the orders of their commanding officers we can expect no service from them but what suits their own inclination and we are apprehensive that they may commit disorders and occasion uneasiness among our own inhabitants. We are in daily expectation of our fleet and when they arrive we hope to be in a condition to defend the island should the Marāthās make any attempts against us. It is therefore agreed that we send the Sidi's people back to Rājpurī. And, that they may not go away disgusted,

¹ Bom. Gov. Consultation, 2nd May 1735, Pub. Diary 8 of 1734-35, 127-128.

² Bom. Gov. Consultation, 10th January 1735, Pub. Diary 8 of 1734-35, 39.

³ Bom. Gov. Consultation, 23rd August 1735, Pub. Diary 8 of 1734-35, 180.

that we give each of them one month's pay according to the rates allowed our own sepoys and Rs. 100 each to the two chief officers.¹

Meanwhile Angria's hostility continued to cause uneasiness. A Consultation of the 4th April 1737 records: 'The President acquaints the Board that yesterday (3rd April 1737) he received a letter from Sidi Balal, the commanding officer at Underi, wherein he says he has certain advice that Sambhaji Angria was preparing to invade Underi with seven grabs and thirty galivats, and if his advice was true they might be expected about this time. Whereupon the President immediately gave notice to Captain Williamson to put his ship in a proper posture and the said Captain now presents the following letter to the Board: Hearing that your Honour has received certain advice that Angria's fleet is expected here every day and that your Honour has some thoughts of sending the *Decker* out with what other force you can make to frustrate his designs, this is to acquaint your Honour that now I am ready with the said ship to obey your Honour's commands. But I hope you will consider that the said ship is sent out as a ship for trade in the Honourable Company's service. She is by Charter Party obliged to defend herself against any ships or vessels that shall attack or molest her in her said voyage; but I do not apprehend she is to be fitted out as a man-of-war to seek an enemy without some security to the owners to make good what damages may thereby accrue either to the ship furniture or stores. This I hope your Honour will consider of; and as you have a precedent of the *Fordwich* at Bengal, I hope the owners may have the same security which will oblige me very readily to obey your commands.'²

On the above letter from Captain Williamson, it is observed that by the Charter Party the Company are entitled to the use of the ship both in trade and warfare, and we could produce instances to prove that the same has been practised and never before objected to. Wherefore we cannot consent to what the Captain desires. Yet as it is reasonable that the Honourable Company should be at the charge of what ammunition may be expended on this occasion, it is agreed that in answer to the Captain's letter the Secretary signify the same in writing, leaving any damage the ship may receive to be adjusted between the Honourable Company and the owners in England. As we have not vessels of the Honourable Company at present able to cope with such a fleet as it is reported the enemy designs to send, the President on this occasion offers the ships *Carolina* and *Pame* belonging to himself and others to be employed as shall be found necessary, the Honourable Company putting on board such stores and ammunition as may be wanted and making good any damage either of the ships may receive. This being so reasonable the Board unanimously accept the offer.³

The same Consultation (4th April 1737) continues: As we hourly expect the *Prince of Wales* galley from Surat, ordered that the ships

Chapter I. History.

Sambhaji
Angria's Designs
on Underi,
1737.

¹ Bom. Gov. Consultation, 5th May 1737, Pub. Diary 10 of 1736-37, 114-115.

² Bom. Gov. Consultation, and Captain Williamson to Govt., 4th April 1737, Pub. Diary 10 of 1736-37, 85-86. Forrest's Home Series, II. 70-71.

³ Bom. Consultation, 4th April 1737, Pub. Diary 10 of 1736-37, 86. Forrest's Home Series, II. 71.

Chapter I.

History.

Sambhaji
Angria's Designs
on Underi,
1737.

proceed as soon as possible without the mouth of the harbour. If they discover the enemy's fleet, that they immediately attack them to prevent their landing any force upon Underi; and should the *Prince of Wales* galley appear and the enemy stand towards her, that our ships make the best of their way to her relief. Ordered that the *Prince of Wales* galley likewise join them and that they lie near to the mouth of the harbour to observe such signals as shall be made from the Fort.¹

The rumour of Sambhaji's invasion seems to have been false. Four days later (8th April) the Council write: Having reason to believe that the report of Sambhaji Angria's design to come to the northward with his fleet is without foundation, it is agreed that the *Decker* be ordered to return into port as it is now time to get her in readiness to prosecute her intended voyage.²

Shahu Raja's
intended Attack,
1737.

With the close of the rains Sambhaji and Manaji Angria who had made up their quarrels again became troublesome. On the 26th August the President acquaints the Board that two days ago (24th August) he received intelligence that the Shahu Raja had got together a body of 20,000 foot and 50,000 horse. That 20,000 of the horse were designed against Goa, and as many against Daman, and that with the remainder of the force they were resolved to attack Bombay. The *putamars* who arrived last night report that they were detained three days at Thana during which time 5000 men came to that place. Resolved whether this intelligence prove true or not, it is our duty to be in constant readiness to defend ourselves. It is therefore directed that strict orders be given to the commanders of the several outposts to keep a careful watch in their respective posts to prevent the enemy getting upon the island by a surprise.³

On the 1st September the President acquaints the Board with the substance of a letter received two days before from the Sidi officer at Underi advising that Sambhaji Angria had fitted and sent out part of his fleet to intercept the vessels expected from Mokha. That on receipt of this notice he had desired Commodore Massey to get his ship in readiness and had ordered two of the cruizers to be also got ready which would be done by to-morrow night (2nd September), and he now desires the opinion of the Board on this occasion. A messenger who arrived this day from Goa likewise informs the President that he put into Oheria in his passage hither where there lay only four grabs though as we are told Sambhaji has not less than 18. The Consultation proceeds: The *Victoria* from Mokha is indeed this instant arrived. But the *King George* and the ship laden with coffee do not yet appear and the *Heathcote* also from England is daily expected. In these circumstances as our vessels are nearly in readiness we think we should be inexcusable not to send them out whether the report proves true or not. For if by neglecting so to do any accident should happen we should justly incur the censure of our Honourable Masters. It is therefore agreed that the *Wilmington*, *Britannia*, and *Princess Carolina* be sent out as soon as they are ready to cruise the latitude of

¹ Bom. Gov. Consultation, 4th April 1737, Pub. Diary 10 of 1736-37, 86.

² Bom. Gov. Consultation, 8th April 1737, Pub. Diary 10 of 1736-37, 92.

³ Bom. Gov. Consultation, 26th August 1737, Pub. Diary 10 of 1736-37, 197.

about 18½ and about 40 to 50 fathom water which is in the tract that vessels from Mokha generally come, and near the place where the enemy's vessels may be expected to cruize should the report of their being gone out prove true.¹

On the 19th September 1737 a Consultation records: As the monsoon seems now broken, the President recommends to the consideration of the Board in what manner to employ our fleet the ensuing season so as to prevent the enemy doing mischief and provide for the safety of the island. We are convinced of the necessity of blocking Angria in his ports, or it will be impossible for any of the trading ships or vessels to go up and down the coast. And as Angria's fleet have often endeavoured to push out while our vessels have been lying before his ports, we apprehend the *Wilmington* will not be of so much service in that respect as our own cruisers, as she cannot go so near in shore nor should they attempt to push it can she follow the enemy so close, not sailing so well as our vessels. The *Britannia*, *King George*, and *Prince of Wales* galleys will be in readiness for this service to go down with the *Mountague*. The *Victoria Rose* and *Princess Caroline* can relieve them by the time their provisions may be expended. Not to weaken ourselves too much by the detachments to be sent on board our fleet, the soldiers who shall go in the *Britannia* and the two galleys may be put on board the other cruisers who relieve them. It is therefore agreed that the said three vessels, the *Britannia*, *King George*, and *Prince of Wales* galleys, be sent to lie off the enemy's ports and watch the motions of his fleet, as we judge them of sufficient strength to cope with any force he can put to sea.²

Greatly as the spread of Marátha power disquieted the guardians of Bombay their position was one almost of safety compared with that of the Portuguese, who, except to the courage and devotion of their General of the North, had little to trust in opposing the flood tide of Marátha success which, unchecked, they knew must destroy all trace of their long-established power. To supplement the shortcomings of their own preparations they could look nowhere except to the vigorous foresight of their former rival Bombay.

The 28th March 1737 the President acquaints the Board that he had desired this meeting to consider what steps are proper to be taken by us on the progress made by the Maráthas in their invasion of the island of Salsette. He informs the Board that last Friday he received a letter from the General of the North wherein he writes he has advice of Marátha designs to invade his territories but he does not seem under any concern thereat, as he says he had prepared for their reception so far as in reason he ought or could do. But yesterday he received another letter from the said General advising that he was then under arms and that the enemy were come over the river of Thána, which he supposed would be sufficient to induce him (the President) immediately to send him what succours he could spare, consistent with the friendship and alliance between the two nations. Whereeto the President answered that he was very sorry for the unhappy situation of their affairs

Chapter I. History.

Angria
Blockaded,
1737.

Marátha Design
on Thána,
1737.

¹ Bom. Gov. Consultation, 1st Sept. 1737, Pub. Diary 10 of 1736-37, 209.

² Bom. Gov. Consultation, 19th Sept. 1737, Pub. Diary 10 of 1736-37, 227-228.

Chapter I.

History.

Maráthá Designs
on Thána,
1737.

and the more so since it was not in his power to give them assistance. For besides the application coming too late (the enemy having passed the river), all our spare force is absent from the island on board our fleet and at Tellicherry. Several people come from Sálsette this morning confirm the loss of Thána, and that the General of the North was retired from thence. Advice is just now received from Captain Douglas Commander of Máhim fort that the Maráthás are come within sight of Bándra, and this morning one of the Padres came over to request us to send assistance to defend the convent which is fortified with two bastions. The President farther acquaints the Board that upon the first notice of the Maráthás' success, he ordered reinforcements to be sent to the several out-forts, with orders to be upon their guard against any attempts the Maráthás might make upon them, and he now desires the opinion of the Board in what manner to proceed. Taking this into consideration we are not to doubt, if the Maráthás fix themselves upon Sálsette, but they will prove very troublesome neighbours and be encouraged to make attempts upon this island. At least (as we can never trust them) that will oblige us to be at a constant additional expense in keeping double guards in the several out-forts fronting Sálsette. The Board being of opinion that if by our sending assistance to the convent at Bándra which lies within gunshot of Máhim fort, we can defend the place from the Maráthás, it will give the Portuguese some little spirit and prevent for the present the molestation the Maráthás may be inclined to give us. It is therefore agreed that we send them an officer and 50 men if the place is found tenable, provided the Padre Superior will engage under his hand that the expense we may be at shall be reimbursed, and make over the convent with the lands appertaining thereto for our security. Directed that the necessary preparations be made and the proper orders issued with the utmost expedition.¹

Measures for
the Safety of
Bombay,
1737.

Two days later, the 30th March 1737, the President observes to the Board that as the Maráthás are become masters of the whole island of Sálsette except the church at Bándra and the small fort at Varsova (Vesáva), and as we have little reason to doubt but such an easy conquest will encourage them to make some attempts upon this island, it behoves us to think of putting our garrisons in a proper posture of defence, and as between Máhim and Suri three or four places in the river, that parts this island from Sálsette, are fordable at low water and but ill provided against an attack, the securing them ought to be first thought of. The President therefore proposes to the Board to raise breast-works opposite to each of those passes that can be commanded from the shore, and that the grab taken from Angria be mounted with guns, and that a flat boat belonging to the Honourable Company be fitted up and likewise mounted with guns to lie as near as possible to such of the passes as are not commanded from the shore, and the President offers the *Fume* frigate now in the road belonging to himself to be employed on this occasion as she may be wanted. These preparations being so absolutely necessary for the safety of the island we must agree to them, though the same may be attended with some expense. Further the Board are sensible that the number of men at present in our pay is far short of what would be

¹ Bom. Gov. Consultation, 28th March 1737, Pub. Diary 10 of 1736-37, 70-71. Forrester's Home Series, II. 68-69.

wanted for the defence of the island, should it be attacked. And as the safety of the island does in a great measure depend upon preventing an enemy's landing, the Board are unanimously of opinion that we ought to increase the number of our fighting men and put our forts and garrisons in a condition of making the best defence possible. It is accordingly agreed that we raise 400 or 500 sepoy with all convenient speed, that the necessary repairs be given to the several forts upon the island, and that they be furnished with everything that shall be judged necessary for their defence, and that strict orders be given to the several commanding officers to be watchful in their posts to prevent a surprise.

The President then observes that our cruizers are ordered to touch at Goa in their return from Tellicherry and to wait for the *Prince of Wales* galley, who we proposed to send thither to join them and bring up arrack for the service of the island. It is now thought convenient to alter this resolution, as the cruizers waiting any time at Goa might be of very bad consequence, and as we know not what occasion we may have for them, and as we suppose the gentlemen at Tellicherry have concluded a peace with the Kánaris, we hope they will be able to spare some of the people from their garrison. It is therefore agreed to despatch a boat instantly to call at Goa, and there lodge orders for our vessels making the best of their way hither, and that then she proceed to Tellicherry with our directions to the gentlemen (in case the vessels should not have left that port) to send up in company with them such of the galivats and as many men as they can possibly spare. But should the cruizers be sailed, that they send up the galivats with as many men as they can take in. And debating whether it would not be proper on this occasion to detain the *Decker*, it is observed that though her men at this juncture might be of great service to us, yet as the keeping her till it is too late to touch upon the coast would upset our Honourable Masters' scheme in sending her this roundabout voyage, we are very unwilling to do it. But it is agreed that we do not despatch her till the 10th or 12th of next month (April 1737), when we shall be able to judge whether we shall be in such absolute want of her men as to detain the ship longer. It is likewise observed that the *Hallifax* is expected every moment to arrive at Surat and the detaining that ship till July or August will be attended with less inconvenience or detriment, as we do not apprehend that there will be any great difference in the price of cotton in the Bay between May and September. Therefore it is agreed that we direct the gentlemen at Surat to order the Commander to call at this port in his passage to Bengal, that if it shall be found necessary we may detain the ship here.¹

The 4th April 1737 the President communicates to the Board the substance of sundry letters he had received from the General of the North and the Commanders of other forts in the hands of the Portuguese, regarding assistance of men and ammunition, all of which he had answered to the following effect: That the enemy being so near our own doors we are obliged to provide for our safety, and that we have not

Chapter I. History.

Measures for
the Safety of
Bombay,
1737.

¹ Bom Gov. Consultation, 30th March 1737, Pub. Diary 10 of 1736-37, 76-77. Forrest's Home Series, II, 69-70.

Chapter I. History.

Surat attempts
to help
Bombay,
1737.

more men and ammunition than will be necessary for our defence in case we should be attacked. Otherwise we should have readily assisted them as far as we could spare and they could pay for. This the Board approves.¹

The Chief and Factors at Surat in a letter of 10th April 1737, express their concern at our situation occasioned by the Maráthás, and shall endeavour to enlist 200 sepoy for the service of the island.² Ordered that the gentlemen at Surat enlist on the best terms they can 100 or 150 good sepoy and that they send them down hither with such cattle and grain as they can procure and get conveyances for before the rains, having reason to believe we shall be in want of the latter articles.³

Mediation
between
Portuguese
and
Maráthás,
1737.

The 27th April 1737 the President communicates to the Board the substance of a letter which in answer to one from himself he had received since our last meeting from Chinnáji, the commanding officer of the Maráthás at Thána. In this Chinnáji seems to consent to accept of the President's mediation between the Portuguese and the Maráthás provided he will send a person with his proposals. In answer whereto the President wrote him that he should be very glad to act as mediator to accommodate matters between them and the Portuguese, but as he could not tell what terms either the Portuguese or Maráthás would insist on, he apprehended it would be more proper for Chinnáji to send a person with his demands hither, and he would signify the same to the General of the North that he might also authorize one to treat on his part when the President promised to use his good offices for bringing about a reconciliation. This answer the Board approves.⁴

Portuguese
efforts against
Maráthás,
1737.

At the same Consultation (27th April) the President acquaints the Board that he has received a letter from the Viceroy of Goa, advising him that he is preparing to send up his fleet with succours for regaining their territories from the Maráthás, the vessels being provided with provisions and ammunition for their own expense. But that he could not send up any powder for Bassein, which he depended upon the President to furnish as well as such other stores and ammunition as should be wanted. The President also last night received letters from Bassein requesting him to supply them with 150 barrels of gunpowder, whereto he had drawn up an answer acquainting them that we have not more powder in store than will be sufficient for our own occasions, and therefore cannot comply with their request. It is observed they had already 160 barrels, and we have not more than about 800 in store. If we comply with their daily demands of 10 or 20 barrels at a time, we shall drain ourselves, and never be free from their importunities. The President's answer to the above letter is therefore approved.⁵

What part
should Bombay
take,
1737.

The same Consultation continues (27th April 1737): The President recommends to the Board to take into consideration what part it will be proper for us to act in the present juncture though it will not be prudent to come to a final resolution till we know for

¹ Bom. Gov. Consultation, 4th April 1737, Pub. Diary 10 of 1736-37, 85. Forrest's Home Series, II. 70.

² Bom. Gov. Diary, 12th April 1737, Pub. Diary 10 of 1736-37, 96.

³ Bom. Gov. Consultation, 15th April 1737, Pub. Diary 10 of 1736-37, 93.

⁴ Bom. Gov. Consultation, 27th April 1737, Pub. Diary 10 of 1736-37, 102.

⁵ Bom. Gov. Consultation, 27th April 1737, Pub. Diary 10 of 1736-37, 102-103.

certain what force the Portuguese can raise. An idle proposal has been made for permitting the Maráthás to conquer Salsette and privately treat with them for delivering it to us. Besides the perfidy of such an action in regard to the Portuguese and the mischiefs it might bring upon our Honourable Masters from that nation, so many objections and difficulties occur against so treacherous a scheme that we can by no means think of undertaking it, were we even secure of the event. It is then debated how far it may be prudent to assist the Portuguese. In this regard it is observed that, so long as the Maráthás continue on Salsette, we shall be put to an extraordinary expense in maintaining an additional force for the security of the island. We shall be obliged to keep the outposts well guarded to prevent a sudden invasion of which we should otherwise be continually apprehensive as that island lies so contiguous to this, and there being so many passages fordable at low water. If therefore the Portuguese can raise such a force that with our assistance the driving the Maráthás from Salsette may be attempted with hopes of success it will behove us to join with the Portuguese. On the other hand should it be judged that the Maráthás are too powerful for us both, we must be content to sit quiet under a heavy expense, as there will be no dependence to be had on the faith of the Maráthás, even should they engage to live on the strictest terms of friendship with us; but our safety will (as already observed) depend on our being constantly prepared to frustrate their attempts.¹

The next day (April 28th) the President acquaints the Board that he has desired this meeting to communicate to them the substance of a message he received this morning by a subhedár from the Portuguese Captain in the fort of Sabage called Bella Flor,² importing that he is in the utmost distress for want of water and ammunition, and that unless we send him succours before night he shall be obliged to deliver up the place to the enemy. The said subhedár reports that there are 500 of the enemy's men very near the fort and about 4000 at some further distance. The President desires the opinion of the Board what resolution it will be proper to take on the present occasion. It is observed that even were it in our power to send the necessary supplies for relieving the said fort, the time given is too short for us to make the necessary preparations. Further, as the enemy are so near as to have immediate notice of our undertaking such an expedition, we should expose the island to their attempts, as we cannot pretend to send any succours without taking off the people stationed to guard the passes from Salsette to this island. Even with the best force we might send the enterprize would be extremely hazardous, considering how closely the fort is blocked up and the number of the enemy. We are sensible that by this fort falling into the hands of the Maráthás, they will become masters of a large tract of land and may the more easily get the entire possession of one side of this bay (when they will have it in their power to distress this island) which we should be glad to prevent. But the short space of time, the danger our own island would be exposed to while our forces were absent, and the

Chapter I.

History.

What part should
Bombay take,
1737.

Risk of aiding
the Portuguese,
1737.

¹ Bom. Gov. Consultation, 27th April 1737, Pub. Diary 10 of 1736-37, 103.

² Shabaz or Belápur, about six miles west of Panvel. See Bombay Gazetteer, Thána, XIII, 491 and XIV, 43-44.

Chapter 1.
History.

Risk of aiding
the Portuguese,
1737.

hazard of the attempt to relieve the place with the small number of men in comparison with the enemy's force, are too weighty objections against the undertaking. The Captain Commandant being called and entirely concurring with us in this opinion, it is resolved to decline the attempt.¹

Next morning (29th April 1737) came news that the fort of Salage was yesterday delivered up to the Maráthás, the garrison being permitted to march out under arms with their baggage.²

Troops from
Goa,
1737.

A week later (the 4th May 1737) a Portuguese frigate arrived from Goa with about 300 soldiers and some ammunition to defend their northern territories from the Maráthás.³

Next day (the 5th May 1737) the President acquaints the Board that having had a long conference with Pedro de Mello, commandant of the forces sent from Goa by the Viceroy, he finds the frigate has brought up only 300 men, little ammunition and no spare arms, the Portuguese expecting we should furnish them with everything they might want. Accordingly the said Pedro de Mello had applied to him for men, powder and arms. In reply the President gave him to understand we had no more than sufficient for our own defence and therefore he could not think it consistent with prudence to part with any. At this Pedro de Mello seemed highly disgusted, telling the President the Portuguese nation were not actually obliged to us for any assistance we gave them, since it was as much our interest as theirs to prevent the designs of the Maráthás. However he having been since very pressing for a supply of powder, as their depending upon us had prevented their bringing up a sufficient quantity from Goa, and upon enquiry finding we have about 900 barrels in store besides what has been delivered the gunner and the several out-ports, it is agreed that we let him have as far as 100 barrels.⁴

The 21st May 1737, as all the forces which the Portuguese can possibly have this season from Goa, consist of only 300 men, the debate is resumed what part will be most prudent for us to act in regard to the Maráthás. The Board is unanimous that, if our force joined with the Portuguese, should be judged capable of withstanding the Maráthás or sufficient to regain the island of Salsette, our coming to hostilities with the Maráthás would be more eligible than our continuing in our present state. Because if the Maráthás were removed from Salsette, we should be under no apprehensions of danger from them nor be obliged to continue the great additional expense we are now at to secure ourselves against them while they remain upon that island. Still when we consider the great number of men the Maráthás can at any time bring into the field, they appear too powerful for the Portuguese and our united force to stand against, and (according to information we have received) they are too well secured in Thána for us to hope to expect them. Therefore seeing that as we might draw great inconveniences upon ourselves besides a heavy expense by declaring against them, it is resolved not to do it unless a very favourable opportunity offers of effecting

¹ Bom. Gov. Consultation, 28th April 1737, Pub. Diary 10 of 1736-37, 110-111.

² Bom. Gov. Diary, 29th April 1737, Pub. Diary 10 of 1736-37, 111.

³ Bom. Gov. Diary, 4th May 1737, Pub. Diary 10 of 1736-37, 113.

⁴ Bom. Gov. Consultation, 5th May 1737, Pub. Diary 10 of 1736-37, 115.

something considerable against them. We do not want pretences for breaking with them, as they have not only refused to permit provisions being brought to this island from any part of their country, but have actually seized and detained several boats belonging to this island, some of whom were sent with money to procure batty from other parts.

A proposal is then made for sending over a person to Chinnáji, the commanding officer of the Maráthás at Thána, to demand the restitution of the boats they have taken and the free trade of the rivers as formerly; to desire to know how far he is resolved to proceed against the Portuguese, whether to make an entire conquest of their country, if not, what terms he will accept from them and to hint to Chinnáji that according to his answer we shall frame our future conduct. As we think no ill consequences can attend this step, it is unanimously agreed to and debating whether to send an Englishman or a native, we think the former might look like too great a condescension, nor could we depend upon their not detaining him. It is therefore resolved that Rámji Parbhu, a person of capacity and experience, be appointed on this service.¹

Chapter I.
History.

Negotiations
with
Chinnáji,
1737.

The 3rd June 1737 the President acquaints the Board that he has received a letter from Rámji Parbhu at Thána, advising him that he has discoursed with Chinnáji on the points he was ordered; who promised to return the boats that had been taken belonging to this island and to grant us the free trade of the rivers, provided we will undertake to protect them from the molestation of the Portuguese. In answer to which the President had ordered Rámji to represent to Chinnáji that we can by no means enter into such engagement, but that we will risk our own boats, not apprehending that the Portuguese will offer to molest them; that he also hint to Chinnáji that such delays of complying with his promises cannot but give us room to suspect he aims at deceiving us, and that therefore the President insists on his positive answer whereby we should be guided in our future resolutions, which answer the Board approves.²

The same day (3rd June 1737) the Marine Paymaster lays before the Board an account of timber bought at Bassein on the Hon'ble Company's account which was lying at Thána when the Maráthás took that place; and was there seized by them, amounting to Rs. 2093-8-23. Whereupon the President is desired to order Rámji Parbhu to demand the restitution thereof from Chinnáji their commanding officer.³

The same day (3rd June 1737) the President observes to the Board that on the commencement of the present troubles in the Portuguese country, the grab of Angria's taken by our cruizers was stationed to guard one of the passes in the river between this island and Sálsette. It is still thought proper to continue her, for, as there is little room to hope but that the Maráthás will remain on Sálsette, we shall be in want of a vessel to give convoy to the northern trade, as the guarding the passes will employ the greatest part of our galivats. The captors have been

¹ Bom. Gov. Consultation, 21st May 1737, Pub. Diary 10 of 1736-37, 125.

² Bom. Gov. Consultation, 3rd June 1737, Pub. Diary 10 of 1736-37, 130.

³ Bom. Gov. Consultation, 3rd June 1737, Pub. Diary 10 of 1736-37, 129.

Chapter I.

History.

Negotiations
with
Chinnáji,
1737.

brought to consent to part with the said grab on condition she was taken for Rs. 4000, which being so much cheaper than we can propose to build a vessel for and a vessel being absolutely necessary, it is agreed that we take her on the Honourable Company's account at that rate, and directed that the amount be paid out of the treasury.¹

The 10th June 1737 the President acquaints the Board that Rámji Parbhu returned from Thána since our last meeting, and brought with him an order from Chinnáji for restoring the boats and cargoes belonging to this island taken by the Maráthás. Chinnáji also promised that we should be permitted to trade up the rivers as formerly, but desired we would desist from sending boats into the rivers of Thána or Panvel while their disputes with the Portuguese continue, as it will not be safe for them to trust any boats passing up and down those two rivers; that Chinnáji declares he will accept of no terms from the Portuguese, being resolved entirely to conquer their country; but that it is his inclination to preserve a strict friendship with us. Rámji Purbhu having been at the expense of Rs. 74 for travelling charges and during his continuance at Thána, directed that the same be paid him out of the treasury.²

Lead-export
prohibited,
1737.

The 4th July the President observes to the Board that at the commencement of the present troubles between the Portuguese and the Maráthás, a stop was put to the exportation of all warlike stores from this island, to prevent the Maráthás getting the same into their hands, in which prohibition lead was included. As it will be necessary to continue the prohibition during these commotions we are assured that the lead lying on our hands will not fetch more than Rs. 7 per *paka man*, and, from the course of the market in Bengal having reason to believe it will sell for more there, and our Hon. Masters in the 48th paragraph of their commands of the 2nd July 1736 received by the *Decker*, in such case recommending to us sending it thither, it is unanimously agreed that after reserving what shall be judged sufficient for the service of the island, the remainder be shipped on board the *Grafton*.³

What part is
Bombay to take,
1737.

The 8th July 1737 the President acquaints the gentlemen that the reason of desiring this meeting is to take into consideration what part is proper for us to act in the present state of the island. At the same time he lays before them the following abstract of our forces, military and marine:

BOMBAY FORCES, 1737.				No.	Total.
<i>A: Military</i>	—	2209
1. Europeans (including Officers)	449	
2. Topasses	817	
3. Sepoys	943	
<i>B: Mariners</i>	—	414
1. Europeans (including Officers)	299	
2. At Mokha	115	
Total				...	2623

He then desires the opinion of the gentlemen present whether with the above force and the assistance of three Europe ships it will be prudent

¹ Bom. Gov. Consultation, 3rd June 1737, Pub. Diary 10 of 1736-37, 130.

² Bom. Gov. Consultation, 10th June 1737, Pub. Diary 10 of 1736-37, 134.

³ Bom. Gov. Consultation, 4th July 1737, Pub. Diary 10 of 1736-37, 148-149.

to undertake any thing against the common enemy Angria by land. If not, whether we can with hopes of success attempt to destroy his grabs in his ports. Observing at the same time that as the Maráthas are so near us it will be necessary to keep such a part of the above force upon the island as shall be thought sufficient to frustrate the attempts they may make against us.

The gentlemen unanimously agree that the safety of the island ought to be first considered. Not one of them is of opinion that with the force we can venture to send any thing can be attempted against Angria by land with hopes of success, as from the best information we have been able to obtain, the enemy has constantly in pay 15,000 or 16,000 men and upon a very short warning can raise 6000 more. As we could not expect to undertake any such expedition without the enemy gaining intelligence of our design, he would have time to make application to Shahu Rájá, who can and in such cases would send a large number of men to his assistance. For these reasons it is thought convenient to lay aside all thoughts of making an expedition by land against the enemy.

The motion, whether the destroying the enemy's grabs in his own ports could not be effected, being next taken into consideration and the opinion of the gentlemen asked thereupon, Captain Walker, Captain Inghird, and some of the commanders of the cruizers who have been in the river of Gheria and are acquainted with the situation of the fort, inform the Board that when the enemy's grabs are in that river, they are constantly hauled up into a bay quite round the fort which forms a half moon and that they lie close to two lines of guns near the water side and a new tower lately built which entirely commands the river and bay where the grabs lie; that in dark nights there are lights constantly burning upon the river and a careful and strict watch is kept by the enemy. And whatever vessel or boat goes into the river, must pass so close by their fortifications that the said gentlemen apprehend it is not possible for them to do it undiscovered; whence it is believed that the making such an attempt would prove ineffectual, and it is therefore dropped.

The President then recommends to the gentlemen to consider whether with our present force we could make any attempts with reasonable hopes of dislodging the Maráthas from Thána fort, acquainting them that by his latest advices there were 2000 men in the place and more daily returning from before Bassein. Capt. Inghird, who is acquainted with the situation of the place, being asked concerning it, informs the Board that no attack can be made by us upon the main fort without passing by a small fort built in the middle of the river, and three batteries lately raised by Mánáji Angria's people who assisted the Maráthas in their present expedition, and also being exposed to the fire from three other forts that did belong to the Portuguese and are now in the Maráthas' possession. That there are also two strong lines of guns along the water side which must be passed in order to come at the proper landing place. The gentlemen are unanimously of opinion that whatever can be done by us must be by a surprise, as should the Maráthas have the least notice of our design they could immediately draw together such a number of men that we could not venture to attack them with all the force we could

Chapter I.

History.

Should Bombay
attack Angria,
1737.

Should Bombay
attack Thána,
1737.

Chapter I.

History.

Should Bombay
attack Thána,
1737.

spare, and should we even resolve to attempt to surprize Thána fort, we must transport our men in open boats and galivats. As they would have so many difficulties to encounter in being obliged to pass by such a large number of fortifications before they could land, it is reasonable to presume that the loss of men would be greater than we could bear and the success of the enterprise very uncertain. These several objections carry such weight with them that the gentlemen are unanimously of opinion that we ought not in prudence to attempt an undertaking attended with so much hazard and difficulty which it is therefore agreed to decline.¹

The 12th July 1737 the President lays before the Board the proceedings of the council of war held last Friday (8th July 1737), the result of which appears to be the unanimous opinion of all those who were present that with our present force no extraordinary expedition can with hopes of success be undertaken against the common enemy Angria; nor that we shall be able to dislodge the Maráthás from Thána. We therefore judge it unnecessary to put the Hon. Company to the expense of demurrage in detaining any of their ships except the *Wilmington*. It is accordingly agreed that we continue in our resolution to despatch the *Grafton* from Surat Bar to take in a loading of cotton for Bengal, if we find the gentlemen are able to procure it; and that we despatch the *Montague* with the saltpetre and redwood in warehouse as soon as the season will admit of her touching at Telli-cherry to take in her cargo of pepper as we designed.²

Portuguese
application
for Aid,
1737.

The 11th August 1737 the President lays before the Council the following: Memorial of Padre Rodrigo d'Estrada on the part of Don Antonio Cardin Froes, General of the North for the Portuguese, dated Máhim 9th August: Honoured Sir, The Captain General of the forts and territories of the North Don Antonio Cardin Froes has been pleased to appoint me to treat with your Honour of the interests which the two most serene crowns of Great Britain and Portugal have in the expulsion of the Maráthás out of the island of Sálsette.

The Captain General Antonio Cardin Froes in the first place represents to your Honour the good alliance and friendship betwixt the two most serene crowns of Portugal and England in Europe. Consequently there ought to subsist the like in India betwixt the generals of both nations, the better to resist the power of such of their enemies in Asia as would oppress them. To which end His Excellency the Count Viceroy recommended to the said general in strong express terms that he should keep up a good harmony with your Honour and be constantly attentive to the interest of the most serene crown of Great Britain and the advantage of the Honourable Company, as the said general declared personally to your Honour at the visit he made you on his arrival at this port of Bombay in his passage up from Goa. In obedience to this order of his Excellency the Viceroy and conformable to the cordial friendship he has hitherto experienced, with respect and view to give your Honour satisfaction as well as to consult the interests above mentioned, he represents to your Honour and Council the following proposals:

¹ Bombay War Council Consultation, 8th July 1737, Pub. Diary 10 of 1736-37, 164-166.

² Bom. Gov. Consultation, 12th July 1737, Pub. Diary 10 of 1736-37, 160-161.

That whereas the Maráthás are now masters of all the island of Sálsette except Vesáva and the convent of Bándra which your Honour has succoured with men and ammunition at the expense of the Portuguese; that this succour should have been given free of cost to the Portuguese on account of the danger of the neighbourhood of the Maráthás, who, having in their minds the great wealth supposed to be in Bombay, have surprised Sálsette, whilst their ultimate point of view is Bombay itself; and as Thána the principal fort of the island of Sálsette is actually now garrisoned with 2000 men, their troops being divided into several bodies, some employed in the siege of Bassein and others of their principal leaders being returned up to their country; and the General Cardin not having a sufficient number of troops for the garrison of the places besieged by the enemy and likewise at the same time to attack Thána and drive out the enemy, implores the succour of your Honour for the joint attacking Thána on both sides of the river, and reducing the forts. This will not be difficult to your Honour after being strengthened with the arrival of three Europe ships, and with these your forces joined to ours, may be effectuated the expulsion of these Maráthás from the island of Sálsette, from which must result to both nations the public benefit of getting rid of so powerful an enemy and chastising their pernicious pride. This must be a great service to both their Majesties and a great obligation laid on the serene King of Portugal, whose interest it is to regain possession of the island of Sálsette, besides which his most serene British Majesty will reap the benefit of Bombay being furnished with provisions which cannot be expected from the present bad neighbourhood.

And as the said General Antonio Cardin Froes has notice that your Honour designs an expedition against Sambháji Angria, he promises that after the recovery of Thána he will assist your Honour with a body of troops for a certain time to be agreed upon betwixt your Honour and the said General. If it shall be necessary he will come to Bándra, and from thence pass over to Máhim to conclude an affair of so great importance to both nations. And conformable to the powers granted him by his Excellency the Viceroy, he promises to fulfil all the terms of such a treaty notwithstanding the appearances of peace betwixt our Government and the said Sambháji which having been negotiated by this very gentleman Antonio Cardin, was agreed to by the Viceroy purely with the intention to procure the success of certain negotiations your Honour had set on foot in behalf of the Honourable Company with the said Sambháji Angria.

Further, the said General of the North represents the great necessity there is for your Honour's assisting him in this intended expedition with all possible despatch before the beginning of the month of September. Because the delay of the said succours may be very prejudicial, as without doubt the Maráthás would come down with fresh troops and more forces, which will render the enterprise more hazardous. And whereas it is reported that some of the English gentlemen have expressed their opinion that the English forces could assist the Portuguese only in case the latter had got power on foot equal to cope with and drive out the enemy, it is submitted to your Honour and Council for their consideration whether it will not be of the most ruinous consequence to both nations

Chapter I. History.

Portuguese
application
for Aid,
1737.

Chapter I.
History.

Portuguese
application
for Aid,
1737.

if all their forces be not forthwith joined and employed to expel the enemy out of Sálsette, and at the same time to hinder and command the passes that no fresh troops may be introduced. Besides all these arguments drawn from the interest and convenience of both the crowns as well as the friendship and alliance betwixt the English and Portuguese nations, the General offers to your Honours copy of two letters of his most serene Majesty the King Dom Affonso VI. of Portugal written to the Viceroy of India, Antonio d'Mello e Castro, plainly proving our right to demand succours of his most serene British Majesty in India, which letters were written at the time that Bombay was delivered up to the crown of England, and are incorporated in the Act of surrender of the said island.

These, Sir, are the reasons which I am ordered to represent to your Honour by the General of the North who entreats your succours for the expulsion of our enemies the Maráthas from the island of Sálsette. As the matter is of so great weight I hope your Honour will determine upon it with all possible despatch that I may return to Bassein with your Honour's answer.¹

The Consultation continues: After debate Padre Manoel Rodrigo d'Estrado being called in, delivers to the President the substance of the instructions given him by the General of the North, whereto are annexed the copies of two paragraphs of letters from his Portuguese Majesty concerning the surrender of this island to the English from which he infers the Portuguese can claim a right to our assistance in all their difficulties. The Padre uses many arguments to induce us to join with the Portuguese in this undertaking; that there would be little doubt of success with our united force; how great credit our nation would gain thereby and the returns of service we might on any occasion so justly claim from the Portuguese; and he assures us that the General will in the King's name oblige himself to make good the expense we shall be at. Being asked what force the General of the North can send on this expedition, he says about 200 Europeans and 1000 natives, and that he expects from us about 1500 men. The Padre then withdrew.

Taking the above into consideration we find that from the present disposition of our military we cannot possibly spare above 120 Europeans, 100 topasses, 220 sepoy, being in all 440 men, unless we draw off the people stationed to guard the several passes, and trust to our militia to defend them which would by no means be prudent. Further when our cruizers are sent out they will take away nearly the above number of Europeans for their detachment; so that the assistance we could venture to give the Portuguese would be considerably lessened. If indeed our united force is judged sufficient to attack the enemy with hopes of success, we ought undoubtedly to join in the undertaking. Since, when the enemy are dislodged from thence, we shall not be under the necessity of putting the Honourable Company to the great expense of keeping so many men in pay for the defence of the island as we are now obliged to do. But, though we are not well enough acquainted with

¹ Pub. Diary 10 of 1736-37, 184-186.

the strength and situation of Thána to judge exactly what force would be requisite to render the proposed undertaking successful, yet as by the best intelligence we can get the Maráthás have not less than 2000 or 3000 men constantly in the place, it would in our opinion be too hazardous to make an attempt without double that number, especially since the Portuguese and we are able to furnish so small a number of Europeans. The river of Thána we are told is too shoal at low water for even our galivats to float, much less any vessels fit to carry mortars or cohorns upon the service of which we should so much depend for the reduction of that fort that we esteem it almost impracticable without them. Besides upon notice of our design (which it would be impossible to conceal from the enemy) they could reinforce the place in a few hours with a considerable number of men from before Bassein and the other parts of the island of Sálsette. We are also to consider the great expense our Honourable Masters are at to supply us with European soldiers, every man they send standing them in between 16 and 20 pounds sterling (including those who die before their arrival here); and should we be repulsed with any considerable loss, this island would be greatly weakened and exposed, and it would be two or three years before we could be recruited with the like number of Europeans.

It is also to be apprehended that upon the enemy knowing that a great part of our strength was sent off the island against Thána, they might in the meantime attempt to invade us, as they can at a very short warning draw a considerable body of men together and in one day march them to the side of the river between this and Sálsette. And should they force a passage over, the mischief and ravages they might commit are not to be described, and we should find it a most difficult if not impracticable task to beat them off the island again. Besides it is to be feared the Maráthás either have or will attempt the same practices with our subjects as they have done too successfully with others, the endeavouring to corrupt them with large bribes and larger promises of future advantages.

Admitting we were to join with the Portuguese, it would become necessary to consider how and when the charges we have and may be at on their account will be reimbursed. Their paying and maintaining our people while employed on their service is the least we could demand. Strictly they ought to make us satisfaction for the extraordinary expense we have already been put to in providing for the safety of our island, since it was occasioned entirely by the ill conduct and neglect of the late General of the North. But even were they to engage to comply with all our demands on this head, we are sensible (their poverty is such in India) that it would not be in their power. We might justly demand a free passage by Thána should the Portuguese regain that fort with our assistance. In their present distress it is probable they would promise it, yet we much doubt their performance afterwards as the late Viceroy gave it under his hand, it was not in his power to grant that favour without particular orders from the Court of Portugal. And if it could not be obtained in consideration of our having defended the place for them at our own charge, we think there is little hopes they would grant it when we insist on their engaging to make good the expense we shall be at before we agree to send our assistance. Nor can

Chapter I.

History.

Portuguese
application
for Aid,
1737.

Chapter I. History.

Portuguese
and Maráthás,
1737.

we help observing that in his instructions to the Padre the only equivalent the General of the North proposes to be given for the succours we may afford him on this occasion is that he will engage (notwithstanding the peace between the Portuguese and Sambháji Angria) the Viceroy will afterwards assist us against that pirate, which, not to mention the little service they could do us, is a condition the Viceroy might not think himself obliged to perform.

The strict alliance between our respective sovereigns in Europe and the natural interest of this island render us heartily inclined to assist the Portuguese for regaining their territories. Still we cannot help remarking that their affairs in India are in a very declining if not desperate and irretrievable condition. The President assures the Board that from the letters he has received from the Viceroy, and the late and present Generals of the North, as well as from the frequent discourse he has held with many of the gentlemen and Padres of that nation, it seems as if they themselves had little hopes of doing anything but depend upon us to fight their battles. We are therefore very apprehensive that if we were once engaged in the war they would afterwards take very little upon themselves but saddle us with the burthen of the whole charge and trouble. If we declare openly against the Maráthás, the trade of the island would be entirely stopped and our Honourable Masters be great sufferers in the loss of the customs, and we be driven to great straits for provisions for our inhabitants and other stores and necessities greatly wanted for the service of the island and which are furnished from the Maráthás' country. Another objection that occurs against joining with the Portuguese on the present occasion is that some years ago when we acted in conjunction against Kánhoji Angria, though our force was four times greater than what we can now raise and strengthened with the assistance of the squadron of men-of-war under the command of Commodore Matthews, we were not able to effect anything, and therefore we cannot hope for better success at present.

The foregoing reasons and objections being duly weighed, the Board is unanimous in opinion that we cannot join with the Portuguese in the present undertaking with any hopes of success against the enemy, but that we should involve ourselves in numberless difficulties and bring on an excessive expense. It is therefore unanimously agreed to decline it, and the President is desired to write a letter in answer to the General of the North drawn from the substance of the foregoing resolutions.¹

Angria intercepts
Bombay Boats,
1737.

Two months later (11th October 1737) the President acquaints the Board that having received advice that 15 of Sambháji's galivats and 14 of Mánáji's were cruising to the northward and had intercepted some boats bound to this island with grain, and being apprehensive they would prevent our receiving the expected supplies, he had ordered the *Britannia* frigate to cruise between Daman and Bassein in order to protect the vessels bound hither. He now communicates to the Board his instructions to the commander which are approved.²

Grain to Underi,
1738.

The 10th April 1738 the President acquaints the Board that two days ago he received a letter by two persons sent from the Sidi's

¹ Bom. Gov. Consultation, 11th Aug. 1737, Pub. Diary 10 of 1736-37, 180-183.

² Bom. Gov. Consultation, 11th Oct. 1737, Pub. Diary 10 of 1736-37, 243.

commanding officer at Underi earnestly requesting us to supply that place with batty for the rains, as otherwise they cannot possibly maintain it. The Board debating thereupon it is observed that we have not grain to spare and our Honourable Masters' orders are very positive against making any further loans to the country governments. We hope the Sidis' necessities for grain may not be so pressing as they set forth. Should they be obliged for want thereof to quit the place, we shall, by withdrawing the guns and stores from thence, in some degree lessen their debt. We are sensible that ill consequences will attend this island falling into other hands, yet for the reasons before given we do not think it prudent at present to comply with the Sidi's demand and the President is desired to write the proper answer.¹

Three weeks later (29th April) the President acquaints the Board that (since our refusing them rice) the Sidis had frequently represented to him that unless we supply the garrison of Underi, the place must inevitably fall into Mánáji's hands. He has already been tampering with their people, some of whom had deserted to him and assured him that the rest would deliver up the fort if he furnish them with provisions. The President gave the reply that they could not be supplied unless they could give security for the payment of what we should let them have. This their necessities for provisions have at length obliged them to do. They now offered two of our inhabitants Daudji Noequa Sunker (Nágáshankar) and Saibu Pándia, persons of some credit and substance, to be bound for them. The Board considering the inconveniences that would attend Underi falling into Mánáji's hands, agree to let the Sidis have 1000 bags of Bengal rice at the rate it is charged to us, on the abovesaid persons giving their bond for payment of the amount.²

The 22nd May 1738 the President acquaints the Board that he has received two letters from the Viceroy of Goa wherein he seems willing to come to terms of peace with the Maráthás and desired the President's mediation for that purpose, acquainting him that he had given the necessary orders and full powers for concluding the same to the General of the North, which letters the President immediately forwarded. We shall be extremely pleased if an accommodation can be brought about; but we presume it will be a difficult task as the Maráthás will no doubt insist on keeping Salsette, and it must be with the greatest reluctance if ever the Portuguese consent to relinquish it, as it is the opinion of the most capable persons among them that the said island is so very necessary for supplying their other places with grain that without it they could not long maintain their other possessions.³

The 25th August 1738 the President acquaints the Board that he has just received letters from the General of the North and Kondáji Mánkar, the commanding officer of the Maráthás at Thína, advising that they had agreed to send persons hither with power to treat of an accommodation between the two States. The President will accordingly use his best endeavours for concluding a peace. Still it is much to be feared

Chapter I. History.

Grain to
Underi,
1738.

Portuguese
anxious for
Peace,
1738.

English
Mediation,
1738.

¹ Bom. Gov. Consultation, 10th April 1738, Pub. Diary 11 of 1737-38, 88.

² Bom. Gov. Consultation, 29th April 1738, Pub. Diary 11 of 1737-38, 103 - 104.

³ Bom. Gov. Consultation, 22nd May 1738, Pub. Diary 11 of 1737-38, 125.

Chapter I.
History.

English
Mediation,
1738.

Mánáji's
Aggressions,
1738.

British
Prisoners,
1738.

that the demands of the Maráthás will be of such a nature that the Portuguese will not submit to them.¹

A month later, 25th September 1738, apparently in reply to a proposed general attack on Angria, the Council note: We cannot with a prospect of success undertake anything against the common enemy more than to prevent his making any depredations. Considering the notorious treachery of the Maráthás it would be highly imprudent to leave the island defenceless, as we must do if we engage in anything of consequence with our whole fleet against Angria.²

On the 6th October they continue: Mánáji Angria's galivats having a few days ago carried into Kolába a *batela* which we suppose was coming to this island with grain and provisions, it is observed that our suffering such practices will deter the northern traders from venturing hither when they find they run so great a risk. It is therefore agreed that the new prahm and three galivats be ordered to lie at the mouth of the harbour between Kenery and the reef (the Prongs) to protect our own trade and prevent Mánáji giving molestation to the vessels bound hither.³ On the 4th November Sambháji Angria's fleet being in sight and going into Kolába, Captain Balchen of the *Ouslow* was ordered instantly to get his ship in readiness to proceed against the enemy.⁴

About this time Sambháji's position in making terms with the English seems to have been again strengthened by the Sávantas or Málvans' capture of the wrecked crew of the Company's *Anglesea*. On the 9th December the Bombay Council record: It appears to us that the Málvans are far from being desirous to detain our people, but that the Killedár is influenced by Sambháji Angria to write in the manner he has done concerning the grab and prisoners. We therefore think it improper to take any notice of that part of his letter farther than to observe that our people fell into the Málvans' hands by the unfortunate loss of the ship through stress of weather, whereas we took Sambháji Angria's grab and people in open war; therefore that our keeping them is just and ought to be no hindrance to the releasing our people. To give a complaisant answer to the other parts of his letter and to let him know we shall be ready to listen to any offers of peace the Rája has to make on sending up persons with the proper powers after releasing our people. The President is accordingly desired to reply to the Killedár's letter and also to write to Sambháji Rája to the above purport. This we judge more eligible than to make any concession or promises in regard to Angria's prisoners, as we are well assured it would only induce the Málvans to demand higher terms for the release of our people and be attended with the like disadvantage, should they think proper to send persons hither to treat of peace. Agreed that a person be sent with these letters to serve as an interpreter in treating for the release of our people and that the President give a letter of credit on Zacharia's son at Goa to furnish our people with

¹ Bom. Gov. Consultation, 25th August 1738, Pub. Diary 11 of 1737-38, 196-197.

² Bom. Gov. Consultation, 25th September 1738, Pub. Diary 11 of 1737-38, 214.

³ Bom. Gov. Consultation, 6th October 1738, Pub. Diary 11 of 1737-38, 232.

⁴ Bom. Gov. Order of 4th November 1738 to Captain J. Balchen, Commander of the ship *Ouslow*, Sec. Out. Let. Book 3 of 1738-1741, 31.

necessaries for their subsistence should they arrive there. That a letter be also lodged at Goa to the commanding officer of our fleet expected from Tellicherry to take the *Angleseas*' people on board should they be there, otherwise to demand them from the Málvans on their coming off their port, sending a person on shore for that purpose.¹

On the 22nd January 1739 the Bombay Government write to Commodore Bagwell: We have perused your narrative in which you do well to be so particular and full for our clearer notion of your state and procedure. We observe duly your account of the engagement you had with Angria's fleet and doubt not your having used your best endeavours for the destruction of the enemy, and we remark with great pleasure the spirit and resolution of your people both before and in the action. It is likewise very agreeable to us that you have sustained no greater damage in so warm an encounter.²

In the same letter Government further observe: We are the more desirous of your coming up, on account of the notice we have that the Maráthás are in the neighbourhood with a strong army with which we judge they will make a push for the entire reduction of the Portuguese territories when our own will not be exempt from danger. At least we shall be glad to be in the best condition for all events, as at present we have few or no Europeans upon the island. Proceed instantly for Bombay, keeping the shore so as to look into all ports and harbours for the enemy till you are past Suvarndurg when you should spread at proper and convenient distances for the more extensive look-out, yet keeping carefully within reach of each other. On arriving off our harbour you may anchor immediately despatching to us a boat with notice, when we shall give you further orders whether to come in or otherwise as circumstances may require.³

While Angria's aggressions forced the Bombay Government to keep men and vessels ready against any attack from the south, swarms of Maráthás were gathering round what remained of the Portuguese possessions in the North Konkan. The 13th October (1738) the Bombay Government warned Commodore Bagwell: The Maráthás are augmenting their forces in all the places this way in order to proceed vigorously in their war against the Portuguese.⁴

In spite of the concern with which they viewed ruin gathering round Bassein the Bombay Government continued to reject all Portuguese proposals for joint action. On the 20th October 1738 in a letter to Pedro D'Mello the Governor thus upholds his decision: As you observe the restoration of your dominions would lighten us of our present great expenses for the guard of our island, it is in that prospect we bear these charges till we have a proper force to enter upon action and expel these faithless neighbours. Still I dare not hazard to increase our charges by a rash and abrupt declaration of war against these

Chapter I. History.

Encounter
with Angria's
Fleet,
1739.

Maráthás gather
round Bassein,
1738.

¹ Bom. Gov. Consultation, 9th Dec. 1738, Public Diary 11 of 1737-38, 335.

² Bombay Government to Commodore George Bagwell, 22nd January 1739, Public Diary 12 of 1738-39, 36.

³ Bombay Government to Commodore George Bagwell, 22nd January 1739, Public Diary 12 of 1738-39, 37.

⁴ Bombay Government to Commodore Bagwell, 13th October 1738, Public Diary 11 of 1737-38, 255.

Chapter I.
History.

people, not only without the order of my superiors, but without a force to support it and carry it through with dignity and reputation. Neither, without such an appearance of success as our present condition does not afford us the hopes of, can I destroy the commerce of the island which is our only dependence, solely to pay you a compliment without service to you and highly prejudicial to ourselves. This you will readily grant when I assure you that our dependencies abroad oblige me to employ our whole fleet abroad, when our force left ashore is as you may be informed but inconsiderable and just sufficient for the guard of the island against all attacks. I have reason to believe the Honourable Company is concerting proper measures in Europe with the Crown of Portugal upon this event. And as their determinations must govern me, which I hope to have in May next, I can only till then continue our defensive alliance which indeed is a point of necessity in our present circumstances, and which, without presuming to advise you, I offer to your consideration. I shall never lose sight of the close union betwixt our two crowns, and our common united interest in these parts, which can never consist in ruining ours without benefiting yours.¹

Bándra Charges,
1739.

The 18th January 1739 the account charges for Bándra from 1st August 1738 to 31st December following, amounting to Rs. 9795-3-64, translated into Portuguese, are laid before the Board, when the President takes notice that the Portuguese government had not even cleared the arrears of the four preceding months from 1st April to 31st July amounting to Rs. 6893-2-21.²

Marátha
Advance,
1739.

Next day (19th January 1739) the President communicates to the Board a letter received from Kondáji Mánkar the commanding officer on the island of Sálsette for the Maráthas, the substance of which is to acquaint him that Chinnáji brother to Bájíráv has reduced Máhim, Kelham (Kelva), and Dáhanu and was bent on subduing the remainder of the country. That this early and frank advice was given us of his intention to attack Vesáva and Bándra, that we might withdraw our succours from the latter place where they are in garrison and which they look on as their right and belonging to their domain, and even offering on the reduction of Bándra if we are jealous of a troublesome neighbourhood, to agree to its demolition. In case of our continuance in Bándra he says he cannot answer for the consequences that may result to the peaceable correspondence we have hitherto maintained with them.

Bombay Neutral,
1739.

It is then remarked that were there any dependence or faith to be given to such an assurance as of the demolition of Bándra it might be more expedient to withdraw our succours rather than hazard a rupture with the Maráthas. On the other hand when it is considered how much the Portuguese would be dispirited by such a procedure and reproach us with abandoning them in these conjunctures; that they would never consent to our demolition of that fortification whilst they are yet masters of it; that we could not justify its demolition without their formal leave, and that we can have no security for the Maráthas' performance of the promise of it, on mature deliberation the Board comes to the following

¹ Bombay Governor and President Honourable John Horne's answer to Pedro D'Mello, 20th Oct. 1738, Pub. Diary 11 of 1737-38, 264-265.

² Bom. Gov. Consultation, 18th Jan, 1739, Pub. Diary 12 of 1738-39, 21.

resolution : That the due preservation of our own frontier, our engagements with the Portuguese, and other indispensable reasons oblige us to maintain and continue our succours to the fortification of Bándra, which we judge may hold out against the Maráthás unless they bring cannons against it. In such case the place being no longer tenable, that care shall be taken to secure the retreat of our people and a mine be sprung for its being rendered unserviceable to the Maráthás. Of this the President is desired to advise the General of the North and at the same time of the indispensable necessity of demolishing the battery at the foot of the hill of Senora de Monte on Sálsette which entirely commands the channel that gives passage into the Máhim river.

The President then acquaints the Board with the frame of his purposed answer to Kondáji Mákar, which is agreed to and is as follows : That he has received his letter and considered the matter with due attention ; that he takes notice of his advices of Chinnáji's progress in his conquests and esteems his ingenuous declaration of his intentions upon Vesáva and Bándra. Touching our withdrawing our succours from the latter place, which is the principal point of his letter, we (the President and Council) answer : That in the first place our engagements with the Portuguese nation oblige us to such an assistance, and that it is an established maxim with the English to adhere to all their treaties and pacts with other governments ; that besides it is the practice of all nations to consult the security of their frontiers ; and that Bándra being confessedly necessary thereto, they could not take amiss the measures we took to preserve it, so that if their nation persists in the design to attack it the fortune of war must decide it ; that if it appeared to them their interest to reduce it, we thought it as much ours to maintain it. That for the rest they could not but be convinced by the free trade and open communication we had with their territories, of our peaceable disposition, and that our only views and desires tended to the restoration of the public tranquillity in these parts, and the preservation of our own dominions rights and privileges.¹

The 27th January 1739 the President communicates to the Board that he had proposed to the General of the North the demolition of Bándra and the batteries commanding the entrance into Máhim river conformable to the resolutions in the Consultation of the 19th. To this he had received for answer that the General of the North did not conceive he had power to authorize or grant leave for such a step but that he would forward copy of the proposal to the Viceroy for his order therein.²

The 27th January 1739 the President laid before the Board the following letter from Martin D'Sylveira the General of the North, dated Bassein 24th January 1739 : I communicate to your Honour the advice I have received that, besides the large force they have got to carry on the siege and batteries at Tárápur, the enemy have with another body of troops invested the fort of Vesáva in the same manner, against which they have got cannon of eighteen pounders ; a cause of

**Chapter I.
History.**

Bombay Neutral,
1739.

Bándra
demolished,
1739.

Portuguese
apply for Aid,
1739.

¹ Bom. Gov. Consultation, 19th Jan. 1739, Pub. Diary 12 of 1738-39, 26-27.

² Bom. Gov. Consultation, 27th Jan. 1739, Pub. Diary 12 of 1738-39, 41.

Chapter I.
History.

Portuguese
apply for Aid,
1739.

not a little anxiety considering the weakness of its walls. Though with relation to the fortifications and batteries of Bándra I answered your Honour's proposal of demolishing them that I could not come to such a resolution without the express order of the Viceroy, I have since determined from the trust I repose in his person on sending to the fort of Bándra the Captain Commandant John D'Souza Ferras in the same station he was in before, that with your concurrence he may execute what may be most convenient for the service of the King my master. So great is our necessity and want of provision in this place, having found little or none in it when I took charge of the government of this province, that I dare not trust the waiting the return of the galls I have sent to Daman in quest of a supply, after having drained the island of Karanja, as the commandant of that place acquaints me was done in the time of my predecessor. As I instantly expect the enemy at Dongri (hill-fort four miles south-west of Bassein) with the same intentions as they are now before Vesáva, I must apply to your Honour as General for his most serene Majesty of Great Britain to assist me with five hundred morahs (*mulás*) of batty or as much as you can spare. This I will either repay you in specie out of what I expect from Daman or in money at the price your Honour will advise me, with the incident expenses, besides being eternally obliged to your Honour to whom in such case I shall confess we owe our preservation.

To this letter the President proposed to send the following answer: To the General of the North, Bombay Castle 27th January 1739. I have this instant received your letter of the 24th January, and at the same time attended to the representation of Senor John D'Souza Ferras on your part. I observe with much concern and anxiety the progress of these Maráthás whose principal aim appears to me no less than the destruction of the European interest and dominion in these parts. As to what concerns the demolition of the batteries and fortification of Bándra I should not have ever proposed such a step to you but in the extreme necessity of present conjunctures. It is very agreeable to me that your opinion concurs with mine in this matter for the common good of both our governments. Conformable thereto I have despatched orders for the immediate demolition of the batteries, and as the fortification of Bándra will require some days before the mines can be in entire readiness to take effect, there shall be no care wanting to put that place out of danger of falling into the hands of these people.

In answer to your urgent request for a loan of batty I assure you with great truth that our island is entirely out of capacity to furnish any quantity being itself in imminent danger of scarcity. We expect to procure a little from Surat and Scindy. However even that we cannot depend upon. Neither from Mangalor nor the Marátha countries do we find it possible to get the least quantity, through the rigorous prohibition of such exports from thence. With all this not many days ago we relieved the straits of our factory at Tellicherry at the hazard of disfurnishing our ourselves with the quantity of near three hundred bales, so that we are now in extreme necessity ourselves, considering the number of people that it lies upon us to maintain and the store of grain it requires. Some days past I gave permission for exporting a convenient quantity of wheat to Bassein, and if any more can be procured and spared, I shall not fail of accommodating you with

all in my power. I have explained all these circumstances with the greater particularity that you may not have any umbrage or doubt left of my being extremely sensible to the urgent necessities of your government and inclined to assist and succour you with all that is in my power and dependence, being well assured that these Maráthás finishing with you, or perhaps before, will sooner or later proceed to the execution of their ill designs against our territories.¹

The same day (27th January 1739) the President acquaints the Board that they are summoned purposely to deliberate on the most expedient measures to be taken on the occasion of the above letter he has received since morning from the General of the North and brought by the Portuguese commandant of the Island of Sálsette John deSouza Ferras, who is sent by the General to represent in the strongest manner their deplorable circumstances. That they expect Bassein and Dongri will be soon attacked by the Maráthás. That in Bassein, through the neglect of the preceding General, they are barely victualled for fifteen days and that they therefore beseech us as friends and allies to succour them with a quantity of batty. That with regard to Bándra and the batteries at the foot of Nossa Senora de Monte, the urgency of circumstances obliges him to retract his answer as before mentioned in the consultation of this day, and not only gives the President his consent for their being razed, but orders John de Souza Ferras may second and see to the execution. That the fort of Vesáva gives him great apprehensions, the Maráthás having brought eighteen-pounders to batter it, which he is of opinion the walls will not hold out against. The President observes that with regard to the razing those batteries and demolishing the fortifications of Bándra, it is of the utmost importance to Bombay that we lay hold of the permission and lose no time in the execution. Upon which the President is desired to issue orders immediately to the Engineer to set to work, first with the batteries abovementioned, and that the prahm and other vessels be stationed at a proper distance to cover the men employed in razing them. Also that the mines to blow up the fortifications at Bándra be likewise prepared with all expedition, care being taken to secure the retreat of the garrison. In order to lessen the debt of the Portuguese government incurred on the assistance given that place with men and stores: Agreed that we receive what remains of the latter back at the same price their account stands charged with, which in their present desperate circumstances we judge the most expedient means to reduce the debt.

The request of the General of the North for a loan of batty falling next under consideration: Agreed it is no time now to make reflections on the improvidence of that government, or the returns we have hitherto met with for all the good offices in our power. It is our incapacity alone that hinders us from such an assistance as they require. Our Honourable Masters cannot but be satisfied thereof from our consultations of the 18th and 23rd preceding this application where our just dread of wanting provisions ourselves is already set out. It is agreed then that

Chapter I.

History,

Portuguese
appl. for Aid,
1739.

Demolition
of Bándra,
1739.

¹ The Portuguese General of the North to the President and Governor of Bombay dated Bassein 24th January 1739, and the President's reply dated Bombay Castle 27th Jan. 1739, in Public Diary 12 of 1738-39, 47-49. Forrest's Maráthas Series, I. Pt. I. 27-28.

Chapter I.
History.

Maráthas
Designs against
Bombay,
1739.

a satisfactory answer be given the General by the President as subjoined to the letter on this occasion.¹

About two months later, 25th March 1739, the Diary contains the following entry: The Bándra fortifications are blown up, with the consent of all parties, ours, the Portuguese, and Maráthás, which last had often pressed the President by letters and messages to have it effected.²

On the 4th February 1739 a consultation was held at which the President acquaints the Board that the meeting is to consider the best and safest measures to be taken on the intelligence he has lately received that the Maráthás would be on Sálsette this day or to-morrow with an additional force of thirty thousand men; that he is credibly informed a number of boats are getting in readiness for some expedition both at Árnála, Thána, and other places belonging at present to the Maráthás; and that they give it out publicly and confidently that their design is against the island of Bombay. The President remarks that whether this force and preparations are really directed against this island or not, and however weak we are in the absence of our fleet, it behoves us in all respects to put ourselves in the best posture of defence we are able, either to prevent or deter any attempts of the people to get upon the island. To this the Board unanimously agreeing the following orders and dispositions are resolved: The Company having no vessel at present in port proper for the purpose of defending to the seaward the Breach and Backbay, the President makes a tender of three vessels—the *Success*, the *Anne* grab actually under despatch for Persia, and the *Robert* for Surat—to be employed in this service, with condition only of a reasonable demurrage and allowance for damages in case of accident. These are accordingly accepted and they are ordered to be stationed off Máhim and strengthened with such a force as we can raise. That for the defence of our passes in the river, two luggage boats, the Honourable Company's balloon and launch and Manekji's boat with twelve Warli fishing boats be forthwith equipped, fitted, and distributed in proper places. That the militia be ordered on strict duty and that fifty Bhandáris be added to the guard already at the Breach and fifty more at the extremity of Malabár Hill. Resolved likewise that as entered hereafter a letter be sent express to Commodore Bagwell to hasten his coming up with the fleet which the President acquaints the Board, by advices received this morning in seven days from Goa, was seen importing there by a tidal of a boat arrived here in the time abovementioned. Ordered that one month's provisions be supplied the out-forts as usual, besides two months' for reserve as stores not to be used but in case of a siege or other necessity.³

The letter to Commodore Bagwell runs: Having certain intelligence that the Maráthás will be on the island of Sálsette either to-day or to-morrow with a body of thirty thousand men with a design to make a descent on this island, you are hereby directed to make the best of your

¹ Bom. Gov. Consultation, 27th Jan. 1739, Pub. Diary 12 of 1738-39, 46-47.

² Bom. Gov. Diary, 25th March 1739, Pub. Diary 12 of 1738-39, 106. Forrest's Maráthas Series, I. Pt. I. 34.

³ Bom. Gov. Consultation, 4th Feb. 1739, Pub. Diary 12 of 1738-39, 51-52.

way hither with the squadron under your command. But should the expected merchant ships from Tellicherry be under your convoy, you with another cruizer are to take care of them and despatch all the others hither without loss of time.¹

It is agreed to despatch a boat express to Tellicherry, with a letter to the Chief and Factors there, advising them of our necessities in point of grain, with direction that in case of having entered upon any treaty or composition with the Karnatak Rája, so that the export of Mangalor rice is no longer prohibited by them, they then contract for twelve thousand robins of rice on the best terms they are able, returning the boat as soon as may be, with advice of what conveyances they can possibly procure to send up the quantity contracted for, that we may judge what tonnage will be necessary to speed to them from hence. But that if the misunderstanding still continues to such a degree as to render the export of rice from Mangalor impracticable, that they then in consideration of the urgent necessities of this Presidency set on foot such an accommodation as may open the way to the relief of our straits, yet without hazarding or endangering the pepper trade, the safety of which they are to prefer to any other consideration, and finally if they can fall upon any other way or expedient to supply us we would have them spare no endeavours towards it as a most acceptable service to this Presidency.²

The 10th February 1739 the President acquaints the Board that last night he received advice that the Portuguese had abandoned the fort of Vesáva, and that on the Portuguese retreat to Bassein the Maráthás were actually in possession of that place. Also that the siege of Bassein was more vigorously pressed than ever by a very considerable part of the Marátha army, so as to be in imminent danger.³

The 14th February 1739 the President lays before the Board a letter from the Viceroy of Goa, dated the 3rd February 1739, advising that the Maráthás are masters of the island of Salsette adjoining to Goa. Salsette is so destitute of men, being drained by succours sent up to the North, that he apprehends it will be with the utmost difficulty they will be able to defend Goa itself should the Maráthás attack it vigorously, especially as Khem Sávant and the Sunda Rája had through fear or other means declared against them, and joined the Marátha party. He requests in the most pressing terms our assisting them with men and ammunition with all expedition, lest the succour should come too late. Adding that their preservation or destruction will depend greatly on our resolution with regard to them on this occasion.⁴

To the aforesaid Viceroy of Goa's letter the Bombay Governor and President sent a reply to the following effect: That the President has received His Excellency's letter and is extremely concerned at the

Chapter I. History.

Rice from
Tellicherry,
1739.

Maráthás
take Vesáva,
1739.

Prayer from
Goa for Succour,
1739.

¹ Public Diary 12 of 1738-39, 53.

² Bom. Gov. Consultation, 5th Feb. 1739, Pub. Diary 12 of 1738-39, 54.

³ Bom. Gov. Consultation, 10th Feb. 1739, Pub. Diary 12 of 1738-39, 59. Forrest's Marátha Series, I. Pt. I. 28.

⁴ Bom. Gov. Consultation, 14th Feb. 1739, Pub. Diary 12 of 1738-39, 67. Forrest's Marátha Series, I. Pt. I. 29.

Chapter I.
History.

The Jesuits at
Bandra,
1739.

situation he is in. That this Presidency now surrounded with the same enemies has absolutely no men to spare from the defence of the island itself, so that he dare not send out the fleet even upon the occasions of the Presidency for fear of being too weak in its absence. That we might strain so far as to spare a few warlike stores, but that we have no conveyance to send them: That he desires His Excellency to consider our own situation, and to believe, as it is really true, that we want not inclination but abilities to assist him in this present distress.¹

The 20th February the General of the North takes notice of the opposition complained of by the President from the Superior of the Jesuits at Bándra against blowing up their college. This he does not know how to answer as he cannot understand how the college can subsist when the bastions are blown up.²

The same day (20th February 1739) the President communicates to the Board two letters from John de Souza Ferras Commandant of Sálsette remonstrating against the obstruction he meets with from the Superior of Bándra in completing the works for the entire demolition of that place and threatening him with the worst consequences if he goes on with the destruction. The President had before received a protest against the same from the Superior: Upon this it is remarked that the power and influence of the society is so great that this Commandant dares not execute the orders given him by the General of the North; and that to leave the college standing may be of great disservice to this island, affording the Maráthis a convenient retreat or place of arms whence they may greatly incommode us. That therefore since it is for the evident benefit of both nations to destroy the place entirely, if we cannot procure their consent, an expedient be tried to bring the Padres to reason by refusing them the protection of this Government for their persons and effects, which they may keep at their college and defend against the Maráthis; or if they abandon the college may leave us at liberty to pursue our measures for the safety of our frontier, without engaging us in a controversy with the Portuguese Government. The Secretary is ordered to repair to Bándra to enforce and explain our sentiments of the Padres' conduct, as well as to excite John d'Souza Ferras to the full performance of his orders.³

Offer of
Karanja,
1739.

The 5th March 1739 the President communicates to the Board a proposal made him by sundry inhabitants of the island of Karanja to take possession of and hold the same for the Honourable Company. This proposal being now taken into consideration, it is observed first that this tender comes from only a few private people without authority or powers sufficient to treat of or conclude such a matter, which therefore is no foundation to proceed upon. Admitting that the necessity to be urged from the situation and conveniency of that island together with its surrender from the Portuguese to an enemy, which must inevitably

¹ Bom. Gov. Consultation, 16th Feb. 1739, Pub. Diary 12 of 1738-39, 68. Forrest's Marátha Series, I. Pt. I. 30.

² Bom. Gov. Diary, 20th Feb. 1739, Pub. Diary 12 of 1738-39, 70. Forrest's Marátha Series, I. Pt. I. 31.

³ Bom. Gov. Consultation, 20th Feb. 1739, Pub. Diary 12 of 1738-39, 72. Forrest's Marátha Series, I. Pt. I. 32.

happen, gives us a right to seize it for ourselves, we apprehend the attempt in our present circumstances is no wise prudent or fit to risk for the following reasons : It would require the raising at least twelve or fifteen hundred men to dislodge the troops now on Karanja with Mánáji in person. And though it is probable, unless opposed by the Maráthás, we might carry the attack through with success, yet as a sufficient force could not be got together without disarming our passes, and that the President has certain intelligence of a large number of Maráthás assembled at Marol (about eight miles north-east of Bándra) apparently with no good intention, such a step might and probably would be attended with bad consequences to our island, as it is reasonable to expect the Maráthás would attack our passes when they found them unguarded. Nor would our seizure or taking of Karanja be attended with any secure maintenance. For so long as the Maráthás continue in the neighbourhood, the charges must exceed the revenue which we are sure our Honourable Masters would be little inclined to support. The fort itself at Karanja is in its present condition entirely untenable, being a large ruinous fortification commanded by a neighbouring eminence. A new fort would be necessary for the preservation of the place and the Maráthás would not fail of attacking it, as they consider Karanja part of the Portuguese domain, and even now avow that Mánáji Angria has taken possession of it for them. In which case it would require at least twelve hundred men with competent ammunition and stores to garrison it with any hopes of holding out. Especially since the Agris or salt labourers, who made a body from seven to eight hundred men well armed and chiefly depended upon for the defence of the place, are gone over to the enemy and were indeed the means of his introduction. All which considered, though we cannot but be sensible of the great inconvenience to Bombay of this new neighbour, it is agreed that we forbear any attempt of this sort that may either endanger the safety of our own island or involve us in increased charges.¹

Hope of help from Bombay failing, a few days later (12th March) Karanja surrendered to Mánáji, the garrison being permitted to depart with their baggage. Captain Inchbird returning from Karanja reported that agreeably to the orders given him for destroying Mánáji's galivats, the bomb ketch and *Triumph* were stationed at the northmost point of the island and himself with the *Defiance* and all our large galivats to the southward, and that they had the good fortune to bring away eight fighting galivats and thirteen fishing boats, setting fire to one other galivat which they could not get off. The vessels were ordered back to their station at the passes, except the *Britannia* and *Carolina* who are to continue in Pen river to prevent any of Mánáji's boats passing.²

The 16th April 1739 the President (Honourable Stephen Law) offers to the consideration of the Board the necessity of agreeing and fixing upon some measures to be observed with our new neighbours the Maráthás.

Chapter I. History.

Offer of
Karanja,
1739.

Karanja
surrenders to
Mánáji Angria,
1739.

Lead supplied
to the
Maráthás,
1739.

¹ Bom. Gov. Consultation, 5th March 1739, Pub. Diary 12 of 1738-39, 88-89. Forrest's Marátha Series, I. Pt. 1. 33.

² Bom. Gov. Consultation, 12th March 1739, Pub. Diary 12 of 1738-39, 93-94.

**Chapter I.
History.**

Lead supplied
to the
Maráthas,
1739.

Sundry paragraphs of our Hon. Masters' letters concerning our conduct with the country governments being read and considered, the President remarks that their whole tenour recommends and enjoins our cultivating a friendly correspondence with these people, avoiding all just occasions of rupture or enmity, to which accordingly it becomes our duty to conform. To this end, he observes, it is not sufficient to profess a neutrality in words, while the Maráthas have the contrary to reproach us with in actions such as furnishing the Portuguese with warlike stores and ammunition, while we continue to prohibit the export of lead iron and other commodities to their country, which they cannot but resent as unfriendly treatment. That therefore it may be expedient to try what effect a cautious and well managed compliance may have in such articles as they may require of us, and which if they cannot obtain immediately from hence, they can always come at (though perhaps at a greater expense) by another channel, the commerce for them being free to the northward. So that this condescension of ours may, without any prejudice to the public good or safety, in some measure correspond with the orders of our Hon. Masters, and serve to remove any occasion of complaint from the above prohibition. Upon this it is agreed that the President do, on any such application from the Maráthas, discretionally furnish them with the articles they may require and in the quantity he may judge convenient.¹

Money and
Stores to the
Portuguese,
1739.

The same day (16th April 1739) the President communicates to the Board the pressing instances he has received in two letters from the Viceroy of Goa to assist Bassein and Chaul (at least Bassein) with money and munitions of war. He specially notices one letter from Caitan d' Souza demanding in the name of his Portuguese Majesty a loan of Rs.1,00,000 and so very large a supply of military stores, as in its present situation this place could not possibly afford without evident danger and imprudence. The said demands being taken into consideration—It is unanimously agreed that we have not authority sufficient from our Hon. Masters to hazard any loan but at the risk of our own fortunes, as may be evident from the strict tenour of their orders. That we will readily afford them whatever stores we can spare from the demand of our own garrisons, and they can pay or give sufficient security for. The President is accordingly desired to explain to the Commandant of the North the restriction the constitution of our government lays us under, and the readiness we are in to furnish whatever assistance to them we can without disobedience to our Superiors, or endangering the safety of our own island, contrary to the trust reposed in us, being otherwise justly sensible of their distress and willing to assist and relieve them.¹

Next day (17th April 1739) the President acquaints the Board that he has summoned this meeting expressly to lay before them the repeated application from the Portuguese for some assistance of money and stores, being reduced to the utmost extremities and in imminent danger

¹ Bom. Gov. Consultation, 16th April 1739, Pub. Diary 12 of 1738-39, 128.

² Bom. Gov. Consultation, 16th April 1739, Pub. Diary 12 of 1738-39, 129-130. Forrest's Marátha Series, I, Pt. I. 35.

of losing Bassein their capital city in the north, without our immediate compliance with their demand; and to desire their opinion whether and how far this extraordinary emergency may justify us to our Hon. Masters, should we venture on affording them a small supply to prevent the instant loss of that town.

The President goes on to remark that however direct or positive their orders may be against on any pretext whatever hazarding any part of their estate in foreign loans, yet in the present conjunctures some expedient appears unavoidably necessary for the assistance of the Portuguese.

That since the Maráthás have hitherto given us no opportunity of making any overtures for settling a peace or friendly correspondence with their government, and seeing that, on their reduction of Bassein, we have just reasons to apprehend they may give us trouble, the preservation of Bassein appears to be greatly for the interest and safety of this island. If Bassein should at once be forced to surrender for want of a small and seasonable relief, besides the reproach we might give room for in dealing too hardly with a nation so strictly allied to ours in Europe, the troops of these Maráthás are too near our island not to justify our entering upon some measures to prevent their designs or at the least to gain time, by enabling the Portuguese to support themselves till the rains set in, when the enemy will not be able to continue in their trenches before the town. Even before the rains a favourable crisis may possibly ensue, and either the Maráthás be called off by the approach of Shaw Nádir's troops or on the success of an embassy sent from Goa to the Sháhu Rája be obliged to give over their siege.

On all considerations it is unanimously agreed that the trust reposed in us of consulting above everything the interest of our Hon. Masters in the security and preservation of this place, requires our venturing a loan on this occasion even at the hazard of our own private fortunes, in case of the same being disavowed by our Employers. It is accordingly resolved that a sum not exceeding Rs. 15,000 be advanced the Portuguese, taking such security as may be got for repayment of the same, on the Hon. Company's account; and the President is desired to signify to the Portuguese Commandant that this is done by way of private contribution, and not in contradiction to the refusal we were limited to in our public capacities.¹

The 1st May 1739 the Hon. Stephen Law Esq., President and Governor of Bombay, laid before the Board the following letter from Caitan d'Souza Pereira Commandant of the North, dated Bassein the 24th April 1739: I received your Excellency's letter of the 16th April regarding the loan of Rs. 1,00,000 as likewise some assistance of ammunition, in the consternation and extremities to which this place is reduced. Upon which matter your Excellency is pleased to write that such assistance does absolutely not depend on you to give, notwithstanding your friendly disposition to favour and assist our nation. These expressions I hold for true and sincere knowing the particular

Chapter I.

History.

Money and
Stores to the
Portuguese,
1739.

¹ Bom. Gov. Consultation, 17th April 1739, Pub. Diary 12 of 1738-39, 131-132. Forrest's Marátha Series, I. Pt. I. 35-36.

Chapter I.
History.

Money and
Stores to the
Portuguese,
1739.

regard you have always shown to it. But seeing this place absolutely cannot preserve itself without succour from abroad, and that I can obtain succour nowhere but from your Excellency, as well by reason of the mutual union betwixt our two nations, as of the interest your island has in our preservation considering the great and dangerous consequences that may result from our ruin, I must again importune your Excellency in the hopes that your generosity and good disposition will be against the losing this place and the capital of this province, whilst it lies so near a nation which in Europe maintains a strict friendship with us, and who do not want for means to prevent a ruin of such importance.

Your Excellency is not unapprised that in your island there are several vassals of this state who have taken refuge thither from several parts with effects to a considerable amount and have resided under your Government with what they had thus brought away, though the greatest part of it did not belong to them. Upon which matter, the senate of this city has been convened with the Prelates of our religious orders and private persons. Your Excellency's letter was laid before them with proof of the want of necessaries to defend the place. Upon which it was unanimously agreed that recourse should be had to these refugees, and that extraordinary and even forcible means should be used with them. That, in the meantime, while these effects are thus withheld by persons taking refuge under other jurisdictions, applications should be made to those governments, with request of their favour and assistance in raising a loan to the royal treasury. By copy enclosed of an Act of Council in the said senate, your Excellency will see it is agreeable to our rights and laws that vassals shall be obliged to furnish assistance to their king, and that his officers have lawful authority to oblige them to help.

I am certainly informed that on your island the persons named in the accompanying list hold considerable effects, of which they are subject to render account as well because the effects do not belong to them as by reason of their vassalage. As this benefit to us cannot be obtained without your Excellency's favour and protection intervening to that effect knowing your particular desire to assist and favour our nation, I request that your Excellency will be pleased to permit or give leave for searching the houses of the persons named in the said list giving order for all assistance and favour to the officers I send on this employment. Or that our end may be obtained with more ease as well as with less noise, that your Excellency will be pleased to send for them before you, and order them to give a faithful account of what they have in their possession, that on discovery of the amount which must not be inconsiderable, it may be used as a pledge for payment of the ammunitions which the place is in want of, and which your Excellency tells me are ready on our paying the value or giving security for it.

In this city on our using extraordinary measures, in virtue of the abovementioned Act of Council, we have discovered a small parcel of plate, which I likewise am determined to apply to the payment for ammunitions and warlike stores that your Excellency may grant me. But as the plate belongs to the churches, and that a considerable loss

will arise on breaking it down, I would fain know of your Excellency if the Company would allow such a benefit to our state, as the taking it in pawn for a debt to the amount of its intrinsic value without interest; or whether it is necessary that it should be sold, that I may remit it weighed with exactness; trusting that your Excellency will in this matter as in all others act for the best in favour of the urgent necessities this place is at present reduced to.

Further, in case all this is not sufficient to engage an assistance in our present extreme distress, in order that the Company may have security for monies advanced to this place, I offer your Excellency some pieces of brass ordnance either in payment or pawn for the debt. Having this consideration that it is most becoming my nation that it should be known to the world how for the preservation of their King's city it was stripped of its artillery (the principal instruments of its defence) whilst they put their trust more in their personal valour, in their constant fidelity and zeal, than in the extraordinary force or hardness of metal. So that if your Excellency will please to accept of this pledge, on advice from your Excellency, I will send the pieces of ordnance that may be necessary to pay the debt incurred. If to all these proposed measures your Excellency or your Council shall object as inconvenient, I have no others nor any recourse besides for the preservation of this place. Considering the reasons above declared, and the fatal ruin we must otherwise undergo, I hope that your Excellency, for the service of His Most Serene Majesty of Portugal, at least will consent to succour us with some ammunition to enable us to persist in the defence of this place. And for the payment of this advance His Majesty will be bound by his agent and all his vassals, as I have wrote your Excellency in my last letter, if they have not lost all credit and reputation with your nation, which they are so careful to preserve.

By reason of the great want of people for the defence and service of this place, through the dispersion of a number of our vassals in different parts, I came to a resolution of publishing a proclamation recalling them all with their effects within the term of fifteen days, under penalties in case of contravention. And as several persons have represented to me their apprehension of trouble in obeying this order for fear of their creditors, considering it as my duty to consult in these conjunctures what may be most useful to the King's service, I have ordered another proclamation to be published, of indemnity in such cases as your Excellency may see by copies enclosed of said proclamations. That these proclamations may meet with due observance, I request of your Excellency free leave for all the vassals of this state to return to this place without impediment or molestation to their persons and effects that they may bring with them. Also that these proclamations may be published on your island to remove any pretext of ignorance, considering the great advantage may accrue from this expedient to the King's service and towards the preservation of the place, the enemy's approaches to which and method of attack may appear more clearly to your Excellency by your officer's delineation and report which are now sent for your Excellency's observation.

At the same meeting this second letter of the same date (24th April) was also read: As the vessels which I have here are soon to proceed

Chapter I. History.

Money and
Stores to the
Portuguese,
1759.

Chapter I.
History.

Money and
Stores to the
Portuguese,
1739.

to Goa, and I know not when those I have sent to Daman may arrive, I request your Excellency to do me the honour to send to this Bar with all possible expedition a secure vessel of war, for our sending upon her the small stock we have discovered to be applied to payment for ammunitions as I have before wrote to your Excellency. Our want of ammunition is so urgent and the season is so far advanced your Excellency well knows how necessary it is I should make the best use of the little time I have left. In the hope the ammunition may be ready to come without delay I have given instructions to the Captain Commandant John d'Souza Ferras to adjust this matter with your Excellency, and at the same time to request your Excellency to send us such bricklayers and carpenters as belong to our jurisdiction, and are now upon your island. Our want of them for the service of this place is great, as well as our need of chunam for which we must depend upon your Excellency's friendly disposition.¹

After due consideration of these two letters we come to the following resolutions: That we will accept of the pledge tendered in plate or wrought silver, and will advance the amount of its intrinsic value redeemable within the term of one year without interest. That whatever brass guns are not absolutely necessary to the defence of the place, we shall be the more willing to accept on the like terms, as we are not without great apprehensions of the place falling soon into the Maráthas' hands, when the cannon found there will proportionably strengthen and enable the Maráthas to carry on any further designs they may have. That we cannot admit of the proclamation referred to in the said letters being affixed or otherwise published in the manner the Commandant desires, as such a practice is repugnant to the forms and authority of our own Government. Much less can we suffer or connive at any compulsive measures to be used with their subjects that have taken refuge here, it being inconsistent with the liberty and privileges granted to all who take protection under this Government, though we shall gladly give all encouragement in our power to promote all voluntary contributions and assistance to them in their present distress. That we will send them whatever stores for the defence of Bassein we can spare without unfurnishing this place. That any bricklayers or carpenters they may procure here to go voluntarily upon their service at Bassein shall have free liberty to repair thither. The President is accordingly desired to answer the above letters in these terms.

Debating what price to fix on the stores to be spared them from this Presidency, it is observed by the President that as the sparing these stores in order to save or at least enable the city of Bassein to hold out some time longer, is neither a point of profit or favour (consulting as we do in it chiefly our own safety and interest) we ought in this case to omit the charging of the twenty per cent advance, usual on stores sold to any but the Honourable Company's servants, by which remission the Portuguese will gain a faith in the quantity to be furnished them, and consider the same as a real and timely obligation. To this the Board concurs and agrees.²

¹ Pub. Diary 12 of 1738-39, 161-165. Forrest's Marátha Series, I. Pt. I. 37-39.

² Bom. Gov. Consultation, 1st May 1739, Pub. Diary 12 of 1738-39, 157-158. Forrest's Marátha Series, I. Pt. I. 36-37.

Six days later (7th May 1739) the President acquaints the Board that yesterday he received the melancholy news that on the 5th instant the capitulations had been signed for the surrender on the 12th of the city of Bassein to Chinnáji the Maráthá general. The cause of surrender was the success of the twelve or thirteen mines the Maráthás sprung on the curtains and bastions. The place is so surrounded with water that only three of the eleven bastions were subject to be attacked. Still the mines made such breaches in two of the three as rendered the storming very practicable. This the Maráthás attempted with the utmost fury and resolution. Several times repulsed they as often returned to the attack, and at length gained lodgments on the bastions. The Portuguese wearied and harassed with so warm an action lasting over two days, having several of their officers and many people killed, and their ammunition near exhausted, observing the place was no longer tenable against such numbers, hoisted a white flag and sent one of their officers to treat of a surrender. Chinnáji allowed them the space of a week to evacuate the town on the very honourable conditions noted below.

The Consultation continues : The Commandant of the North having made application to the President for assistance from this Government of boats and vessels to bring away the inhabitants and their effects according to the terms of the capitulations, orders have been given immediately to prepare what number of boats could be procured, to be sent to Bassein to assist them in this distressful conjuncture. The *Prince of Wales* and three galivats were appointed to convey them safe from any attempts on the sea. Resolved likewise, as the Commandant of the North is obliged to seek harbour here with his people till the rainy season is over, that the most honourable reception be given him, and a lodging be prepared for him suitable to his station with such accommodation as can be got for lodging his people. This treatment we think due to a nation in friendship with ours, especially in their present distressed deplorable condition. We hope the circumstances will appear in that light to our Honourable Masters.¹

The following were the conditions of surrender :

1. The said Chinnáji Appa shall permit free passage out of the town to all the troops as well regular as auxiliaries, with their arms in order, drums beating and colours flying, also with four pieces of cannon and two mortars.

2. He shall likewise grant free passage out to all the noble families that are now in the town, with all their moveables and effects, as also to all the Christians Gentus and Moors who do not choose to remain in the place, and that with all their goods and effects.

3. He shall permit free and unmolested passage out of the port of this place to all vessels of war now in it with their artillery and provided at all points for defence as well as to all other vessels whose owners do not choose to remain.

4. He shall furnish all the vessels that may be wanted (charges paid) to convey away to Bombay, Chaul, or Daman, as well the noble

Chapter I. History.

Fall of Bassein,
1739.

¹ Bom. Gov. Consultation, 7th May 1739, Pub. Diary 12 of 1738-39, 168-170. Forrest's Maráthá Series, I, Pt. I, 39-40.

Chapter I.

History.

Fall of Basscin,
1739.

families as the common people, with all in general that choose to leave the place with their goods and effects, which they shall carry with them; and shall engage that Angria shall not rob or strip them of what they carry, upon the sea, until they have arrived at their destined port.

5. He shall likewise grant free passage to all in religious orders, and to the priests in general (who do not choose to remain in the place) with leave to carry off their goods and effects such as they may not sell beforehand.

6. He shall permit the shipping off and carrying out of the place all victualling stores and ammunitions of war in the town belonging to the inhabitants and defenders; and in general all treasure in gold or silver with every one's provisions and moveables, as likewise every thing belonging to the churches of whatever sort or value.

7. That the Christians who remain voluntarily in the place shall enjoy the liberty of worshipping God in the faith they profess, as likewise all over the district belonging to that jurisdiction without being robbed or stripped of what they have got. The same is to be observed in every respect with the Gentus and Moors that shall choose to stay behind, each according to his law.

8. The said Chinnáji shall forthwith release all the prisoners in his power, that they may have the benefit of coming away in my company. And I will restore all that I have got, for him to dispose of as he thinks proper, in return for those of our side.

9. On the day appointed for the garrison's evacuating the place which is the 12th May (23rd of May N. S.) his army shall retreat to Madrápur, that I may with my troops go over the walls and embark free of any fear of molestation from his army.

10. Chinnáji Appa himself shall engage not to enter the town with his troops till I am safely embarked with mine and all the people that go with me, and got out of the reach of the artillery of the place.

11. Chinnáji Appa shall purchase whatever provisions moveables or effects the inhabitants or others in the place may have and want to sell, by the means of persons of credit or trust, and to that end shall send into the town thirty such Banians to agree the price, paying the value to the proprietors, and receiving the things so purchased.

12. That whilst Chinnáji Appa shall be in possession of this city, he shall for ever maintain the privilege of three churches within it, (besides) one in the district and one on the island of Sálsette, for the Christians that shall remain in the said city, or places stipulated for, where they may freely exercise all the acts of their religion. The said churches shall have their curates subject to the most illustrious and reverend Primate of India, for him to settle their proper jurisdiction for the cultivation of the said Christianity. Whatever images I may leave behind shall be suffered to remain in the said churches, with the most necessary ornaments for adorning them. And for the security of the performance of all the above articles of capitulation, the said Chinnáji Appa shall sign the same according to his custom, and shall likewise confirm and ratify them with his own seal and that of Bájiráv the

general of all the Shāhu Rāja's troops. This being executed, the said Chinnāji Appa shall send one of his principal officers to my satisfaction, to remain as an hostage on board a vessel of war in the channel of the bar of this place, out of the reach of the artillery. And for the security of such an officer, I will send one of mine to stay in his army till these stipulations have been performed, when I will return his officer in exchange of mine. Likewise as soon as he has ratified these capitulations, he shall order his people to retire from the foot of the walls into their batteries and trenches to the distance of twenty paces; evacuating also the breaches, leaving in each the number of twenty men. In the interim there shall be no innovation on either side, or any new work be carried on. To this is added:

I Chinnāji Appa accept of the above articles of surrender, except the sixth relating to the munitions of war which I will purchase and the ninth which I will not engage for. For ratification thereof I set my seal to them in my camp before Bassein the 16th May 1739 (N. S.)¹

The terms of capitulation were honourably carried out on both sides. On the 13th May 1739 the *King George* and three galivats arrived from Bassein Bar, bringing several boats and two grabs under their convoy, with the garrison and inhabitants of Bassein and their effects, together with Caitan d'Souza Commandant in the North and Governor of Bassein.²

Two days later (15th May 1739) the Board agreed that, as Bassein is reduced, it will be highly proper to send a letter of compliment to Chinnāji Appa with a small present in the eastern manner, to consist of six yards of red velvet, six yards of green, and six yards of cloth. This present Bhiku Sinay is pitched upon to carry, a person the best qualified we can find for such an employ, as the same may be an opening or introduction to a further knowledge and insight into Chinnāji's movements and designs.³

Three weeks later (8th June 1739) the President acquaints the Board that Bhiku Sinay was returned with a civil answer from Chinnāji who had given the said messenger a friendly and favourable reception. Soon after arrived two deputies from Chinnāji with a letter to the President, and assurances of a desire on the part of the Marāthās to maintain peace and friendship with this Government, concerning the regulation and establishment of which they proposed treating and coming to agreement. According to Bhiku Sinay's report the conference he had with Chinnāji passed chiefly in some exceptions taken by him at our conduct since their invasion of the Portuguese territories. To these Bhiku made suitable answers and explanations, wherewith Chinnāji seemed satisfied. When he was about taking leave Chinnāji gave him an hint, as if he expected we should assist him with a loan of money, for which he quoted what aids of that sort had been furnished the Sidis and Portuguese. The deputies since arrived having in their discourse with the President confined themselves chiefly to general

Chapter I.

History.

Fall of Bassein,
1739.

Portuguese
in Bombay,
1739.

Marātha
Negotiations,
1739.

¹ Pub. Diary 12 of 1738-39, 171-173. Forrest's Marātha Series, I. Pt. I. 40-41.

² Bom. Gov. Consultation, 13th May 1739, Pub. Diary 12 of 1738-39, 181.

³ Bom. Gov. Consultation, 15th May 1739, Pub. Diary 12 of 1738-39, 187.

Chapter I.
History.

Marátha
Negotiations,
1739.

Capt. Inchbird
sent to
Chimnáji,
1739.

assurances of their master's good intentions to our nation, and Chimnáji in his letter desiring that Captain Inchbird may be appointed to confer with him more particularly about the means of settling a good harmony and understanding with this Government, the President proposes the sending of Captain Inchbird, as no ill consequences can be apprehended from his going. On the contrary as we may expect the more friendly overtures in consequence of our gratifying him with his choice of a person to treat with, it is agreed that Captain Inchbird be instantly despatched to Chimnáji with proper instructions and a competent present.¹

The same day (8th June 1739) the following instructions were conveyed to Captain James Inchbird : Chimnáji Appa, the Marátha general, having applied very urgently for a person to be deputed to them, and you being named by him as one that would be acceptable for a personal conference, wherein it may be requisite to treat of several matters of great importance to the welfare of this island, we have on mature deliberation come to a resolution of sending you on the part of the Honourable Company on this deputation. You will herewith receive my credential letter and such presents as I could judge (or were to be procured) the most fitting and adapted to the liking of these people, to whom I would have you take proper notice of my friendly disposition in gratifying this their particular request of my sending you. You are by experience so well versed in the nature, customs, and manners of the Gentu governments round us that I need add no instructions on those heads. As to the most material points which you may want authority or directions to propose, or answer, and for your general guidance in the management of your conferences with Bájiráv, Chimnáji, or those authorized to treat with you on his or their parts, you will find them contained in the following articles :

(1) If the Maráthás are desirous sincerely to improve a good understanding, so we are the same.

(2) We will not suffer the Portuguese to attack the Maráthás from any part of this island ; therefore it will be needless for the Maráthás to erect any work near the passes, as such can be of no other use than to cause us jealousy. They must be sensible we have no sort of intention to violate the friendship which we openly profess a desire of maintaining.

(3) That as the real end of our holding Bombay is to circulate a free trade round us, so we wish to have some favour showed us in the duties of the rivers, which will encourage the resort of merchants, and prove thereby of more utility to the Maráthás than can arise to them by heavy impositions.

(4) That we on our parts are desirous of fixing on some terms of agreement tending to encourage the inhabitants on each side, and if any manufactures of goods proper for us be set about in the places subject to the Maráthás we shall willingly be purchasers thereof, provided we can be furnished on reasonable conditions.

¹ Bom. Gov. Consultation, 8th June 1739, Pub. Diary 12 of 1738-39, 212-213.

(5) That our force now maintained as well by land as sea is merely intended for our preservation. And, therefore, on having a suitable security of a friendly disposition on the part of the Maráthás we shall in no wise molest their navigation. Contrary-wise we shall afford a becoming assistance to them therein, to which end the waters leading to their rivers will be kept free. Since Angria under a borrowed name may attempt passing Máhim river, and aim to injure us thereby, we hope no other vessel than those employed in trade will pass that way, as vessels of war may easily enter between this island and Karanja.

(6) That such persons as have fled hither from the Maráthá countries have now leave, and shall hereafter be permitted to return.

(7) That as Chimnaji may surmise we have attempted by our messenger to his master to establish matters on a footing in prejudice of him (Chimnaji), I now commit to you copy of my letter sent from hence.

(8) Should, as Bhiku Sinay has hinted, any demands be made for loans of money, you may say that although we might in times past favour the Sidis therein, yet we have been since ordered so peremptorily by the Company to avoid such a practice as puts it out of our power to comply therewith.

(9) Should tribute be demanded you may reply that, as Chimnaji well knows, the trade of our island has been so reduced by the bordering troubles, and the heavy expense in supporting it with provisions brought from distant countries (when denied by the Maráthás), that we are unable to pay tribute.

(10) If we are accused of assisting the Sidis and Portuguese in prejudice of the Maráthás, you may reply that what we did then was on a supposal that the destruction of either by the Maráthás might tend to injure us. But on a farther knowledge that the Maráthás consider the welfare of their dominions, we have for some time observed a becoming neutrality.

(11) If we should be required to assist in reducing Mánaji Sambhaji and the Sidis, you may reply that Mánaji being at present on good terms with us, we cannot justify the entering into any measures against him; nor would it become us to molest the Sidis, as they are the immediate subjects of the Moghal, through whom we enjoy at our several settlements very advantageous privileges. But Sambhaji, whilst he continues an enemy to us, will be annoyed as much as possible by the fleet we have for long been obliged to maintain in the protection of our trade against his attempts.

The above several points you will speak to and enforce as occasion offers, being what at present occurs most material to caution you upon. Should any other matters arise wherein you are not furnished with replies, apply hither with all speed for our giving suitable directions.¹

Chapter I.

History.

Capt. Inghbird's
Instructions,
1739.

¹ Pub. Diary 12 of 1738-39, 216-219. Forrest's Maráthá Series, I. Pt. I. 69-70.

Chapter I.
History.
Capt. Inghbird's
Negotiations,
1739.

Three weeks later (29th June 1739) the President communicates to the Board a letter received from Captain James Inghbird, dated Bassein the 27th instant, containing a relation of his procedure and negotiations with Chimnaji, the Marátha general, and enclosing a draft of nine articles proposed on the said Chimnaji's part for grounding a treaty of peace and commerce upon. Also a draft of fourteen articles proposed by Captain Inghbird on our part for the establishment of a peace with those people, on which he desires such instructions and powers as may enable him to come to a conclusion in this matter with all possible despatch. The Board approves of Captain Inghbird's conduct and management hitherto; and proceeds to take into consideration the terms contained in the said articles of Chimnaji. Upon the whole of which, it is remarked that the success of these people has so much elated them that, as appears by the style of those articles, they are far from treating us upon equal and moderate terms. At the same time as it is undeniable that we have neither forces nor authority sufficient to enter on any measures of opposition to them, and that on the contrary we are positively enjoined by our Honourable Masters to seek by all fitting means the establishment of a friendly correspondence with these people, there appears no preferable method for us to pursue than showing such a disposition to settle a state of peace and commerce with them, if they are sincerely inclined to the like on their side, as may leave no reasonable pretence to come to a rupture with us, nor give our Honourable Masters any occasion to blame or censure us for deviating from their positive express injunctions with regard to our conduct towards these new neighbours. For the clearer explanation of the sense and opinion of this Board on the terms proposed by the Maráthas, each article is in order and separately debated upon. The Consultation continues: Having gone through the above articles, and taken into consideration a sketch of an agreement digested by Captain Inghbird into fourteen articles—Ordered that in accordance with the tenour and purport of the above recited resolutions on Chimnaji's proposals, with the additions and alterations that may appear necessary, a set of articles be immediately collected and framed with the approval of this Board, to be transmitted to Captain Inghbird for a groundwork to the treaty in hand. And the President will in his answer to Captain Inghbird take notice to him that there is no material difference in the concessions made by us to their several demands, so that if they are in earnest or sincere in their professions of desiring a friendly correspondence, we see no obstacle to an accommodation on the terms they propose. In case of their starting any such objection to any one or more particulars of consequence, that he cannot get over, he is not by a peremptory refusal to break off the negotiation, but advising us thereof without delay, wait for further orders from hence. At the same time it may be recommended to him to press the fixing the customs of their ports and rivers at the same moderate rates as ours, as the same will greatly encourage the introduction of a flourishing commerce into their country. The President will likewise signify

to Chinnáji that Captain Inchbird has his power to conclude and ratify a treaty and agreement with him on the above declared footing.¹

Meanwhile (5th May 1739), when there was still hope in Bombay that Bassein might hold out till the rains the President Honourable Stephen Law acquaints the Board that in his opinion the present state of affairs and his own recent entry upon the charge of the Government made it expedient to send a letter to the Sháhu Rájá as a proper step and introduction towards obtaining a friendly correspondence with that court, which seems the more necessary now those owning him for their sovereign are become and are like to continue our near neighbours. He observes that such an advance on our part is entirely agreeable to our Honourable Masters' directions for improving all occasions of cultivating a peaceable disposition towards us in the country powers. Further that, considering the little assurance or certainty we have of Bájiráv's and Chinnáji's designs this direct application to the Sháhu Rájá, whom they acknowledge for their master, may produce a good effect, and cannot possibly be attended with ill consequences, as we have no such dependence on the success as to lessen our guard and caution. The Board unanimously agreeing to this proposal the President remarks that it will be necessary to accompany the letter with a few presents at a moderate expense, such as looking-glasses and other Europe curiosities as may be procured on the place. As a messenger to carry these presents he had pitched on one Bhikáji Pant who had heretofore been employed on messages to that court by the Sidis, and was therefore the properest person for this purpose. This the Board approves.²

Two days later (7th May 1739), the day after the news of the fall of Bassein, the President communicates to the Board that since the last consultation Captain William Gordon had been represented to him as a person well qualified for deputation to Sháhu Rájá, as he understands the country language tolerably well and is acquainted with the humour and manner of these people. He observes the sending a European will on the one hand give more weight to any verbal explanation that may be requisite or serviceable to make at that court and on the other may be more safely depended upon for gaining information of their policy and designs than one of the country people. The Board approves this choice; and desires the President to give Captain Gordon the necessary instructions for his conduct.³

The same day (7th May 1739) the following letter from the President to Sháhu Rájá is approved: On my entering upon the charge of the Government of this island of Bombay, it became immediately and naturally my care to pay my respects to your majesty whose health God preserve with increase of prosperity for many years. To this end therefore I send Captain Gordon a person of trust to your majesty's presence, there to testify the great zeal and desire I have to deserve your friendship and approve my readiness to serve your majesty on all occasions,

Chapter I. History.

Presents to
Sháhu Rájá,
1739.

Letter to
Sháhu Rájá,
1739.

¹ Bom. Gov. Consultation, 29th June 1739, Pub. Diary 12 of 1738-39, 226-7, 232-3.

² Bom. Gov. Consultation, 5th May 1739, Pub. Diary 12 of 1738-39, 167.

³ Bom. Gov. Consultation, 7th May 1739, Pub. Diary 12 of 1738-39, 170.

Chapter I.
History.

Letter to
Sháhu Rája,
1739.

wishing thereby to establish a good correspondence betwixt your majesty's subjects and those under this Government, more especially as they are become such near neighbours. It is known to the world how much benefit and advantage may result from a free traffic and commerce being maintained with the countries not belonging to your majesty, situate as they are with respect to this place whence it may be carried on, and I do not doubt but your majesty will be pleased to allow this consideration its just weight and attention, as the same is of so great importance. The consequence is plain that your territories which border upon ours will become the centre of traffic, whereby your subjects inhabitants of them will become more rich and opulent than those of your other provinces. I wish your majesty a happy and prosperous reign, with increase of greatness, and to myself many occasions of being employed in the service of your majesty.¹

Capt. Gordon's
Instructions,
1739.

Three days later (10th May 1739) the Board approved the following instructions to Captain William Gordon: We have appointed you as an envoy to Sháhu Rája, and for the management of such concerns as you will find by the following instructions are committed to your care and discretion. On receipt of this you are to set out with all convenient expedition for Sátára in the Deccan, or in whatever place you shall learn that the Prince for the time resides, having in your charge the said letter and the presents we send accompanying it, as by the list annexed. You will likewise receive herewith some other letters addressed to his chief officers, with suitable presents, of the delivery of which you are to take care. As you cannot be so well versed in the language and forms necessary to be used with these country governments, I send with you a proper person well acquainted in those matters having heretofore been employed by the Sidis in messages to Sháhu Rája, who may therefore be serviceable to you in the course of your negotiation. He is a Gentu by name Bhikáji Pant. On your arrival at Sháhu Rája's court you are to see the letter and presents delivered with the usual ceremonies, which you are beforehand to get yourself instructed in.

As one great inducement to the step at present taken in sending you is the view of gaining some information and insight into the government, interests, and designs at that court, I would have you use your best industry and management to obtain a sufficient knowledge of Sháhu Rája's government. Who are the principal men that direct or influence his resolutions, what are their several views or interests, and the general disposition and drift of their councils. These it may be the easier for you to come at as they observe little or no secrecy in them, and may serve not only to guide you for the present in your application and conduct, but be useful to us in future. As we are informed Bájiráv does not want for great and powerful enemies at that court, you will do well to inquire who they are and how much they may be depended upon; and if you see proper occasion and opening, it will not be amiss to instil a jealousy of his ambition and growing power, which must be much increased by the accession of these conquests from the Portuguese, and consequently it must be high time to check

¹ Bom. Gov. to Sháhu Rája, 7th May 1739, Pub. Diary 12 of 1738-39, 173-174.

or put a stop to (influence already) but too prevalent. At the same time I have also thought proper to send Bájiráv a letter on this occasion, with a present in the eastern manner, and it will be necessary you guard against making him an enemy, lest he might be excited to aim at doing us ill offices.

In the conference you may have with Sháhu Rája or his ministers you are to assure them that on my coming to the Government my first care was to seek the means of renewing the ancient good correspondence and friendship betwixt our Governments, to which end I had pitched on this expedient of sending you as an early mark of the sincerity of our intentions. You are at the same time most carefully to guard against their suspicions that any fear or apprehensions of Bájiráv's arms may have a share in this resolution; letting them know that though we prefer peace and good harmony with our neighbours, we are determined to defend ourselves in the best manner we are able in case we are attacked. You are to represent to them also, and this is indeed the most material matter, how much it is their interest and advantage to live upon amicable terms with us, it being notorious that our nation has never meddled with their religion, or had any views of conquest or extending dominion in these parts. The sole business and end of our residence is Trade. This must be equally a benefit to their country, the superfluities of which we take off their hands, and import treasure and other commodities advantageous to them both in consumption and custom. All which you may at large explain and enforce.

By this means I would have you draw out some declaration of that Prince's intentions. If, without being amused or deceived, you find his intentions favourable to our purpose, you may intimate how agreeable it will be to me as they are now become our neighbours, that some treaty or negotiation be set on foot for establishing and settling a firm friendship on terms to be mutually agreed, concerning which I shall willingly hearken to any just and reasonable proposal. As their new conquered territories lie at present contiguous to or so near our island, you may insist how greatly the preserving of a free and uninterrupted trade will naturally benefit them, and serve to render their new possessions the most flourishing and rich part of their dominions. If any overtures are made that you judge may be depended upon and require a conclusion, advise me fully that I may give you suitable instructions. Otherwise when you have done your business, you are to come away keeping a diary of your procedure and transactions until your return.¹

The 15th May 1739 the President communicates to the Board the substance of a letter from one Lakshman Pant a Marátha officer in post at Bándra, requesting the resettlement of a passage boat at Máhim, it having been stopped on some apprehensions upon the blowing up of Bándra. It is agreed that, on the terms we are at present, it will be inconsistent with the declaration of our friendly intentions to keep up any show of diffidence more than is necessary for our safety, that our safety can be no ways endangered by restoring the liberty of the passage boat under a strict inspection from our customs house at Máhim,

Chapter I. History.

Capt. Gordon's
Instructions,
1739.

Máhim-Sálsette
Ferry Boat,
1739.

¹ Pub. Diary 12 of 1733-39, 177-180.

Chapter I.**History.**

Máhim-Sálsette
Ferry Boat,
1739.

and that the boat may be an advantage to the island, by bringing in provisions, green trade, and other necessities from Sálsette : Resolved that the passage be again opened and freedom given for all unsuspected persons to have free egress and regress to our island ; and should hereafter any abuse or inconveniency arise from the present settlement of the passage boat we may either timely remedy or remove it. As regards Lakshmanji's further request that leave be given for the return of such persons as have forsaken Sálsette and are at present on our island, as this point is strongly insisted upon the part of the Maráthás and as a refusal may be attended with great disgust: Agreed that free liberty be given to such as have a mind to return under the Maráthá government.¹

Negotiations
with Angria,
1739.

The same Consultation (15th May 1739) the President proceeds to offer to the consideration of the Board, whether it is most eligible to continue Angria's prisoners in their present state of captivity or to try the effects of releasing and returning them. It is observed that the expense of maintaining them exceeds the value of the labour and also service they are put to on the public works. Their release may induce Sambháji Angria to a like return of our people now actually prisoners with him, or in case of future captures. As the breach has been hitherto kept so wide, and all hopes of an accommodation seem cut off, this friendly advance on the part of the President, at his coming to the chair, may look like an overture, or disposition to receive proposals of peace, and enter on treaty towards it. And as this procedure appears to be entirely conformable to the tenour of our Honourable Masters' orders and directions for embracing all means of re-establishing and cultivating a good correspondence and harmony with the country powers round us : Agreed that the President order the release of the prisoners in the manner he may judge the most conducive to the foregoing purposes ; and that Captain Inchbird, a person usually employed in any negotiation with him, be directed to set this matter in a proper light to Sambháji.²

Aid due by
Jesuits to
Portuguese,
1739.

The 29th June 1739 the President communicates the following letter from Caitan de Souza Pereira, dated Bombay 27th June : In my letters of the 10th and 24th April, written at Bassein, I represented to your Excellency the great perplexity and straits I was involved in through the urgent necessity that place (being the principal one of this Province) stood in of money for the payment of the troops. This was the true justifying motive that obliged me to request your Excellency in the name of his most serene Portuguese Majesty to assist us with a loan from the Honourable Company of Rs. 1,00,000, being driven even to offer in pawn certain large brass cannon, as having no other security to give for the said loan. This proposal of mine not taking effect for the reasons your Excellency was pleased to declare in your letter of the 23th (16th) April and others that occurred, I was obliged to fall upon extraordinary methods. With the consent of an assembly of the senate prelates and nobility, I gave order for a search into the convents churches and private houses, and the seizure of the gold

¹ Bom. Gov. Consultation, 15th May 1739, Pub. Diary 12 of 1738-39, 187-188.

² Bom. Gov. Consultation, 15th May 1739, Pub. Diary 12 of 1738-39, 187.

jewels and silver that might be found in them. These the King took by way of loan, certificates being given in order to repayment, whenever it was possible. The money this search produced has hitherto served to pay the troops and defray other the most necessary expenses for the King's service. Of this there is now none remaining. And the Jesuits, though they have on this score received a letter of thanks from his Excellency the Count Viceroy in the name of his Majesty, have failed of the promise they made of contributing 40,000 Xeraphins, out of their great capital in Bombay. I cannot compel them to a contribution of the said sum, as they are now within the jurisdiction of the Government of your Excellency. This difficulty, joined to the pressing necessity there is of money to pay the troops and the necessary expense for fitting and preparing vessels of war, oblige me to have recourse to your Excellency, reminding withal that on my retreat from Bassein I could neither pass down to Goa through the lateness of the season, nor to any other place of this Province, for want of victuals and other necessaries in them for the support of the troops under my command. I sought shelter here, presuming from many concurring reasons to find on this island a favourable protection from your Excellency and the Honourable Company, and likewise expecting recovery of the abovementioned loan as promised by the Jesuits with the help of which our expenses might be defrayed for the four months that remain, till some provision may be made from Goa. Even in this there will be no small difficulty, Goa, as your Excellency well knows, being greatly straitened and exhausted by the late treaty of peace.

On these considerations I hope from the good disposition of your Excellency, and that weighing the justice of my reasons, you will please to apply proper measures for obliging the Jesuits to contribute without delay the loan which they promised of 40,000 Xeraphins. As vassals of the state they are in duty bound to concur with the rest in these urgent necessities. And if these troops were in any place of our jurisdiction, I could obtain from the merchants a supply of all necessaries for their subsistence till money could be raised to pay them, an arrangement which in this island is in no sort practicable. For this consideration your Excellency ought not to permit that the said troops, being under the jurisdiction of your Government, should, for want of pay, be reduced to so miserable a state as not only to disband and seek other recourse, but to put themselves on the terms of taking some desperate resolution the consequences of which might be very prejudicial to his Portuguese Majesty. At the same time it would give me the deepest concern to see them suffer, with the vexation of having no means to assist them for want of money and credit upon this island to supply their wants, my reputation and credit not being a little concerned in this important matter, being obliged to give an account of them to his Excellency the Count Viceroy. I wait for your necessary determination in this affair, and wish for many occasions to serve and oblige your Excellency.¹

At a Consultation of 6th July 1739 was read the President's answer, dated Bombay Castle the 30th June 1739 O. S., to the Commandant of the North: I received your favour of the 27th June (9th July N. S.)

Chapter I.

History.

Aid due by
Jesuits to
Portuguese,
1739.

President's
Reply,
1739.

¹ Pub. Diary 12 of 1738-39, 249-251. Forrest's Marátha Series, I. Pt. I. 45-46.

Chapter I.

History.

President's
Reply,
1739.

and likewise the enclosed letter of the Jesuits on which you ground your dispute with them. The whole matter has been deliberated upon in Council with due attention, and to see if any expedient could be found to give you entire satisfaction, which my own inclination leads me to procure you in every thing within my power. However in this case I am obliged to reply to you that according to the constitution of our laws and Government (which yourself must be acquainted with) no other ways can be used with these Jesuits who have taken refuge under the protection of our Crown, but those of persuasion and advice, which failing, as in effect they have failed, the abovementioned considerations together with the regard due to national protection hinder me from the pursuance of this affair with the Jesuits by other means. To this I hope you will not take exception, as you will do me the justice to believe that I shall always be desirous of serving yourself in particular and favouring the interests of the Portuguese nation in everything that depends upon my Government and is not out of my power as this is. With this I return you enclosed the said letter of the Jesuits. If they have failed in their promise or civil obligation as loyal subjects, I do not doubt but on their return under the jurisdiction of your nation, to whom alone belongs to judge in this matter, justice will take its due course, as for the above declared reasons this Government has no authority to interfere.¹

Aid to
Portuguese,
1739.

The 6th July the President communicates the following reply from Caitan d' Souza Pereira Commandant of the North, dated Bombay the 3rd July 1739: I received your Excellency's most esteemed letter of the 30th June in which I observe what you are pleased to say with respect to the matters proposed in mine. To this I am in the necessity of replying, that the policy of a Government belonging to the most serene Crown of England (considering the friendship subsisting betwixt our two nations) as well as the respect owing to all national protections, is the most forcible reason why your Excellency and Council and the Honourable Company should, in such extreme necessity as the present, attend to the preservation and subsistence of the King's troops. These under the protection of your Excellency's Government are now on this island in want of all the means of sustenance, having already consumed the little gold and silver that remained in the churches convents and private houses in Bassein, and the agent of his most serene Majesty of Portugal not having any supply left wherewith to furnish the requisite charges.

In the above declared circumstances I have again recourse to your Excellency, hoping that by all possible ways and means you will concur to the making a loan to the state of Rs. 30,000 to serve for the subsistence of the troops, fitting of vessels, and other indispensable necessary expenses. Having no better security to give for the said loan, I convened the officers of my council, and agreed by act thereof to oblige the Factor and Padre, administrators of Bassein, to remain on this island as pledges till full repayment be made by the Court of Goa of the whole sum. As either of these persons is bound to give account of receipts and issues to a very considerable amount, I am

¹ Pub. Diary 12 of 1738-39, 264. Forrest's Marátha Series, I. Pt. I. 47.

persuaded that the loan will be made good without delay that they may be forthcoming at the said court of Goa. Seeing the generous disposition of your Excellency voluntarily and liberally contributed such copious sums in charity to the poor widows who took refuge on this island after the unfortunate retreat from the city of Bassein, besides assisting all those who are in distress and have recourse to your Excellency, it does not seem just that the troops of his most serene Majesty of Portugal should experience a less degree of patronage from your Excellency's bounty. In case all these reasons are not of weight enough to gain due effect, as I have no other means for the preservation of the King's troops, I deliver them to your Excellency and Council, as you shall be answerable to his most serene Majesty of Great Britain for the damage and prejudice that from the ruin of these troops may result to the state and service of my sovereign. Or your Excellency will give me leave to pass with them to the island of Karanja or Sálsette, seeing it will be better that I with the Portuguese officers and soldiers die in fight with the enemy of our faith and nation, than expire under the terrible torment of hunger.¹

After debate, the President remarks that the substance of the above letter being to borrow money for the immediate subsistence of the Portuguese troops, with a tender of the best security they had for the present to give, he had discoursed with the agent for the King of Portugal about the sum that might be precisely necessary for this end. Upon the closest calculation this could not well be less than Rs. 4000 a month for the support of seven to eight hundred men, including officers of distinction. This delay cannot now last longer than three or four months before an opportunity offers and the season answers for the transport of these people to some place under the Portuguese jurisdiction. As in such circumstances this Government could not have justified the refusal of a retreat to the subjects of a European Prince in alliance with our Sovereign, it cannot be matter of dispute whether we should supply them with the necessaries of life, of which they are in want during their stay on the place. It is therefore proposed that a sum not exceeding Rs. 4000 be issued monthly out of the treasury to the order of the Portuguese agent, upon the security mentioned in the General's letter. To this the Council unanimously agreed, adding: It is here to be noted that through the sudden surrender of the city of Bassein, the loan to the Portuguese approved in our Consultation of the 17th August last (1738) was never made.²

The 7th August 1739 read the translate of a letter from the Commandant of the North to the President, requesting the advance at one payment of the loan agreed to in our Consultation of the 6th July last for the three months of residence in Bombay presumed to be for August September and October, with a further sum for the repairs of the vessels belonging to them, and necessary to carry him and troops off the shore to some place of retreat within the Portuguese jurisdiction. After debate considering that though the permission and leave given

Chapter I.
History.

Aid to
Portuguese,
1739.

¹ Pub. Diary 12 of 1738-39, 262-263. Forrest's Marátha Series, I. Pt. I. 47-48.

² Bom. Gov. Consultation, 6th July 1739, Pub. Diary 12 of 1738-39, 254-255. Forrest's Marátha Series, I. Pt. I, 44-45.

Chapter I.
History.

Aid to
Portuguese,
1739.

to the Portuguese to retreat hither after the surrender at Bassein, was a step that could not be avoided without a breach of national regards, it proved to be attended with some ill consequences both to the tranquillity of the place from their unruly mutineering soldiery, and by engaging us in loans of money for their immediate subsistence, as their quick departure and thereby ridding the place of the load of their maintenance and other troubles depends on our advancing this sum now requested: Resolved, if sufficient security for their speedy departure is obtained, that Rs. 12,000 be issued and advanced in full of the intended loan of Rs. 4000 monthly for the three ensuing months. Also that a sum not exceeding Rs. 2000 be allowed for refitting the vessels to carry them off the shore, and such supplies of stores as may serve for their defence; the management to be entrusted to the President, on the same security as before accepted.¹

The 23th September 1739 read letter from the Commandant of the North to the President, dated Bombay 21st September: Last Thursday, on my ordering a company designed for garrison to go on board a grab that lay ready, they made great objections on account of their not being paid their arrears for one quarter or three months. To oblige them to embark, I was forced to interpose my authority, and go myself on board with them. As those that remain behind make the same clamour, I convened my Council, and on enquiry of the Factor it appeared there was no money left of the loan he had received of the Honourable Company, all being disbursed in the ordinary payment of the troops. Having regard to the importance of the matter, I, with my said Council, waited upon your Excellency to request the loan of Rs. 10,000 to supply the aforesaid demand, and provide some necessaries to go from this place to the assistance of some soldiers that are sick. As on the part of your Excellency certain circumstances were represented in opposal to the grant of the sum requested, I assembled the officers ordering them to lay before the soldiery the state of our affairs. Thereby the soldiery were reduced to be satisfied with the payment of a half quarterage, for which and other necessaries the sum of Rs. 7000 is indispensably wanted. This I desire your Excellency will please to lend, considering the condition the soldiers must otherwise go in, without pay, to enter upon any action, and the prejudicial consequences that may arise to the King's service, if before they embark they are not paid at least one-half of their quarterage. Besides obliging my Council to the payment of the said sum, I promise your Excellency that out of the first money that comes from Goa, the whole amount of what has been lent by the Honourable Company shall be paid, or I will give your Excellency a pledge equal to the said loan.² After debate the President observes the unreasonable and growing demands of these people. Notwithstanding an urgent expostulation against this method of proceeding with the General himself and the King's agent, he found it impossible to procure the retreat of the Portuguese troops, without either proceeding to violent measures, or at once cutting off all pretences for their longer stay by a compliance in part with this

¹ Bom. Gov. Consultation, 7th August 1739, Pub. Diary 12 of 1738-39, 316-317, Forrest's Marátha Series, I, Pt. I, 48-49.

² Pub. Diary 12 of 1738-39, 382-383. Forrest's Marátha Series, I, Pt. I, 53.

unreasonable request. Being very unwilling to embroil matters for a small sum, he had at last prevailed on the General to make the best shift he could to satisfy his men with about Rs. 3000 for less than which it appeared impracticable to get rid of them by fair means. He therefore proposed to the Board to consent to this last trial, the necessity of which seemed evident. The same was unanimously agreed to.¹

The 9th October 1739 read letter from the Commandant of the North, dated Chaul the 6th October: Advising his safe arrival and amply acknowledging the favour and protection shown to the troops and subjects of his Portuguese Majesty. Stating on his arrival at Chaul he had made dispositions to attack Mánáji Angria who besieged it and had thought proper to offer him terms of peace, to which the situation of affairs and a desire of obeying his Excellency's orders for repairing to Goa with the troops under his command had obliged him to condescend. He requests that conveyances be sent him from hence to Chaul, for the transport of some men designed for reinforcing Daman. Debating on this last request, the Board is of opinion that our giving such a convoy as is desired up to Daman would alarm the jealousy of our new neighbours, and afford them matter of complaint which ought by all means if possible to be avoided. Agreed therefore that a civil answer be returned, expressing that the occasions of this presidency for its vessels are such as that they cannot be spared on other service. But on the first expedition of a convoy to our trade up to Surat, they may embrace the benefit of it for the safe transport of their intended succours to Daman.²

Meanwhile during the rains care was taken to cultivate good relations with Mánáji Angria. The 6th July 1739 the President acquaints the Board that in pursuance of the step resolved upon in Council of the 7th May last, of withdrawing our vessels from the mouth of Pen river, in the hopes of bringing on some overtures of a friendly accommodation with Mánáji Angria, and likewise as set forth in our Consultation of the 1st May, by our release of a vessel directly bound to his port, Mánáji Angria had sent over deputies with authority to make proposals, and treat of terms of agreement. After several conferences had fully settled every point in dispute, and the terms were ready to be ratified on each side, Mánáji's deputies of a sudden unexpectedly flew away from all the articles they had agreed to, and without assigning any reason broke off the treaty abruptly and took their leave to return to their master. For this unaccountable behaviour the President can assign no other motive than some underhand management of the Maráthas who might be jealous of any union that they thought would tend to oppose their apparent and avowed scheme of getting the whole dominion of this coast into their hands. And Mánáji, although frequently warned of the chain he is preparing for himself by an implicit obedience to them, has hitherto openly abetted and assisted that growing power without any care or security for his own interest and independence.³

Chapter I. History.

Aid to
Portuguese,
1739.

Mánáji Angria,
1739.

¹ Bom. Gov. Consultation, 28th Sept. 1739, Pub. Diary 12 of 1738-39, 377-378. Forrest's Marátha Series, I. Pt. I. 52.

² Pub. Diary 12 of 1738-39, 395-396. Forrest's Marátha Series, I. Pt. I. 54.

³ Bom. Gov. Consultation, 6th July 1739, Pub. Diary 12 of 1738-39, 257-258.

Chapter I.

History.

Rupture with
Mánáji Angria,
1739.

The 27th July the President acquaints the Board of advice that Mánáji Angria has proceeded so far towards an open rupture as to seize and detain at Revani (Revas) four boats with the people sent from hence to Nágothna, where they were to receive an equivalent in batty for the same quantity as was taken out of a *batela* freighted by the Chief and Factors at Surat on account of the Honourable Company, by the Marátha cruizers off Arnála (about ten miles north of Bassein) as may be seen in the Consultation of the 19th March 1739. That he insists as the four boats had not his leave or safe conduct to pass that way, he will not deliver them up until his galivats and boats shall be returned him, which were in the action at Karanja taken and brought away by Captain James Inchbird. This he alleges although an article of the treaty provided that the Karanja boats should be returned to him, on his paying the sum of Rs. 7000, being a most moderate computation of the damages and demands of this Government since his last rupture. Upon the whole it is the opinion of this Board that there is no further trust or dependence to be placed in one who has given such repeated proofs of perfidy and disregard to all obligations and engagements. That this last step of his in the detention of our boats, which he effected not only without the least management or regard for us, but for the Marátha government, as the boats were bound thither on an express order of theirs, is an evident mark of his ill intentions. That for the present having no opportunity for any attempt to bring him to reason by forcible means, and to prevent the immediate inconveniences which might be expected from a total rupture, such as stopping our communication with his rivers, which is yet left open to the small trading boats, we take no notice of this incident, as writing has been ever found ineffectual, and in the meantime keep ■ watchful eye over his motions, until occasion offers for seeking a proper satisfaction in this matter one way or other.¹

Attempt to seize
Angria's Grab,
1739.

At the close of the rains (26th October) the President acquaints the Board that on receiving intelligence of a grab of Mánáji Angria's being designed to push out of Kolába for Maskat, he had ordered out the *Victoria* in the morning in hopes to intercept her, by way of reprisal for the several hostilities and robberies exercised on our subjects. Of this action the Board approve.²

On the 1st November the Bombay Government addressed Mr. Rigby Superintendent of Marine: The President had on advice of a vessel of Mánáji Angria's being to sail out of Kolába, despatched the *Victoria* out in order to intercept her; but on receipt of yours, directions were immediately given to recall and fit her instantly for proceeding down to join the squadron under your command, agreeable to your proposal.³

Sambháji's Fleet
off Bombay,
1739.

The same evening (November 1st) part of Sambháji Angria's fleet were seen off Bombay by the *Carolina* and *Prince of Wales* stationed off the port, who immediately came in with the notice. The Council ordered the *Prince of Wales*, *Carolina*, and *Neptune's Prize* to join the

¹ Bom. Gov. Consultation, 27th July 1739, Pub. Diary 12 of 1738-39, 290-291.

² Bom. Gov. Consultation, 26th Oct. 1739, Pub. Diary 12 of 1738-39, 408.

³ Bombay Government to Mr. W. Charles Rigby Superintendent of Marine Bombay dated Bombay Castle 1st Nov. 1739, Pub. Diary 12 of 1738-39, 421.

Victoria and *Rose* galley, and accompany them down to Rájápur, making a stretch to the westward, in hopes of meeting with Angria's vessels. On the junction of the fleet at Rájápur, the *Prince of Wales* *Carolina* and *Neptune's Prize* being a sufficient strength in case of meeting the enemy were to return to their stations off Bombay. Accordingly they all sailed the night of this day, the *Rose* being bound to Tellicherry.¹

On the 6th November Mánáji Angria hoisted his flag on the island of Elephanta about half a mile distance from Butcher's Island, having taken possession of the same some days before, and fortified it with a redoubt by the water-side and a small fort built on the highest hill of the two of which the island is constituted.²

The 14th November 1739 the President lays before the Board a piece of advice received from good hands, importing that the Maráthas intended to attempt a descent at Máhim. For this purpose they were assembling about fifteen thousand foot near the hills of Gontara (Guntara), Mauli (Máhuli), Karavi (Khárbhao) and Tungár and in another part of the country near Bacumallangah (Báva Malangad) ten thousand horse. When all was ready the foot were to pass one night in galivats from the Serra Cortada to Sálsette and thence to the pagoda at Canarah (Kánheri) on Sálsette, and there encamp till the horse should join them by land. They would then attempt to force a descent on Bombay in the manner they did at Thána, though it should be with the loss of ten or twelve thousand men. That Chimnáji was not in Poona, but was coming down to the seaside. For the truth of all this the President says he will vouch no further than that extraordinary preparations are certainly on foot, but it is uncertain whether they are directed against the remains of the Portuguese possessions or against Bombay. At all events, till these peoples' views or designs are known, we ought not to part with any of our strength or forces. He therefore proposes detaining the Europe ship and northern convoy one spring longer. Some of the members moving for the recall of our southern fleet the President acquaints the Board, with recommendation of secrecy, that Mr. Rigby had by an express boat wrote him a private letter with intimation that he proposed going down with the *Rose* galley as low as Tellicherry, as he heard a part of Angria's fleet was to the southward, and that there he should get intelligence of the Dutch movements this season, and whether they had any design on foot against Angria. In these circumstances as it was probable our orders might not reach him in time, it was necessary to detain the vessels before proposed. To this the Board accordingly agrees.³

The 15th November 1739 the following disposition of our vessels was made to prevent any attempt or descent upon our island. The *Trial* sloop, the *Dolphin* and twelve of the lesser galivats were ordered to cruize between Cross Island and Mauli point (Máhul west of Trombay) and the *Prince of Wales*, *Neptune's Prize*, and *Sullamander* bomb

Chapter I. History.

Mánáji Angria
takes Elephanta
1739.

Marátha
Designs on
Máhim.
1739.

Bombay Defence,
1739.

¹ Bom. Gov. Consultation, 1st Nov. 1739, Pub. Diary 12 of 1738-39, 422.

² Bom. Gov. Consultation, 6th Nov. 1739, Pub. Diary 12 of 1738-39, 434.

³ Bom. Gov. Consultation, 14th Nov. 1739, Pub. Diary 12 of 1738-39, 448-449.

Chapter I.
History.

ketches were sent to lie off the Breach, and guard the coast thence to the mouth of Máhim river.¹

The 30th November 1739 the following further disposition of vessels was made for securing that island: The *Robert* galley and *Adventure* grab merchant vessels with the *Neptune's Prize* were stationed off the port and in the bays, and the *Emelia* sloop was ordered up the river to strengthen the guard.²

Surrender of
Chaul,
1739.

The day previous (29th November 1739) the President communicated to the Board two letters from the Viceroy of Goa. On these the following resolution was passed: After deliberation it appears to this Board that the proposal therein made of the capitulations for the surrender of Chaul being left to our discretion and management, and the brass artillery to be appropriated to the payment of the Portuguese debt to our Honourable Masters might have produced a very good effect, besides ensuring so large a sum in the best manner now attainable, had the Viceroy left it in our choice to treat with Bájiráv upon the cession of Chaul, a place which we know he long has had an eye upon, and which must sooner or later fall into his hands, since it is evident the Portuguese are now thoroughly disabused of the hope of any timely succour from Portugal. Further, his letter distinguishes in such a manner betwixt the Sháhu Rája and Bájiráv as might on our undertaking to treat with Bájiráv give the Viceroy a pretext hereafter to disavow our measures and procedure therein. We are sensible that as matters are circumstanced, treating with the Sháhu Rája directly would be to no purpose, since Bájiráv's power is so firmly established that such a step would give him a jealousy that we are aiming at subverting his interest. On the other hand the tender to him of a place of such strength and importance will be the strongest proof of the reality of our assurances that we have no ambition of extending our possession, or placing garrisons in his country. We hope this measure may produce a further confidence and good disposition in the Maráthás towards us or at the least leave them no pretence for mistrust or complaint. It is true the annexing so strong a place to the Maráthás will greatly increase their power. Still it is better they should owe the obligation to us than to let it fall into the possession of Mánáji Angria with whom no measures can be taken, or of the Sidi who we know is not in a condition to defend it. Agreed that an express boat be instantly despatched to the Viceroy with a letter from the President, setting forth the necessity of treating with Bájiráv or Chinnáji for the surrender of Chaul and requesting an immediate reply engaging meanwhile that the secret required in this affair will be duly kept.³

The 11th December 1739 the President acquaints the Board that the express boat despatched to the Viceroy of Goa with a letter agreeable to our resolution in Council of the 29th ultimo is returned with an answer, wherein the disposal of Chaul is left to us without reserve. Agreed that we accept of this procuracy and assignment of the brass

¹ Bom. Gov. Consultation, 15th Nov. 1739, Pub. Diary 12 of 1738-39, 450-451.

² Bom. Gov. Consultation, 30th Nov. 1739, Pub. Diary 12 of 1738-39, 491.

³ Bom. Gov. Consultation, 29th Nov. 1739, Pub. Diary 12 of 1738-39, 480-481. Forrest's Maráthá Series, I. Pt. I. 57.

artillery and proceed on our first scheme of tendering the fort to the Maráthás and endeavouring to make a merit to them of this preference, since they will see it is evidently in our hands to keep it ourselves or choose a possessor for it. Meanwhile Captain Inchbird to be appointed to treat with Bájiráv or Chinnáji, carrying with him proper credentials and the following instructions (13th December) from the President:¹ Herewith you will receive translates of the Viceroy's letters to me by which you will observe that the two forts of Chaul and Moro are left entirely to my disposal. These letters will likewise serve you for your guidance in the treaty which I now trust to your conduct and management to carry on in regard to the delivery of these places to the Marátha government. You are as far as practicable to secure the issue desired in these letters. At the same time you are to make with the Maráthás all the merit you can of the preference given to them over the Sidis Angriás or other possible possessors. You are likewise to remark to them that we cannot give a greater proof of the sincerity of our assurances of friendship than putting into their hands so strong an hold and so fine a sea-port, which must prove that we have no views of extending our dominions, or seeking to establish new fortresses in their country since we voluntarily and manifestly part with so fair an occasion. As it is not unlikely they may affect to undervalue this offer on the presumption that the place must sooner or later fall into their hands; you will naturally reply that in whatever hands those forts came, their natural strength and advantageous situation would make them so great an accession to the power in possession, that it would cost any one else the expense of much blood and treasure to wrest them out of it. All this, with the hazard of the event, is now plainly saved to them by this mediation of ours, and our warranting the delivery of the fortifications to them. For this service we insist upon nothing for ourselves but the confirmation and firm establishment of our treaty of friendship and commerce, which is likewise an advantage to their own state. I would have you then use your best endeavours to gain for the Portuguese the most advantageous capitulation you can according to the tenour of their own proposals. If the Maráthás will hearken to no terms of pacification, you must still take notice that you are to conclude for the delivery of the forts on the best or any conditions you may obtain. The Sidis we know are not able to maintain possession of the forts, and to let Manáji Angria seize them would only increase the power of a faithless treacherous pirate. Either such disposal would disoblige those more powerful neighbours and give them an handle of complaint without any benefit to ourselves, since we are determined against maintaining more country than we have at present. On the whole you have my full power to treat and ultimately conclude and ratify the treaty you shall transact with them in this matter, for as it will bear no delay or loss of time in writing backward and forward, you are to put the last hand to it without further order from hence. Adjust the means of delivery and return hither as soon as you have completed this affair. You herewith likewise receive my letters to Bájiráv and Chinnáji, for the delivery of which you are to take care.¹

Chapter I. History.

Surrender of
Chaul,
1739.

¹ Bom. Gov. Consultation, 11th Dec. 1739, Pub. Diary 12 of 1738-39, 502-503. Forrest's Marátha Series, I. Pt. I. 64.

² Pub. Diary 12 of 1738-39, 511-513. Forrest's Marátha Series, I. Pt. I. 65-66.

Chapter I.
History.

The 21st December 1739 the President acquaints the Board that the Maráthás had seized and detained fourteen of our Koli boats carried away from the fishing stakes with eighty-four men of the number of those refuged on our island upon the Marátha invasion of Sálsette, who had since voluntarily remained with us. Upon which as we are of opinion we have no means to seek satisfaction any other way, it is agreed that the President write Captain Inchbird to make a suitable remonstrance to Chinnáji for this open insult.¹

Designs of
Sambháji Angria,
1740.

On the 26th March 1740 the President received intelligence that Sambháji Angria was making preparations of vessels and men with which it was reported that he designed to fall either upon Anjanvel Chaul or Kolába, which last is esteemed the most probable. Whereupon the Board instantly wrote a letter to the Chief and Factors at Surat by an express *patamar* advising them of the Board's intention to detain the *Neptune's Prize* to strengthen the marine force in Bombay and obstruct the enemy's measures or designs against the coast: telling them not to depend on any reinforcements of the northern convoy from Bombay being otherwise sufficiently secure; and especially recommending to them to secure the passage down of the Bombay timber boats as any disappointment in that article would be of very ill consequence.²

Sambháji attacks
Angria's Kolába,
1740.

Four days later (30th March) the President addressed the following letter to Commodore Thomas Langworth: The intelligence we have received of Sambháji Angria's attempt to get Kolába into his hands, in person bringing up a force which he has actually landed, has engaged us in order to defeat his designs to send what vessels we had in port manned and equipped under the direction and command of Captain James Inchbird. This is therefore to require you immediately to repair with the *Prince of Wales* and *Trial* sloop to the assistance and reinforcement of the expedition before Kolába, proceeding to the command of the vessels employed therein according to your station, withall strenuously recommending to and enjoining you to consult and concert all measures with Captain Inchbird whose experience and knowledge of these people, their port, and other essentials, are of absolute necessity for the conduct and success of this expedition. We do not doubt of your co-operating with him for the common good and prosperity of the service and he will communicate to you our instructions for your perusal and guidance. By the best intelligence we can get the enemy has fifty-eight galivats and two grabs, his number of troops uncertain, though we suppose he has brought up with him the choice of his men on this enterprise. To oppose whom we have sent what force we had in port with a bombardize and all necessaries. You are therefore to join and do your utmost with the whole force under you, to annoy offend and destroy the enemy and their vessels, using your best skill and art to come at them so as to burn sink or endamage them as much as possible. As Captain Inchbird is charged with the negotiations of all concerns with the country governments, you are to wait his notifying to you that the matters committed to him admit of your coming away and proceeding

¹ Bom. Gov. Consultation, 21st Dec. 1739, Pub. Diary 12 of 1738-39, 520.

² Bom. Gov. Consultation, 26th March 1740, Pub. Diary 13 of 1739-40, 137-138.

hither, in which you are to conform yourself to Captain Inchbird's intimation, and the necessity of the service.¹

On the same day the President went in person on board the vessels designed for the expedition to Kolába, as well to hasten the preparations as to animate the people and see that every thing was in order to proceed early the next morning.²

Later on the same day the President acquaints the Board that this meeting is extraordinarily summoned to consider of the most efficacious measures to be taken in the present conjuncture, having yester evening received certain advice that Sambháji Angria was actually come up in person to the northward with two grabs and fifty-eight galivats which served for the transport of his men whilst another body of his troops marched overland through the skirts of the Sidi's country who it seems allowed them free passage. Sambháji Angria was himself landed at Kolába with his forces with little or no opposition, all the forts and strong places being surrendered to him in consequence of the private intelligence he had managed with Mánáji's officers. Only Kolába itself and one small out-fort depending on it, still held out for Mánáji: But that Sambháji having raised batteries against the place it was much to be feared that from the treachery of the besieged and their inclination to Sambháji the place would soon fall into his power if Mánáji's hands were not immediately strengthened by succours from hence or from the Maráthás. The President had thereupon without loss of time provisionally wrote Mánáji an encouraging letter to give him hopes of relief from hence, since which he had received one in a very humble strain from Mánáji acknowledging his past misconduct and praying immediate succours. And as our marine force is almost entirely out of port on other service, he had instantly at all events prepared the loans of the merchant vessels in port to be equipped out of hand on any expedition this Board may resolve upon on this occasion.³

Consideration being had of Sambháji's present attempt, the Board are of opinion that the success of it would be attended with very ill consequences to Bombay in proportion to the great increase of power men revenues and vessels which would enable him to be so much a more mischievous neighbour than Mánáji (allowing their inclinations to piracy and robbery to be equal); that it would oblige the Honourable Company to increase their marine force (the expense of which is already intolerable) to secure in any measure the navigation of the coast or even our harbour itself from insults as well as provide for the other indispensable occasions of this Presidency. It is agreed therefore that all possible means be used towards frustrating the success of Sambháji's expedition.⁴

The 2nd April the President acquaints the Board that he has certain advice that Sambháji Angria's coming up to Kolába was in concert with some of Mánáji's own officers, that he had accordingly got possession of the fortress of Alibág where he had established his head-

Chapter I. History.

Bombay helps
Mánáji,
1740.

Sambháji
takes Alibág,
1740.

¹ The President to Commodore Thomas Langworth on board the *Prince William*, dated Bombay Castle 30th March 1740, Pub. Diary 13 of 1739-40, 141-142.

² Bom. Gov. Consultation, 30th March 1740, Pub. Diary 13 of 1739-40, 143.

³ Bom. Gov. Consultation, 30th March 1740, Pub. Diary 13 of 1739-40, 138-139.

⁴ Bom. Gov. Consultation, 30th March 1740, Pub. Diary 13 of 1739-40, 138-139.

Chapter I.
History.

Bombay helps
Mánáji,
1740.

quarters, and would have infallibly got Kolába in his hands at the first insult had not our fleet despatched out of port the 31st ultimo (March) appeared in that critical juncture off Kolába and revived the spirits of Mánáji's party.¹

The 3rd April arrived in Bombay harbour from Kolába three of Mánáji's galivats in quest of water for supplying the Kolába garrison. By whom received advices from the fleet that Sambháji's two grabs on sight of our vessels had made off to the southward; and his galivats were hauled up a creek under cover of his guns where the water was too shoal to admit of our vessels getting at them. That Mánáji expressed great joy at the coming of our succours; and Captain Inchbird finding there could be nothing effectual done for him unless sending him a mortar ashore with a gunner and a few of the people, had complied with his desire and that sundry shells had been thrown into the enemy's fort and batteries with good success.²

Help to Mánáji,
1740.

The 5th April the President lays before the Board letters received from Captain Inchbird, written in the hurry incident to his present situation and purporting that he had been obliged to supply Mánáji Angria with a mortar and that the bombardize (Mr. Joseph Smith) and the gunner's mate (Mr. Waters) were both on shore to assist in the management of their artillery. Commodore Langworth, with the division under his command, had on the 3rd instant (April) joined the fleet before Kolába. That he was ill provided with certain intelligence of the Maráthás' designs, and whether they proposed to assist Mánáji or not, of which he wanted the speediest advice for his better guidance. That he had sent trusty people ashore to inspect the store of powder in his magazines, which appeared to be more than what one Malhárij had told him, who was it seems disaffected to Mánáji's cause; that Mánáji was, however, in want of many necessaries and money especially of which he had none; that Sambháji had undoubtedly a strong party for him within Kolába, who would open the gates to him were it not for fear of Mánáji; that in the danger the place then was, it would be highly expedient to send a body of our sepoys to throw into it, and especially to help garrison a small out-fort called Sarga Truse (Sarja Buruj) a post of the utmost importance to the preservation of Kolába itself.³

The same day, 5th April, the Bombay Government reply: The accession of Kolába to Sambháji Angria, a faithless and declared enemy, would we think be attended with such ill consequences to the island that we are entirely for preventing this dangerous revolution. Since you write that a few men might be of service to defend the place, we now send you two hundred sepoys with their officers, with what stores and ammunition you write may be wanting; the disposition of all which, together with the terms of their security, we leave entirely to you; and as you may want a small sum of money for proper expenses we send you a supply of Rs. 1000.

As to the fort of Sarga Truse (Sarja Buruj) the importance of which

¹ Bom. Gov. Consultation, 2nd April 1740, Pub. Diary 13 of 1739-40, 144.

² Bom. Gov. Consultation, 3rd April 1740, Pub. Diary 13 of 1739-40, 149.

³ Bom. Gov. Consultation, 5th April 1740, Pub. Diary 13 of 1739-40, 150.

you represent so strongly, we should not be against your throwing such men into it as may maintain it against the enemy, but we are afraid of hazarding either Mr. Smith, Mr. Waters, or indeed any Europeans even within Mánáji's power. Though if you think the place is so tenable and of such essential necessity to preserve with so small a garrison, you may take your measures at discretion for fortifying it with what people you can spare, getting from Mánáji such security or hostages for the freedom of their persons as you shall think necessary.¹

Next day, 6th April, received certain information that the Maráthás had got together some forces with which they proposed seizing for themselves Karanja and Elephanta at present in Mánáji's possession. Chimnáji himself with Bájiráv's son is marching with a body of men by land against Sambháji Angria, who is encamped against Kolába; so that Mánáji must be every way straightened.²

The same day the *Prince of Wales* galley came in from the fleet for water and provisions, and returned the same evening. No news, only the firing continues briskly on both sides.³

Next morning (7th April) descried from the fort a number of vessels belonging to the Maráthás, standing from Sálsette towards Karanja where they landed their men, and took possession of the fort with little or no resistance, so that they are now in possession of that whole island.⁴

The same Consultation continues: Captain Inehbird in a letter of the 6th April sent per boat writes to the President that the Maráthás under Chimnáji's command are coming down on the back of Sambháji who will be infallibly destroyed if he stands the consequences, as his power and forces are so much inferior. At the same time, he adds, it is much to be feared that Chimnáji being so near Chaul with his army may think it a fair occasion to seize it immediately without waiting the delays and issues of a negotiation; and the place is in a defenceless condition for want of men and money. Mánáji Angria having received a reinforcement from Karanja declined admitting into Kolába our sepoy sent for that purpose, so that Captain Inehbird is in doubt whether it will be best to send them back or keep them. The Maráthás have already taken a frontier place called Páli (in Bhor State, six miles south-east of Nágothna) on their way to Alibág, where Sambháji is encamped and pretends to fortify.⁵

Next day (8th April) the President received a letter from a commanding officer of the Maráthás notifying his having taken possession of Karanja, and intending to do the like instantly by Elephanta. In conformity to which, he forthwith sent a few men who seized that island, finding no resistance from Mánáji's people, and set about demolishing a fort Mánáji had built on one of the hills.⁶

Chapter I. History.

Advance of
Maráthás,
1740.

Maráthás
take Karanja,
1740.

Maráthás'
chance of
taking Chaul,
1740.

Maráthás take
Elephanta,
1740.

¹ Bom. Gov. to Captain James Inehbird dated Bombay Castle 5th April 1740, Pub. Diary 13 of 1739-40, 153.

² Bom. Gov. Consultation, 6th April 1740, Pub. Diary 13 of 1739-40, 156.

³ Bom. Gov. Consultation, 6th April 1740, Pub. Diary 13 of 1739-40, 157.

⁴ Bom. Gov. Consultation, 7th April 1740, Pub. Diary 13 of 1739-40, 157.

⁵ Bom. Gov. Consultation, 7th April 1740, Pub. Diary 13 of 1739-40, 157.

⁶ Bom. Gov. Consultation, 8th April 1740, Pub. Diary 13 of 1739-40, 157.

Chapter I.**History.**

Peace between
Mánáji and
Sambháji,
1740.

The same Consultation continues : Received advice from Kolába that the Maráthá army was actually arrived before the place, and the vanguard had a skirmish with Sambháji Angria's people in which the Maráthás had greatly the advantage. Sambháji Angria finding his retreat in danger of being cut off both by sea and land has recourse to making overtures of peace to Mánáji Angria, who finding the Maráthás under colour of assisting him had already seized Karanja and Elephanta to their own use, and were besides masters of some out-forts that commanded a great part of his country, is now afraid of losing all, and is the readier to hearken to his brother's proposals, and forget in their present common distress the quarrel that is between them. Accordingly several of their relations and Bráhmans keep open an intercourse betwixt the camp and Kolába, and a treaty is set on foot, wherein it is proposed that Sambháji Angria shall have frank passage from the fort of Kolába, and Mánáji Angria will connive at and favour his return but not admit him into the fort where he dare not trust him.¹

Transfer of
Chaul,
1740.

The arrangements for the transfer of Chaul to the Maráthás continued to receive attention. The 21st April 1740 the Board read the following letter from the President to Captain James Inehbird : After many delays and demurs the Viceroy has at length nominated and delegated his power to Don Francisco Baron de Gallenfells for the conduct and conclusion of the Chaul treaty, who being now arrived will proceed directly to Chinnáji in order to set this negotiation on foot. In pursuance of my engagement I now constitute and appoint you to proceed in company with the said Baron de Gallenfells to Chinnáji, with whom he is to treat and conclude. You are to act on my part in the office of mediator, using your best endeavours to bring matters to the best accommodation. At the same time to avoid any future inconveniences or reflections you are strictly to take notice that you are engaged no farther than such a friendly office requires, without warranting or becoming surety on either side. Any engagement of that sort on our part might expose us to many ill consequences and after-reckonings. Simple mediation and attesting of transactions is all I would have you be concerned in. As you are already acquainted with the Maráthás' demands and the Viceroy's answer, it is needless to say more in the way of instruction than that you do your best to level and remove the difficulties and objections on either side. You will occasionally have to impress on the Maráthás that in this affair we give the greatest proof of the reality of our professions and views, which evidently aim at nothing more than a peaceable good understanding with the country powers in order to carry on our trade and commerce. The protection of our trade is all that arms us or makes us desirous even of holding Bombay, without extending our dominion or gaining forts or settlements that might give them a jealousy, since they cannot but confess that we had a fair opportunity of getting Chaul for ourselves, had not those maxims we profess been against it.²

The 16th May 1740 the President lays before the Board a letter received from Captain James Inehbird acquainting the Board that, by

¹ Bom. Gov. Consultation, 8th April 1740, Pub. Diary 13 of 1739-40, 167.

² Public Diary 13 of 1739-40, 184-185.

Captain Inchbird's report and other concurrent advices, the Maráthás are so jealous of Sambhaji's power, and so many hostilities have already passed between them that they are bent upon reducing him and will in all probability attack him as soon as a proper season will allow, Chinnáji having at present retreated with his forces up-country to secure his family interest and succession on Bájiráv's death. The Maráthás have likewise been very pressing to gain a declaration of our intention in case of their attacking Sambhaji Angria whether we will assist them with our fleet or not. The President therefore desires to know the opinion and resolution of this Board in such case, that on application from the Marátha government, he may be furnished with a proper answer. On this, after consideration, the Board are unanimously of opinion that in our present situation and state of war with Sambhaji Angria and the little prospect there is of bringing him to any reasonable terms of peace, we cannot do better than embrace the Marátha party, and, so far as our forces will permit us, assist them in any expedition against Sambhaji, especially since no new charge would be incurred, as independently of this alliance the same force would be employed against this enemy. We are sensible that such a discreet use may be made of this assistance, as at the same time to oblige these neighbours and humble or weaken a resolute bold enemy. Meantime we may benefit by their enmity. It is certain we should have many ill consequences to dread from their union, and no good ones from our refusal to act in concert with the Maráthás against Angria. Agreed therefore that in case of the Maráthás pressing us to join them against Sambhaji, a favourable answer be given by the President to their proposals, containing an assurance of a reasonable concurrence with them, as far as our situation and affairs will permit us.¹

The 18th July 1740 the President acquainting the Board that Chinnáji has applied to him very pressingly for his speeding the conclusion of the affair of Chaul, and that he proposes despatching Captain Inchbird up-country to him in company with Baron de Gallenfells to put the last hand to that negotiation on the plan and footing contained in his instructions of the 21st April last, the Board entirely approves. As it will be necessary to advance some money for defraying the charges of this expedition it is agreed that whereas there is no other provision made by the Portuguese State, and that we are too far embarked in the mediation of this affair to rid our hands of it, without affording the Maráthás a handle of complaint; that the same as far as absolutely requisite be advanced by us as a loan to the Portuguese State on the Viceroy's engagement to see the Honourable Company repaid. It is to be hoped this will be the last call upon us, and as the Honourable Company's interest requires this additional trust, we presume they will not disapprove.²

The 16th September 1740 the President acquaints the Board that Captain Inchbird is now returned from the Marátha country in company with the Portuguese deputy, bringing the following report: As the Maráthás and Portuguese are unwilling to trust each other the

Chapter L

History.

Transfer of
Chaul,
1740.

¹ Bom. Gov. Consultation, 16th May 1740, Pub. Diary 13 of 1739-40, 202-203.

² Bom. Gov. Consultation, 18th July 1740, Pub. Diary 13 of 1739-40, 262.

Chapter I.
History.

Transfer of
Chaul,
1740.

only expedient they could agree upon was for us in a neutral quality and as mediators to take provisionally possession of the forts of Chaul and Moro, with condition to deliver them to the Marátha power as soon as certain advices shall arrive of their having agreeable to articles entirely evacuated the Goa territories of Salsette and Bardes. Captain Inchbird, without engaging further than to represent this matter to the Government here, has now left it open for us either to accept of this deposit or reject it. It is now recommended to the Board for their deliberation which is the best part to pursue. Debating thereon it is observed that many ill consequences may arise from our taking such a step as receiving immediately the charge of that place in respect especially to the Portuguese, whose government may probably be changed by this time and we shall run a risk of their disavowing our procedure, and perhaps impute the blame of it to us. On the other hand, should we refuse to act in their behalf they would then reproach us with inconsistency with our promise to assist them in quality of mediators, and of indifference to their preservation. All sides of the question being duly weighed, it is the opinion of the Board that the best expedient to gain time, and secure the fullest authority for our intervention will be for the President to write the Viceroy to send him a full power, nay and a request to take charge of these forts, he supplying us with all the incident expenses. The letter to be conceived in the plainest and most managed terms for our security.¹

Sambhaji
increases his
Force,
1740.

The 4th August 1740, the President thinks it necessary to acquaint the Board that he has certain intelligence that Sambhaji Angria is preparing and increasing his sea force for some enterprise and that it behoves to take under serious consideration the state of our marine, and whether as it is it will be sufficient to watch the enemy's motions and answer all the exigencies and occasions the service will require after the opening of the season, until the arrival of the Commodore ship. Concerning which he is advised by Captain Freeman and others that from the severity of the season at Home and the great difficulty there is to procure men for their ship the Honourable Company will hardly be able to get theirs for this side out in time to reach this place before December next (1740), and desires Captain Freeman (who attends without) may be called in and examined as to his opinion and the grounds for it. Captain Freeman being accordingly called in and interrogated, confirms the above declaration and withdraws.

The President then sums up the number of vessels to be anyways depended upon. These are the *Rose* galley, *Prince of Wales*, *Neptune's Prize*, the new grab, the *Salamander* bomb ketch, the *Trial* and *London* sloops with the galivats. He proposes the question to the Board, whether or not this force is sufficient without the Commodore ship both to watch the enemy's motions (whose increase of power and designs have been already noted) and to protect the trade in convoy to the northward and southward. The Board all agree that our present force is not sufficient, Mr. Geekie excepted, who gives his opinion that it is. The President then proposes that since the *Montague's* demurrage

¹ Bom. Gov. Consultation, 10th Sept. 1740, Pub. Diary 13 of 1739-40, 342-343.

will not commence till the 17th November next (1740), she may be kept in reinforcement of our marine till the Commodore ship or some other arrives us to relieve her, which can be of no ill consequence or increased expense to the Honourable Company. And for the present she may be ordered up to Surat, thence to bring down coffee and piece-goods for this Presidency, as with proper management she may be down time enough for any service she may be wanted for. This is agreed to.¹

The 8th October 1740 this letter to the President was received from a messenger sent by Sháhu Rájá: God preserve you in your Government of Bombay. After assuring you of my friendship, I am to inform you that on a disunion between the valiant Mánáji Angria and Sambháji, I was induced, on a knowledge had of the former's merit, to preserve him in the possession of Kolába, who acquaints me of the assistance and favours you have bestowed on him, and with which I am extremely pleased. On the first advice given me of Sambháji's late attempt against the other, I despatched my secretary Jiváji Khandaráv, but on his arrival the said Sambháji retired thence being struck with fear. Mánáji is my faithful servant and therefore shall not want my protection, whether against Sambháji or any other that may presume to molest him; and as you are his neighbour I hope you will continue to favour him on all occasions. Your sending me frequent letters will be always pleasing to me.²

The President answers to the Sháhu Rájá, styled Mahárájá or the great king, who values the honour of carrying the Umbrella, 9th October 1740: From the hands of your messenger I was honoured with your letter and vestment; and beg your majesty will be assured of my just sense of this token of your favour. As we are situated so near your dominions, in order to conduct our commerce with all possible justice, I thought it necessary on my arrival to despatch a gentleman to your presence for paying my respects, who did on his return hither duly relate the civilities your majesty showed him, and I hope we shall experience a continuance of the same. Sambháji Angria persisting to disturb our navigation, as well as of others trading in these seas, we have been compelled to maintain a considerable force for protecting us against his attempts; ever being disposed on our parts to concert terms of friendship with him; but his well known perfidy has hitherto prevented a conclusion we so much desire. When I arrived here, we had many of his people prisoners to whom liberty was granted with marks of courtesy exercised to them. Yet notwithstanding this, he now detains with severe treatment three Englishmen taken last year in a small grab. But as your majesty is his sovereign, and are pleased to honour us with your favour, I hope through your goodness to see their release effected, which will lay us under a high obligation. It gives us great pleasure that your majesty approves of the aid we bestowed on Mánáji Angria for preserving his fortresses against the attacks of Sambháji; And we shall readily continue our friendship to Mánáji provided he

Chapter I. History.

Shán Rájá on
The Angriás,
1740.

The President
on The Angriás,
1740.

¹ Bom. Gov. Consultation, 4th Aug. 1740, Pub. Diary 13 of 1739-40, 306-307.

² Public Diary 13 of 1739-40, 359-360.

Chapter I.
History.

will duly exercise the means towards rendering his country beneficial to his own people and others, by observing a strict justice, which we are assured will prove much more advantageous to him than cruizing on the fair traders, as he has hitherto done. *N.B.*—According to the custom of the country a note was put in the packet bag containing the above letter to the following purport: The English Government begs the Serene Máhárāja will accept of a statue of a cow and calf; also a clock with chimes and several moving figures.¹

The 10th October 1740 the President acquaints the Board with the arrival of a person from the Sháhu Rájā (as noted in the Diary under the 5th instant) who brought a present of a *sirpán* together with a letter from him, translate whereof is read, and whereto an answer had been prepared which is approved.²

Maráthá
Seizure of
Bombay Boats,
1740.

The 27th October 1740 the President informs the Board that the Maráthás have lately seized four boats belonging to this island and actually furnished with our pass and colours; that he had made application to the commanding officer at Arnála where they had been carried, but had hitherto met with evasive answers and pretexts to elude the claim. Even though the release of these boats should be effected, the Maráthás' action showed how little their observance of treaties is to be depended upon. Some time since he had sent the Maráthás the impression of a seal affixed to the passes so that they must have known the boatmen belonged to Bombay. That the whole Maráthá proceedings show a proneness to dispense with all engagements when not immediately subservient to their inclinations. As we have it not in our power to oppose them by force, it is indispensably necessary to proceed with the utmost caution, and as far as possible prevent the evil designs which sooner or later they may attempt to put more effectually in execution. The Board, duly considering this representation, and that frequent captures of trading boats will strike a terror and dispirit in the merchants, the securing of whom calls for some regard, agree that a part of the marine force be constantly stationed on convoy between this port and Surat. With this object we direct the superintendent of the marine on their return to prepare the vessels now employed to the northward to proceed back on that service.³

Chaul and
Moro held
in deposit,
1740.

The difficulties in the way of the peaceable transfer of Chaul and Moro from the Portuguese to the Maráthás again occupy a leading place in the Consultations. The 14th October 1740 the President acquaints the Board he had called this meeting to communicate a letter received yesterday from the Viceroy of Goa with an authentic instrument enclosed, expressing his full and clear declaration and request of our receiving the deposit of Chaul and Moro, under the terms prescribed in the treaty concluded between the Maráthás and their commissary (as mentioned in Consultation the 16th September last) his acceptance and ratification of which he has now returned. The President remarks that the Portuguese inability to supply the expense unavoidable on the occasion

¹ Pub. Diary 13 of 1739-40, 359-360.

² Pub. Diary 13 of 1739-40, 357.

³ Bom. Gov. Consultation, 27th Oct. 1740, Pub. Diary 13 of 1739-40, 374.

of the delivery of Chaul, which by a moderate computation must amount to Rs. 8000, gives him the utmost concern. That indeed he should have been averse to entering into the present measure but from a conviction of the benefit that may accrue to the Portuguese which depends on the preservation of those fortresses until the proper time for the cession. He assures the Board he has disbursed out of his own private fortune between eight and ten thousand rupees for that purpose. And urges as it is our national policy to assist the Portuguese and since on the issue of this negotiation rests their future quiet in India, the repayment of the incidental charge whereof will be secured by the most valid writing from the Viceroy so as to avail at the Court of Portugal, he is willing to hope our Honourable Masters will not disapprove of our advancing the sum requisite for this service. Especially as, should the affair fail of being brought to the desired end, the result may subject us to many ill-consequences both from the Maráthás as well as the Portuguese. In this opinion the Board concurs and agrees.

A state of the military is then laid on the table, in order to appoint a garrison for the security of the Chaul fortifications, for which two hundred of our military with proper officers together with the Portuguese now there are esteemed sufficient. As it is uncertain how this proposition may be treated by those in possession, who may show a disinclination to vacate the place, it behoves us to proceed with great circumspection. Therefore the President proposes instantly despatching Captain Inehbird to acquaint the Commandant Don Francisco Baron de Gallenfels of the Resolution received from the Viceroy, and to be particularly informed by him (whose veracity we may rely on from his general good character) of the present disposition of the people, and whether they are willing to (give charge of the forts). Of all this Captain Inehbird is to forward immediate notice, we delaying further movement until its receipt. This precaution being judged highly necessary is approved and the following instructions for Captain Inehbird are prepared:¹

As when you were at Poona the Maráthás would not finish the long debated treaty with the Portuguese unless we absolutely assumed the charge of Chaul and Moro as a deposit until the fortress of Cocolem (Cancolim) and the village of Ansolna (Assolna in Goa Salsette) should be vacated and restored to the Viceroy, we, on a willingness to assist his nation, did represent this matter to him at the same time assuring him of our readiness to comply with the part desired, provided he would furnish us with a proper instrument in writing requesting our so doing. This being come we are now preparing some people to proceed on the service, but our numbers being small and having many services to employ them on, we are obliged to act with caution, lest unsurmountable difficulties might be thrown in our way. You are, therefore, to embark on the bomb ketch and repair to Chaul, where you are to deliver the Viceroy's letter now given you as well as another from the President to Don Francisco Baron de Gallenfels the Commandant, and explicitly know from him whether the soldiers

Chapter I.

History.

Chaul and
Moro held
in deposit,
1740.

¹ Bom. Gov. Consultation, 14th Oct. 1740, Pub. Diary 13 of 1739-40, 361-362.

Chapter I.
History.

Chaul and
Moro held
in deposit,
1740.

and people now in charge of the garrison will without hesitation consent to our assuming the deposit of the place, and also assist willingly in its security until the proper notice comes from Goa, that the Maráthás having performed their parts we may surrender the fortresses so deposited with us unto the order of Báláji Bájiráv agreeable to the articles stipulated and now in your possession.¹

The 5th November 1740, read the following letter from Captain James Inghird to the President, dated Chaul 4th November 1740: Don Francisco discovers such a malignant spirit in the Padres, that he is apprehensive they are combining in some ill designs, and is afraid if not prevented they will put the city in flames. Sure, such unheard-of villains and inconsiderate men are hardly to be met with. I tell Don Francisco the consequences of such actions may be highly resented. And, as the Maráthás may not easily forgive such proceedings, they may probably return measure for measure; and what we are doing for the relief of the miserable state of the Portuguese may prove fatal, and involve us in a labyrinth of trouble. This, and the means to prevent it, I pressed him timely to consider. Don Francisco says the only way is without loss of time to draw off the Portuguese garrison and to keep all preparations secret till the arrival of the vessels, when he will have all his men in readiness immediately to embark. When the Portuguese garrison embarks he advises me to place guards in all the convents and oblige the Padres to withdraw and prevent further mischief. He hints to me that Chaul may be in as bad a situation as Moro was. For he reasonably apprehends evil results from the malignant spirit of the Padres. I can plainly see the Don's whole garrison look on themselves as little better than prisoners. As they have been long here starving and without pay, they are afraid they shall be forced hence to Goa or some other place with their families to end their lives in misery. This I believe at the hazard of their lives they would prevent. I urged the danger of delays, and that it would be proper he should write your Honour. To this he agreed and forwarded the accompanying letter. Should your Honour think it advisable to withdraw the Portuguese garrison, Don Francisco will want fifteen or sixteen *shibars*. Each of the thirteen companies must have one for them and their families. The others Don Francisco will want for himself and the Captain of the place. Exclusive of the Portuguese the present garrison is three hundred of our troops, of whom I propose one hundred for Moro and two hundred for Chaul. At the same time, as it has already proved in the case of the Sidi, the main security from foreign attempts must be our dependence upon the Maráthás. This confidence in them is great, but it cannot be avoided. At the foot of the Moro hill is a body of four hundred Marátha sepoyes and in a fort adjoining the limits of Chaul is another body of two hundred and fifty. If any attempts should be made against Chaul, we must permit the Maráthás to remain in and defend the limits. This is all that we shall expect from them. Should the Moro be attacked, we shall be obliged to admit the Maráthás to defend the lower towers, as our own people will be unable

¹ Public Diary 13 of 1739-40, 368.

to do more than defend the upper and main place. We daily expect the arrival of the body of men that Chinnáji is to send to the camp of Saint John. I have written to Captain Walker, but humbly submit the whole to your Honour's consideration.¹

The accompanying letter from the Baron de Gallenfells, dated Chaul 4th November 1740, was in the following terms: I am to inform you that yesterday on burning the principal altar belonging to the Dominican Convent, where Captain Inehbird and I are quartered, the fire seized the roof, and had presently consumed the whole, if the necessary assistance had been delayed. This accident (though undesigned) greatly alarmed the officer appointed by Chinnáji Appa to take an account of the artillery and ammunitions to be delivered. As I am apprehensive what in this case happened by ill fortune may arise in another convent through malice, I am with all earnestness to request that you will please to transport my people with all expedition to Bombay and so prevent the many fatal consequences that may attend the state by the least delay. The three hundred men you have sent hither will be sufficient for its security at this time, as there is no room to expect that Saubhájí, Mánáji Angria, or the Sidis will make any attempts. For the transport of my people I shall want fifteen boats, which I beg may be hastened for the reasons above recited, and so overcome this difficulty as you have done several others which were much greater.²

At the same Consultation after debate agreed: The only expedient to prevent further ill consequences is the immediate removal of the Portuguese garrison to Bombay. As so many impoverished people may incline to evil designs, they are not to be permitted to land in Bombay with warlike arms; and are to be quartered at the habitations designed for the weavers, with a proper body of our sepoy's patrolling their quarters. To the unavoidable expense until they can be again sent away, we must submit. That the *Neptune's Prize* be directed to proceed to Chaul to strengthen the place against any attempt. Her detachment and crew with the sloops now there will be a considerable reinforcement. As we are uncertain whether the *Neptune's Prize* can safely be carried into the Chaul river, we leave the issue of orders to Captain Inehbird.³

On the 11th November 1740 the President wrote to the Viceroy of Goa: On the 17th and the 31st of October I had the honour to address you, copies whereof are now transmitted. I am truly concerned at so great a delay in receiving the expected advice for our quitting the fortresses of Chaul and Moro. Our continued keeping of these fortresses is unsupportable exposing us not only to heavy expense, but to the absence of a considerable part of our forces and of the whole of our fleet. At the same time we are so excluded from any dependence on our people that all of them are withdrawn hither. It must be clear to your Excellency that in more zeal for your service we assumed the holding of those places, always supposing that in ten or at most

Chapter I.

History.

Chaul and
Moro held
in deposit,
1740.

¹ Pub. Diary 13 of 1739-40, 391-391. ² Pub. Diary 13 of 1739-40, 391-392.

³ Bom. Gov. Consultation, 5th Nov. 1740, Pub. Diary 13 of 1739-40, 389.

Chapter I.

History.

Chaul and
Moro held
in deposit,
1740.

in fifteen days we might resign them. As in this we are unhappily disappointed, this boat is hastened express to convince you it will be impossible for us to continue longer in Chaul than one month in all. If through any default in the Maráthás the treaty you have made with them cannot be instantly ratified we beseech you will cause your own forces to repossess Chaul and Moro, otherwise their abandoning will be unavoidable. For your Excellency will nowise desire that we risk the concerns of our Employers by persisting in holding Chaul. I am moreover obliged to represent to you that according to the Company's standing rules we cannot employ their money otherwise than for their own immediate and actual service; and although for assisting your state we have in some cases deviated from those so positive orders, yet your Excellency will not desire we should increase our guilt and endanger our own proper fortunes which may probably be rendered liable to satisfy all loans so advanced without their permission. I therefore entreat your Excellency to provide for the support of your troops withdrawn from Chaul, and restore with all possible speed those sums we have issued for your service. I should not be thus pressing with your Excellency were the matter less important. After effecting the business he went for, Sambháji Angria is returned from Sátára. His success at Sátára and the fact he is preparing to send his fleet this way, increases our uneasiness.¹

Chaul handed
to the
Maráthás,
1740.

Three weeks later (2nd December 1740) a Consultation contains the following entry: Received a letter from Captain James Inchbird with advice that the Maráthás had given assurances their people should be down and receive possession of Chaul by Thursday. He therefore desires five *shibars* may be sent for conveying our people away, and a large boat for the baggage and remains of ammunition. To this a reply was instantly given expressing our satisfaction on the likelihood of getting clear of that troublesome trust; and the boats required were accordingly ordered.²

A week later (9th December) a Consultation records the successful issue of this troublesome trust: Captain Inchbird returned from Chaul with all our people, having delivered that place to the persons appointed by the Maráthás, to the entire satisfaction of both parties.³

Underi,
1741.

The safety of Henery or Underi and the recovery of the Sidi's out-standings are once more prominent in the 1741 letters. A Consultation of the 28th February 1741 records: Certain it is this charge for defending Underi is productive of no advantage or utility to our Honourable Masters and only tends to increase the Sidi's debt. As recalling our people must be first proposed to the governing Sidi and the withdrawing the cannon may possibly give some handle of disgust which from the intelligence we have of a large body of the Moghal's forces being on their march against the Maráthás and even advanced near these parts, we cannot think it would be prudent to move therein at this juncture, though we shall watch a proper opportunity for

¹ Public Diary 13 of 1739-40, 397-398.

² Bom. Gov. Consultation, 2nd Dec. 1740, Pub. Diary 13 of 1739-40, 434-435.

³ Bom. Gov. Consultation, 9th Dec. 1740, Pub. Diary 13 of 1739-40, 437.

effecting it in future.¹ Regarding this same subject the 3rd April 1741 the President proposes, so soon as a vessel can be spared, to send Captain Samuel Walker to discuss this matter with the Sidis at Rájpurí and bring it about upon amicable terms. This the Board approved.²

The 29th April 1741 The Honourable Mr. Stephen Law, Governor and President, addressed Captain Walker: Though you have already instructions from myself and Council under the 28th instant touching your present deputation to the Sidis, yet I shall remark some necessary points. As it is proper you should carry a present to the head Sidi and Sidi Sambal his second, the subsequent things are provided to be given as you think most suitable; two presents of fine gold chints, value Rs. 90, two chests of rosewater, two fuzzees (fusces) value Rs. 50. What little gratuities may be necessary for the servants about the Sidis, you will bestow in the manner you esteem most consistent which must be left to your discretion. The charge of defending Underi, including pay and provisions to our men now there, amounts to nearest Rs. 1900 annual, which matter your instructions point out to you. I think should the Sidis not consent to our withdrawing our guns, yet you should prevail on them to our having the granadoes and such like articles that are not proper to remain in their hands. By our present calculation the Sidi's debt to the Company, which includes the value of the stores at Underi, amounts to nearest Rs. 40,000. In case they do agree to our possessing said stores, which we shall take at the value they were rated, then a considerable sum will be deducted. For the remainder they must be pressed to give us an assignment on the *tankha* of Surat which is hinted to you in the instructions. There has been a rumour that the Sidis and Sambháji have lately come to a good understanding with an intent to execute certain projects against Mánáji Angria, the Maráthás, or us. You must therefore endeavour to get at the reality of what has passed as it may be of service to us to know. Should the Sidis start the subject of our appearing as mediators between the Portuguese and Maráthás in the cession of Chaul, as you know this was a point we could not withdraw from, without totally leaving the Portuguese remaining possessions to the extremest hazard, your own judgment will suggest the needful reply.³

The above instructions given by the President to Captain Walker are read to the Board and meet with their approval.⁴

The 11th May 1741 Captain S. Walker writes in reply: I acquainted the Sidi with your Honour's orders to this garrison and the several posts round Bombay not to suffer any armed sepoys coming from the neighbouring powers to land upon this island; that, however well assured your Honour was of their friendship to this place, you could not exempt their people from being subject to this order, which could not be done without the other neighbouring powers taking exception. He said he had received a letter some months ago from your Honour acquaint-

Chapter I. History.

Capt. Walker
sent to Sidis,
1741.

Results,
1741.

¹ Bom. Gov. Consultation, 28th Feb. 1741, Pub. Diary 14 of 1740-41, 107-108.

² Bom. Gov. Consultation, 3rd April 1741, Pub. Diary 14 of 1740-41, 141.

³ Public Diary 14 of 1740-41, 161-162.

⁴ Bom. Gov. Consultation, 1st May 1741, Pub. Diary 11 of 1740-41, 165.

**Chapter I.
History.**

Results,
1741.

ing him with the order and regulation you had issued to be observed in future, with your reasons therefor. He said he was very glad that your Honour had made such regulations and that he was well acquainted with the situation of Bombay. That it was a place of trade where many people resort under the denomination of merchants from all parts of the continent; and that it behoves the government of this place strictly to observe in future the regulation your Honour had made, and that for his part he was so far from taking it amiss that he was glad of it as it tended to the security of his friends.¹

The 15th May on his return from his deputation to the Sidis Captain Samuel Walker delivers a report of his transactions which is read. On this the President informs the Board that in discourse with Captain Walker, learning the Sidis had consented to return certain stores from Underi, as also the withdrawing our people, he immediately gave orders and appointed a vessel to convey them hither.² The final settlement of the Sidi's outstandings was for some time delayed. At last in March 1743 the Court of Directors write: 'The Sidi's debt being at length likely to be cleared is pleasing to us. The many delays obstacles and difficulties that constantly attend recovering money from the country powers must warn you against making loans to them on any pretence whatever.'³

Marátha
Aggressions,
1741.

The Maráthas in Sálsette, who as noted above in October 1740 carried off certain Bombay fishing boats, were not long before they again gave trouble: At a Consultation of the 12th June 1741 the President reminds the members of the frequent intimations he has given of Marátha insolence. Their conduct gave him great uneasiness. Constant attention and even on some occasions the disbursing of small sums, had hitherto kept things tolerably quiet. Lately they had gone so far as to interfere in the process of the Bombay Courts of Justice though the cause of action arose on the spot and the parties were inhabitants of the island. On this occasion Kondáji Mánkar, commanding on Sálsette; appointed a person to discuss the question in dispute. When discussion was refused Kondáji's agent passed over to Máhim with a body of armed attendants. In addition to this Kondáji threatened to send orders for seizing all boats and effects belonging to our subjects at Kalyán. Submission to so gross an imposition will bring on us great discredit and in the end will prove an introduction to the Maráthas' still greater demands and insults. In this case it appeared most eligible through Captain Inchbird to expostulate with Kondáji and endeavour to make him hearken to reason. If this fails and redress cannot otherwise be obtained, application to Poona will be unavoidable. In this opinion the Board are unanimous.⁴

Settlement
with Kondáji
Mánkar,
1741.

A Consultation a fortnight later (26th June 1741) approves the following letter of instructions to Captain Inchbird:⁵ Kondáji Mánkar

¹ Public Diary 14 of 1740-41, 199.

² Bom. Gov. Consultation, 15th May 1741, Pub. Diary 11 of 1740-41, 189.

³ Court to Bombay 13th Mar. 1743, Pub. Dept. Court's L. Vol. 3 of 1742-51, 39.

⁴ Bom. Gov. Consultation, 12th June 1741, Pub. Diary 14 of 1740-41, 223-224.

⁵ Bom. Gov. Consultations, 20th and 26th June 1741, Pub. Diary 14 of 1740-41, 232-233 and 238.

the Marátha governor of Sálsette, having as you well know treated us lately in a very unkind manner, myself and Council have thought it convenient that you do proceed to him for expostulating on the same and endeavour to prevail on him that he may in consequence of the articles of friendship with the late Chimnáji Appa behave to us in a way consistent with the amicable terms we have ever been careful to maintain on our part and which we mean to observe in future. Some time since one Shankarbhat Bráhma, inhabitant of this island, having a dispute with Gammábai (Gangábai?) widow, also resident here, relating to certain lands situate on this place, the cause came to a hearing before the Mayor's Court. On a full discussion and examination the matter terminated in favour of Shankarbhat pursuant to the rules observed by the caste of Bráhmans, who, we understand, were consulted on the occasion; Gangábai not being satisfied made complaint to Kondáji Mánkar the governor of Thána. When Shankarbhat went that way on his proper business he was detained and after near two months compelled to assign the said Gangábai one-half of the lands in dispute. On this Kondáji Mánkar wrote me a short intimation that Shankarbhat from a knowledge of the other's right and moved by conscientious motives had given the same to Gangábai voluntarily, desiring that she might accordingly enjoy it and be exempt from any trouble or molestation for having applied to him. As this matter so evidently tended to deprive us of the authority we ought to maintain over our people, I evaded sending a positive reply intending that you should discourse with him personally how unjust, not to say insolent, it was in the Marátha government to assume the cognizance of what in no sense comes under their jurisdiction, and that we never will or can consent to allow them any such power. If Shankarbhat was of himself disposed to part with his own right, we should not interfere.

Again, lately, on some Europeans deserting, we made application to Kondáji Mánkar who was at last so kind as to permit their return. For that end by my order you did send over an officer and four sepoys to conduct back the deserters. But under pretence that the said officer's father owed money to a Marátha, he was arrested, detained several days, and in the end was not suffered to leave till he had paid Rs. 25. This was surely a most absolute act in arresting our officer when on application made here we should readily have compelled him, as we have done others, to satisfy any just debt, provided the party had wherewith to that end. You must therefore endeavour to convince Mánkar and others in authority that such incivilities are a manifest breach of the friendship we are desirous of cementing with them.

Again, we are frequently troubled regarding the cession of slaves even although they may have been in captivity here for many years, and the ascertaining the right is so difficult that we are sadly incommoded by such demands. Seeing our agreement comprehending the delivery of slaves is but of two years' standing its enforcement should be limited to such slaves as may have come here since that time. Yet in this in order to gratify the Maráthas we have made great advances paying money for slaves long since in dispute, merely because we would not appear slack in doing all that is possible for pleasing them. On the other hand we are unable to get any slaves that have lately fled from

Chapter I. History.

Settlement
with Kondáji
Mánkar,
1741.

Chapter I.
History.

Settlement
with Kondáji
Mánkar,
1741.

hence, as they are generally screened by the petty or superior officers, and in cases of debt even in the most obvious cases we hardly ever obtain any relief.

In consequence of our solicitation the Maráthás have long since consented that no people come over hither with arms as a different conduct might be prejudicial to our safety from the numbers that resort not only from the Marátha country but also from Mánáji Angria, the Sidis, Cutch, Scindy, Cambay, Gogha, Surat, Persia, and elsewhere. In spite of this it happened lately that on Mánkar's Parbhu being prevented repairing hither with many armed men, Mánkar so highly resented this as to threaten the stoppage of all our effects in Kalyán and other parts. I must say this was a notable piece of arrogancy and hope when you come to lay this case before Mánkar he will be brought to consider he had no reason to be provoked. Though we cannot withdraw the cautions we exercise still if after previous notice, on any occasion he is inclined to send over a person of weight with three or four armed men, we shall readily acquiesce.

Though I have represented the foregoing chief points you are well aware of many others wherein we are ill treated. You must strive to convince them we are determined to maintain all our engagements, and if Mánkar and others near us will not manifest the same desire on their part, we shall be under a necessity of remonstrating all their injuries to Poona for obtaining a due redress, not at all doubting but we may prevail there as we have hitherto prevailed in matters of the like nature. Our island is evidently advantageous to their country, our trade benefiting the Maráthás more than it benefits the Company. All impediments and obstructions to our trade must prejudice themselves—a fact so plain as to require no argument. Custom has fixed the necessity of making some presents on visiting these people. You may therefore carry with you a silver rosewater bottle, some flasks of rosewater, and a little fruit to be given to Kondáji Mánkar, governor of Sálsette, and the same for Gangádhár Pant who commands in Thána Fort. If you think anything else more acceptable and it does not cost much, I leave it to you to do therein as you shall approve. I presume you will hold it convenient to retain your presents until you see what temper they are in and how far they are disposed to regard our complaints. I wish you success in this deputation.¹

The 27th June 1741 Captain Inchbird forwards the following account of his negotiations with Kondáji Mánkar: We had a long discourse in regard to slaves and matters of debt arising between the Maráthás and our people. I remonstrated how impracticable it would be for either them or us to decide matters begun long before the Maráthás acquired the Portuguese dominions. At last this was admitted and promises were given that it should be considered a rule of conduct.

As regards the question of retinue they were very pressing for us to allow that such officers belonging to them as may have occasion to come to Bombay on business should be permitted the attendance of ten

¹ Public Diary 14 of 1740-41, 233-235.

sepoys. After my representing the inconvenience thereof as the same would be expected by Mánáji Angria the Sidis and others, they were contented that such officers should have no more than five armed sepoys.

When I set forth that while we are ready to gratify them in every thing within our power, the slaves which run hence are not to be got and in other respects we are unkindly treated, they desired that all which is passed may be forgot, and undertook that no further cause of complaint shall arise.¹

The 10th July 1741 Captain James Inchbird returning some days since from his deputation to Kondáji Mánkar delivered the President a narrative of his proceedings, by which it appears, notwithstanding all that was urged, the Maráthás could not be brought to acquiesce in the order forbidding their officers passing to this island with an armed attendance. It was therefore necessary to allow an officer to come with five sepoys and the usual arms. This had accordingly been mutually stipulated. Ordered that the same be signified to the custom-masters of Bombay and Máhim for their guidance, and that it extend also to the Sidi and other neighbouring powers who undoubtedly will expect to be indulged in the like mark of distinction.²

Two months later (8th September 1741) the President observes that the Maráthás are in the habit of opening all letters coming to Bombay. This and other suspicious actions had its rise in jealousy conceived from some misrepresentations of the plan we should pursue if the expected Portuguese armament came this way. As our Honourable Masters have in their last commands approved the treaty entered into with the Maráthás and recommended the cultivation of their friendship, he had seriously considered whether it may not be highly expedient by a proper agent to represent the exact neutrality we design to preserve and the uprightness of our intentions. The Board being fully convinced of the justness of the proposal and Captain Inchbird being esteemed the most proper person to conduct such a deputation, the following instructions are ordered to be prepared.³

On the same day 8th September 1741 the President writes a letter to Captain Inchbird, in which he says: The President has received certain notice that the recent Maráthá practice of opening all our letters proceeded from their jealousies of our joining the Portuguese against them. This has its rise from letters from the Commanding Officer at Pundem (Panjim) near Goa wherein it is expressly said that our Honourable Masters had sent positive orders for us to join the Portuguese. That this has rendered the Maráthás extremely suspicious of us and may produce some ill effect should we omit to use all the means in our power for removing their distrust. This is therefore to direct you, with all convenient speed, to repair to Thána and there in our name to assure the commanding officers that by the last shipping the Honourable Company have approved the agreement made between us

Chapter I. History.

Armed Escort
to Country
Powers,
1741.

Capt. Inchbird
sent to the
Maráthás,
1741.

¹ Public Diary 14 of 1740-41, 252-254.

² Bom. Gov. Consultation, 10th July 1741, Pub. Diary 14 of 1740-41, 247.

³ Bom. Gov. Consultation, 8th Sept. 1741, Pub. Diary 14 of 1740-41, 346.

Chapter I.
History:

Negotiations
with Sambhaji
Angria,
1741.

Stricter
Surveillance
in Bombay,
1742.

and the late Chinnaji Appa, and that we shall strictly and inviolably observe the same on our parts in every respect. Should the Portuguese make any attempts against them (of which intention we are at present totally ignorant) time will discover the reality of our professions. After performing the above at Thana you must proceed to Bassein and make the very same declaration to the commander there and as he and the others have some confidence in you, we believe you will be able to convince them of our upright meaning.¹

During 1741 efforts were made to establish friendly relations with Sambhaji Angria. The 13th October (1741) the President received this letter from Sambhaji: I have seen your letter. Observing the contents and what has been signified to me by your messenger Amadji Korlia, a war has long been maintained between us, and it is my desire that a peace be established for the public welfare. I ought to have sent capable and intelligent people to you, but, as yours is so, I have told him what is necessary. If you are willing to adjust a peace, write me so by the persons I now send. Afterwards I shall appoint others versed in things to proceed to you, and then on your sending able men with your sealed agreement, each of us must observe the same. You desire the release of the people I have in prison which is of small importance; on your sending men hither, the prisoners may proceed with them. I am willing to be in friendship with you, and, if God pleases, this will be effected. I leave Amadji Korlia to relate every thing. I wait for your answer and desire your affection.²

On the 28th January 1742 the President observes to the Board that considering the situation of this island with respect to the several neighbouring governments the various and large numbers of people who continually resort hither either on trade or otherwise furnishes cause of anxiety: Further even as regards those properly esteemed inhabitants we are not sufficiently acquainted either with their character or their trustiness: Bearing in mind that it is the undoubted and fundamental maxim of all states to enforce such cautionary measures as may be best calculated for the prevention of any designs whether attempted from open force or secret treachery, he is induced to propose the following points for the consideration of the Board as tending to greater safety and security. That as the Bazár Gate, where is a continual concourse of people either to or from the town, has at present only a few privates on duty under a serjeant's command, he apprehends it would be better, both in point of security as well as discipline, that an ensign be stationed in that post with two serjeants two corporals and thirty private men, and that a proper apartment be provided for the accommodation of the officer. Further that for shutting the town gates hours should be fixed namely for the Apollo and Church Gates at sunset and for the Bazár Gate within half an hour after sunset. That a large bell be placed over the Bazár Gate to be rung about a quarter of an hour after sunset and to continue ringing a quarter of an hour when all the inhabitants living within the town are to repair home and those living without are to go out before the bell has done ringing, and that the signal may be still better heard the Fort and Church bell to ring

¹ Public Diary 14 of 1740-41, 317-348.

² Public Diary 14 of 1740-41, 419.

at the same time. That, as at present each gate has not a bell, until bells are provided a drum may begin beating at the time mentioned and continue a quarter of an hour. That such servants as live without the fort and are employed by gentlemen in the fort may have leave to go out by the Bazar Gate wicket or postern at any time till 9½. That no housekeeper on any pretence presume to entertain any strangers after the hour fixed without previous leave being given by the President or in his absence by his second. As a number of boats and vessels constantly lie in Moody's Bay, that the people belonging to such vessels or boats do repair on board every evening before the gates are shut, except, with due permission, such *nākhudās* or others from foreign parts as may be confided in. In order to have an exact account of all inhabitants on this island Mr. Robert Rawdon and Captain Thomas Stoneham to be appointed to take a list of all housekeepers living within the walls; to examine into their characters, how long they have been inhabitants, what is their family, what arms or ammunition they may have, and also at the same time to enforce the prohibition of furnishing any offensive weapons or ammunition of war as ordered in Consultation of October 1740. That after the above list is perfected all of whose fidelity we are not thoroughly satisfied, be compelled to live without the walls on a reasonable recompense being made for removal. And that with the assistance of the vereadores and other proper persons, Messrs. Charles Crommelin and George Sadlier do proceed on the like examination with respect to those living in the districts of Mahim, Sion, Warli, Parcel, and other parts of the island distant from the town, and Mr. William Davis and Mr. Edward Say with respect to those districts which lie nearer as Dongri, Gregao (Girgaon), Malabar Hill, and Apollo which are esteemed in the district of Bombay.¹ The space between the bandar and the marine yard, a large area in which are several open passages to the water side as well as back doors belonging to private houses which may afford opportunities to people to get off the island and sometimes clandestinely to bring goods ashore, he proposes all be shut except the marine house and the old bandar. That the old bandar is to be shut precisely at 10 every night and that except by that passage after sunset no person be suffered to pass or repass without license. That with the view of rendering the streets more regular and uniform persons living within the town be required to state the nature of the houses they propose to erect, and that leave to build be refused until the applicant's character be ascertained, and that work be not allowed to begin till the engineer has lined out such house in a regular manner for bringing the streets into order. For this service the said engineer to be allowed if a tiled house Rs. 5, if a cajan house belonging to any in the Company's service nothing, if to any one else Re. 1. It would also be highly proper to reserve vacant spaces within the walls for accommodating families of Europeans, topasses, sepoys, and the better sort of Christians, the gunroom lascars carpenters smiths sawyers and other handicrafts, as well as the most trusty of the Bhandaris which on occasion may have to be brought within the fortification for its defence.

Chapter I. History.

Stricter
Surveillance
in Bombay,
1742.

¹ The lists or reports showing the result of the enquiries by these specially appointed officers are not available.

**Chapter I.
History.**

Vanjárs in
Bombay,
1742.

The Board being well convinced how little faith can be had on our neighbours the Maráthás, and that the security of the place must in a great measure depend on a constant guard and great circumspection, accord their unanimous approval to the above proposals. Directed the proposed rules be as soon as possible put into execution and a publication be immediately issued notifying the same to the inhabitants.¹ Four days later (February 1st) issued the above publication by beat of drum and affixed the same at the usual public places.²

A Consultation of the next day (February 2nd) records: Several merchants attending and being admitted, they represent many inconveniences that will follow the denying lodging to strangers within the town. The chief inconvenience will be denying such a license to the Vanjárs or heads of caravans, for whom hitherto the brokers and merchants with whom they deal have provided proper lodging within the town. These Vanjárs are inhabitants of the Ghát country, who in the fair season resort hither bringing considerable sums of money with which they purchase large quantities of goods, and then return up-country. The number at any time upon the island is very uncertain as they are occasionally long delayed waiting the arrival of shipping. As the trade carried on by these Vanjárs is beneficial to the island, we should be loath to give them any disgust. We therefore resolve that any Vanjárs who come directly to the house of any merchant or broker may be permitted to remain provided the person to whose house they resort make a report thereof immediately to the Governor and be answerable for their behaviour during their continuance on the island. To this the merchants readily acquiescing are ordered to withdraw.³

Bombay
Building Rules,
1742.

At a Consultation the 12th February 1742, a list of the several inhabitants living within the town taken by Messrs. Rawdon and Stoneham is laid upon the table. On this list the Board proceed to pass the following notice and orders: That it will be highly necessary to abstract the said list distinguishing the several castes and separating the old inhabitants from the new who have come since the commencement of the Sidis and Portuguese troubles. That to accommodate within the town such of the new comers as may desire it, Messrs. Edward Owen Robert Rawdon and Thomas Stoneham, with the assistance of the engineer, be appointed to allot vacant places, suitable to the abilities of every one inclined to build. And that they examine into the characters of all within the town and order those whose fidelity cannot be trusted to withdraw from the town, choosing others of good repute to take their places. To provide the necessary sites the Moody and others who have vacant ground must either themselves build on it or resign the same recovering a reasonable ground rent from the occupiers to be fixed by the forenamed gentlemen. At the same time a particular regard is to be had that the main streets have the best houses and that any houses of very small value now standing on the main streets are removed for a

¹ Bom. Gov. Consultation, 28th Jan. 1742, Pub. Diary 15 of 1741-42, 46-50. Forrest's Home Series, II. 76-77.

² Bom. Gov. Diary, 1st Feb. 1742, Pub. Diary 15 of 1741-42, 63.

³ Bom. Gov. Consultation, 2nd Feb. 1742, Pub. Diary 15 of 1741-42, 67-68.

reasonable consideration to be paid by those wanting to erect good houses in their place. So far as may be without detriment to the public every sect or caste should be suffered to remain where it is most agreeable to them. Again in consequence of the recent Resolution enforcing the complete clearance of 300 yards round the town wall several houses within that line must be demolished or removed. Directed that Messrs. W. Sedgwick Richard Saunders and George Scott be appointed a Committee to consider and determine how and where to accommodate those evicted, having in regard that Moors and the several sects of Gentus may dwell where it is most easy and agreeable to them in their respective qualities. In case there shall not be ground of the Company's to receive them, that they prevail on the *juzindárs* or other landholders to receive all they can without great inconvenience. As the sites of certain miserable habitations of bucket-makers, of the *Pharás* or sweeper caste at Dongri are likely to be useful to the trading Moors, the same may be appropriated for this purpose, proper satisfaction being given the bucket-makers for their compulsory removing. Ordered that the Secretary signify to the respective persons these our Resolutions and at the same time recommend the several points to their attention as conclusive to the general good of the place.¹

The 18th March 1742 the President acquaints the Board that having lately been to see the several houses erected by the inhabitants who have been obliged to remove their former houses for clearing round the town wall, he finds that to accommodate some it will be necessary to appropriate the spot now kept for the Company's garden. It is further thought a part of some private oarts will be required as well for the benefit of the people as to make the building uniform and regular. The Board agree and note that a proper place for a garden should hereafter be fixed.²

At a Consultation the 3rd August 1742, apparently in consequence of the Directors' strictures on excessive expenditure connected with the fortifications, the President notices the following items are still unexpended: Counterscarp wall from the Bazar Gate to the Church Gate, Rs. 17,350; Bridge at the Church Gate, Rs. 1560; Wall along Moody Bay, Rs. 29,716; To removing 167 houses, Rs. 36,052. On this the President puts the question—Shall the whole be finished; if not the whole, what part? To this the Board answer that as the ditch is now so far advanced the counterscarp must be finished, otherwise the earth will be continually falling in and filling the ditch, and that the work be pressed on so soon as the water in the ditch is sufficiently low. As regards the Moody Bay as the place is open and exposed to a descent from boats the wall seems a necessity. The members will themselves view the place that they may the better judge whether any alteration can be made in the present design so as to answer the intent and at the same time lessen the cost. With regard to the houses not yet removed without the town walls, the Board agree they shall remain as at present until Mr. Wake's arrival, the President adding he esteems their removal most important and not to be delayed for the reasons

Chapter I.

History.

Bombay
Building Rules,
1742.

Savings and
Retrenchments,
1742.

¹ Bom. Gov. Consultation, 12th Feb. 1742, Pub. Diary 15 of 1741-42, 91-92.

² Bom. Gov. Consultation, 18th March 1742, Pub. Diary 15 of 1741-42, 141.

Chapter I.**History.**

Savings and
Retrenchments,
1742.

stated when it was determined to remove both houses and trees. The President further remarks that towards the end of the dry season the water in the town wells often fails. And as there is a large tank near the foot barracks and fronting the fort, it would seem to him proper to have the same closed in by a small wall to exclude cattle and keep the water sweet and clean. The expense he apprehends will not be considerable. Directed that the land paymaster prepare a calculate of the expense and lay the same before us.¹

At a Consultation of the 27th August the Board consider the estimate of Rs. 432 for a wall from the pay office to the tank house. After debate the Board apprehend the wall is unnecessary as the sentinel who is constantly on duty at the pay office may be ordered to suffer no persons or cattle to come to the tank on that side, but direct them to go to the usual place. Directed that the first mentioned work (the counterscarp) be set about and completed as soon as possible.²

Esplanade
Clearing,
1742.

At a Consultation the 3rd December 1742 the President desires the Board will determine whether the remaining 137 houses valued at Rs. 36,052 within 300 yards of the town wall ought to be removed. On this it is agreed that as the answer of our Honourable Masters may be expected by the first ship from England, no resolution need be passed especially as no immediate necessity for the work is apprehended.³

In this connection in a letter dated the 13th March 1743 the Court writes: We observe with satisfaction a stop was put on receipt of our orders by the *Somerset* to the removing any more houses. According to a minute of Consultation upon our present Governor Mr. Wake's arrival, there is no necessity for it, though the late President urged the clearing as strenuously as if our all upon the island depended on it. As regards the Moody Bay wall they were glad to learn it would be completed for Rs. 5000 instead of the original Rs. 29,000 and withal more commodiously. This they describe as a pleasing specimen of our President's attachment to our true interest, the saving our money; an instance from which we persuade ourselves that the reduction of our charges will be effected wherever prudently can.⁴

Musalman
Converts,
1744.

The 24th February 1744 a Consultation notes that Mr. Thomas Marsh coming this morning from Máhim, informed the President that last night a Marátha officer came from Sálsette demanding some women which were in the Sidi's galivats who sailed in company with the *Restoration*. The other gentlemen of Council being in the Fort in order to attend the President to the Town Hall for holding a Quarter Sessions, the following letter was immediately prepared and communicated to them and being approved the President signed and sent it away: Being informed that the Maráthas are greatly disgusted with the Sidis for having seized and forced to turn Muhammadans, certain Marátha women now on board the galivats proceeding to Surat in

¹ Bom. Gov. Consultation, 3rd Aug. 1742, Pub. Diary 15 of 1741-42, 352-353.

² Bom. Gov. Consultation, 27th Aug. 1742, Pub. Diary 15 of 1741-42, 397.

³ Bom. Gov. Consultation, 3rd Dec. 1742, Pub. Diary 15 of 1741-42, 566.

⁴ Court to Bombay 13th March 1743 paras 64-65, Pub. Dep. Court's L. Vol. 3 of 1742-1751, 40.

your convoy, this being a religious affair in which we have nothing to do, you are to advise the people of the said galivats, to take the best care of themselves they can, for that your orders are not to interfere in such religious matters. In case the people of the Marátha vessels demand the women of you or attack the Sidi's galivats, you are not to give the Sidis any assistance or protection. Give the like orders to Captain Lyell.¹

A letter from the Directors dated 11th March 1742 contains the following entry: The Maráthas we observe with pleasure continue good neighbours. We would have you cherish their friendship by all proper means; thus a beneficial commerce for us and the whole island in general may be carried on. No umbrage must be given by siding with the Portuguese against them, upon any pretence whatsoever, but an exact neutral state must be maintained.²

A second letter of the 13th March 1743 records to the same effect: We take notice with satisfaction that you continue on good terms with the Maráthas upon Salsette, there being no manner of complaints in the advices before us of their conduct. We persuade ourselves that by a prudent management and behaviour, they will be very good neighbours and for the welfare of the island we would have you cultivate a lasting friendship with them being at the same time duly upon your guard against all treachery and deceit.³

Of the Portuguese the same letter notes: We expect by your renewed solicitations the Portuguese at Goa have before now honourably discharged their debt. The relief afforded them in the times of their great distress should be a strong motive to them to pay what they owe without further delay.⁴

Chapter I. History.

Neighbourly
Maráthas,
1743.

Union of Companies (1708) to French War (1744).

SECTION II.—GENERAL, 1708-1744.

The following are the main general and trade references in the records for the period between the Union of the Companies and the French War, that is between 1708 and 1744.

In a letter to the Bishop of London dated 5th October 1715, the Reverend Mr. Cobbe, to whose energy Bombay owes its Cathedral, gives the following description of the Town and Island at the beginning of this period:

'The island is about eight miles long and twenty in circumference. It is much healthier than heretofore, or than is usually reported; partly perhaps owing to the prohibiting the *Buckshaw* (*Baushe*)⁵ or smaller fish,

Bombay,
1715.

¹ Public Diary 17 of 1744, 70-71.

² Court to Bombay 11th March 1742 para. 56, Pub. Dept. Court's L. Vol. 3 of 1742-1751, and Comp. of Standing Ord. Vol. 1 of 1715-1721, 131.

³ Court to Bombay 13th Mar. 1743 para. 56, Pub. Dept. Court's L. Vol. 3 of 1742-1751, 39.

⁴ Court to Bombay 13th Mar. 1743 para. 58, Pub. Dept. Court's L. Vol. 3 of 1742-1751, 39.

⁵ Colonel Yule (Hobson-Jobson, 89) under the word *Buckshaw* gives the Konkani *bousa* little fish of all kinds. He doubts whether *bousa* is the correct form and also whether it is correctly applied to more than one kind of fish. Enquiry in Bombay and in Kárwár support the correctness of Col. Yule's authority. The word is *bause* or *boushem* a Konkani term for fry still in use in Goa and Kánara (Dr. G. Da Cunha; Mr. J. Davidson, L.C.S.).

Chapter I.

History.

Bombay,
1715.

with which they used to dung their ground and trees; partly to the stopping repair of several sea-breaches, through which a third part of the island was formerly overflowed. The soil is poor and barren, a sandy rock, yielding little besides rice cocoanuts and a few greens. Still the neighbouring coasts plentifully supply us with a variety of provisions. *Syrsh* (Shiráz) wine, our chief liquor, we have from Persia, very strong and wholesome, but not so well tasted; arrack from Goa or Batavia; and extraordinary good wheat from Surat, with which we make the best bread in all India. We have three good forts here and one strong built and well fortified castle. Including the English, the inhabitants are reckoned about 16,000. They are of different languages and religions. The Moors and Gentus have their mosques and pagodas. The Portuguese, several, I think five, churches supplied with Padres and Clericos from Goa; the English have only a private chapel for their public devotion. Here are indeed the remains of a spacious Church formerly intended but never brought to perfection, the ruins of which are to this day a standing monument and byword of reproach to us among the heathen. This reproach we hope in a little time to wipe off, having already gotten considerable large contributions from the neighbouring factories, as well as this place, in order to rebuild it. Generally speaking the inhabitants of this place are a people wholly given to idolatry and superstition, ignorant and poor. They consist chiefly of Moors Gentus Portuguese and Cooley Christians some converts which the Portuguese have made by marrying into their families, the better to ingratiate themselves with the natives.¹

Government
of Bombay,
1715-1720.

As regards the Government of Bombay, Aislabie, with whose rule the title of General ceased, left India in 1715, and after a brief inter-regnum during which Stephen Strutt the Deputy Governor discharged the duties of the executive, was succeeded by Charles Boone, usually styled either President or Governor; who again in 1720 was succeeded by William Phipps. The Governor's salary was £300 a year; the Deputy Governor who was also Accountant, received £100, and Lawrence Parker, who succeeded Strutt in the office, received another hundred pounds as Chief Justice. The third in Council had £70; the fourth and fifth £50 each; the sixth seventh and eighth, each £40. Then came the Minister, as he was called, whose salary was £50, and as usual another £50, a gratuity, if found deserving. A physician and two surgeons received £36 each. Altogether in 1720 there were 46 covenanted servants in Bombay - Military officers not being then included under that head—whose salaries were paid half-yearly, and amounted to £786 14s. 9d. or Rs. 6293 annas 3 pias 7 exchange being at the rate of 2s. 6d. to the rupee. There was also a monthly charge of Rs. 2620 made on these gentlemen's account for diet and other allowances, and horses were provided for them at the Company's charge. A separate account too was kept for extraordinary disbursements, under which head came the Steward's bill of Rs. 1170, for festivities on New Year's and Christmas Days. There were no restrictions on private trade, so that Civil and Military Officers were openly engaged in large

¹ Cobbe's Letter to the Lord Bishop of London, 5th October 1715, in his account of Bombay Church (1766), 21-22.

mercantile speculations with the Company's sanction, as may be seen in the extant ledgers, called the Latty Customs or Records. Occasionally the Government remunerated their servants for special services, as when in this year (1720) they recovered Rs. 9,05,000 by the payment of debts long due to the Factory at Surat, they ordered with great liberality that five per cent should be presented to the Governor and two per cent be divided amongst the other Members of Council. Governor Boone's share is entered in the books as Rs. 43,255, and each Member of Council obtained Rs. 2376, prizes which they richly deserved for the adjustment of the Company's claims was entirely the result of their spirited efforts.¹

The domestic concerns of the Presidency were for the most part of an ordinary and prosaic character. The Governor's ordinary duties were in the main those of a merchant; he not unfrequently might be seen chaffering like a very petty tradesman. A cursory glance at the archives would satisfy any inquirer that the heads of Government were engrossed with trade rather than with politics. If they were occasionally compelled to discuss questions of administration or of war and peace, these were but digressions, and they soon reverted to the business of the warehouse. The duty of His Honour the President was to make himself acquainted with the state, variations, and prospects of the markets, to cheapen calicoes, criticise investments of pepper and haggie in his Council Chamber with natives for the disposal of a European cargo. He and his correspondents used a surprising jargon of terms, most of which, since English drove Indian fabrics out of the market, have become obsolete. They wrote a great deal about 'dutties,' 'lungees,' 'tapseils,' 'guinea-stuffs,' 'scarlet drabs,' 'porpetts,' 'brawls,' 'chelloes,' small or large 'neccances,' and 'chints' of sorts. His Honour of Bombay, when writing to His Worship of Surat, would wish to know 'what was doing in large Broach, blue Brodera, and Cambay cottons;' he had received a supply of cloves nutmegs and mace, with 'a very choice assortment of sword blades;' he would be glad to hear that the gentlemen of the Factory could purchase plenty of cotton-yarn, and he took that opportunity of enclosing an invoice of 'flowered cloth,' which had been forwarded as an experiment to see whether such an article would be in demand; he lamented that their supply of elephants' teeth had fallen short that year; found fault with the way in which the chelloes had been 'calendered and papered;' he and the Honourable Members of Council, having measured three pieces out of each bale of the neccances, had decided that they were far too coarse, and had not found a piece which was not deficient in length and breadth; they were now on the look-out for a supply of chints's, including 'coloured and white grounds,' with so many 'pairs green grounds small running work,' and a few 'with large noscgays and bunches of flowers,' or 'small dittoes and stripes.' Then after having despatched these important advices, the Honourable the President and Council would perhaps, like any respectable auctioneer of the present time, give notice that they would hold a public outcry, when a large

Chapter I. History.

Government
of Bombay,
1715-1720.

The Governor's
Duties,
1715.

¹ Bombay Quarterly Review (1856), III. 41-48.

Chapter I.
History.

Encouragement
to Trade,
1710-1715.

variety of goods would be offered for competition; or that there would be 'a sale by candle,'¹ the conditions of which were that the articles would be disposed of for ready money to the highest bidder who must remove them at his own risk. Such a century or a century and a half ago were the official despatches and the occupations of an Indian Governor and Council.²

Fortification
Charges,
1716.

The Court of Directors under date the 24th March 1710 order that special care be taken that all who pay the duties and deal fairly, be encouraged to trade; that none be suffered to engross all or any commodities imported, or to do anything else that may discourage merchants frequenting the port or the inhabitants that reside on the island. They add: It is vain to expect to see Bombay flourish till these orders are religiously and constantly obeyed, and that you take care that not only yourselves but all under you do their duties therein.³

In 1716, to defray the expenses of fortifying the town, the merchants and other inhabitants agreed to pay additional duties at the rate of two per cent. At the same time, on condition that they should be exempted from their former duty of raising train-bands or militia, the vereadores agreed to contribute 15,000 Xeraphins a year for the defence of the island.⁴

Plan for
saving Loss in
Exchange,
1715.

In a letter of the 5th April 1715, for the further encouraging of trade the Court direct: If at any time any country voyage is set on foot and a sufficient stock cannot be otherwise raised, and if you have such a surplus of money or proper goods as will not be absolutely necessary for despatching the ships on our hands for the ensuing season, you may join what you think fit on our accounts as far as eight or ten thousand rupees; because we are sensible, a small stock will not bear the charge of an Europe ship's demurrage, when a larger will. In case any of our ships by their late arrival or otherwise cannot be despatched the same season, it is better they should be employed on such a country voyage than lie idle. At the same time we also expect they be made to earn their demurrage or thereabouts. Take care to send us the account current of every such voyage, with the vouchers for each article. Whenever such a ship is sent to China, take care to provide gold sufficient to send to Kárwár and other of the pepper factories. We note this because we find in your Consultations gold is so much better than silver. In the Consultation of the 5th February 1712 gold is said to be upwards of twenty per cent at Calicut more than at Bombay, and in that of the 12th there is an order for selling crusadoes and buying more gold for the subordinate settlements. Also the said factories' books show a loss on foreign silver. Further if the entry of the 11th June 1713 is true the produce of silver sent from Bombay to Kárwár and sold there for pagodas, makes the pagoda stand in about eight shillings and

¹ It is evident from the Records that sale by candle was frequent at Bombay and Surat. It appears to have been ordinarily adopted in London at least during the previous century. Dryden describing the popularity of Wild's poetry, says that he had seen people reading his *Iter Boreale* in the midst of 'Change,—"nay so vehemently were they at it, that they lost their bargains by the candle-ends," Bom. Quar. Rev. (1856), III. 32.

² Bom. Quar. Rev. (1856), III. 31-33.

³ Court to Bombay 24th March 1710 para. 82, Comp. of Standing Ord. Vol. I of 1715-1721, 145.

⁴ Bom. Quar. Rev. (1856), III. 34.

eight pence.¹ Of this, as we do not know the weight of the silver sent, we cannot be sure; nor unless we know whether the pagodas there are of the same weight and fineness with those at Madras. Therefore do you advise us the true weight and fineness of the Kárwár pagoda for our future government, and whether we might not be allowed to coin pagodas at Bombay, as we do at Madras. This would save the loss in exchange.²

In the same letter, 5th April 1715, the Court write: Be careful to preserve to all the natives their civil rights. They add: Whatsoever English have liberty to reside at Bombay and do merchandize, must on pain of not continuing under our protection, if they are of age and have not done it already, enter into the covenants of a free merchant.³

Eighteen months later (30th November 1716) the Court resume: We have written to the Bay (Calcutta), and shall to Madras as we now write to you that no free merchant be permitted to return to England till the five years' residence for which he has covenanted under a bond of £1000 be expired. Our design in giving merchants liberty to reside at our settlements is for the increase of our people and of the country trade. If these aims are not attained we are deceived—a sufficient reason for recalling the grant. You will find their covenants give you power at any time to send them home if they do anything in prejudice to our interest. They can scarce do anything worse than assist these new sort of interlopers. We are told some of our servants at Surat did assist the *Victoria*. If this be true root them out that they may not have an opportunity of doing so a second time. We understand at Surat the Moghal governor asked the English Chief, whether the *Victoria* was a pirate, and the Chief answered, No. For the future, if any ships of the like sort come to your ports, let our people, if we have any at Surat, and, if we have none, do you represent to the governor of Surat, and all others of the city and port, that you do not know to whom such ships belong, nor can you say whether they are pirates or not. That you have reason to suspect that their pretence of foreign commissions has little or no truth in it, and that such commissions are either counterfeit or have been procured underhand and with an ill design from some persons who pretend authority to give out such commissions, and who in all likelihood granted them for a little money. That such commissions were obtained as a cover to show the European nations who have settlements in the East Indies, if they questioned their authority for coming thither. That the Company are so little satisfied with vessels of this class that if any English are on board them, you are ordered if possible to seize and imprison them. That if the Moors permit them trade, or so much as liberty of getting supplies at Surat, or any other ports, they may thank themselves for the ill consequence of it. That if any piracies are committed on Moor ships, the Company do declare they are innocent, and have ordered you to acquaint them. We are

Chapter I. History.

Natives and
Covenanted
Merchants,
1715.

Free
Merchants,
1716.

¹ Pagoda an Indian coin worth 7s. 8d. Grose's Voyage Vol. I. Glossary, 12.

² Court to Bombay 5th April 1715 para. 71, Comp. of Standing Ord. Vol. 1 of 1715-1721, 147-148.

³ Court to Bombay 5th April 1715 paras 78, 55, Standing Ord. Vol. 1 of 1715-1721, 149, 112.

Chapter-I

History

Free
Merchants,
1716.

credibly informed that a crew of ill-disposed persons of several nations are got together, who pretend to obtain commissions from the Knights of Malta who are always at war with the Turks to fight against the Muhammadans, and, thinking such commissions will screen them from being accounted pirates, will cruise on all Muhammadans because the Turks are Muhammadans and when they think it their interest they call all Muhammadans Turks. We hear they will also endeavour to get Muscovite or other commissions to make use of either sort as they think will most contribute to their ill designs.¹

On the 8th September 1718 the Bombay Council wrote to Surat: The Right Honourable Company having in their letters to us by these ships been pleased to give the President, at a rate to be settled in India, an allowance of consulage on all goods of English merchants living under their protection in India, imported or exported at Bombay or Surat, we have fixed the rate at two per cent, and do direct that Mr. John Hope collect the same according to the orders that shall be given him by the President on all English goods excepting those of the Company's servants residing at Bombay and Surat to which the President lays no claim.²

Goldsmiths,
1719.

The Surat Diary of the 16th September 1719 notes: Our shroffs have provided ten goldsmiths to go down to Bombay pretending it must be kept secret lest they come into trouble. We have paid the shroffs Rs. 100 and Rs. 20 for way charges and the Surat *Tankul Dároga* or mint master Rs. 100 for connivance.³

The Surat Diary of 4th October 1719 contains, the following: We received a letter from the Secretary written by the President's order to inform us that on being paid the year's *peshekash* he has sent a present of broadcloth amounting to Rs. 4540 for the governor of Surat and Rs. 2000 to be given his *diván* if it will facilitate our business.⁴

Country
Shipping,
1719.

In the matter of the Indian country shipping trade, on the 9th March 1719, the Court wrote: The more ships come to Bombay the greater encouragement and reputation to your port. Therefore do you on the first opportunity write to our settlements at Madras and Bengal, and let them know we earnestly recommend them to direct that such of their shipping as trade to the coast of India, do call at Bombay, where they shall have such fair and just usage as may invite their return. That for so far only as they trade with you, they are to pay the customary duties of the port excepting they are such goods as have paid the duties at Fort St. George. If the Company's grant of being custom free at Surat is continued, then they are to pay consulage, otherwise not, nor on any goods not sold at Bombay.⁵

The Ostend
Company,
1719.

The 4th November 1719 the Court wrote: We send you by this ship the Act of Parliament forbidding any of His Majesty's subjects being concerned in the Ostend Company's trade. Among other things you

¹ Court to Bombay 30th Nov. 1716 para 15, Standing Ord. Vol. 1 of 1715-1721. 184-185.

² Bombay to Surat, 8th Sept. 1718, Pub. Diary 1 of 1720, 65.

³ Surat Diary 16th Sept. 1719, Surat Factory Diary 611 of 1719-20.

⁴ Surat Diary 4th Oct. 1719, Surat Factory Diary 611 of 1719-20.

⁵ Court to Bom. 9th Mar. 1719 para 22, Standing Ord. Vol. 1 of 1715-1721, 116.

will note a particular clause providing for our seizing and sending to England, to answer for their offence any subjects of His Majesty found in any place within the limits of our Charter. With this we hereby positively require you and all under you to comply to the utmost of your power and endeavour.¹

The 4th November 1719 the Court wrote: Do not forget what we last year wrote in regard to the Suraters taking your passes. Remember Angria's pass-duty is one rupee a *khandi*; yours, one rupee a ton. If you humble Angria, we think with good management you might raise the duty on the Suraters to or near to what Angria levies. You might also make good use of his taking any vessel, who hath not your pass, by enlarging the number, and raising the price of your passes so far as the prudential consideration of affairs will allow.²

The same letter (4th November 1719) notes: In the Consultation of the 1st October we find a very good order to put our boats, which were partly employed by the warehouse keeper and partly by the master attendant, under the master attendant's care and that he look particularly to it that our boats neither ship nor bring on shore any private goods without receiving boat hire. Also to employ on our boats no more than the necessary lascars, and that only when in use. We doubt not the same good care for saving charges, which inclined you to make this order, will prevail to ensure its constant and careful observance.³

The 13th June 1720 the Surat Diary records: This afternoon came in two pairs of *patamurs* (or post messengers) reporting that they were despatched from Bombay on the 3rd instant one pair with letters for Surat, the other for Madras; that having passed Mahim river and coming ashore at Bāndra they were carried to the Portuguese *Cubo* (Captain) and sent by him under a guard to the General at Bassein, where they were confined and their packets demanded of them which they delivered accordingly. After four days confinement they were discharged without their letters and bid to go about their business.⁴ To prevent further inconvenience it was arranged that during the dispute with the Portuguese letters between the Bombay

Chapter I History

Convoy Duty 1719.

¹ Court to Bom. 4th Nov. 1719 para 12, Standing Orders Vol. 1 of 1715-1721, 23. In 1719 a fresh Company of European traders sent a ship to Surat. This was the Ostend Company which started in 1717 under the protection of the Emperor of Austria. At Surat the heads of the Dutch and English factories joined in doing 'all disservices possible' to the people of this ship. But the deputy governor of the city favoured them, and two more ships that arrived in 1719 seem to have been allowed to trade without disturbance. In 1720 the Surat Factory Diary under date the 4th February (Vol. 611 of 1719-20) contains the following entry: Arrived at the Surat Bar ship *Concordia* of Ostend with Emperor's colours (formerly said to be the Nottingham man-of-war). She has touched at the several ports on the Malabar Coast. The supercargoes give out she has procured a considerable quantity of pepper and is come here to make sale of elephants teeth iron and broadcloth. They employ Sāmalji Haridās for their broker. In the same volume an entry dated the 23rd October 1720, refers to the arrival at the Bar of the Ostend ship *Haarlemberg*. A few years later opposition revived. In 1727 it rose to such a height that the Austrian Emperor was forced to suspend the Ostend Company's charter. Bombay Gazetteer, Surat, II. 116; Macpherson, 295; Milburn's Or. Com. I. xlvii. and 411. The Ostend charter seems to have been suspended only for a time. As late as 1743 the Court of Directors warned the factors at Surat to be on their guard against the ships of the Ostend Company. Bom. Quar. Rev. (1856), III. 31.

² Court to Bom. 4th Nov. 1719 para. 63, Standing Ord. Vol. 1 of 1715-1721, 153.

³ Court to Bom. 4th Nov. 1719 para 81, Standing Ord. Vol. 1 of 1715-1721, 153-154.

⁴ Surat Diary 13th June 1720, Surat Factory Diary 611 of 1719-20.

Chapter-I.
HistoryOstenders,
1720.

and Surat Councils should be sent under cover to some Pársi or Banian at Kalyán.¹

On the subject of the Ostend Company the Directors on the 13th January 1720 wrote: That we may do our parts to prevent the repetition of Messrs. Hill and Sav's assistance to the Ostenders, we have thought fit to lay down the following rule and standing order: That you neither directly nor indirectly, by yourselves or others, afford the least help countenance or assistance to any Ostenders or other new upstart traders coming to Mokha. If you are honest your own reasons must tell you that for such people to get any share in our privileges and trade at Mokha, is mischievous to the interest of your native country as well as to us, and ought therefore to be opposed by all those who eat our bread. Any one found breaking this our order we will endeavour to treat according to their deserts. If on the other hand you are faithful, and do your utmost to prevent all such interlopers, you may depend on our favour and encouragement. We are assured the Dutch have full instructions from their Company to join with you in all endeavours against interlopers. Therefore on all occasions consult and concert with the Dutch what is proper to be done.²

The same letter (13th January 1720) notes the despatch of a printed Act of Parliament, made last year, to prevent any of His Majesty's subjects trading to the East Indies, under Foreign Commissions, and calls attention to the power granted the Directors to seize any of His Majesty's subjects found within the limits of our Charter contrary to this and other Acts of Parliament, and to send them to England.³

A year later (24th March 1721) the Directors continue: Herewith we send you two Acts of Parliament passed last spring, to prevent His Majesty's subjects being concerned in the Ostend trade to or from the East Indies. You will observe that whenever found out, all concerned are liable to penalties, and are obliged to make discovery upon oath, how far they have been concerned in such trade and are subject to punishment in proportion to their interest therein. That all contracts whether for money on bottomry, loading advances, supplies of stores, wage agreements, or copartnerships of all sorts relating to such trade are void. Do you draw out the substance of these provisions and hang it up in tables for general notice in Bombay and Surat and all other subordinate factories.⁴

Presents of
Horses to
Merchants,
1724.

In the choice of presents on the King's birthday economy seems to have been carefully studied. A Consultation of the 22nd May 1724 contains the following entry: There being four horses in the stables altogether unserviceable and if offered to sale not likely to fetch any thing, the President proposes presenting them to four of the most considerable Banian merchants on the island. To render the horses the more acceptable, the President suggests the dressing of them with a yard and a half of red cloth. The Board agreeing, the warehouse-

¹ Surat Diary 30th July 1720, Surat Factory Diary 611 of 1719-20.

² Court to Bom. 13th Jan. 1720 para 8, Standing Ord. Vol. 1 of 1715-1721, 21-25.

³ Court to Bom. 13th Jan. 1720 para 9, Standing Ord. Vol. 1 of 1715-1721, 25.

⁴ Court to Bom. 24th March 1721, Standing Ord. Vol. 1 of 1715-1721, 26.

keeper is directed to issue six yards for that purpose to be presented on His Majesty's birthday the 28th instant (May 1724).¹

A Consultation of a few months later (14th August) records a less economical gift: Rustam Ali Khān, the new governor of Surat, though an oppressor of the people, having as yet given us no molestation, we have thought it necessary to make him a present. We have accordingly shipped on board the *Bombay* a curious clock with chimes which, provided his behaviour gives you no good reason to the contrary, we would have you deliver him in the name of the President.²

Next year under date 20th December 1725 a letter is sent along with the Company's broker Laldās, directing the Council in Surat to present him with a horse not exceeding Rs. 400 in value.³

English deserters from the Company continued a cause of disquiet. The 22nd September 1724 the Bombay Council wrote to Surat: We understand several English deserters from Bombay now in the service of the governor have been so audacious as to insult commanders of our vessels as well as the Factory. Learn how many such the governor has entertained; and represent to him the improbability of their being of any service to him. Persuade him it is through such vagabonds that pirates, common enemies to mankind, become so numerous and try and induce him to deliver them up. If he refuses, give him to understand you have made demand according to our orders, and that you must acquaint us of the denial he makes you.⁴

From the Company's view point the transition from deserters and pirates to interlopers and Ostenders is small. The 3rd March 1731 the Directors wrote: We have good reason to apprehend that several ships with English officers and seamen are designed for the East Indies now fitting out in a collusive manner. If any should arrive on the Malabār Coast under the commission or pass of any Foreign Prince or State, who are not used to send ships to your ports, we direct that no manner of assistance be given them, no, not so much as water or provisions. We positively forbid any of our servants trading with them. Let these our orders be transmitted to all the subordinate settlements, for we will excuse none that act contrary to them.⁵

After many years of rest the question of gaming once more exercises the conscience of the Court. On the 28th February 1727 the Directors write: We are greatly concerned to hear that the mischievous vice of gaming for great sums of money continues and even increases among our covenant servants, free merchants, and others residing at our settlements in India, and that the women are also infected therewith, to the ruin of many as well on boardship as on shore. In England by Act of Parliament under severe penalties all gaming for above ten pounds value is strictly forbidden. That we may do what in us lies to prevent the evils which sooner or later generally attend and frequently ruin

Chapter History

**Present to
Governor
1724;**

**Present to
Broker,
1725.**

**English
Deserters,
1724.**

**Gaming
Prohibited,
1727.**

¹ Bom. Gov. Consultation, 22nd May 1724, Pub. Diary 2 of 1724, 68. Forrest's Home Series, II. 37; Bom. Quar. Rev. (1856), III. 54.

² Bombay to Surat, 14th Aug. 1721, Surat Fact. Diary 612 of 1723-1725.

³ Bombay to Surat, 20th Dec. 1725, Surat Fact. Diary 613 of 1724-1726.

⁴ Bombay to Surat, 22nd Sept. 1724, Surat Fact. Diary 612 of 1723-1725.

⁵ Court to Bombay 3rd Mar. 1731 para 10, Standing Ord. Vol. 1 of 1715-1721, 32.

Chapter-I.

History.

Gaming
Prohibited,
1727.

gamesters, we peremptorily forbid all manner of gaming whatsoever in any of our settlements or elsewhere in India, to the amount of ten pounds or upwards. If any of our covenant servants or others in our employ whether civil, maritime, or military, or any free merchants under our protection, or any women whether married or unmarried belonging to our covenanted servants or others under our protection shall ever be discovered to have played at one time at any sort of game, for the value of ten pounds sterling or upwards, and be thereof convicted before you by two credible witnesses, such offender, be he who he will and in what station soever, shall *ipso facto* be dismissed the service and sent home by the first shipping.

The Court proceeds: We easily foresee that the reproach of informing may keep persons silent who may know of such gaming. To prevent this we direct that you enter in your Consultations a particular account of the persons who shall from time to time be proved guilty of such gaming, and also of the accuser or accusers. For the encouragement of such accuser, if he be a covenant servant, we direct that he shall be allowed a year's standing in our service and be further entitled to our favour as a person inclined to check this vile practice.

We further direct that as soon as may be, copies of these orders be sent to all the subordinate factories and be there, as well as at our head factories, publicly read and made known within ten days after the receipt thereof, and copies be hung for general notice, that no person whatsoever may plead ignorance.¹

House Building
in Bombay,
1731.

The 1731 records contain two somewhat interesting applications for house-building. A Consultation of the 9th July 1731 has the following entry: Mr. William Henry Draper presents a certificate from the elders or *mahátárs* of Bombay regarding the measurage of a piece of ground, part of that called Umbercarry (Umarchádi) situated near the hill Visorain (Vajra ?) productive only of grass, containing according to the measurage of the country 30 *barges* (or *bargás* of 60 square yards equal in all to 1800 square yards or nearly $\frac{2}{3}$ ths of an acre) valued by the said *mahátárs* in Rs. 24 (that is nearly three pices the square yard). This the said W. H. Draper offers to pay into the Honourable Company's treasury praying he may be therefore entitled to the said spot of ground to build a small house thereon he paying the Honourable Company the annual pension over and above the said Rs. 24 purchase money which is agreed.²

A Consultation of the 3rd December has the following: The humble petition of Láldás Vithaldás, the Honourable Company's broker at Surat, Bombay 3rd December 1731: That your petitioner is desirous of building a commodious house on Bombay Island for the residence of himself and family at any time when they may be called from Surat to attend your Honours, and for the entertainment of such persons as your Honours shall, from time to time, think proper to order and direct. As he further conceives the building such a house may be a means to induce the merchants of Surat and other ports to the north-

¹ Court to Bombay 28th Feb. 1727 paras 50-52, Standing Ord. Vol. 1 of 1715-1721, 192-193.

² Bom. Gov. Consultation; 9th July 1731, Pub. Diary 4 of 1731, 70-71.

ward to frequent and reside in Bombay, he humbly prays your Honour to grant him the same indulgence as is allowed the Rustam family, who, he understands, are exempted from paying the Honourable Company any ground or quit-rent for their house.¹ After debate the Board are of opinion that the building of such a house will not only be a considerable ornament to Bombay, but by sending one of his family to reside here the broker may encourage other merchants of substance to follow him. The Board agree to grant him the indulgence he requests.²

An entry ten days later (13th December) shows how important a constituent was Laldás the broker, and with how much honour he was treated: Laldás, the Surat broker, having bought all the woollen goods lead copper and iron received by the ships last arrived from England, on his return for Surat requests to be dismissed in the usual manner with a present or *sirpav*. Agreed that we give Laldás a *sirpav* to the value of Rs. 500, and, as we have none on the island fit for that purpose, order our gentlemen at Surat on his arrival to present Laldás with a horse to the value of Rs. 800.³

A Bombay letter to Surat, dated the 17th September 1732, notices that it has blown and rained so hard for these three days past as to cause great uneasiness regarding the Company's galleys at Surat Bar.⁴

A Consultation of the 13th March 1733 contains the following reference to the sale of brass guns: The Már Rája (Maharája) Abhesingh (Subha 1733-37) now subha or governor of the province of Gujarát has for some time solicited us to sell him two large brass cannon mounted in the fort weighing cwts. 155-3-25 valued in the general stores at Rs. 48 the cwt. amounting to Rs. 7486-0-57. Seeing the Már Rajah is a person of great authority and capable of obstructing us in making our investment in Cambay and other places within his jurisdiction, and still more because the price offered far exceeds anything we could have expected, the guns also being at present of no great service, we agree to let the Maharája have the said two guns for Rs. 20,000 ready money; and direct the storekeeper general on receipt of the said Rs. 20,000 to deliver the two guns to the Maharája's agent or *vakil*.⁵

A letter from the Court of Directors, dated the 7th March 1733, contains the following on the country trade: It is matter of surprise to us that our servants should take it for granted that all their silver might be carried from one port to another freight-free upon our vessels; when as a late instance in the Bay shows they make us pay freight on parcels carried. We therefore direct that all goods and treasure, let them belong to any person whatsoever, be charged according to the usual method of computation when put on board country ships, that the amount be paid into our cash; and for our satisfaction let separate accounts be opened on the general books for the forementioned duty of coinage and for this of freight, that we may see at one view what profits accrue to us every year from them.⁶

Chapter I History

Present to
Broker,
1731.

Trade in Guns,
1733.

Country Trade,
1733.

¹ Pub. Diary 4 of 1731, 166-167.

² Bom. Gov. Consultation, 3rd Dec. 1731, Pub. Diary 4 of 1731, 163-164.

³ Bom. Gov. Consultation, 13th Dec. 1731, Pub. Diary 4 of 1731, 173.

⁴ Bombay to Surat 17th Sept. 1732, Surat Fact. Diary 614 of 1729-1732, 101.

⁵ Bom. Gov. Consultation 13th March 1733, Pub. Diary 5 of 1732-1733, 68.

⁶ Court to Bom. 7th Mar. 1733 para. 55, Standing Ord. Vol. 1 of 1715-1721, 156.

**Chapter I.
History.**

Compilation
of Standing
Orders,
1733.

Political
Relations,
1733.

At a Consultation in Bombay (18th May 1733) Government directed that Messrs. John Horne John Braddyll and John Lambton be appointed a committee to inspect the sundry letters received from our Honourable Masters since the year 1729, and abstract from them such general standing rules and orders as have been given for the better management of their affairs and likewise such as have been made here. That the same be entered fair in two books together with those that preceded that date; one of which books to lie constantly on the Council table and the other to remain in the Secretary's office.¹

How confined was the authority of the Bombay Government in 1733 and how full of distrust were their relations with the powers across the harbour, appears from the Consultation dated 24th August 1733 regarding the advantages and the risks of maintaining a ferry boat to Revas at the mouth of the Nagothna river. The President represents to the gentlemen of the Board that when it was first agreed to establish a passage boat betwixt this island and Revanee (Revas) in the river of Pen, the said port of Revanee was under the jurisdiction of the Sidi. Since his reducing that place and Thal, Revas is now under Angria. That therefore when on that side the farmer of the said passage must be under Angria's direction. In these circumstances it will be impossible to prevent his gaining intelligence of all things transacted on this island. On the other hand should we prohibit the said passage boat going to and fro, it will be a great detriment to the trade of this port as the said passage boat brings sundry provisions for the use of the island and the Benjars (Vanjáris) from the *ghát* country come hither and return with goods and merchandise. Taking this into consideration we are but too sensible that with all the precaution we can possibly use, the enemy is but too well acquainted with most things that pass on the island, the port being free for all that do come hither under the notion of traders, and we esteem it more advantageous to this settlement to receive intelligence of what passes in the enemy's country than it is to him to learn what passes here. As the Revanee passage boat is the most immediate and frequent means of securing such intelligence, it is agreed that the said passage boat be permitted to go to and fro. To prevent any inconvenience it is agreed that Mánkoji Pntlíji Parbhu, inhabitant of this island who being two years a prisoner in Angria's country is so well acquainted with most of Angria's subjects, be placed at the custom house to inspect all boats with passengers and to distinguish such as are traders from those that may come on pernicious designs, and that for his trouble he be allowed Rs. 6 per month to be paid by the customer.²

Six weeks later (5th October 1733) a Consultation records: No body appearing to rent the passage from hence to Revanee, and because of the wars in the adjacent countries the former renter not being willing to continue it on the terms of the last contract, it is agreed that until the times are more settled and we see what turn is given to the Sidi's

¹ Bom. Gov. Consultation, 18th May 1733, Pub. Diary 5 of 1732-33, 127.

² Bom. Gov. Consultation, 24th August 1733, Pub. Diary 5 of 1732-33, 177-178. Forrest's Home Series, II, 58.

affairs, we continue the boat on the Honourable Company's accounts, giving the charge and management to the custom master.¹

A Consultation of the 21st December 1733 records a shipping difficulty with the Rájá of Porbandar in south-west Káthiáwár (described as Port Bunder in Cutch): The President acquaints the Board of an application by Jagannáth Láldás, the Honourable Company's broker at Surat, representing that a grab belonging to him coming from Maskat and having in bad weather lost her mast, was obliged to put into Port Bunder (Porbandar) on the coast of Cutch. On arrival at Porbandar the Rájá or governor seized the vessel and cargo, and still detained her in spite of a certificate from Mr. Henry Lowther Chief at Surat that the vessel and her cargo belonged to the English broker. The President wrote to the Rájá, demanding that the vessel and her cargo be handed to Vandrávan Láljí the representative of the Surat broker. In reply the Rájá offered to deliver the vessel and Rs. 3000 in lieu of such part of the cargo as he had disposed of. Vandrávan refused to accept the vessel and the Rs. 3000 alleging the cargo to be worth Rs. 25,000. On this the merchants of Porbandar applied to the Rájá representing the risk that the Governor of Bombay would make a reprisal on the Porbandar vessels trading to Bombay. The Rájá was inflexible, saying he had given his ultimate answer to Vandrávan Láljí. In consequence the broker applied to the President requesting that some of the Porbandar vessels in Bombay might be stopped. The President taking into consideration the little regard paid by these petty governors to the friendly offices and good treatment shown to their subjects at this port, and that if we tamely submit to the insults too frequently offered at their ports to those trading under the Honourable Company's protection, our authority would be daily more and more despised, and hearing there was a vessel now in the road belonging to a merchant of Porbandar, who had the greatest intimacy and influence over the Rájá, and that the said vessel had on board in money the sum of Rs. 3890 bound to the Malabar Coast; he advised some gentlemen of his Council and ordered the custom master to stop the said vessel and seize the money to be deposited in the custom house until the Rájá made satisfaction for the grab he had detained.²

On the 4th March 1733 (1734?) the Directors impress on their three Presidents the necessity for harmonious action: Nothing we can think of will more effectually conduce to the benefit of trade than entire union and harmony among the three head settlements. We have therefore recommended to Fort St. George and Bengal, and now recommend you, to frame an equitable scheme for carrying on the trade to the several ports in India, jointly settling the number of ships between you, and allotting to each settlement a proper share of the trade carried to China, Persia, Surat, Mokha, and Manilla or elsewhere. In case such an happy union is brought about, we hereby direct that no other ships be permitted to go to those ports but what shall be agreed on by our several Governors and Councils.³

Chapter I.

History.

Dispute with
Porbandar,
1733.

Union
Enjoined,
1734.

¹ Bom. Gov. Consultation, 5th Oct. 1733, Pub. Diary 5 of 1732-33, 227.

² Bom. Gov. Consultation, 21st Dec. 1733, Pub. Diary 5 of 1732-33, 308-309.

³ Court to Bombay 4th March (1733-34 ?) para 84, Comp. of Standing Ord. Vol. I of 1715-1721, 125.

Chapter I.**History.**

Union
Enjoined,
1731.

The Court continues: That our servants and the free merchants may not be discouraged or debarred the liberty of raising their fortunes, we hereby direct that all persons who have an inclination and can find ready money towards the buying and fitting out those ships to sea, may be allowed to join and that if they have any goods proper to those markets, they must be taken according to their value, without any commission. It may at first seem difficult to reconcile so many different interests. Yet we are fully persuaded, if it is heartily set about, and every one concerned is willing to forego a little private gain for the public emolument, this matter may be brought about; and in a few years the advantage arising from such an union will be very conspicuous.¹

Sultānpur
Pirates,
1734.

The 13th September 1734 the President acquaints the Board that having noticed the Kolis to the northward were fitting out fifteen galivats at a place called Sultānpur (on the river Kurla six miles south-east of Talāja on the south coast of Kāthiāwār) he had sent the bomb ketch with seven of our galivats to be joined by the Surat sloop, to take or otherwise destroy the pirate vessels gathered at Sultānpur. This, he hopes, will render our trade that way more secure. The Board approves.²

Gombroon.

A Consultation of the 27th February 1735 has the following note regarding the Factory at Gombroon: As the Arabs and Sunnis are entirely reduced, we apprehend the gentlemen of the factory at Gombroon will have no great occasion for their garrison, which we must leave to their discretion. As the garrison is the main article of their charges, it is agreed to recommend their return provided it can be done with safety.³

Bombay Land
Difficulties,
1735.

On the 5th March 1735 the Court wrote: In your letter of the 18th August (1734) you complain of a want of husbandmen or *Corumbees* on the island. You state that since the Royal Charter was published our *Corumbees* refuse their subjection, and will not manure the batty grounds upon the ancient established terms, causing us to lose half the produce of such batty grounds. We cannot help saying this is a strange unheard-of doctrine. The Charter was never intended to deprive us of our property, but to secure you and the inhabitants in the free possession of such estates as you were or from time to time might become legally entitled to. The Charter by no means conveyed to the *Corumbees* a title to lands or an exemption from their prior obligations to us. You ought to exert your authority to prevent such an abuse and at the same time by good usage excite these useful men to continue among you on the former terms. At the same time we are willing you should grant them relief, if, on serious consideration, you are persuaded

¹ Court to Bombay 4th March (1733-34?) para 85, Comp. of Standing Ord. Vol. 1 of 1715-1721, 125-126.

² Bom. Gov. Consultation, 13th Sept. 1734, Pub. Diary 7 of 1734, 157. Under Capt. Radford Nunn the expedition against the pirates of Sultānpur was completely successful. After an absence of eight days Capt. Nunn returned to Surat with five guns and fourteen boats. Fifty-five more boats had been burned, five by Capt. Nunn and fifty by the Kolis to prevent them falling into Capt. Nunn's hands. This victory was secured with the loss of two European and two Native soldiers. Surat Factory Diary, 616-618 of 1734; Bom. Quar. Rev. (1856), IV, 99.

³ Bom. Gov. Consultation, 27th Feb. 1735, Pub. Diary 8 of 1734-35, 76.

that prohibiting the use of *kut* or fish manure has sensibly lessened the produce of the lands.¹

In 1735 the question of irregular levies on Bombay traders came before the Council. On the 5th December 1735 the President acquaints the Board that complaint had been made by some Vanjárs that the Bombay merchants whom they employ as brokers charge extraordinary duties amounting in some cases to 14 per cent. The details are :

Bombay Customs 5·5 per cent ;
 Weighing Duty 0·5 per cent ;
 Brokerage to Ambaidás 0·5 per cent ;
 Other Brokerage 1·25 per cent ;
 Cooly Hire 0·125 per cent ;
 Karanja Duties 3·0 per cent ;
 Thána Town Wall 1·0 per cent ;
 Basscin Duty 2·0 per cent ;
 Total 13·875.

Inquiry shows it has been customary to pay the three per cent Karanja duty on all goods passing by that island. On the other hand for the one per cent Thána and the two per cent Basscin duties no authority is known. Nárandás Takidás (Sakhidás) confesses to have defrauded the Honourable Company in their customs to the amount of Rs. 839 in three years and has in like manner defrauded the Portuguese of part of the duties which he had collected for them. We further find that the said Nárandás Takidás has advanced to the renter of the customs at Karanja Rs. 500, Nágardás Lalji has advanced Rs. 500, Lakhmidás Shankar Rs. 250, and Lakhmichand Govind Rs. 100 ; the account to be adjusted at the end of the year, when doubtless each reserves a share to himself. Without permission from this Government to presume to collect duties under our flag for any other nation, is an unpardonable insolence calling for a very severe punishment. At the same time as the practice has never before come under notice the people would plead that they did not know it was held objectionable. We must therefore think of preventing the like for the future, rather than of punishing the offenders for what is past.

It being proved that Nárandás Takidás has defrauded the Honourable Company of Rs. 839 customs, we think it just that he restore that sum and fine him and the three others above mentioned half what they have advanced for the Portuguese duties, namely Nárandás Rs. 250, Nágardás Rs. 250, Lakhmidás Rs. 125, and Lakhmichand Rs. 50. This being agreed to, the several persons are called in and acquainted with what we had ordered. As Lakhmichand had been a very small time in this business, and was instrumental in making the discovery, it is directed that his Rs. 50 fine be remitted, and that the custom master recover the fines as well as the other Rs. 839 Nárandás had defrauded the Honourable Company. Ordered that for the future except brokerage and reasonable expenses no merchants belonging to this island shall presume to charge or receive from the Vanjárs or others any duties but what are immediately payable to the Honourable Company.²

Chapter I.

History.

Levies on Trade,
1735.

¹ Court to Bombay 5th March 1735 para 70, Comp. of Standing Ord. Vol. 1 of 1715-1721, 157.

² Hon. Gov. Consultation, 5th Dec. 1735, Pub. Diary 8 of 1734-35, 270-271.

Chapter I.
History.

**Bhandári
Settlement,
1736.**

On the 25th March 1736 at the beginning of a fresh tobacco farm the farmers' bonds and articles are signed and delivered. As usual Bhiku Sinay is presented with two shawls and Manoel de Jesus with five yards of scarlet cloth.¹

**Brokers
Abolished,
1737.**

A Consultation of the 7th May 1736 records the loan of Rs. 200 to the Mukádam or head of some new Bhandáris come from the other side to settle in Bombay to provide them with houses and other conveniences.²

On the 6th January 1737 the Court of Directors wrote: We have very maturely considered the many evils we have suffered from having an established broker. We are satisfied our investment may be carried on better by contracting direct with the merchants, and that our duties and the consulage at Surat may be collected equally well by a proper person appointed for that purpose. We therefore abolish the office of Broker; and do order that the present broker, if you have any, do act no more in that capacity, and be considered no otherwise than as other merchants. This we hope will also restore to our servants trading from all parts of India to Surat, that perfect freedom of trade we would have them enjoy, which they have made such continual complaints they have never hitherto been able to obtain being always obstructed by the power, interest, and influence of the broker. For these and the like weighty reasons we not only abolish this office at Bombay and Surat, but also at all our subordinate settlements.³

**Company's
Brokers,
1737.**

In 1737 a prosecution of the Company's brokers occupied much attention in Bombay. On the 16th March a Consultation has the following entry: The President moves the Board to lay a restraint upon Jagannáth Govindás the Company's broker at Surat. A proposal is made for suing him in the Mayor's Court. But since this might have opened questions connected with the heirs of Sir John Child, the proposal is abandoned. Agreed that from the openness of the fort on the sea side, as there will be no security in keeping Jagannáth within the town walls, he be allowed in the day time liberty to go where he thinks proper, to converse with whom he pleases and only to sleep in the fort at night, and that the deputy accountant's apartments be kept for his use. To this the members agree except Mr. William Henry Draper who next Council day will give his reasons for being of a different opinion.⁴

In a Consultation of the 1st April 1737 it is unanimously agreed that Jagannáth Govindás and Manordás Láldás be dismissed from the post of brokers to the Honourable Company at Surat and that Mánekji Navroji be appointed in their stead and proceed to Surat by the first proper conveyance, and we make no doubt but our Honourable Masters will experience the benefit of the exchange.⁵

¹ Bom. Gov. Diary, 25th March 1736, Pub. Diary 9 of 1736, 136.

² Bom. Gov. Consultation, 7th May 1736, Pub. Diary 9 of 1736, 236.

³ Court to Bombay 6th Jan. 1737 para. 86, Standing Order Vol. 1 of 1715-1721, 207. This order was comprised in the Court's L. of 13th Jan. 1738, para 3, ditto 207.

⁴ Bom. Gov. Consultation, 16th Mar. 1737, Pub. Diary 10 of 1736-37, 59-60.

⁵ Bom. Gov. Consultation, 1st April 1737, Pub. Diary 10 of 1736-37, 81.

It being an established custom upon the appointing of a new broker to give him a *sirpáv* and horse as a mark of favour, the not complying therewith would be construed to the discredit of the broker. It is therefore agreed that we continue the old practice in regard to Mánekji who being called in, is accordingly presented with a *sirpáv* and horse.¹

The 15th August 1737 the President observes to the Board that of late the Sangianians and other northern pirates have been very troublesome, having during the last season taken several boats belonging to Bombay. That as several of the trading Rájás connive at these robberies and share in the booty; the making reprisals on some of their vessels might have a good effect. This being the proper season for such an undertaking as their vessels from Mokha are shortly expected, and as we cannot spare any of the Company's vessels for this service, he offers to send the *Robert* and *Success* belonging to himself, the Honourable Company being at no other charge than the putting on board each a detachment of soldiers and some European mariners. This is agreed and the vessels directed to proceed on this service with the necessary expedition.²

On the 6th January 1738 the Court write: By the advices before us, it plainly appears that, for many years past, our servants at Surat instead of paying hard rupees for carrying on our investments, have imposed their own goods on the undertakers; and by fictitious transfers in account, have fallen into the like bad practices which our servants at Bencoolen formerly carried on to our very great hurt and damage. We positively forbid every thing of this nature in future.³

On the 2nd July 1738 the Court wrote: We are informed our Fort and Castle at Bombay is now in a manner forsaken by our Governor. This is not right. We apprehend it to be the most defensible place on our island remembering how in former wars the Castle held out when all the rest of the island was taken. This may happen again in future. If it be well garrisoned its sea communication will enable the Castle to be maintained against all the force that can be brought against it in those parts. We therefore order that the Fort be the residence of our Governor who ought never to lie out of it, and that it be kept in good repair.⁴

The 21st July the Court wrote: We hereby acquaint you that to encourage our servants at Bombay and the subordinate factories to carry on the China trade in a defensible Europe ship, we shall in future send out yearly to Bombay, on or before the 20th of May, a ship which may arrive at Anjengo or Tellicherry in December following. This ship shall be ordered to take under her convoy any English country ships or vessels bound up the Malabar coast. After delivering her outward cargo at Bombay and doing other service, she must about the end of March be laid in at Surat or Bombay for a voyage to China and back to Bombay. Our servants at Bombay and the subordinates may be concerned in the whole or part of the stock as they shall think

Chapter I. History.

Pirates,
1737.

No Governor
to be out of
Bombay Fort,
1738.

China Trade,
1738.

¹ Bom. Gov. Consultation, 8th April 1737, Pub. Diary 10 of 1736-37, 93.

² Bom. Gov. Consultation, 15th Aug. 1737, Pub. Diary 10 of 1736-37, 191.

³ Court to Bombay 6th Jan. (1738?) para 40, Stand. Ord. Vol. 1 of 1715-1721, 100.

⁴ Court to Bombay 2nd July 1738 para 45, St. Ord. Vol. 1 of 1715-1721, 207-208.

Chapter I.
History.

China Trade,
1738.

fit, and the rest shall be made up by and upon our account; all the accounts of the voyage shall be stated and finished and laid before you; and an attested copy thereof be yearly transmitted us, whether we are concerned or not. Our servants residing at Bombay, who are concerned in the said stock, shall appoint the supercargoes and order such a cargo to China and back as they think proper. The back cargo the said ship shall deliver at Bombay and afterwards take in her loading there and on the Malabár Coast for England. That she may be the better prepared for this, she shall carry out her whole kentledge (or ballast) in iron to be left at Bombay until her return from China, that so the freighters may have the benefit of the whole tonnage she is let for. On her return to Bombay and delivery of her cargo there, the freighters shall pay us Rs. 25,000, which will be cheaper than any country ship of that burthen. Our servants will also have the benefit of being freed from so much dead-stock of shipping. Further there will be no need of staying for convoy, which is so great a charge in the case of country ships trading to China. At Canton the freighters shall be obliged to take on board upon our account one thousand pecul (pecul = 133½ lbs.) of tea for certain, and as much as one thousand pecul more, or any part thereof, if the freighters desire it, and we shall order our supercargoes to load it accordingly. For all this tea on the ship's arrival at Bombay the said freighters shall be allowed one tale and three quarters per pecul (tale or tael = $\frac{1}{16}$ of a pecul), freight to be deducted out of the before mentioned Rs. 25,000. As the tea shall be landed at Tellicherry and Anjengo, to be disposed of as we shall order, the ship will go clear and unpestered up the Malabár Coast.¹

President's
Horses,
1739.

On the 2nd February 1739 the President represents to the Board: As the Honourable Company have always esteemed a coach and four a just allowance to keep up the state and appearance requisite in his post, he has hitherto made use of his own coach and four horses. As the Company are unfurnished with such a suitable equipage, he makes a tender of his own coach at Rs. 300 and of four good and serviceable grey horses at Rs. 350 each. The Board taking the same into consideration, and noting that among ten horses on the Company's books some are superannuated and unfit for service, and that the prices set by the President on his present tender are really a moderate valuation, it is agreed to accept thereof; and to lighten any needless expense in keeping, it is ordered that the old and unserviceable horses be sold for what can be got and the sale-proceeds be carried to the Honourable Company's account.²

Certificates to
Foreign Vessels,
1739.

At a Consultation on the 28th September 1739 the nature and intent of the new regulation for issuing to foreign vessels certificates instead of passes being considered, it is unanimously agreed that as the certificates are in English, the Honourable Company's seal should not be affixed, as this might serve to mislead such as through ignorance of English cannot understand the distinction between a pass and a cer-

¹ Court to Bombay 21st July 1738 paras. 39, 40 and 41, Standing Ord. Vol. 1 of 1715-1721, 129-130.

² Bom. Gov. Consultation, 2nd Feb. 1739, Pub. Diary. 12 of 1738-39, 50.

tificate. Further that with the withdrawal of our right to issue passes our power to collect the tonnage must cease.¹

A Consultation of the 3rd April 1739 records: By the last we received a letter from the Chief and Factors at Surat, advising us that a party of the late Moghal's forces having raised a quarrel in Delhi on account of some religious debate with Nádir Sháh's soldiers, five hundred Persians had fallen. This so greatly incensed Nádir Sháh that he gave a general order to his whole army to massacre at discretion. After the massacre had lasted two days the Sháh issued a proclamation to forbear any further effusion of blood. These troubles had put a stop to all business in Delhi and bred such insecurity that Tarwary shroff—the drawer of bills to the amount of Rs. 50,000 on the Honourable Company's account—had offered repayment thereof with the growing interest in a month's time. This proposal they had accepted and request us to advise the President and Council in Bengal of this affair.²

A Consultation of the 9th October 1739 recorded the following: On a motion to renew the promise of Rs. 2000 extraordinary gratuity for every fighting grab taken in battle, the President offers to contribute six hundred, Mr. Rigby two hundred, and Mr. Stonestreet on behalf of Mr. Waters two hundred, the remaining one thousand to be supplied out of the Honourable Company's treasury. This gratuity their servants engage to give purely that the cruizers may be encouraged to exert themselves against the enemy with spirit and vigour.³

On the 19th February 1740 the President mentions the formal announcement to him of weddings at Poona in Bájiráv's family. As at the time of the announcement it was insinuated that on such occasions it was customary to send a person with a compliment accompanied by a present, the President had ordered some fire-works to be sent and some gold joys and trinkets adapted to their use on the occasion. This the Board entirely approves as such things duly timed may have a good effect in establishing and improving a friendly correspondence with these people. The account cost of Rs. 1439-2-26 is also passed.⁴

Chapter I.

History.

Massacre at
Delhi,
1739.

Encouragement
to Cruizers,
1739.

Marriage Present
to Bájiráv,
1740.

¹ Bom. Gov. Consultation 28th Sept. 1739, Pub. Diary 12 of 1738-39, 380. The following is the form of certificate agreed upon by the President in Council, April 1734: To all commanders of ships or vessels or whomsoever subject to His Majesty George II. King of Great Britain France and Ireland, Defender of the Faith &c.

These presents are to certify at the request of inhabitant of
. and owner of the burthen Candys: Whereof goes
. with guns laden with and bound to;

That in consideration of the friendship peace and amity between our respective nations and governments, I, James Hope Esquire, Chief for affairs of the British nation in Surat, do accordingly require all or any subjects navigating or trading under the protection of the Honourable English East India Company that may happen to meet with the said in her intended voyage, not to give her the least hindrance or molestation, which certificate is to be in full force during the term of months and no longer. Given under my hand in Surat this day of Anno Domini 1739. By order of James Hope Esquire, Chief for affairs of the British nation in Surat. Diary of the Surat Factory, 10th Aug. 1739, Vol. 629 of 1739-40, 3; Bom. Quar. Rev. (1856), IV, 188.

² Bom. Gov. Consultation, 3rd April 1739, Pub. Diary 12 of 1738-39, 112-113.

³ Bom. Gov. Consultation, 9th Oct. 1739, Pub. Diary 12 of 1738-39, 397.

⁴ Bom. Gov. Consultation, 19th Feb. 1740 Pub. Diary 13 of 1739-40, 82.

Chapter I.

History.

Chaul
Bhandáris
in Bombay,
1740.

A Consultation of the 19th March 1740 records the following petition from the Bhandáris of Chaul to the Governor and President, Bombay: Your petitioners and their forefathers have for many generations lived under the Portuguese government at Chaul and have hitherto maintained the character of true and faithful subjects to that government. In March last (1739) to our great misfortune Mánáji Angria entered our limits, burnt our houses, and cut down our trees depriving us of the means of subsisting ourselves and families as Bhandáris. The straits and wants to which we have been reduced have not in the least lessened our affection and fidelity to the Portuguese government. Had we any way or means left of subsisting ourselves and families we are still ready to venture our lives in their service. Want of subsistence alone drives us to put ourselves under the protection of some other government. We choose to make a tender of our service to your Honour and Council if we can be entertained and provided for in our way of life as Bhandáris. We promise to be with all fidelity good subjects to this government. Our requests are, namely:

1. That when the Portuguese at Chaul give us liberty or they withdraw from that garrison, we desire your Honour will assist us with boats and transport us and our families to Bombay;

2. When we arrive at Bombay we beg your Honour to supply us with means of building our houses, and we will pay as soon as our ability will permit us;

3. We require sixteen toddy trees for each man; and the number of Bhandáris that may come are one hundred and seventy-five, ten more or less;

4. That your Honour has let or farmed the vendage of country arrack to the Bhandáris of Bombay for the sum of Rs. 12,500 by the year. In the same manner as these Bhandáris pay, we oblige ourselves to do the same in proportion;

5. In case of war and the invasion of this island (which God forbid) if we are deprived of the benefit of drawing our trees, we request the rent may cease till peace is restored; and during that time that we may be allowed a subsistence for us and our families;

6. The Mukádam, Chaughulás, and Trumpeters, with colour-bearers, desire you will give them pay monthly, as your Honour shall think our service shall deserve;

7. What Bhandáris care to serve the Honourable Company as sepoy, your Honour will please to admit them upon the same footing as the Bombay sepoy.¹

In seconding the Bhandáris' request the President remarked they were a useful body of people fit for action and always esteemed faithful to the government they lived under. The Board concurs in the opinion for giving the petitioners a favourable answer, leaving it to the President's management and disposal to admit them on such terms of

¹ Public Diary 13 of 1739-40, 122-123.

entertainment as he shall please to adjust with them for the good of the service.¹

At a Consultation of the 13th January 1741 the head or mukádam of the weavers represented that a late fire had destroyed most of the weavers' houses and prayed an advance of Rs. 2000 to be repaid in five years without interest, offering to pass his own bond with Rupji Dhanji as security. As both were men of property and as the weavers deserved encouragement the advance was sanctioned.²

A Consultation of the 9th January 1741 has the following note on the pepper trade: Reperusing the letter from Tellicherry by the *Princess Louisa*, it is observed that the gentlemen particularly desire our directions in regard to the assistance necessary to be given the prince to enable him to frustrate the encroaching schemes which the French are pursuing; wherein should they meet with success, our Honourable Masters will infallibly be deprived of their share in the pepper trade. After full consideration it is agreed we signify to the gentlemen that seeing the occasion was urgent and its consequence so immediately tending to continuing our Honourable Masters' share in the pepper trade, we acquiesce thereto. At the same time we recommend a constant care to keep the charge within the sum specified and when it can be done with prudence to bring to an end so heavy an expense.³

A Consultation of the 30th January 1741 notes that for several years when a messenger comes from the neighbouring governments, armed sepoys have been permitted to land with him. This the President conceiving to be a dangerous practice which no other European nation would allow, had represented the same to the Maráthas and so far prevailed on them that the Marátha messenger now came without any retinue. As the Sidis had shown displeasure at being denied their former state, the Board agreed that a letter couched in the most complaisant terms be despatched.⁴

The 14th February 1741 the following publication was issued: Whereas treaties and agreements with several powers in these parts stipulate freedom of commerce to the inhabitants of this island, and thereby their goods and vessels are rendered more secure than those of other governments; In consequence of this security some persons residing on this island have conveyed in their vessels merchandise belonging to foreigners in nowise entitled to the protection of this Government. This practice furnishing a pretext for the seizure of the ships, the President and Governor, by and with the advice and consent of his Council, doth hereby publicly order that in future no inhabitant of this island, to whom a pass under the Honourable Company's seal shall be granted, do presume to carry any merchandise other than what appertains to them or is the property of others the subjects of this State. To the end that no one may plead ignorance of this order the said President and Governor hath caused these presents to be published

Chapter I. History.

Weavers'
Houses
destroyed
by Fire,
1740.

Pepper Trade,
1741.

Armed Escorts
Forbidden,
1741.

No Bombay
Merchant
to carry
Foreigners'
Goods,
1741.

¹ Bom. Gov. Consultation, 17th March 1740, Pub. Diary 13 of 1739-40, 115.

² Bom. Gov. Consultation, 13th Jan. 1741, Pub. Diary 14 of 1740-41, 13.

³ Bom. Gov. Consultation, 9th Jan. 1741, Pub. Diary 14 of 1740-41, 6-7.

⁴ Bom. Gov. Consultation, 30th Jan. 1741, Pub. Diary 14 of 1740-41, 52.

Chapter I.
History.

Convoying the
Mokha Trade,
1741.

by beat of drum and affixed in the usual places. Given in Bombay Castle this 14th day of February 1741.¹

A Consultation of the 20th February records the following petition of Vandravan, Rupji Dhanji, Vithaldás Keshavráam, and others the principal merchants of Bombay: That your petitioners being informed the Honourable Company have been pleased to forbid the sending a commissioner to Mokha, beg leave to lay before your Honour the consequences that will attend the public and your petitioners by not receiving that large sum which for these many years has been brought to this island through the countenance and credit of a person sent from hence and from the security of the Honourable Company's vessels. Though the Mokha freights are at first no more than consignments to us from the merchants to the northward, yet from your petitioners returning them such goods as they want, this money is kept on the island and greatly tends to maintain a current of trade equally advantageous to the public as to your petitioners. On the other hand, if the opportunity of bringing this freight is missed, the northward merchants would cause their money to be brought at once into their own hands and we would then have no tie upon them to send their boats to us for cargoes. By the loss of this beneficial trade from the north the Honourable Company would lose imports which contribute no trifling sum to the customs. To your petitioners the failure of the north trade will be fatal, as it is mainly with this money and from the profits of this trade that we are able to carry on our business and maintain ourselves and families.

Except Mr. Morley, who thought such action might subject him to the displeasure of his Honourable Masters, the Board agrees that to cease sending a commission and escort to Mokha would imperil the trade to the northward. After debate agreed that a calculate be framed and laid before us at next meeting of the excess cost involved in sending a ship and a servant over the expenses incurred if the vessel were to remain in Bombay.²

Maintenance
of *Rose* Galley,
1741.

At a Consultation held the 26th February 1741 the calculate for the *Rose* galley showed an excess cost for the voyage to Mokha of Rs. 1221 and excess earning of Rs. 4600, that is a balance of Rs. 3376 in favour of the voyage compared with the result of keeping her ashore in Bombay and of Rs. 3545 compared with the result of keeping her afloat in Bombay harbour. Agreed, Mr. Morley excepted, that the *Rose* galley be ordered to Mokha in the proper season Mr. Charles Crommelin taking passage on her.³ The details of the estimate are interesting:

¹ Sec. Out. Let. Book 8 of 1738-1741.

² Bom. Gov. Consultation, 20th Feb. 1741, Pub. Diary 14 of 1740-41, 85, 88, 89.

³ Bom. Gov. Consultation, 26th Feb. 1741, Pub. Diary 14 of 1740-41, 97, 100. Voyage to Mokha: Dr. To expenses, Rs. 2090; = present for the (*Rose*) galley, Rs. 200; extraordinary charges that will be incurred by the *Rose* galley going to Mokha more than by lying ashore in the rains as per calculate, Rs. 1223-2-44; total Rs. 3423-2-44. Cr. By freight of treasure last year (1739-40) amounted to Rs. 5600. Deduct the captain's one-fourth part, Rs. 1400; add coinage duty one per cent on about Rs. 2,60,000, Rs. 2600; total Rs. 6800. Deduct per contra Rs. 3423-2-44. Balance (gain) Rs. 3376-1-56. Public Diary, 14 of 1740-41, 99.

*Maintenance of Rose Galley, 1741.*Chapter I.
History.

NUMBER AND SORT OF PEOPLE.											VICTUALLING.			Monthly Wages to Mariners.	Total Monthly Charges.		
Mariners.					Military.					Mariners.	Military.	Total.					
Europeans.	Cook.	Syng.	Tindale.	Labours.	Sergeant.	Corporal.	Drummer.	European Soldiers.	Total.								
At Sea ...	40	1	1	2	20	1	1	1	12	90	Rs. 426	0 46	125 1 30	551 1 76	825 3 20	1377 0 96	
Ashore...	40	2	42	339	0 28	...	339 0 28	636 3 20	975 3 18	
Difference	1	1	2	20	0	1	1	1	12	48	87 0 18	125 1 30	212 1 48	189 0 0	401 1 48	
The monthly amount of salt, bags, and jars delivered with the provisions about ...															6	2	0
Extra Expense per Month ...															407	3	48
This multiplied by 3, the number of months the vessels usually lie ashore (to wit) from the 15th May to 15th August produceth the entire amount of expense saved the Honourable Company by her lying ashore during the rains ...															1223	2	44
At Sea ...	40	1	1	2	20	1	1	1	12	90	Rs. 426	0 46	125 1 30	551 1 76	825 3 20	1377 0 96	
Bombay Roads...	40	1	6	2	19	357	0 32	...	357 0 32	674 1 20	1031 2 12	
Difference	1	1	1	19	9	1	1	1	12	41	68 3 54	125 1 30	194 0 54	151 2 0	345 2 84	
The monthly amount of salt, bags, and jars delivered with the provisions about ...															6	0	0
Extra Monthly Expense ...															351	2	84
This multiplied by 3, the number of months from the time of reducing her people until they are again taken into service produceth the entire extra charge or difference between her being sent on a voyage and lying off in Bombay Road during the rainy season ...															1053	0	53

A Consultation of the 26th February 1741 records: Our whole fleet being now lying in port, ordered that, should the enemy be abroad, so soon as the *Restoration*, *Prince of Wales*, and *Neptune* are victualled, they be sent to cruise to the southward to protect the trade.¹

Coast-Guarding,
1741.

At a Consultation, the 30th July 1741, the Board notes: Recourse to the Court's commands of the 11th March 1735, shows the Court has already pointed out a method for preventing their affairs being involved through the sale of ships by private persons. Resolved and ordered as a standing rule that no ship or vessel under the English protection do proceed to the Gulf of Persia till the owners have previously entered into a bond under a penalty of Rs. 40,000, not to dispose of such ship or vessel either at Scindy, Maskat, Persia, Basra, or other place or port in the Gulf, without the consent of the President and Council of Bombay or the Agent and Council of Gombroon. And that by the first opportunity we apprise the Presidencies of Bengal and Madras of this resolution transmitting at the same time copy of the above paragraph from the Honourable Court of Directors in hopes of their acquiescence for

No Ship to be
sold in the
Persian Gulf,
1741.

¹ Public Diary 14 of 1740-41, 98.

**Chapter I.
History.**

Repairs to
Bombay
Armaments,
1741.

avoiding the ill consequences that will otherwise sooner or later ensue.¹

At a Consultation, the 19th June 1741, the President acquaints the Board that since the latest advices from Europe seem to consider war with France unavoidable he had been consulting the most proper measures for obviating any attempts on Bombay from the sea. To that end he had ordered the gunner and bombardier to mount the largest and most trustworthy guns on the seaward bastions. They had represented that notwithstanding the number of carriages seemingly in readiness, want of iron capsquares made them useless for action. As all the smiths on the island were employed on other material work, agreed we write to the Chief and Factors at Surat to procure 25 smiths to whom they may promise the Bombay rate of Rs. 4 for every cwt. of iron wrought. As a further encouragement we agree to a monthly allowance for provision which we leave to the Surat Council to fix on the most reasonable terms.²

Portuguese
and French
Alliance,
1741.

At a Consultation, the 3rd November 1741, the President communicates to the Board news that a small ship belonging to the Portuguese and a large French man-of-war were arrived at Goa. The Portuguese ship gave out she parted with four others and the French ship with five of her nation bound to India, with which it was hinted the French were to assist the Portuguese in regaining their country. We are afraid this will end in giving the Portuguese a footing in these parts. Besides should a war break out between our nations, the three large ships, with whom we have none that are able to cope, would prove terribly destructive to our affairs. In this uncertain situation it is deemed right to put our island in the best posture of defence that can be devised. It is therefore directed that a line of guns be mounted on the platform before the Bandar. A protection is much wanted for the security of the landing place and dock.³

Deserters from
Bombay,
1741.

At a Consultation, the 15th May 1741, the President moves to the Board that since, notwithstanding all precautions and orders, the escape of people, more particularly of our European seamen and soldiers, is so frequent as greatly to injure the public service and the island in general, a publication be issued, offering a reward of Rs. 10 for every person (excepting labourers) who shall be stopped or detected in an attempt to convey themselves secretly off the place. Also that in order that the punishment may be adequate to their crime it is provided that if the persons so attempting to elope are employed by the Honourable Company the amount of the gratuity be afterwards deducted from their pay. To this the Board agree.⁴

At a Consultation, the 10th July 1741, read several depositions relating to the recent conveying away one Bábu with his family and the flight of Wodon (Udhav) Náik the treasury shroff. The President remarks that he had been under the necessity of promising a pardon to Rámset Danbáji to secure his evidence. At the same time Rámset

¹ Bom. Gov. Consultation, 30th July 1741, Pub. Diary 14 of 1740-41, 272. These rules were framed to guard against the establishment of a navy by Nádir Sháh (1736-1747). See below page 287 note 6.

² Bombay Gov. Consultation, 19th June 1741, Pub. Diary 14 of 1740-41, 231.

³ Bombay Gov. Consultation, 3rd Nov. 1741, Pub. Diary 14 of 1740-41, 449.

⁴ Bombay Gov. Consultation, 15th May 1741, Pub. Diary 14 of 1740-41, 191.

is suspected of contributing to the departure of others, the Board agrees he should be directed to remove from this island receiving such recompense as may be found reasonable for any loss he may sustain from leaving his house or otherwise. Cháya Thákur admits he assisted in carrying off Bábu and his family. For so heinous an offence he is directed to receive a public whipping at Bombay of 39 lashes, and, within a month after, the like number at Mázgaoon, then to be confined at labour on the town ditch for the term of six months, and afterwards to be transported from this island, never more to be permitted to return. The charge against Bhiku Sinay junior of being in company with Udhav Náik is not proved. At the same time as several of Udhav's effects were found secreted in Bhiku Sinay's house, there is just cause to suspect him. It is therefore directed that Bhiku be dismissed his present employ in the custom-house and be deemed incapable of holding any trust in any branch of our Honourable Masters' affairs.

Since such people as escape from Bombay are generally entertained by the Maráthás to be made use of hereafter if occasion serve, agreed we cannot be too cautious and nice in our enquiries who comes or goes from this island. The better to be informed on this point, proposed that two capable upright and intelligent persons be stationed at the passages of Bombay Máhim and Sion, to keep at each place exact registers of all that come and go, noting the day of landing, to whose house they say they will repair, and the time of departure, reporting every fifteen days to the President of all strangers remaining on the island. To secure the accurate record of all resorters, no stranger shall be allowed to leave the island except at the place he landed. Nor may any one go ashore at Mázgaoon or elsewhere without making his appearance at Bombay Custom-house, at Máhim, or at Sion, to be there registered. This proposition is approved and ordered to have effect from the 1st of August (1741).¹

At a Consultation, the 10th December 1741, read the following letter from Captain James Inchebird, dated Sion Fort 1st December 1741: The last five years of my service have been spent in the command of Sion Fort with its dependencies. On this post, when first I had charge, were large detachments of officers, Europeans, topasses, sepoy, and the Company's slaves. For some time there was no house or place convenient for the provision or entertainment of the officers of so large a garrison. To meet this want I built a convenient house not only for the officers but to provide room for the Coffrees (Zanzibar slaves), provisions, as also a cookroom and all other conveniences. As the detachments are now removed, except the rice store-house for the four companies there will not be so great a necessity for such house. This induces me to petition your Honour and the Honourable Council to take the buildings off my hands on the Honourable Company's account at such a price as you shall think most reasonable.²

Considering on this matter we must own the purchase of the said house does not appear absolutely requisite, and indeed we might do without it. Yet as the services of Captain Inchebird ought undoubtedly

Chapter I. History.

Register of
Travellers,
1741.

Sion Fort,
1736-1741.

¹ Bom. Gov. Consultation, 10th July 1741, Pub. Diary 14 of 1740-41, 243-246.

² Public Diary 14 of 1740-41, 500.

Chapter I.
History.

Bajirav's Watch
repaired gratis,
1741.

Marriage
Presents to
Bajirav's Son,
1742.

Convoy
Necessary,
1742.

to entitle him to some marks of indulgence, and as our Honourable Masters in their commands by the *Princess Louisa* expressed themselves not against a gratuity which they had conceived had been given him by the late President and Council although in reality he received no such favour, we presume they will not censure us for gratifying him. We therefore agree the buildings be taken over at the cost price of Rs. 1283.¹

A Consultation of the 6th November 1741 records: The watch that came out in the *Queen Caroline* packet for Bajirav having been sent to his son, and the receipt thereof acknowledged with a complaisant answer for the favour, the Board think it will be best to omit charging Bajirav anything for the mending but make him a compliment thereof in regard to the friendship which subsists between our governments. The land paymaster is therefore directed to pay unto Captain Inchbird the sum of Rs. 216-2-28 which was disbursed upon that account by his order in England.²

A Consultation of the 22nd February 1742 records: The intended marriage of one of the late Bajirav's sons having been in the accustomed manner notified to the President, and in such case, as has been already observed, a present is unavoidable, it is therefore agreed that the following articles be sent by a proper messenger³:

6 Shawls of Rs. 20 each	120
1 Gold chain	105
1 Sari or covering for a woman	40
Putulis or gold coins	75
Charges that will be incurred for the person sent	50

Total Rs. 390

At a Consultation, the 2nd February 1742, the President represents that several boats and vessels being in readiness to proceed northward the merchants have been very pressing for a convoy: At this juncture it is certain any of our vessels can be but ill spared from the immediate guard and protection of our island. The repeated daily reports of the Maratha designs and of large bodies of troops in our neighbourhood are so generally known as not to need a recital, and though the President does not take upon him to assert the truth or falsity of those rumours, yet prudence forces him to declare that the perfidy of those people can never admit of confidence in them. Consequently that our safety must depend on a constant guard being observed and showing a readiness to the utmost of our power to resist their designs. The protection of the trade more immediately carried on by the subjects and dependents of this island is a duty equally incumbent on us more especially considering the numerous rovers who infest these parts as well to the north as to the south. Any incapacity to protect our subjects must inevitably sink our credit and render us mean in the eyes even of our own people. Still it is extremely difficult for our force to provide for these several services. In the present case, were we to order the grabs now off Warli to start as convoys to Surat, their return would

¹ Bom. Gov. Consultation, 10th Dec. 1741, Pub. Diary 14 of 1740-41, 497-498.

² Bom. Gov. Consultation, 6th Nov. 1741, Pub. Diary 14 of 1740-41, 452.

³ Bom. Gov. Consultation, 22nd Feb. 1742, Pub. Diary 15 of 1741-42, 114-115.

depend on the coming back of the vessels and boats, who proceed to Cambay and other ports further northward. Meanwhile the extent of this island from Malabar Point to the entrance of Máhim river, would be exposed to a descent from the Maráthas. On the whole therefore the President proposes that the *Trial* sloop with one of the largest galivats be appointed to proceed with the merchant vessels for Surat; and that orders be privately sent to the Commanders of the *Bombay* and *Restoration* grabs to see them as high as St. John's and then instantly return back. This will not require many days and the others may with little danger go on to Surat and with the addition of the *London* sloop and *Tiger* galivat now there, they will be of competent force to protect the boats to the other northern places. That the gentlemen at Surat must be directed to give us precise information of the day they intend to despatch them back, when we can take the proper measures and order vessels to meet and secure them in their passage hither. After full consideration the members agree with the President; and the Superintendent is directed to give the proper orders to the vessels conformable to this resolution.¹

At the same meeting (2nd February 1742) the Board consider the request of the Bombay custom master for directions regarding the rates of convoy to be levied on small *shibars*. According to the present scale, a boat of only 20 *khandis* pays equal to one of 100. In order to put the same on a more equitable footing it is directed that in future all boats under 20 *khandis* pay no convoy duty, from 20 to 50 *khandis* Rs. 5, and from 50 to 100 *khandis* Rs. 10 each trip or voyage. The existing rates on larger vessels to be continued.²

A Consultation of 2nd March 1742 records the following: A person now on the island belonging to the Cutch Rájá requests some brass and iron guns may be sold him. It is certain we have brass guns in store, and, though for many obvious reasons the Board are against the sale of such articles, as our Honourable Masters were at a great expense in procuring and sending the guns hither with the object of securing a profitable sale, it is agreed to empower the storekeeper to dispose of the number desired, being eight of 2, 3, 4, and 6 pounders brass cannon, charging at the rate of Rs. 120 the cwt.³

A letter from the Court dated the 11th March 1742 notices that by the Consultation of the 3rd April 1741 it appears that three of our vessels ordered on a cruise to the south, instead of continuing the same, put into Goa and stayed there for some time at the Viceroy's desire. Though this met with approbation at Bombay, we can by no means acquiesce in it. Our marine force is not designed for the defence of other people's territories, to the neglect of our own trade and the exposure of it to Angria's depredations.⁴

In the same letter of the 11th March the Directors continue: We are greatly dissatisfied that the *Rose* galley should again be sent to Mokha contrary to our former orders. Once for all we absolutely forbid the

Chapter I. History.

Convoy
Necessary,
1742.

Convoy Rates,
1742.

Sale of Guns
to Cutch,
1742.

¹ Bom. Gov. Consultation, 2nd Feb. 1742, Pub. Diary 15 of 1741-42, 63-65.

² Bom. Gov. Consultation, 2nd Feb. 1742, Pub. Diary 15 of 1741-42, 66.

³ Bom. Gov. Consultation, 2nd March 1742, Pub. Diary 15 of 1741-42, 122.

⁴ Court to Bombay 11th Mar. 1742 para. 9, Pub. Dep. Ct.'s L. Vol. 3 of 1742-51, 2.

Chapter I.
History.

Storm,
1742.

sending any of our vessels to Mokha in future. Our design in maintaining them can be answered only by their constant employment against the enemy and in watching his motions.¹

A Consultation of 11th September 1742 records: This day had an exceedingly hard storm of wind and rain. The ships in the road drove from their anchors, and a large Moor ship parting her cables ran ashore between Cross Island and Dongri. The *Somersett* and *Salisbury* ran foul, the *Somersett* breaking her main yard and part of the quarter galley, and receiving, it is believed, other damage; the *Salisbury's* head was carried away and part of the cutwater. The gale was so excessive as has not been exceeded in the memory of many now on the spot.²

Three days later, 14th September, the President lays before the Council reports from the several outposts of the damage done through the late storm: Mázgaon Fort house untiled; the thatched posts at Cooley Bandar and Sidi Bandar blown down; also Drong Battery, though having a thick wall of stones and covered with tiles; Suri houses or sheds untiled, and the guard rooms to the eastward very leaky, though paved with stone cemented with mortar; Candala and Marine Batteries untiled and the roof so damaged that the sepoys guarding there can have no shelter when it rains. The President goes on to observe that Mázgaon is of no strength and that Cooley and Sidi Bandars are all the same as is Drong Battery. These places are of no further use than to prevent boats landing from Salsette or the main, and hinder people going off this island, no boats being permitted to land in any of the bays or creeks betwixt Sion and Suri or Suri and Bombay without first having a permit from the customer of Bombay or Máhim. Suri commands a large bay and has been thought a necessary security that way. As he conceives all the pre-mentioned small posts are requisite for answering the end proposed, he notes that making light eajan hatches or roofs with ordinary tiles only draws on a constant expense and in the end is much more chargeable than doing them well at first. Provided they are thought necessary, he proposes to direct the engineer to estimate the expense at every place for rendering them firm and secure, subject only hereafter to the turning of tiles, which is but a small matter. To this the Board agree, and will form their determination when the estimate is laid before them.³

That two days later (16th September) details were submitted showing in the Máhim and Bombay orchards the storm had blown down 1½ jacks, 517 cocoa-palms, 3 brabs, 20 betelpalms, 7½ mangoes, and 2 poons.⁴

Bombay the
Grand Mart,
1743.

On the 13th March 1743 the Court write: In case you have reason to apprehend that any species of goods will at some periods sell better at Surat than Bombay, we would have them disposed of accordingly, although in general we choose that the sales should be made on the island in order to render it the grand mart on your side of India.⁵

¹ Court to Bombay 11th Mar. 1742 para. 65, Pub. Dep. Ct.'s L. Vol. 3 of 1742-51, 9.

² Bom. Gov. Consultation, 11th Sept. 1742, Pub. Diary 15 of 1741-42, 428.

³ Bom. Gov. Consultation, 14th Sept. 1742, Pub. Diary 15 of 1741-42, 436-439.

⁴ Bom. Gov. Diary 16th Feb. 1742, Pub. Diary 15 of 1741-42, 441.

⁵ Court to Bombay 13th Mar. 1743 para. 41, Pub. Dep. Ct.'s L. Vol. 3 of 1742-1751.

French War (1744 to 1803).

On the 10th April 1744 the Court of Directors wrote: The declaration of war with France and Spain requires you and all our servants to exert all possible sagacity for the preservation of our property trade and estate. Our Secret War Committee for the current year are Samuel Feake, Dodding Braddyll, Alexander Hume, and William Mabbott, Esquires, or any three of them. What orders and directions may be given by those gentlemen for the security of our shipping and settlements must be strictly complied with and obeyed as if signed by the whole Court of Directors.¹

On the 10th January 1745 the Court wrote: With respect to the Surat piecegoods, as the war has put a stop to the Guinea trade, we are obliged to direct you, if it can conveniently be done, to lessen the investment ordered last year. As you may depend upon having very small orders from us this year for Guinea goods, we desire you to forward a large stock of treasure to Bengal for carrying on our important investment there.²

A Consultation of the 26th April 1746 records: For the protection of the Honourable Company's trade in these parts against the depredations of the French and Spaniards, the King has been pleased to send out eight men-of-war who have taken all the French ships returning from China with those from the Gulfs of Mokha and Persia with some others of less note. One of His Majesty's ships is now here and four more are expected.³

The 7th May 1746 the Directors wrote: His Majesty having judged proper that a squadron of his ships should cruise against the French and Spaniards in the Indian Seas, you must not enter into any neutrality.⁴

At a Consultation of 23rd October 1746 the Council record: Reports of the French having taken Fort St. George being come to our black merchants from their correspondents at different parts, as likewise to the President from Tellicherry and Goa, with the additional circumstance noticed in all those advices that the next designs of the French are against this place and the Honourable Company's pepper settlements, it behoves the Board, as the coast settlements were supplied by the *Pelham* with such stores as could be spared, to provide for the safety of this island. Although Bombay is in good condition against all country enemies, yet as the European manner of attacking a town differs widely from that of the Indians, some additional works are judged necessary towards the sea side, the

Chapter I.
History.

War
with France,
1744.

Effect of the
War,
1745.

English Fleet,
1746.

French take
Madras,
1746.

¹ Court to Bombay 10th April 1744 paras. 2 and 3, Pub. Dep. Court's Letters Vol. 3 of 1742-1751, 105. These orders were repeated in letters of the 21st Dec. 1744 and of the 10th Jan. 1745, Vol. 3, 113, 114, 117.

² Court to Bombay 10th Jan. 1745 paras. 12 and 13, Pub. Dep. Court's L. Vol. 3 of 1742-1751, 118.

³ Bom. Gov. Consultation, 26th April 1746, Pub. Diary 19 of 1746, 139.

⁴ Court to Bombay 7th May 1746 para 29 Pub. Dep. Court's L. Vol. 3 of 1742-1751, 129.

Chapter I.

History.

Threatened
French Attack,
1746.

better to annoy such ships of the enemy as may be stationed in the road to bombard the town; considering also that the *Drake* sloop's complement of sailors and detachment of soldiers will be a considerable addition to our force, the Board is of opinion she had better be detained for that purpose. This is specially suitable as the *Success* galley, a good sailing vessel, is now under despatch to the Gulf of Persia, by whom our advices to the Honourable Company may be forwarded when we can learn more certain and particular accounts concerning the misfortune befallen Madras. Resolved, therefore, that the Dock Pier Head be enlarged so as to mount nine guns in the face towards the road and two more for flanking the face of the Royal Bastion; that the wall of communication be duly repaired, the foundation of which not being at first properly sustained is much weakened by the constant washing of the sea and part of it actually fallen; that as the condition of the casemated part of the said bastion is so bad as to render any guns placed there unserviceable, it must be pulled down and a dry ditch made along the face of the said bastion, the enclosures of that casemated part not being above two feet from the surface of the ground.¹

The same Consultation continues: With regard to the reinforcements required to preserve this island against any attempts of the French, the President acquaints the Board that the French have written to Goa for wheat, arrack, and other necessaries to be provided there for their fleet. In return for this it may not be unreasonable to conjecture that the Portuguese will get the French to assist in retaking their northern territories from the Maráthas. Should the French agree and succeed, our enemy will have the use of the port of Bassein within seven leagues of this island. Instead of joining the Portuguese, should the French directly on coming attempt this island, it is observed that all advices notice that in return for presents they were befriended by the Nabob of Arcot. Though we have no reason to doubt Bájiráv's willingness to keep on good terms with this Government, yet some of his petty governors of sea-ports may probably be brought over by presents to assist our enemy. Taking all the circumstances into consideration, it is unanimously agreed that the President write to the Chief of Surat to raise with all possible expedition for the present season 2000 men of arms consisting of Arabs Turks and others of different nations, preferable to their being all Moors or of any other one nation. Further, as the Sidis are a very resolute and warlike people, and from the assistance they have often received likely to be attached to this Government, it is resolved to send to Janjira Captain James Sterling, who speaks the language, with the President's letter to the Sidi asking leave to enlist 200 men. Except a party of about 200, the Sidis and the 2000 recruits from Surat will be encamped in the body of the island ready on the shortest notice to be sent to any part where they may be wanted. That the Honourable Company's covenant servants, with such other English inhabitants as are capable of bearing arms, be stationed upon the works in such manner

¹ Bom. Gov. Consultation, 23rd Oct. 1746, Pub. Diary 19 of 1746, 352 and Forrest's Home Series, II. 78-79.

as the Governor shall appoint, and that arms be accordingly delivered out to them. As the French are represented to be so very powerful, it is judged proper that the treasure at the coast settlements, more than what is necessary for their immediate expenses, should be removed to some neutral port or other place of security. Agreed that the President write to the Chiefs of Tellicherry and Anjengo what is necessary on this subject. In case the French fleet intends to come upon this coast, they will in all probability arrive about the end of next month (November). To secure our having the quickest advices of them it will be necessary that Tellicherry be not without a small advice boat; and that it be wrote to Anjengo to send all necessary advices thither in the most expeditious manner. The French may be expected to call at Goa for such provisions and necessaries as are there in readiness; it is judged proper that a boat with an intelligent person be likewise sent to Goa to bring such advices of the French as may be necessary.¹

Four days later (27th October 1746) a Consultation records: Received by *patamar* express a letter of the 23rd October from the Chief and Factors at Surat, acquainting us that the French Chief there has received letters from Pondicherry, under date the 10th September, advising that Monsieun La Bourdonnais went by land to Madras with 550 Europeans and for three days bombarded the fort by land, as did their ships by sea, and that on the day of writing (September 10th) they took it; that none of their people were wounded, but they take no notice of the loss of the English; that Tarwari had likewise received letters in 28 days from Madras and 25½ from Arcot, advising that the French, to the number of 5000 Europeans and Indians, had attacked the place for two days, while eight of their ships bombarded it from the sea; that Governor Morse, not finding the place defensible, delivered it up on the 10th and afterwards ransomed it for 11 lakhs of pagodas (Rs. 33 lakhs), eight to be paid immediately and the rest to be made good in a few days when the French were to deliver the place to the English.²

Next day (28th October 1746) has this entry: Received by *patamar* a letter from the Chief and Factors at Surat, dated the 21st October, acknowledging receipt of ours of the 3rd and advising us that the French took Madras on the 10th September (O. S.); that the French had 2000 Europeans and 10,000 of the Karnatak men, and that their fleet was actually in Madras Road. As there was no news of our men-of-war it was supposed they were gone to the eastward, not finding themselves a match for the French fleet.³

A Consultation of the 30th October records the following further information: The French had 5000 men whom by giving the governor of Arcot one lakh of pagodas they were able to land at St. Thomas; that in three days they had about 100 men killed and that our men suffered likewise; that though the place was well stored with ammunition, provision and men, on the fourth day Governor Morse thought proper to sur-

Chapter I. History.

Bombay
Preparations,
1746.

Surrender of
Madras,
1746.

¹ Bom. Gov. Consultation, 23rd Oct. 1746, Pub. Diary 19 of 1746, 445-447.

² Bom. Gov. Consultation, 27th Oct. 1746, Pub. Diary 19 of 1746, 451-453. Forest's Home Series, II. 79.

³ Bom. Gov. Consultation, 28th Oct. 1746, Pub. Diary 19 of 1746, 356-357.

Chapter I.**History.**

**Surrender of
Madras,
1746.**

render on the following terms: To pay the French eleven lakhs of pagodás and to deliver them the Company's goods that were on the spot, after which the place was to be restored to the English; that the first payment of eight lakhs of pagodas had been made and the Company's goods sent on board the French ships, and that in a day or two the remaining three lakhs would be discharged. The French would then deliver the place and return to Pondicherry. That the French did not plunder one house, nor did a private person lose a rupee; that during the three days the gates were shut the country peons whom the English had entertained had broken down several houses and committed some robberies. That the English at Tellicherry had removed their effects to Calicut, expecting every moment to be attacked by the French who had some ships cruising there, and that they had taken a vessel out of Tellicherry Road. Certain Armenian advices added the following details: That the French bombarded Madras three days and on the fourth day Governor Morse delivered it to the French, who seized English goods jewels and money to the amount of ten millions of pagodas and sent it by their ships to Pondicherry; that they touched nothing that was claimed by the Armenians or country people; that after the place was plundered, Monsieur La Bourdonnais agreed to deliver it to the English in consideration of eleven lakhs of pagodás. With this Governor Duplex was displeased and desired Mon. La Bourdonnais either to raze the place or to keep it till orders arrived from France. This La Bourdonnais refused to do, saying he would be answerable to the King for his actions. The French were to leave Madras the 29th September and proceed to other conquests.¹

**Force to be sent
to Fort St.
David,
1747.**

A Consultation of the 3rd April 1747 records: It being probable that during the rains we shall have no occasion for the northern forces that were raised against any French attempt on this island, it is agreed that, except the 200 Sidis who, if willing, may go to Fort St. David, they may with a month's wage be discharged and sent to Surat on the *Princess Augusta* and the other vessels now bound thither.²

The 24th April the Council record: Considering what supplies of men can be possibly spared for Fort St. David, it is agreed that Ensign Williams, with 68 European soldiers, 200 good topasses, and, as the Sidis decline to go, 115 of our garrison sepoys, including their officers, be sent to Madras under command of Captain Thomas Andrews; also six quarter gunners under the direction of Mr. Hugh Flinn, our gunner's first mate. Directed, therefore, that Captain Andrews with the European soldiers take passage on board the *Warwick*; that Ensign Williams with the topasses proceed on the *Ilchester*; and that Mr. Flinn, with the quarter gunners as also the sepoys, be sent on the *Princess Augusta*.³

**Dullness in
Trade,
1747.**

The 25th February 1747 the Court wrote: The trade to Guinea continuing very dull and not likely to improve during the war,

¹ Bom. Gov. Consultation, 30th Oct. 1746, Pub. Diary 19 of 1746, 357-358. Forrest's Home Series, II, 80.

² Bom. Gov. Consultation, 3rd April 1747, Pub. Diary 20 of 1747, 104.

³ Bom. Gov. Consultation, 24th April 1747, Pub. Diary 20 of 1747, 143.

our servants at Surat must not exceed the quantity of piecegoods mentioned in the list of investment.¹

The 2nd December 1748 the Court wrote: A treaty of general peace is happily concluded between Great Britain France and Holland, to which Germany Spain and the other powers engaged in the late war have acceded.²

During the time of uneasiness the relations with the Sidi and the arrangements regarding Underi continued satisfactory. A Consultation of the 10th May 1745 records: The Sidi's commanding officer at Underi having written the President of his necessity for laying in provisions for the rainy season, the Board decide that Rupji Dhanji see 80 *morahs* of batty and other stores be duly provided by the Sidi's agent and the amount be paid out of the treasury and bills taken for the same.³

At a Consultation the 26th April 1746 Government observe that notwithstanding the Sidis are somewhat backward in discharging their debt, yet as the expense of assisting them to keep Underi is now only about Rs. 650 a month, it is agreed that we continue helping them to preserve that island from falling into the Maráthás' or the Angriás' hands.⁴

The 7th May 1746 the Court of Directors write: We observe with satisfaction that our Chief and Council at Surat have at length fully recovered the Sidi's debt. We acquiesce in your taking the island of Underi under our protection for twelve months, the Sidis having engaged to pay the whole expense, and made over the island to us as a security. See to it at the year's end that they duly reimburse the charge.⁵

A Consultation dated 19th June 1747 records: The Sidis having some few days past desired to be eased of the charge of maintaining our people at Underi, the President acquaints the Board that, as at this time of the year the Sidis are under no apprehensions of being attacked, he ordered the account to be made up to the end of April. The result was a balance of Rs. 2001-2-47 against the Sidi, of which Rs. 681-1-64 were the charge of maintaining our people at Underi from the end of January to the end of April, and the remaining Rs. 1320-0-83 were for sundry stores the Sidis desired to keep for the defence of the island. This account was accepted by the governing Sidi and laid on the Council table. The President further acquaints the Board that he has received a letter from the Sidi's Killedár or chief officer at Underi, informing him of his having surprised the fort of Thal, which was in the possession of Mánáji Angria. To maintain the garrison at Thal the Killedár desires he may be supplied with 400

Chapter I. History.

Peace,
1748.

The Sidis,
1745.

Sidis Capture
Thal,
1747.

¹ Court to Bombay 25th Feb. 1747 para 41 Public Dep. Court's L. Vol. 3 of 1742-1751, 139.

² Court to Bombay 2nd Dec. 1748-1751 para. 4, Court's L. Vol. 3 of 1742-1751.

³ Bom. Gov. Consultation, 10th May 1745, Pub. Diary 18 of 1744-45, 158.

⁴ Bom. Gov. Consultation, 26th April 1746, Pub. Diary 19 of 1746, 133.

⁵ Court to Bombay 7th May 1746 para 31, Pub. Dep. Court's L. Vol. 3 of 1742-1751, 129.

Chapter I.**History.**

Sidis Capture
Thal,
1747.

Recovered
by Angria,
1774.

Musalmán sepoys for the space of one month with sundry warlike stores. On this the President observes that as in 1737 this Government mediated a peace between the Sidis and Mánáji Angria, wherein on certain conditions it was stipulated that the district of Thal should belong to Mánáji, especially while Underi was under the Company's protection, it was wrong in the Sidis, unless from some special cause, to commit any hostilities against Mánáji without previously advising the Bombay Government to prevent Mánáji taking offence. The President proposes writing to assure Mánáji that he was entirely unacquainted with the capture of Thal till the affair was over. The President further proposes to write to the Sidi to know his reasons for seizing the fort of Thal, and to say with regard to the stores that it is not consistent with the Honourable Company's orders for us to spare them. Still as they are in friendship with us they may purchase them in Bombay if they are to be had. As to the requisition for sepoys, the President observes we have none of our own to spare, but as they lately permitted us to enlist people in their country it is but reciprocal they should have the like liberty here, although, it is believed, they will be able to find few in Bombay that will prove of much service. All this the Board approves.¹

The 13th October 1747 the President acquaints the Board that a letter received on the 11th from Mánáji Angria gives information of his retaking the fort of Thal from the Sidis. As Mánáji and the Sidis have hitherto been backward in coming to terms, the President proposes to endeavour to settle their differences on the same good terms as before—a result of great advantage to the Sidis who, in a manner, are mainly supported by this Government. This the Board approves.²

The 8th December 1747 the President acquaints the Board that he is informed the Sidi's killedár at Underi has had some thousand rupees remitted from Sháhu Raja and by various informations seems to be setting up for himself independent of the government of Janjira. This, the President is well assured, is contrary to the intentions of the Janjira government. As only 80 of our men, including officers, are at Underi, to prevent treachery on the part of the killedár, he judges it necessary to send to Underi the *Defiance* prahn³ with a military officer and 40 men to assist our people ashore in case of necessity. To this the Board agrees.⁴

A Consultation of the 8th March 1748 records: The Sidis at Underi as well as the governing Sidi at Janjira, wishing our people and prahms to be withdrawn from Underi as the misunderstanding between them is at an end, resolved that our men and boats be accordingly recalled and the accounts transmitted to Janjira for the Sidi's approval and for giving bills on Sidi Masut at Surat for the amount.⁵

¹ Bom. Gov. Consultation, 19th June 1747, Pub. Diary 20 of 1747, 212-213.

² Bom. Gov. Consultation, 13th Oct. 1747, Pub. Diary 20 of 1747, 367-368.

³ Prahm for the Dutch praam, a flat-bottomed boat. Forrest's Marátha Series, I. Pt. I. 32.

⁴ Bom. Gov. Consultation, 8th Dec. 1747, Pub. Diary 20 of 1747, 461.

⁵ Bom. Gov. Consultation, 8th March 1748, Pub. Diary 21 of 1748, 88.

Two days later (10th March) the *Defiance* and *Triumph* prahms returned to Bombay from Underi with all the people that had been at Underi.¹

On the 16th August 1745 in the Diary of the Court of Oyer and Terminer, the entry occurs: The Justices being this day assembled agreed that the office of scavenger should be abolished and that the clerk of the market see to it that the inhabitants clean the streets before their respective doors, or otherwise they are to be fined. The Justices further ordered that the prisoners should be removed to the allotted house in the Marine Yard and that the Sheriff charge no commission upon the assessment.²

A Consultation the 1st July 1746 records: Sidi Masut requesting to be supplied with two four-pounder and six six-pounder iron guns for the use of his grab, the storekeeper is directed to deliver them accordingly at the rate of Rs. 18 per cwt. the price charged our own inhabitants, taking care duly to receive the amount before the guns are delivered.³

As regards the relations between the Bombay Government and the local powers, the Court wrote, 7th May 1746: We are very glad that you continue on good terms with your neighbours the Maráthás. For the benefit of our island you will do well to cultivate a friendship with them, always being watchful against any surprise. So long as their successors (successes) in the countries adjacent to them do not encroach upon our property, or impede our investments, you must keep neuter with respect to the contending parties.⁴

In the following year (25th February 1747) the Court resume: We are highly pleased that you still continue on good terms with the Maráthás, and entirely approve of sparing them a small quantity of shot in order to avoid all manner of disgust. Although for the benefit of the island we recommend harmony and agreement with them, yet at the same time in the best manner to guard the passes or ferries we must caution you against surprise, by a strict discipline of the military stationed at the passes and in our vessels.⁵

Of Nádir Sháh's (1740-1745) efforts to make Persia a maritime power, a Consultation of the 19th January 1747 records: As the common people belonging to Nádir Sháh's two ships have been lately very troublesome to the poorer sort of our inhabitants, the President acquaints the Board that to prevent the ill consequences that might otherwise ensue, he has given orders forbidding those people to go out of the town gates.⁶

Chapter I. History.

Scavenger
Abolished,
1745.

Guns sold to
the Sidi,
1746.

The Maráthás
Friendly,
1746.

Troublesome
Persians,
1747.

¹ Bom. Gov. Consultation, 10th March 1748, Pub. Diary 21 of 1748, 89.

² Diary of Court of Oyer and Terminer, 16th Aug. 1745, Vol. 119 of 1743-1745, 61-62; Forrest's Home Series, II. 412.

³ Bom. Gov. Consultation, 1st July 1746, Pub. Diary 19 of 1746, 212.

⁴ Court to Bombay 7th May 1746 paras. 26 and 27, Pub. Dep. Court's L. Vol. 3 of 1742-1751, 128.

⁵ Court to Bombay 25th Feb. 1747 para 47, Pub. Dep. Court's L. Vol. 3 of 1742-1751, 139-140.

⁶ Bombay Gov. Consultation 19th January 1747, Pub. Diary 20 of 1747, 27. When the mind of Nádir (1745) was in its most disturbed and frenzied state, he continued to brood over those plans which he had cherished in his happier days. He anxiously desired to encourage trade; and thought that his country would not only become wealthier, but more powerful, if he could form a navy. The aid of an enterprising but

Chapter I.
History.

Settlers in
Bombay,
1747.

In their letter of the 25th February 1747 the Court approve the punishment inflicted on contraband trade with Angria. They write : The laudable fine and confiscation for the contraband trade with Angria carried on by one of your inhabitants, will deter others from such illicit bad practices.¹

In the same letter (25th February 1747) the Court add : We entirely approve the protection granted to a wealthy merchant who retired from Surat. We perceive with satisfaction that the Moghal government at Surat was not offended or at least shewed no resentment upon the occasion.²

Fines to
Fishing Boats,
1747.

Some inhabitants of Bombay having been detected in letting out six fishing boats to freight to one Trimbak Pant, a merchant of Salsette, contrary to a publication issued by this Government in February 1740, the Bombay Council at their Consultation on 7th September 1747 resolved that the owners of five of the vessels burthening 100 khandis be fined in the sum of Rs. 100 each, and that the owner of the sixth being above that burthen be fined Rs. 200. This, it is hoped, will deter other people from a practice which may involve this Government in disputes with our neighbours.³

Dear Grain and
Cheap Cloth,
1747.

A Consultation of the 10th August 1747 has the following entry on dear grain and cheap cloth : Mr. Fraser urges that at Surat duttys and baftas are now bought from fifteen to twenty-five per cent cheaper than last year. In reply the Council are satisfied that though this may be true with respect to small quantities or ordinary sorts, the Honourable Company's investment being in large quantities and on a muster of a certain manufacture, the contractors are obliged to advance considerable sums to the weavers who are generally poor. It is well known the calamities in and about Surat were so great that people perished daily for want, or sold their children to support themselves. This doubtless rendered it hazardous for the contractors to advance any money lest necessity should oblige the undertakers to disburse it or at least some part of it for their present support. These circumstances

indiscreet Englishman (Mr. Elton) enabled him to commence the execution of this project on the Caspian. But the effort produced no benefit to Persia ; and, by exciting the jealousy of Russia, proved destructive to an infant commerce, which British merchants had established in that quarter. Nadir had also ordered ships to be built on the shores of the Persian Gulf ; and, with the true spirit of an unreflecting despot, commanded that timber for that purpose should be conveyed from the forests of Mazenderan, a distance of more than six hundred miles, and through a country which had neither canals roads nor wheel carriages. The inhabitants of the intervening provinces were compelled to contribute their labour to this object, which was never accomplished. The rude ribs of an ill-constructed vessel were to be seen some years ago on the beach at Abusheher, and seemed spared to be the memorial of the folly of this attempt. He also directed an immense quantity of marble to be carried from Aderbejan, to ornament his palaces at Kelat and Meshed, the transport of which caused almost as much misery as conveying the timber. In 1810, I (says Sir John Malcolm) visited the quarry where this marble was found, and saw a great number of half-finished blocks, which had lain untouched since his death. This quarry is on the banks of the lake of Ormeah, and about eighteen miles from the town of Maraga. Malcolm's Persia (1829), II. 48.

¹ Court to Bombay 25th Feb. 1747 para 29, Pub. Dep. Court's L. Vol. 3 of 1742-1751, 136.

² Court to Bombay 25th Feb. 1747 para 48, Pub. Dep. Court's L. Vol. 3 of 1742-1751, 140.

³ Bom. Gov. Consultation, 7th Sept. 1747, Pub. Diary 20 of 1747, 329.

and the dearness of indigo (which Mr. Fraser allows) confirm us that he draws an unjust conclusion in asserting that the whole of the investment might have been contracted for ten per cent cheaper than last year. Mr. Fraser is the only person that ever used any arguments to prove that an investment could be made cheapest in a time of famine. We are as anxious in reality as Mr. Fraser pretends to be that the Honourable Company's investment should be provided on the easiest terms. For this purpose we have lately pressed the Surat gentlemen to stir up as many competitors as possible (exclusive of Mánékji whom we had dismissed the service), nor for the reasons before given can we justly deem Nágar fit for the present investment, neither can we consider the untimeliness and manner of preferring his proposals in any other light than as already set forth, whatever gloss Mr. Fraser may put upon this transaction.¹

In reply to these strictures, on the 18th November 1747, Mr. Fraser wrote from Surat: I will first lay before you reasons which perhaps did not then occur to the Honourable President and Council why in years when grain is dearest, cloth is cheapest and comes in greater quantities to market. In years of dear grain those who spin the yarn work twice as long as they do in times of plenty that their earnings may in some measure compensate for the dearness of provisions. By this means yarn comes in greater quantities to market and is cheaper. Still it is mainly owing to the weavers that the great difference in the price of cloth arises. For whereas they formerly took five days to weave a piece of *duttis* and three days to weave a piece of *baftas*, they now do it in half the time and so proportionately in all sorts of cloth. This occasions a much larger quantity coming to market and the weavers are obliged to sell them off speedily that they may be enabled to buy a little grain and more yarn to go to work anew. I have this season bought a considerable amount of *duttis* and *baftas* from 20 to 25 per cent cheaper than last season. What confirms the truth of this beyond all contradiction is that our contractors agreed this year for the 18 and 9 *duttis* for *chints* which are two very considerable articles in the present investment at Rs. 85 and 81 per corgé, for which sorts they last year paid 96 and 55 (85?).²

Upon this the Bombay Government observe (24th November 1747): With regard to Mr. Fraser's assertion that cloth is cheapest when grain is dearest, it is what we cannot comprehend, nor consequently have we any reason to alter our former sentiments on this head as expressed in our Consultation of the 10th August. However, it is agreed to defer this, as also what he asserts concerning the certificates said by him to be signed and sealed by several principal merchants (which the Chief and Factors seem to doubt) and the low prices given by the Dutch for their investment to be fully enquired into by the gentlemen at Surat; though with regard to the latter it may not be improper to remark that it is notorious that the Dutch accept such goods as are from time to time rejected at our Factory for being inferior to muster.³

Chapter I.

History.

Dear Grain and
Cheap Cloth,
1747.

¹ Bom. Gov. Consultation, 10th Aug. 1747, Pub. Diary 20 of 1747, 266-267.

² Mr. Fraser to Mr. T. Marsh, Surat 18th Nov. 1747, Pub. Diary 20 of 1747, 442.

³ Bom. Gov. Consultation, 24th Nov. 1747, Pub. Diary 20 of 1747, 440.

**Chapter I.
History.**

The Bettering
of Bombay,
1748.

On the 15th March 1748, on the subject of the general improvement of Bombay, the Court write: We are encouraged to believe our island of Bombay may be rendered a very advantageous settlement and less expensive to us. To this end therefore we positively direct and require that by the exercise of a mild good government, people from other parts may be induced to come and reside under our protection. Let there be entire justice exercised to all persons without distinction, an open trade allowed to all, and as often as necessary or as the force allotted will enable you, let convoys be provided to the ships and vessels in a body. In this we require exactness as much depends upon it. An able honest man must ever direct the custom-houses at Bombay as well as at Máhim. No preference must be given to any merchant over others; for as all must and will pay our duties, no distinction should be made under any pretence. A constant steady pursuance of these rules will naturally draw people to leave the oppressions of other country governments, and come to you while freedom and exact justice subsist in our settlements. And because the inhabitants will constantly require materials for building and provisions for their families, which must be brought to the island, we direct that no obstructions be given in this or more duties charged thereon than may be publicly established. Be particularly careful that our servants take no fees or perquisites that are not consonant with reason or the ease and freedom of the inhabitants. We are determined to resent oppression, be it by whomsoever exercised.¹

Rules
against Fires,
1748.

On 13th June 1748 a fire in the chawls where the topass soldiers usually reside consumed 170 houses belonging to those poor people. As they were entirely unable to provide themselves new habitations, the Bombay Council, on 14th June 1748, agreed that the topasses be advanced out of the Land Pay Office the sum of Rs. 241½ to be stopped out of their monthly growing pay. The Council add: As this unhappy accident happened through those houses being built of tatters (*tuttis*) and roofed with cajans which are not only liable to catch fire but difficult to quench, to the great danger of the merchants' houses and warehouses, it is resolved that for the future no person be permitted to build any house warehouse or out-houses within the town unless the walls be of stone or mud and the roofs be covered with tiles.²

Ten days later, 24th June, the Council add: There being reason to believe that the fire of the 13th June was greatly spread from a house full of hay, the President had ordered the provisional clerk of the market to take an exact account of all hay and straw kept within the town. This account being now (24th June 1748) laid before the Board and duly considered, it is agreed that such inhabitants as have hay or straw in their dwelling-houses be fined the sum of Rs. 500 to be distributed by the land paymaster and captain commandant to such poor soldiers and other people as were sufferers in the late fire.³

¹ Court to Bombay 15th March 1748 para 48, Pub. Dep. Court's L. Vol. 8 of 1742-1751, 168-169. Compilation of Standing Ord. Vol. 1 of 1715-1721, 131-132.

² Bom. Gov. Consultation, 14th June 1748, Pub. Diary 21 of 1748, 188.

³ Bom. Gov. Consultation, 24th June 1748, Pub. Diary 21 of 1748, 195-199.

As regards the protection of trade the Court write (17th June 1748) : We rely on your continuing to employ the cruizers in the best manner for the protection of trade on the coast against Angria, and that you will also keep his brother Mánáji in due subjection.¹

Entries during the next fair season show the form of protection that was required and supplied :

The 6th October 1748 sailed the *Trial* snow to join the *Triumph* prahm and cruize between (Kenery) and Vosáva for endeavouring to protect the small trade bound into this port from any enemy's galivats.²

On the 21st October 1748 the President acquaints the Board that instead of cruising as he was ordered Captain Taylor in the *Trial* snow with the prahm under his direction lay three days at anchor off Máhim, and that in consequence the enemy's galivats had taken eight of our fishing boats from Warli stakes. That as Captain Taylor was in all respects unfit for that service the President judged it most for the safety of the *Trial* snow to order her into port and to keep in port till the season permitted of returning her to the other side. This the Board approves.³

A Consultation on the 20th November 1748 records : Sundry galivats of the enemy's being in the offing, for the better security of vessels that may be coming in, the following sailing orders are issued to Commodore Richard Crabb : On receipt hereof you are to weigh anchor and proceed on a cruize between the island Canarec (Kenery) and the fort of Vosáva about a league to the northward of Máhim Bar, keeping in from 10 to 15 fathom water and standing in towards this island once in 24 hours so as to be able to observe the signal of an Union Flag and Blue Flag under it, with one gun that may be made either at Warli or Old Woman's Island, upon which you are to make the best of your way into port again.⁴

On the question of the opium trade with the Straits and China the Court write (17th June 1748) : As to the Dutch pretensions to an exclusive right of trade in opium in the Straits of Malacca and to the eastward as advised from Bengal and your place, we utterly deny such right. In case our ships are molested in carrying on our commerce, do you empower the commanders to resist such hostilities and to make reprisals not only in defence of themselves but also of English country ships with your passes and British commanders that may be in their company. Public notice must be given hereof by fixing this our order up in the several languages at every factory, as we are informed the Dutch fixed theirs up at Surat and other places.⁵

On the receipt of these orders a Consultation of the 4th April 1749 directs that a copy of the following notification be transmitted to the

Chapter I.

History.

Protection to
Shipping,
1748.

Opium Trade,
1748-49.

¹ Court to Bombay 17th June 1748 para 7, Pub. Dep. Court's L. Vol. 3 of 1742-1751, 177.

² Bom. Gov. Diary, 6th Oct. 1748, Pub. Diary 21 of 1748, 322.

³ Bom. Gov. Consultation, 21st Oct. 1748, Pub. Diary 21 of 1748, 334.

⁴ Bom. Gov. Consultation, 20th Nov. 1748, Pub. Diary 21 of 1748, 363-364.

⁵ Court to Bombay 17th June 1748 para 22, Pub. Dep. Court's L. Vol. 3 of 1742-1751, 179.

**Chapter I.
History.**

Opium Trade,
1748-49.

Chief and Factors at Surat to be affixed at the usual places in that factory.¹

Notification.—Thomas Dorrill Chief and one of the Council for all forces and affairs of the Honourable United English East India Company under the Presidency of Bombay to all to whom these presents shall come greeting: Whereas the Dutch East India Company by the chiefs of their several factories in India said to be by the authority of their General and Council at Batavia did in the year 1746, by notification affixed at their respective factories, pretend to an exclusive right of trade in opium as set forth in said notification: To the end thereof that those trading under the protection of the Honourable United English East India Company may not be discouraged from carrying on their lawful trade and commerce, they have thought proper in their commands to their President and Council of Bombay, dated the 17th June last, not only utterly to deny such a right to belong to the Dutch East India Company, but in case any of their ships should be molested in carrying on their commerce to empower their said President and Council to give the commanders of such ships positive orders to resist such hostilities and to make reprisals not only in defence of themselves but also of English country ships carrying their pass and navigated by a British commander. The said Honourable United English East India Company being resolved and determined to suffer no infringement in their trade and commerce and that every one may be apprised thereof this declaration is ordered to be affixed at their several factories in the East Indies.

Given at Surat in the factory of the Honourable English Company this day of April 1749, by order of the Honourable William Wake Esquire, President of and for all affairs of the Honourable United Company of merchants of England trading to the East Indies, on the coast of India Persia and Arabia, Governor and Commander-in-Chief of his Majesty's Castle and Island Bombay, and its dependencies.²

Gaming,
1749.

In their letter of 30th August 1749 the Court repeat their well worn homily against gaming. It has been intimated to us that a spirit of gaming has lately prevailed among our servants at Bombay. As we can place no trust or confidence in persons guilty of that pernicious vice, you must immediately make a strict enquiry into the behaviour of our several servants in this respect, and send us a particular account of such enquiry and in the meantime reprimand suspend or even dismiss them from our service according to the degree of their guilt.³

Troubles in
Surat,
1748-1752.

A Consultation of the 10th February 1748 records: Received by *patamar* a letter from the Chief and Factors at Surat, dated the 3rd February, acknowledging receipt of a Bombay letter of the 25th January and acquainting us that the situation of affairs in that city will not possibly admit of their sending hither the sloop and galivat. That the city gates were all shut, batteries built by both parties in every quarter of the town, and, besides the cannonading

¹ Bom. Gov. Consultation, 4th April 1749, Pub. Diary 22 of 1749, 90.

² Pub. Diary, 22 of 1749, 90.

³ Court to Bombay 30th Aug. 1749 para 19, Pub. Dep. Court's L. Vol. 3 of 1742-1761, 220.

between the Castle and Darbár, there are almost daily skirmishes and street fights. As the place is in the utmost confusion and distress, the people belonging to their vessels are their only dependence, should anything happen in their part of the town.¹

A Consultation two days later (12th February 1748) records: A further letter from the Chief at Surat, dated the 3rd, stating that on the 1st instant Safdarkhán bid fair for burning the whole town by setting fire to some camphor warehouses which notwithstanding several messages sent by Achan to the Darbár to desist firing that all might join in putting out the flames, occasioned 400 houses to be consumed with a damage reckoned at 15 lákhs of rupees. That a counterpart of this would have been executed the night after by the other party by way of revenge had it not been for the Chief's remonstrances, the plan being laid for beginning with the officers' houses who commanded at the above piece of cruelty.²

After discussion agreed to forward the following letter from the President to the Chief and Factors at Surat (February 1748): If Safdarkhán alone suffered the town to be set afire, surely such an abominable transaction must cause his own destruction. Doubtless you did well in sending down the sloop and galivats, and I desire you will consider whether the treasure and what else she can take in of value would not be more safe on board the sloop. I know not what danger or inconveniences there are in going up or down the river; but I wish all of value were on board the sloop and the *Augusta* as soon as possible after her arrival at the bar. I imagine the force you have with the detachment and gunners from the *Augusta*, are as many people as you know what to do with in respect to the defence of the Factory against any enemies except fire. Your preventing Achan's commanding the like abominable practice with Safdarkhán was very commendable, which barbarity if pursued must inevitably and totally destroy the place. You do not take notice in any of your letters what is to be apprehended from Damálji's (Dámáji Gáekwár's) being admitted into the city, namely, whether and if so on what terms he will leave, should Achan carry his point in driving out Safdarkhán. The same question arises in respect to the coolies whom Safdarkhán has called to his assistance. While the contest is in progress it will be absurd for us to side with either party as great aspersions would afterwards ensue. But surely by this time you must know whether the Nizám be sincere in Achan's cause. If he is I judge this to be your most sure guidance. I imagine ere this you have Nazirjang's army not far distant from you when I should think you might engage with safety in favour of Achan whether he has the Moghal's authentic *sanad* or not. The fact that Safdarkhán set the town on fire would fully vindicate all the European factors siding with Achan. I can only further say that I pity your situation and wait with such patience as I am able the fate of the now miserable city of Surat.³

A Consultation of the 2nd October 1748 continues the account of

Chapter I.

History.

Troubles in
Surat,
1748-1752.

¹ Bom. Gov. Consultation, 10th Feb. 1748, Pub. Diary 21 of 1748, 46.

² Bom. Gov. Consultation, 12th Feb. 1748, Pub. Diary 21 of 1748, 47-48.

³ The President to the Chief and Factors at Surat, Feb. 1748, Pub. Diary 21 of 1748, 52-54.

Chapter I.
History.
Troubles in
Surat,
1748-1752.

affairs at Surat : An express boat from Surat brings a letter from the Chief and Factors there, dated the 28th ultimo, wherein they inform us that in violation of the treaty subsisting between him and Mia Achan on the 25th ultimo Safdarkhán took by surprise three gates of the outward wall of Surat city, and on the 26th by bribery possessed himself of the Killedár's serai, a strong building near the outward wall. That he has raised batteries against the inward wall and made an attack upon the town so that the gates were all shut and war actually commenced. Since then Safdarkhán had been daily increasing his forces which then amounted to about 5000 men. That Moidin Khán had about 6000 men in the town and castle. That these troubles had put an entire stop to that part of the investment manufactured in and about Surat ; neither could the finest part of the investment, the goods in warehouse that require whitening and calendering, be sent out to be finished.¹

At a Consultation the 24th November 1748 the President lays before the Board letters from the Chief of Surat, dated the 11th 12th and 13th instant, showing they were still in want of a number of sepoy for the security of the Honourable Company's factories and effects. Resolved that we take the opportunity of ten merchant *shibars* now bound thither to send them 200 sepoy with their officers. It is hoped that the Surat troubles will be settled without the Factory entering upon action. Still conformable to our resolutions of the 3rd October this must be left to the discretion of the Chief and factors at Surat. The Board further held that as the present troubles at Surat were an hindrance to the merchants of that city sending their agents to bid at the Bombay sales, the sale of the Honourable Company's goods which was to have been held to-morrow be deferred till the 23rd December.²

Five days later (29th November 1748) the Diary records the receipt by *patamar* of advices from the Chief and factors at Surat, dated the 20th, acknowledging receipt of the detachment of military and the train with the mortars and shells sent upon the *Restoration* grab, and advising that as the consequences of Safdarkhán's cruel disposition in case of his entering the city was so justly dreaded by all sorts of people they found it necessary for the security of the Honourable Company's factories and effects to employ those forces in support of Mia Achan, whose cause is also unanimously espoused by Sidi Masud, Chelabi, and all other principal merchants. The Dutch had declared themselves neuter, though it was well known they had assisted Safdarkhán with money and ammunition. That they should keep the grabs at Surat as they had been obliged to take out part of their crews. And that the merchants had desired to have the sale of the Honourable Company's goods put off till the troubles in town were over.³

On the 16th December 1748 the President received word from the Chief of Surat, dated 9th instant, acquainting him of the success of the Surat government against Safdarkhán by taking three of his batteries, spiking several of his guns, and killing his chief officer.⁴

¹ Bom. Gov. Diary, 2nd Oct. 1748, Pub. Diary 21 of 1748, 303-304.

² Bom. Gov. Consultation, 24th Nov. 1748, Pub. Diary 21 of 1748, 368-369.

³ Bom. Gov. Consultation, 29th Nov. 1748, Pub. Diary 21 of 1748, 370-371.

⁴ Bom. Gov. Diary, 16th Dec. 1748, Pub. Diary 21 of 1748, 391.

In the following years (1750-1752) the unsettled state of Surat continued one of the most important questions for the Bombay Government.

At a Consultation on the 18th April 1750 the Chief of Surat having represented to the President that a few more military and sepoys may be necessary to countenance the Honourable Company's affairs during the present unsettled state of the Surat government, the Board agreed to send on the *Drake* ketch 18 Europeans with an officer and 12 sepoys and that they detain the ketch sloop and galivats with the detachment on board them during the rains.¹

A Consultation on the 14th January 1751 reminded the Chief at Surat that in respect to the quarrel between Mīa Achan and Ali Navāz Khān they were strictly to observe the Honourable Company's orders not to make themselves parties in any disputes but to use all their good offices in bringing disputes to a happy issue.²

In their letter of the 9th April 1751 the Surat Chief and factors write: Since the capture of the Darbār the Sidi and Safdar Khān's slaves have seized on four merchants and shroffs and forced from them upwards of Rs. 40,000. That Achan's people had that day made a sally and destroyed the batteries which the other party were raising against the castle, the cannon of which also greatly annoyed them. That Achan reports he has provisions and ammunition for two years and that he will defend the fort to the utmost. On the other hand, the Sidi declares he intends to take and make himself governor of the castle and establish Safdar Khān governor of the Darbār. That the *Ghinims*, that is *ghanim* robbers or Maráthās, are retired out of the town and stop provisions and trade of all kinds from coming into it, threatening to return with a number of men to revenge the Sidi's burning the house of one of their principal officers. That it is reported the Sidi has promised the Dutch that they shall again begin on their works in two days; that the Factors hold the factory in good posture of defence, keep their vessels near at hand, and have possession of the city gate to the water side near their factory.³

At a Consultation on the 17th April regarding the contents of this letter the Board decide to direct the Chief and factors to observe a strict neutrality since the season is so far advanced that even if they were inclined so to do the Board would find it difficult to send them any reinforcements.⁴

At a Consultation on the 4th September 1751 the Board read letters from the Chief and factors of the 22nd August and the 2nd September 1751, telling that as one of their Portuguese soldiers was coming from church he was attacked by an Arab belonging to the Sidi from whom he snatched his scimitar and wounded him in two places. That they immediately sent to the Sidi to complain of this insult who instead of giving redress answered that his people were very ungovernable. That soon after they were informed the Arabs were assembled in a

Chapter I. History.

Troubles in
Surat,
1748-1752.

¹ Bom. Gov. Consultation, 18th April 1750, Pub. Diary 23 of 1750, 137.

² Bom. Gov. Consultation, 14th Jan. 1751, Pub. Diary 24 of 1751, 19.

³ Surat Letter of 9th April 1751, Pub. Diary 24 of 1751, 131.

⁴ Bom. Gov. Consultation, 17th April 1751, Pub. Diary 24 of 1751, 132.

Chapter I.

History.

Troubles in
Surat,
1748-1752.

tumultuous manner, threatening to attack the factory. That on their Bombay sepoy's making ready the Sidi's people fired on them as they did on Captain Sterling who marched with a guard of 60 men to view round their quarters. On this a battle ensued and all Safdar Khán's party joined to attack the factory and continued attacking it from adjacent houses till ten at night when they agreed to the Sidi's desire for a cessation of arms for twenty-four hours. They had nine soldiers, three Bombay sepoy's, and twelve Surat, killed and 40 wounded. That Captain Sterling was wounded in the foot with an arrow and Lieutenant Levick in the shoulder with a musket ball. That Mr. Pym had likewise received a shot through the calf of his leg and Mr. Delagarde one through the thigh. That their keeping in the houses rendered it impossible for them to do any significant mischief as they were to leeward of the Sidi and therefore could not conveniently dispossess them by fire. That they should do their utmost for the good security of our Honourable Masters' affairs and that against any loss which the Honourable Company might sustain in stock they had sufficient in Bombay now on the Mokha and Jidda ships belonging to Sidi Masud, Sidi Mafta, and others of that faction to make them ample satisfaction. That upon their signal being made Captain Sanders had fired ten of the Sidi's galivats and entirely destroyed them.¹

Bombay
Government
decide to take
Surat Castle,
1751.

After weighing the present unhappy situation of affairs at Surat the Board held that the general decay of trade must greatly affect the Honourable Company's sales and that Sidi Masud's pretensions to the government are founded on no other authority than his ambition. Considering the great indignity put on the Honourable Company by the attack on the factory the Board conclude that should the Sidi ever get into the quiet possession of the government of Surat, we shall not be able to carry on our Honourable Masters' business in a free and reputable manner, and that therefore the only expedient for recovering trade at Surat is for us to take possession of the castle. To effect this it is agreed to send what force we can spare with proper officers and ammunition under the command of Major William Mackenzie.²

A Consultation on the 11th November 1751 records that Rámáji Pant being come over to Karanja and having intimated his desire to the President that some person might be sent to confer on Surat affairs and other matters, the President despatched Mr. William Andrew Price with directions to treat on the following articles as agreed to by Gangádhār Pant:

1. To assist in driving out of Surat Sidi Masud, his son, and Safdar Khán, or if taken prisoners, that they be delivered to the English ;
2. The *tankha* now enjoyed by the Sidi to be preserved to the English ;
3. Mia Achan to remain *killedár* of the castle ;

¹ Surat Letters in Bom. Gov. Consultation, 4th Sept. 1751, Pub. Diary 24 of 1751, 305-306. ² Bom. Gov. Consultation 6th Sept. 1751, Pub. Diary 24 of 1751, 311.

4. All charges and expenses to be made good to the English by the Surat government ;
5. The Dutch wall to be demolished by the mortars ;
6. To have a settlement at Jambusar with the same privileges as at Cambay ;
7. We to build our factory at our garden in Surat in such manner as we judge proper for our trade ;
8. The castle to be kept by us till every thing is settled and all the Honourable Company's privileges to be preserved in full force ;
9. That Nána the Pandit Pradhán (Báláji Bájiráv, 1746 - 1761) shall enjoy one-fourth of the revenues of Surat as offered by Achan ;
10. If any disputes happen between Nána's people and the Moor's governor the English are to be umpires.

On the other hand, that the following articles be agreed to by the Honourable Richard Bouchier, Governor of Bombay, in behalf of Pandit Pradhán (the Nána) and by Gangadhar Pant his agent :

1. The said Pandit Pradhán shall enjoy one-fourth part of the revenues of Surat City and the district thereof, for collecting which one of his officers shall assist with a few people and a house to be allowed him to dwell in ;
2. If any Marátha merchant shall come to Surat with Pandit Pradhán's license he is not to be molested ;
3. Whatever goods are bought and sold at Surat for the use of his Sarkár and Rámáji Pant, no customs to be collected and all those merchants under his protection shall pay no more than half customs ;
4. Should it upon any urgent occasion be necessary to call any of the said Pandit Pradhán's armies for their assistance their pay and other charges to be paid out of the whole amount of the revenues ;
5. When the Surat government is settled, the English shall join their forces with those of Pandit Pradhán and assist in reducing Jáfarábád in South Káthiáwár where the English shall have a factory when the Maráthás are possessed of it.¹

On the 26th November 1751 a Consultation on Surat affairs resumes : In spite of our agreement with Rámáji Pant on behalf of Nána for his joining us with a body of men in attacking Surat, since Nána is at present obliged to draw the greatest part of his forces to his frontiers to defend them from the Moghals, we cannot at this juncture expect his assistance. It is therefore agreed that the President write to Nek Alamkhán (governor of Broach) to know what forces he can send to Surat.²

The next day (27th November) the President Hon. Mr. Bouchier lays before the Board the following articles of agreement between the

Chapter I. History.

Bombay
Government
decide to take
Surat Castle,
1751.

¹ Bom. Gov. Consultation, 11th Nov. 1751, Pub. Diary 24 of 1751, 397-398.

² Bom. Gov. Consultation, 26th Nov. 1751, Pub. Diary 24 of 1751, 416.

Chapter I.
History.

Bombay
Government
decide to take
Surat Castle,
1751.

Honourable Company and Nek Allam Khán through Khoja Vertanes Nicolaos his Vakil :

(1) The Honourable Company to assist in conjunction with your forces in driving out of Surat Sidi Masud Safdar Khán and their sons, and if both or either of them are taken prisoners they are to be delivered to the Government of Bombay ;

(2) The *tankhu* now received by the Sidi to be preserved to the Honourable Company, and they are to protect the port of Surat by the sea side ;

(3) Mia Achan to remain killedár of the Castle of Surat and the said Nek Alam Khán to be governor of the town ;

(4) All the Honourable Company's charges and expenses on account of these troubles and in making him governor of Surat to be made good by Nek Alam Khán ;

(5) The Dutch are not to be permitted to build any wharf ; they must demolish any works they have raised ; and must obtain no privileges in addition to what they have ;

(6) The Honourable Company shall build a factory at their garden in such manner as they shall judge proper for their trade ;

(7) The Castle to be kept by the Honourable Company till everything is settled ;

(8) All the Honourable Company's privileges to be preserved in full.¹

At a Consultation on the 6th December 1751 the President suggests, as the situation of affairs at Surat is drawing to a crisis, a committee be appointed to proceed to Surat Bar with full powers from the Board for accommodating all the unhappy disturbances of the city in the manner most advantageous to the Honourable Company. The Board desire until Tuesday next (the 10th) to consider this proposal.² At the meeting on the 10th the Board unanimously approve the President's proposal for a committee proceeding to Surat Bar. The President then proposes that Major William Mackenzie be a member of the committee and also take upon him the command of the whole force there and of that now proceeding. In this the Board also concur as it is judged his presence is absolutely necessary on the present service ; it being the Honourable Company's intention that he should be more immediately consulted on all military operations without which in all probability affairs are not likely to be brought to an advantageous issue. Upon this Major Mackenzie acquaints the Board that he must decline going on this service esteeming the number of men and officers inferior to his command. Decided that a detachment of 100 military, 38 people of the train, and 300 good sepoys with proper supply of ammunition and three months' provisions go up with the committee ; likewise a considerable supply of wood agreeable to Captain Best's request.³

Treaty with
Sidi Masud,
1752.

At a Consultation on the 5th March 1752 the Board approved the following proposals for a treaty of peace with Sidi Masud⁴ :

(1) The treaty made by Mr. Lambc and Council and witnessed

¹ Bom. Gov. Diary, 27th Nov. 1751, Pub. Diary 24 of 1751, 418-419.

² Bom. Gov. Consultation, 6th Dec. 1751, Pub. Diary 24 of 1751, 443.

³ Bom. Gov. Consultation, 10th Dec. 1751, Pub. Diary 24 of 1751, 445-446.

⁴ Bom. Gov. Consultation, 5th March 1752, Pub. Diary 25 of 1752, 86.

by the European chiefs to be null and void, and the Rs. 30,000 then paid to Sidi Masud Khán to include our *peshkash* to September next, till when nothing is to be demanded of us ;

(2) Rs. 2,00,000 to be allowed and paid us immediately in consideration of our charges during this war as also for the losses in our Latty (or customs) ;

(3) The two sons of Mia Achan to have posts of considerable honour and credit under the government and granted at our desire ;

(4) All the coaches oxen and horses taken from the English to be returned ;

(5) The Company's Phirman privileges to be preserved and our goods to pass the Mulla or water-gate as heretofore ;

(6) The Company's garden and house with whatever may belong to them to be delivered to us ;

(7) Our Chief and people to be released and our Latty with our factories to be secured to us ;

(8) All hostilities to cease and all batteries to be taken away ;

(9) All people under our protection that have absconded during these troubles must be suffered to return and to remain in future without molestation ;

(10) That the Castle be given to Sidi Masud Khán and the City to Safdar Khán, but that Safdar Khán be turned out as soon as convenient ;

(11) That the Dutch wall shall be pulled down.¹

A Consultation of the 31st October 1752 records the following decision on Angria's affairs : Mánáji Angria having been guilty of many insults to the vessels belonging to the inhabitants of this island, and in particular lately seized four vessels coming from Maskat which he plundered of goods to the amount of Rs. 1500 ; It is resolved to deter him from the like in future by the issue of orders to the commanders of the Honourable Company's vessels to treat him as a common enemy by taking sinking and destroying his grabs and galivats or otherwise distressing him. This we doubt not will soon bring him to reason.²

At a Consultation held on the 28th January 1751 in view of the Surat disorders, and also with the object of centering trade at Bombay, the Council agree that the *True Briton's* cargoes be landed at Bombay and disposed of at public outcry on Friday the 1st of March next, of which the Secretary is directed to give proper notice. The Council also directed that a letter be wrote to the Chief and factors at Surat enclosing them a list of the said cargo and ordering them to give proper notice at that place of its intended sale. Likewise that a list of such articles as the supercargoes request in part of the *True Briton's* returning cargo and can most properly be provided at Surat be enclosed to the Chief and factors and they be ordered to comply therewith as near as possible if to be procured at such prices as will turn to an account at the rates mentioned in the Canton price current. Copy of such goods to be sent to Bombay during the month of March at latest.³

Chapter I. History.

Treaty with
Sidi Masud,
1752.

Angria
a Common
Enemy,
1752.

Bombay the
Market of
Western India,
1751.

¹ Bom. Gov. Consultation, 5th Mar. 1752, Pub. Diary 25 of 1752, 87-88.

² Bom. Gov. Consultation, 31st Oct. 1752, Pub. Diary 25 of 1752, 324.

³ Bom. Gov. Consultation, 28th Jan. 1751, Pub. Diary 24 of 1751, 35.

**Chapter I.
History.**

Import Duty
on Foreign
Broadcloth,
1751.

A Consultation on the 15th February 1751 on the competition of foreign broadcloth from the Persian Gulf records this decision :

Several parcels of French and other foreign broadcloth having of late been imported from Basra and Surat, whose slightness of fabric enables the importers to sell at cheaper rates than the Honourable Company, and as, if this traffic is permitted to continue on easy terms, it is likely in time to greatly prejudice the Honourable Company's trade in woollen goods, the Bombay Government resolve that a duty of nine per cent be assessed on all sorts of woollen goods imported by any person or persons except the Honourable Company, and the same duty on exporting any of said woollen goods again to any other parts, and that no person may plead ignorance hereof, they order that this resolution be published by beat of drum through Bombay and Mahim and afterwards affixed at the usual places.¹

On the 15th December 1752 the President acquaints the Board that he has received advice from Shunkráji Pant, the commander of Bassein, that a peace is concluded between the Maráthás and Moghals. As this agreeable news will be attended with the opening of the inland trade especially for woollen goods, the Council resolved to acquaint the Chief and factors at Surat that they shall put up to public sale the broadcloth and long ells and likewise the elephants teeth, which are now in demand, on Wednesday the 3rd January next, being the day affixed for the disposal of other articles.²

Unlicensed
Trade,
1752.

On the 4th March 1752 the Court write to Bombay: Having great reason to believe that the commanders and officers of our ships carry out in a clandestine manner large quantities of goods, particularly woollens, greatly to the Company's prejudice, you are hereby directed to observe it as a standing rule to take and cause to be taken an exact account of all private trade landed from every ship at Bombay or any of the subordinate settlements, and transmit copies thereof to us for our information. If any unlicensed goods are found, they must be seized and confiscated for the use of the Company. In order to discover unlicensed trade, we do hereby promise and agree to pay to any person or persons that shall discover any goods or merchandise carried out in any of our ships, by the commanders officers or any other persons whatsoever, without our license, so as the same shall be seized and confiscated to the use of the Company, one moiety or half part of the net produce of the same, law charges and all other charges whatsoever being first deducted, to be paid in England to such person or persons or their representatives. And in case any goods or merchandise shall be so discovered and confiscated, you are to send us exact accounts thereof, and such full and necessary information of the whole transaction as may enable us readily to comply with our beforementioned promise.³

Europe Goods
in Demand at
Bombay,
1752.

In the same letter (4th March 1752) the Court add: It gives us great satisfaction to observe that the demand for Europe goods at

¹ Bom. Gov. Consultation, 15th Feb. 1751, Pub. Diary 24 of 1751, 50.

² Bom. Gov. Diary, 15th Dec. 1752, Pub. Diary 25 of 1752, 385-386.

³ Court to Bombay 4th Mar. 1752 paras. 13 and 14, Pub. Dep. Court's L. Vol. 4 of 1732-1756, 3-4. Comp. of Standing Ord. Vol. 1 of 1715-1721, 48.

the Bombay market continues increasing. As we have so often pressed you to encourage the sale of European goods, particularly of woollens, we shall now only say that in so doing you will merit the favour of your Employers as well as serve your country.¹

In 1753 (March 14th) the Court write to Bombay: We cannot help most earnestly reminding you of our frequent recommendations for your encouraging substantial traders to reside under our protection at Bombay. We cannot but believe this may be easily effected if set about heartily, especially when it is considered how much more secure they will be in their persons and estates than they are or ever can be under the precariousness and oppressions of the neighbouring governments. The advantages resulting to us in drawing trade to Bombay by these means, are too obvious to require particular mention.²

On the 4th September 1753, at a meeting of the Board, agreeable to the orders of the Court of Directors per *Stafford*, the exemplification of His Majesty's Royal Charter was read to the Board and the copy examined by it, a few mistakes being carefully corrected. The Board resolved that Friday next be appointed for publishing this Charter of which the Secretary is directed to give the proper notice.³

Accordingly on the 7th September 1753 His Majesty's Royal Charter was published at the New Bandar a tent being pitched for the Governor and Council covenanted servants and others. The regiment was drawn up and fired three volleys of small arms and the Fort 21 pieces of ordnance.⁴

On the 26th March 1755 the Court addressed the following letter to Bombay: It is very agreeable to us to observe that notwithstanding the superstitious attachment of the Indians to the places of their nativity, the number of inhabitants are greatly increased and that some very substantial people have settled among you to the great advantage of the island. As it is our earnest desire that as many people as possible, especially those of circumstance, be encouraged to settle at Bombay, we strongly recommend it to you, to use the most prudent equitable and encouraging methods for that purpose. In particular we direct that so long as it incommodes not the defence of the place, you suffer new-comers to build houses wherever it shall be convenient to them; that they have free liberty to build and repair their own ships themselves in what manner and how they please, and be supplied out of our stores with what materials they want at the rates and prices allowed to Europeans; that they have likewise free liberty of appointing, as commanders, subjects of Great Britain and Ireland for their own ships agreeable to their own choice and election, without any persons whatsoever interfering in the same. And, in general, that they have all the reasonable privileges that can possibly be given them. In addition the Court specially takes notice

Chapter I. History.

The Increase of
Bombay Trade,
1753.

Royal Charter,
1753.

Measures
to Increase
Bombay,
1755.

¹ Court to Bombay 4th March 1752 para 54, Pub. Dep. Court's L. Vol. 4 of 1752-1756, 10.

² Court to Bombay 14th March 1753 para- 85, Pub. Dep. Court's L. Vol. 4 of 1752-1756, 80.

³ Bom. Gov. Consultation, 4th Sept. 1753, Pub. Diary 26 of 1753, 287-288.

⁴ Bom. Gov. Diary, 7th Sept. 1753, Pub. Diary 26 of 1753, 294.

Chapter I.**History.**

Measures
to Increase
Bombay,
1755.

that Mulla Fakr-ud-din appears highly deserving of encouragement. We shall expect to hear he meets encouragement at Bombay in all respects to his satisfaction. And as freedom in trade is another the most probable method and inducement for increasing the number of inhabitants and encouraging a general resort to the island, you are hereby directed to suffer all persons to buy and sell publicly or privately as they themselves shall choose, to deal freely and without restraint with whoever they shall think proper, and, if any of our servants shall prevent or endeavour to prevent such a freedom of trade on any pretence whatsoever, they will incur our highest displeasure. The more effectually to prevent all combinations monopolies and attempts against the freedom of trade, you are to affix up in the most public places, in the usual languages, publications for the notice of all persons of these our intentions that they may be entirely free from apprehensions of being hindered, imposed upon, or oppressed by the Governor, the members of the Council, our inferior servants, or any other persons whatsoever. You are to transmit to us for our information copies of such publications. The same rules are, allowing for difference of circumstances, to be observed by our servants at the subordinate settlements¹

On the 25th September following (1755) the Bombay Diary records: Issued a publication, translated in the several languages, and notified by beat of drum offering the many advantages contained in the 86th paragraph of the Honourable the Court of Directors' commands, received the 16th instant, for the encouragement of merchants and other persons of substance to settle on the island of Bombay.²

Value of Land,
1755.

A Consultation of the 13th May 1755 records: The house situated near the horse stable being in so ruinous a condition that it will cost Rs. 1000 to repair it, and when repaired will accommodate one servant only; it is judged more for the Honourable Company's interest to dispose of it, together with the compound, which, as the black inhabitants are much in want of ground within the walls, we judge will induce them to bid liberally. We order therefore that the Secretary affix notifications as usual that we will put it up to public outcry on this day seven nights.³

A week after (20th May 1755) several people attending in consequence of the notifications fixed for the sale of the house agreeable to the resolution at the Board's last meeting, they were admitted and being first informed that the purchaser must pay the Honourable Company's quit-rent as usual for the ground which measures 833 square yards, and that we should allow two months' credit, the house out-house and compound with some old stores belonging thereto were put up. Mr. Hugh Symmons being the highest bidder at Rs. 2705, was ordered to take charge thereof in his own name.⁴

On the 26th March 1755 the Court writes: To our great

¹ Court to Bombay 26th March 1755 para 86, Pub. Dep. Court's L. Vol. 4 of 1752-1756, 219-220. Comp. of Standing Ord. Vol. 1 of 1715-1721, 160-161.

² Bom. Gov. Diary, 25th Sept. 1755, Pub. Diary 28 of 1755, 363.

³ Bom. Gov. Consultation, 13th May 1755, Pub. Diary 28 of 1755, 209.

Bom. Gov. Consultation, 20th May 1755, Pub. Diary 28 of 1755, 217-218.

satisfaction you have for long been on very good terms with the Maráthás. A strict friendship with the Maráthás has been and in all respects will continue to be of the highest advantage to the Company; especially in the probability of their becoming masters at some time or other of Surat. We therefore recommend the cultivation of Maráthá friendship as a point of the greatest importance.¹

On the 6th December 1755 the President acquaints the Board that by articles of agreement with the Maráthás in March last, when our troops went with them on an expedition against Tuláji Angria, it was stipulated that the forts at Pancote (Bánkot) and Himmatgad with their dependent villages should be yielded to our Honourable Masters and the other conquered places to the Maráthás.² In consequence of this stipulation the Maráthás have offered and are now ready to comply with their engagement. The chief motive for this stipulation is the advantage of securing a certain supply of cattle and other provisions in which the island of Bombay is wanting, and the need of obtaining which from the Sidis at Rájpuri has often exposed us to their insolence. Till about eighteen years ago, when Angria gained possession of Bánkot from the Moors, it was a port of considerable trade, and there is much reason to conclude its neighbourhood to Poona and Sátára, where most of our woollen goods and other Europe staples are carried, and the large export of salt from Bombay will render it a beneficial settlement. Hoping the possession of it will prove agreeable to our Honourable Masters, the Board resolve and the President nominates Mr. William Andrew Price Chief of Bánkot as he is perfectly acquainted with the manners and customs of the country-people and their language. This is unanimously approved, and Messrs. Henry Moore and Nicholas Starkie are appointed to his assistance, also a company of military, another of sepoys, and a detachment of the train to be held in readiness to garrison it. As Captain Jacques De Funck, our engineer, is wanted for the immediate service of Bombay, Captain Hugh Cameron Clerk of the Works to proceed to carry on necessary additions and repairs to the Bánkot fortifications, and Mr. John Hardecastle, who has served many years as surgeon at Gombroon and Anjengo, to be entertained as surgeon at Bánkot.³

About the close of 1755 Government resumed consideration of an expedition against Gheria on the Ratnágiri coast.⁴

Chapter I: History.

Relations with
Maráthás,
1755.

Bánkot,
1755.

Fall of Gheria,
1756.

¹ Court to Bombay 26th Mar. 1755 para 70, Pub. Dep. Court's L. Vol. 4 of 1752-56, 214.

² Bánkot afterwards Fort Victoria in the north of Ratnágiri seventy-three miles south-east of Bombay. Bombay Gazetteer, Ratnágiri, X. 320-321.

³ Bom. Gov. Consultation 6th Dec. 1755, Pub. Diary 28 of 1755, 466-467.

⁴ On the 10th March 1755 the President laid before the Committee three letters from Nána general of the Maráthás, earnestly desiring us to join the Company's forces with theirs and endeavour to subdue and demolish Tuláji Angria. It was then resolved that Messrs. Price and Hough proceed to Rámájipant, who was appointed by Nána to adjust all matters with the President, with full power and authority to settle things in the best manner for the Honourable Company's interest. The President further acquaints the Committee that at a late interview with Rámájipant he was very pressing for our attacking Gheria in conjunction with Nána's forces. On considering the lateness of the season and some of our cruizers being dispersed on different services, it was impossible to execute this plan. It was at length determined that the Maráthás should attack Severmook (Suvarndurg), while we blockade it by sea to prevent Angria's throwing in any succour that way. Resolved therefore that the *Protector*, the ketch

Chapter I.
History.
Fall of Gheria,
1756.

The Bombay Diary of the 1st December 1755 records: It not being in our power to proceed any further in regard to the expedition against the French and their allies in Deccan and Arcot, the President acquaints the Committee that he has conferred with Admiral Watson concerning the design against Gheria, which the Committee appointed last season under orders received by ship *Hardwicke*, were instructed to undertake in conjunction with the Maráthás. The President has learnt from the Admiral that if the Admiral assists therein with His Majesty's squadron, a clause in his instructions obliges him to stipulate that our Honourable Masters shall make good what ammunition may be expended, and that the men-of-war shall be refitted in case of damage. As such a force shall be a means of our reducing Gheria with greater ease, the President gave his word of honour to the Admiral those conditions should be complied with. This the Committee unanimously approve and confirm. A week later, 9th December 1755, another Consultation was held to settle the command of the troops to be sent on the expedition against Gheria. The entry in the diary of that date runs: The President acquaints the Board that as he has remarked that Colonel Clive is the one appointed by the Honourable the Secret Committee to command in case of our proceeding on their plan against the French and their allies in the Deccan and Arcot, and that in the supplement to their commands under the 26th March last (1755) which is now read, they are pleased to mention that they think it improper that Sir James Foulis should be absent from the island during the unsettled state of affairs with the French in Europe; and Colonel Clive making a tender of his service, which he says he thinks is but his duty on this occasion, as well as any other, from the Honourable Company's having obtained him a superior commission to Sir James Foulis, it is unanimously decided that agreeably to the commands of the Secret Committee Sir James Foulis shall not be absent from the island and that Colonel Clive's offer be accepted.

Five weeks later, 15th January 1756, the President informs the Committee that, in consequence of the assurances given him as regards ammunition and damage in attacking Gheria, Rear Admiral Watson had agreed to proceed with the squadron under his command to act in conjunction with the Maráthás. It being the opinion of the President and Mr. Samuel Hough that there is depth enough at low water to admit of His Majesty's capital ships going sufficiently near the batteries to make a breach, and the Committee unanimously agreeing that, by embarking the detachment of His Majesty's Royal Regiments of artillery together with such of the Honourable Company's forces as can be spared, the Marátha army investing the place at the same time, the attack of Gheria with such a force will be attended with the greatest prospect of success. Admiral Watson, in obedience to His Majesty's instructions to him dated the 2nd March 1754, agrees to undertake this service.

Swallow, and the prahm *Triumph* be immediately got in readiness for this service. On the 21st March 1755 the instructions to Commodore or Commander William James bearing on this expedition were signed and delivered. Savarnburg fell the 6th April 1755. Secret and Political Diary 1 of 1755; Forrest's Marátha Series, I. Pt. I. 87, 89; Bombay Gazetteer, Ratnagiri, X. 196, 339.

The three following weeks were spent in preparation. On the 7th February 1756 the expedition started and within a week Gheria had fallen. The Diaries of the 7th and 15th February 1756 have the following entries: About eight this morning (7th February 1756) sailed His Majesty's ship *Kent*, Rear Admiral Watson, which, on weighing anchor, was saluted from the fort with 15 guns, the *Cumberland*, Rear admiral Pocock, with the *Tyger* and *Salisbury* men-of-war, the *Hardwicke* store and hospital ship, *Viper*, *Warren* and *Despatch* ketches, *Triumph* prahm, and 20 fishing boats with sepoys to join His Majesty's ship *Bridgewater*, sloop *King Fisher*, and the Honourable Company's cruizers off Gheria, and proceeded on the expedition against Tulaji Angria.

Chapter
Histor
Fall of Gb
1756.

On the 13th February 1756 at 6-23 p.m. the flag in Gheria fort was struck, and an officer with sixty men marched into the fort and took possession. At 6-36 p.m. English colours were hoisted at the fort. On the 14th February 1756 Colonel Clive with all the land forces marched into the fort, despatched away an express boat with advices to the Honourable Richard Bouchier, Esquire, President and Governor of Bombay, of having taken Gheria and burnt all Angria's fleet, which consisted of the *Restoration*, eight ketch grabs, and two large three-mast grabs on the stocks ready for launching besides a number of small craft.

The following entry from the Bombay Diary of the 19th February 1756 relates how the success at Gheria was proclaimed at Bombay: The President having received advices from Rear Admiral Watson that the Fort at Gheria surrendered to him the 13th instant (February 1756) 21 guns were fired this evening (19th February) from the Castle and the military discharged three volleys on the parade to manifest our joy on this happy occasion.¹

On the 9th April 1756 Captain Jacques De Funck, Company's Engineer, wrote to the President and Council: Captain Cameron asked me whether the Company's garden or the next batty grounds would be any hindrance to the cannon at Dongri as the Governor thought proper to line out the streets upon the paddy grounds for the people's houses. I told him the houses would cause no interference. At the same time, as the place lay so low as to be for some months liable to be under water, it was my opinion that Old Woman's Island or Mázgaon would be a healthier situation.²

Company
Garden,
1756.

On the 31st March 1756 the Court of Directors wrote on the subject of the vend of woollens: As our great object is the vend of our woollen manufacture we shall depend upon your endeavours to extend to the best of your power the consumption of woollens, not only wherever it may be done in the Persian Gulf, without prejudice to the sales at Gombroon and Basra, but also at any ports near Bombay, especially at Scindy, which we are assured yearly takes off a considerable quantity of woollens and many other European goods, cloth and long ells, lead,

Sind Trad
1756.

¹ Bom. Gov. Pub. Diary, 7th and 19th Feb. 1756, Vol. 29 of 1756, 65, 87. For full details see Secret and Political Diary I of 1755 and III of 1756, and Forrest's Marátha Series, I. Pt. I, 87-121.

² Pub. Diary 29 of 1756, 172.

Chapter I.**History.**Sind Trade,
1756.

steel, iron, elephants teeth and cochineal imported by the Dutch.¹ Scindy has the further advantage of producing putchuck, the favourite Chinese incense, saltpetre, salamoniac, and cumin seeds besides chints ginghams and most sorts of cotton cloth. It is also a very plentiful country for rice, wheat, cattle, and other provisions. As in the view given us Scindy may not only be useful in opening a new channel for our trade in woollen goods, but in many other respects affords a pleasing prospect of further improvements, we recommend you to consider well what advantages may result from imports and exports at that place. If you are of opinion it may be for the interest of the Company to cultivate a trade there, you should, at as little expense as the nature of the service will admit, appoint under your orders a Resident and an Assistant constantly to reside at Scindy. You are to communicate to us your impartial thoughts upon this project, and give us an explicit account of your proceedings herein from time to time.²

Dutch Rivalry,
1756.

On the 31st March 1756 the Court explained that rivalry with the Dutch was one of the reasons for the Court's anxiety for the maintenance of friendly relations between the Bombay Government and the Maráthás. They write: It gives us pleasure to observe that harmony and friendship continue between you and your neighbours the Maráthás. We cannot too earnestly recommend you to exercise the utmost care and attention in preserving friendly relations. Among other advantages from their friendship we hope to be informed that the Maráthás will not permit the Dutch to establish a factory at Bassoin. As this is a point of the utmost importance to the Company, we approve of the measures you have already taken in this matter, and shall depend upon your assurances of using the most effectual means to prevent the Dutch getting a footing in the Marátha dominions. We are sensible that the exclusion of the Dutch must necessarily be attended with some expense, the extent whereof and the manner of its application we shall leave to your discretion and good management, reminding you only that the present situation of the Company's affairs requires the utmost frugality in every outlay.³

In the same letter (31st March 1756) the Court continue: The very being of the Company will in great measure depend upon our several settlements being in the best possible posture of defence. We cannot too earnestly recommend you in particular to be constantly on your guard that you may be in a condition to defend the island against any hostile attempt. Your attention to our affairs on the Coromandel Coast and the considerable detachments of military you had sent thither, at times when they were greatly wanted, are extremely agreeable to us, and convince us that you will always have in view the good of the service in general, when

¹ Court to Bombay 31st Mar. 1756 para 60, Pub. Dep. Court's L. Vol. 4 of 1752-1756, 299.

² Court to Bombay 31st Mar. 1756 para 83, Pub. Dep. Court's L. Vol. 4 of 1752-1756, 306-307.

³ Court to Bombay 31st Mar. 1756 para 77, Pub. Dep. Court's L. Vol. 4 of 1752-1756, 304.

your circumstances will admit of; and those of our other Presidencies require assistance.¹

A Consultation on the 21st August 1756 has the following entry: Reperuse the advices received last night (20th August) from the select committee at Fort St. George. After consideration remark thereon: These advices do not acquaint us how many of our Hon. Masters' ships are arrived from England, nor when, nor up to what date, they bring intelligence of the secret committee. We therefore conclude the select committee must have despatched other *patamars* immediately on those ships' arrival, by whom we may expect to receive a packet from our Hon. Masters. As to the large force which the secret committee are apprehensive the French have sent to India and which the gentlemen at Madras expect are destined to attack the settlements on their coast, we cannot but think there is equal or more reason to imagine the French force will be employed against this place rather than against Madras or Bengal. This seems the more likely considering that the French are fully aware that Mr. Watson's squadron has been stationed on the other coast all the fair monsoon, and that Colonel Alercron's (Abercorn's?) regiment is there to assist the squadron. The French may also think from the report, which was current on the departure of our last year's ships, that Colonel Clive with His Majesty's three companies of the Royal Regiment of Artillery proceeded immediately thither. They may also be deterred from action against Bengal, because of the great risk to largeships going up the Hugli and because of the ease with which Mr. Watson's squadron might come to the relief of Bengal. For these reasons we cannot but conclude that the French will look on Bombay as the easiest conquest, and that we have the most reason to expect an attack, especially as we well know that the French have long been anxious to get a seaport on this side of India capable of sheltering their ships from the monsoon. We have fully acquainted the gentlemen at Madras that it is not in our power to send them even the *Protector* except fitted as a merchant ship. As to their present strenuous requisition for both the *Protector* and the *Revenge*, it appears to us very improbable that Mr. Watson will not be sufficiently reinforced from Europe, especially as the secret committee mention they had applied to the Ministry. We are fully concerned for the bad situation of our Hon. Masters' affairs in Bengal and are aware they have required a reinforcement from Madras. Still the ships recently arrived at Madras have doubtless brought out the usual number of recruits, and from the best accounts we can get of their strength it consists, including the King's troops, of about 2500 Europeans. On the other hand, as Sir James Foulis' accompanying statement shews, in consequence of draughts sent to Gheria and Fort Victoria our garrison consists of only 1571 men, including all the military, sick and

Chapter I.

History.

Probable
French Attack
on Bombay,
1756.

Preparations
for Defence,
1756.

¹ Court to Bombay 31st March 1756 paras 75 and 76, Pub. Dep. Court's L. Vol. 4 of 1752-1756, 304.

Chapter I.

History.

Preparations
for Defence,
1756.

well, of every denomination.¹ In these circumstances our unanimous opinion is that we are not able to reinforce the gentlemen at Madras in the manner they desire, though, agreeable to our former resolution, we still intend sending the *Protector*.

In the present state of affairs thinking it highly incumbent on us with the utmost expedition to take all proper measures for rendering Bombay as defensible as possible, especially on the side next the sea, resolved, as the works which Captain Jacques De Funck intends, though we believe extremely well calculated, cannot be completed for a very considerable time, that fascine batteries made of cocoanut trees and bamboos and mounted with heavy cannon be erected between the bandar and the fort, and wherever else the artillery officers consider the coast most exposed to the attack of large ships. Resolved further that steps be taken to ascertain that Captain De Funck has the proper number of cartridges filled with shot, wads, ironcrows, and handspikes as are wanted for working all the cannon at the first alarm; that the two prahms to be got ready to block up the entrance between the two Pier Heads; that Major Chalmers with the King's and our own artillery captains (the Chief Engineer being one) be consulted regarding our present situation and what is necessary to render the place more defensible. And that the Hon. Company's covenanted servants and other inhabitants be destined to such services as the President may think fit when occasion requires.²

Military Opinion,
1756.

At the same Consultation (21st August 1756) the President acquaints the military gentlemen that the unsettled state of affairs between us and the French in Europe renders it probable the French might make an attempt on this place, and that the committee had proposed erecting fascine batteries, the better to guard against attack. This the military gentlemen judging very proper, they were desired to state what places in their opinion were best suited for such batteries. Major Chalmers was further acquainted that in case of service His Majesty's troops should act where he liked best, and the Hon. Company's troops elsewhere. Captain Jacques De Funck's plan of the town was called for and inspected. The gentlemen choosing to reconnoitre the ground next the sea, as well as to take the soundings of the harbour, before they came to a determination as to the works necessary to be set about and the best situation for them, they were desired to proceed accordingly, and Mr. Hough offering to give them all the information in

¹ The abstract of all the troops on Bombay, August 21st, 1756, is :

		Effective,	Sick,	Total.
King's Artillery	...	220	56	276
Company's Artillery	...	195	16	211
Infantry	...	1030	54	1084
Total	...	1445	126	1571

Of these troops 986 are Europeans and 585 mesties (half castes) and topasses (hat wearers). Of the whole number 337 are on duty in town, 288 on outposts, 126 are sick, and 820 are in reserve. Bom. Gov. Consultation 21st Aug. 1756, Secret and Political Diary 2 of 1756, 126.

² Bom. Gov. Consultation 21st Aug. 1756, Secret and Political Diary 2 of 1756, 124-126.

his power, his offer was readily accepted. The military gentlemen were next informed that, on account of their expectations of the French, the select committee at Fort St. George had desired us to assist them with two principal cruisers and a reinforcement of Europeans. In order that they might form a proper judgment, if it was in our power to send the cruisers, the state of the garrison given in this morning was laid before them, and they were asked whether in our present situation they thought it prudent to comply with the Madras Committee's request. All conclude that it was highly necessary for the safety of this island that we should keep all the force we had on it, and that, was it their own case, they would not part with a single man. Finally, as 60 artillery lascars are on duty at Gheria, the services required from the artillery people are more than that corps is able to perform. Ordered that 100 lascars be hired to assist in this emergency.¹

At a Consultation held five days later, 26th August 1756, the following letter from Sir James Foulis and other military officers to the President and Council, dated Bombay 21st August 1756, was read: Judging that an European enemy who should form any attempt against this place would do it on the side towards the sea, as the town has at present but little defence on that side and ships of force can cast anchor very near the fort, we have carefully examined what seemed most proper for strengthening the sea side. Under the Tank Bastion, rocks that advance some yards into the sea are dry at low tide and at high have about four or five feet of water over them. On these rocks a battery of cocoanut trees earth and stones may soon be raised and will be of great use against any ships that might attack the fort. The site has been measured by Captain De Funck, who reports it can be so disposed as to hold twelve guns. In case of an attack in boats this battery will have the advantage of being well flanked with small arms. A sketch of the fort and proposed batteries done by Captain De Funck, engineer, accompanies.² On the other side of the fort, betwixt the Flag Staff Bastion and the further end of the bandar, if the ground is cleared of the Grand Chaunki and some other ruinous buildings, there will be room for thirty-four or thirty-six guns. Other spots may be found proper for batteries. But as the two places above mentioned are conveniently situated for the defence of the fort and the harbour, and as their batteries will lie low, and their works can soon be finished, we judge it will be proper to set about these first rather than to take too much in hand. If we are straitened for time it is better to have a small number of works all in good condition than a great number all undefensible. These will add forty to fifty guns to the defence of the fort, and may be set about as soon as materials, particularly cocoanut trees, are brought.³ After consideration resolved that two batteries, one on the rocks next the Tank Bastion, the other between the Flagstaff Bastion and the further end of the bandar, be approved and ordered to be immediately set about. In this connection the President mentions that to keep the expense within the lowest

Chapter I.

History.

Defences,
1756.

¹ Bom. Gov. Consultation 21st Aug. 1756, Secret and Political Diary 2 of 1756, 127-128.

² Not in the Bomlay Records (1892). ³ Secret and Political Diary 2 of 1756, 130.

Chapter I.
History.

Defence
Suggestions,
1756.

possible bounds, he has ordered cocoanut trees to be provided, being such as are dead and of the least value with respect to bearing fruit, though equally fit to be used for batteries. Resolved, in case of an enemy attempting to land, that the field train be got ready in all respects to march on the first notice wherever it may be wanted and that the Major enquire exactly into the state of the militia and their arms.¹

At a Consultation, the 8th September 1756, read the following further letter from Majors Sir James Foulis and John Chalmers to the President and Council, dated Bombay 3rd September 1756 : If there is the least reason to apprehend that this place may be attacked by the French, it appears past dispute that one grain of gunpowder ought not to be sent off the island. In order to put this in the clearest light, we will consider our own situation and what is likely to be that of an enemy that would attack us by sea. Captain Hough confirms the opinion that it is not to be imagined that any attempt would be formed against this place with less than seven or eight ships of considerable force. Without magnifying the strength of the enemy, we may calculate that this fleet reckoning but one side of the ships will present against the town and castle near four hundred guns. If we have time to finish the batteries begun within these few days, we will be able to answer them with five mortars and above ninety guns. In calculating what powder our guns and mortars will expend we find that in the space of twelve hours at the ordinary rate of firing, which must take some intermission for respite both to men and guns, the powder used will amount to about nine hundred barrels, besides what may be requisite for the use of small arms. With regard to this calculation it is also to be observed that in order to husband the small quantity of powder we have, we propose to use guns of lower dimensions than we would choose to use, if our magazines were filled in such a manner as so important a service requires. This too is supposing things in the most favourable light for us, that we are to be attacked only by seven or eight ships, and that we lose no powder but what is expended on proper service. It ought to be considered that our powder, which is now laid up in masonry magazines, supposed secure from accidents, must be brought out and in great part be laid ready for the use of the batteries, in magazines secured only with beams and earth and made in a hurry. In these circumstances nothing is more likely than our losing fifty sixty or fourscore barrels at once, blown up by a casual shot or shell from the enemy. Our situation would be much worse if, instead of seven or eight ships a greater number should come against us. In such a case, though they might not have room to present their whole line at once, they could haul off their disabled ships, and supply their places with fresh ones. This would certainly enable them to hold us in play for more than one day. If we part with any of our powder now, we will not have enough for two days, and what will our condition be if an enemy should attempt to land, when our ammunition is spent. At the very highest calculation we do not find the powder mills can make above three hundred barrels a month, that is about one-third of what we may have to spend in one day. Moreover the powder-maker assures

¹ Bom. Gov. Consultation, 26th Aug. 1756, Secret and Political Diary 2 of 1756, 129.

us that during this rainy season within any limited time he cannot answer for finishing any powder at all. Madras may have pressing occasion for gunpowder, but please to consider that when you did us the honour to ask our opinions and that of the Captains of the King's and Company's artillery at the Committee, August 21st, you seemed to be of the same sentiments with us that for the reasons then given it was most likely an attempt might be formed on this place. If you think this the case, your own urgent necessities are first to be provided for. We are therefore of opinion that so far from being able to spare any of your small stock of powder, no care ought to be omitted to increase what you have. Resolved for the reasons stated in the above letter no gunpowder can be spared for Madras.¹

At a Consultation, the 6th October 1756, the President acquaints the Board that the occasion of this meeting is to inform them that he last night received a packet from the Honourable the Secret Committee (in England) enclosing some of His Majesty's printed declarations of war against the French King. These declarations of war being laid before the Board, directed that the Secretary require all the Honourable Company's covenanted servants and other European inhabitants to attend at the Horn Work to-morrow morning by nine o'clock to hear the same proclaimed and that he likewise send an order to the clerk of the market for beating the battica to summon the Black inhabitants for that purpose. Also that one of the declarations be sent to each subordinate settlement by the first conveyance.²

At a Consultation, the 12th October 1756, read the following letter from Captain Jacques De Funck to the President and Council, dated Bombay 7th October 1756: Yesterday, as a French War is declared, your Honours were pleased to order me to deliver this day a plan of Bombay showing the situation of the fortified works and to mark out the necessary batteries to oppose any enemy. As I mentioned in my last description submitted to the Board, the fortified work round the town is in a very bad condition, and the most of the sea side is quite open. At the sea side to the right and left of the fort are two batteries in A and B of the draught³ and now in execution by your Honours' approbation. To make the front of the fort still more defensible I here propose one battery in C, which shall cover the foot of the curtain from all danger from attack. As this battery is to lie horizontally out upon the point of the rock it will force the enemy to keep off to a further distance. On this side of the fort under the curtain is already contrived a little *souterain* with a gate, which will render it more convenient for a passage to and from this battery. This battery is to be made of the stems and leaves of the cocoanut tree in the same manner as I have begun for the other battery below the fort by the Tank Bastion. It will be very necessary that the upper part of the Governor's house is taken down, as its ruins will prove a very ready material to throw over the curtain and fill the

Chapter I. History.

Defence
Suggestions,
1756.

War
with France,
1756.

Measures
Proposed,
1756.

¹ Secret and Political Diary 2 of 1756, 137, 139-140.

² Bom. Gov. Consultation, 6th Oct. 1756, Pub. Diary 29 of 1756, 410-411.

³ This plan has not been traced (1892).

Chapter I.
History.

Defence
Proposals,
1756.

open space which forms the battery. Upon the bed of rocks, before the Mándvi and Royal bastions, I have proposed two similar cocoa-palm batteries marked D and E. These two batteries are to second the other batteries below round the fort, and likewise the intervals between the two abovementioned bastions and the Castle. They will further secure the full flanked defence at present wanting at the faces of the Mándvi and Royal bastions. Dongri is a dangerous place. It ought to be sustained with some good battery to prevent the hill falling into the enemy's possession. The plan will show in F and G the battery I now propose contrived with a full flanked defence which is necessary as that fort had none before. This battery may be made of ground and fascines which will make the expense as little as possible. It will be necessary to join this battery to the fort with chevaux de frize, which I have ordered to be made.

On the land side opposite the Banian bastion a small hill rises about as high as the Town Wall. On this hill, a work which will not take long, a battery must be cut into the ground. This battery will command much of Back Bay northward and southward. It will keep the enemy at a distance, and hinder their approaches, or raising any batteries near the fortifications of the town. I have proposed another battery of the same kind outside of the Apollo gate, which will be at the least expense possible. One thing must be observed, that the hedges and trees which surround most of this and the north parts ought to be destroyed or they will enable the enemy to come under the wall without being seen from any of these works.

By the entrance of the Old Woman's Island near Mr. Broughton's house a fine spot commands one part of the entrance of the road and likewise Back Bay. Upon this place I propose a redoubt which can easily and speedily be cut downwards in the ground. This redoubt will keep the vessels far out in the road and hinder an enemy entering the island.¹

Government
Orders,
1756.

After consideration the Secretary is directed to acquaint Captain De Funck that he has mistaken the verbal order we gave him the 6th September, which was to deliver in a plan of the whole works as they now stand, with the alterations he proposed making. As Captain De Funck represents it to be necessary, agreed the trees and hedges within four hundred yards of the town wall be immediately cut down conformable to an order of the Board dated the 6th July 1739. In regard to the destruction of the upper part of the Fort House, should a Board of officers deem it absolutely necessary, the President will issue orders to have it pulled down. At the same time a proper house must be first found for keeping the Secretary and Accomptant's offices. Resolved, when the batteries now raising are finished, that should they be found necessary the others now proposed by Captain De Funck be begun.²

War Council,
1756.

At a Consultation held the same day (12th October 1756) approved the following opinion of the Council of War, dated Bombay 8th

¹ Secret and Political Diary 2 of 1756, 173-175.

² Bom. Gov. Consultation, 12th Oct. 1756, Secret and Political Diary 2 of 1756, 172.

October 1758: Sir James Foulis acquainted the officers that he was directed by the Governor to take their opinions of the best method of quartering the troops, militia, and other inhabitants of this island for its defence, should an enemy attempt to land upon the island. The following arrangements are proposed. The several corps of military and militia are to rendezvous at the alarm post assigned them, from whence they may be immediately detached to oppose the enemy in their attempt to land. A proportionable train of field artillery is to accompany each party, which is to be reinforced by part of the garrisons of the adjacent forts. Should the town be attacked, the guards, officers included, will amount to three hundred and sixty-three, and as it is probable that the attack may be from the sea, eight hundred more would be requisite to work all the artillery that might be brought to bear upon ships in and coming into the Road. Now the garrison consisting but of twelve hundred military, it appears that the whole must be upon constant duty, without expecting a relief, a fatigue that could not possibly be long sustained. This difficulty indeed is seemingly obviated by supposing that attacks made by sea are of a short continuance and therefore the fatigues of the defenders being short may be supported. Even granting this, a great inconvenience must necessarily happen for this reason that if any place should be too hardly pressed by the enemy, there would be no troops to spare for its assistance. To remedy this and other inconveniences, such a disposition of the military and other troops must be made as to make a relief possible.

To employ the whole militia without distinction on military duties would in all probability rather create confusion than further the service. It is therefore thought more proper to pick five hundred out of the whole, and four hundred sepoy, and to appoint a proportion of them for guard, to do duty with the regular troops in such places particularly as are farthest from danger. By these means the duty will be eased, and more men may be spared for the service of such places as may want help. After all this 216 men will still be wanted to complete our relief. This defect may be supplied by European seamen or lascars, of whom no disposition is or can be made at present, since it depends upon the number of vessels that may be in port, or the occasional use that may be made of those people. If ordered ashore for land service, they may be appointed to rendezvous behind the marine banksaul (or storehouse) in the street leading to the Apollo gate. The European inhabitants who make up but an inconsiderable number, may be reserved for a piquet guard. Such of the militia as are unfit for military duty may be usefully employed in helping to extinguish fires, in assisting to bury the dead or to carry off the wounded, to remount cannon or bring ammunition. For these, the upper bazar seems a proper place of rendezvous. In case of an attack by land, two hundred men would be sufficient for the service of the cannon and mortars that might be employed against the enemy's batteries and approaches. If, on the other hand, sallies are to be made, breaches repaired, and retrenchments cast up a much greater number must constantly attend for these several services. Nor is it to be forgotten that in

Chapter I.**History.**

Council of War,
1759.

Chapter I.
History.
 Council of War,
 1756.

the preceding estimate no allowance is made for loss of men, nor for such as may be disabled by sickness wounds or other accidents. In fine, it seems in any case necessary to employ the above mentioned number of militia and sepoy's or an equal number of equally good men in the manner and for the purposes already explained.¹

On the above letter the select committee passed (12th October 1756) the following orders: Sir James Foulis delivers in the opinion of the Council of War held agreeable to last Consultation. This is read and agreed to be carried into execution as fast as possible. Also that orders be sent to the subordinates (that is subordinate settlements or factories) and elsewhere for entertaining all the able bodied and useful men that can be met with.²

At a Consultation, the 1st November 1756, read the following letter from Captain Jacques De Funck to the President and Council, dated Bombay 1st November 1756: Agreeable to your Honours' commands I now deliver the plan of Bombay fortifications³ as they now stand with the additional works which I have proposed to render this place more defensible in the same manner as I have long since shown the Board. I am now at work upon another project to fortify this place on the land side to a larger extent, by which means many of the buildings now without the town will be included in it, which I hope will prove to your Honours' satisfaction as well as to that of the inhabitants. With this plan and project I will clearly demonstrate the advantage and disadvantage of the expense. I must humbly beg to be excused that this rough sketch I now lay before your Honours is not so completely finished as I could have wished. My time will not permit it otherwise. I am constantly employed about the fortifications, and have very little assistance either in that or in the command of the train. I cannot charge myself with any neglect or delay in the performance of anything my superiors have ordered me and hope to be commended by my Honourable Employers for the same.⁴

Resolved that as Captain De Funck represents he is so fully engaged with the duty of Engineer that he cannot attend properly to the train, the Major put the next officer in command of the train till Captain De Funck has more leisure. This is not in any shape to prejudice Captain De Funck's emoluments arising from the train during such interval.⁵

Clearance round
 the Town Wall,
 1756.

At a Consultation, the 19th November 1756, reparsed a letter from Captain Hugh Cameron, Clerk of the Works, setting forth that he had complied with our order of the 13th October for cutting down all trees or hedges within four hundred (400) yards of the town wall. Agreed, in order to prevent their growing again, that Captain Cameron be required to turn up the roots.⁶

¹ War Council's Opinion, Bombay 8th Oct. 1756, Secret and Political Diary 2 of 1756, 175-177. ² Secret and Political Diary 2 of 1756, 172-173.

³ This plan not traced (1892). ⁴ Secret and Political Diary 2 of 1756, 205-206.

⁵ Bom. Gov. Consultation, 19th Nov. 1756, Secret and Political Diary 2 of 1756, 212.

⁶ Bom. Gov. Consultation, 19th Nov. 1756, Secret and Political Diary 2 of 1756, 212.

At a Consultation, the 30th November 1756, the President informs the Board that since the declaration of war the Chief Engineer has represented to the select committee that he deems it necessary that the upper part of the Fort House should be pulled down: Resolved that Sir James Foulis consult with Major Chalmers and His Majesty's and the Honourable Company's artillery Captains on a survey of the same and report what part they judge ought to be pulled down, as we imagine a considerable part of the House may stand without incommoding the defence of the fort.¹

At a Consultation the 7th December 1756 read the following survey report on the Fort House, dated Bombay 2nd December 1756: After having considered the disposition of the buildings, it seemed absolutely necessary that the back part of the accountant's office and of the Secretary's apartments and the stair leading thereto should be pulled down as far as the inner arch of the gateway in a line parallel to the curtain; because in case of an attack on the fort, the ruins of these buildings would fall on the ramparts and be an obstacle to the defence. The curtain itself ought to be strengthened by walling up part of the embrasures and thickening the parapet with parts of the materials of the buildings pulled down. When that is done and the space cleared by the demolition of the places mentioned, they will then be able to judge more exactly whether and how far it is requisite to pull down more. Resolved that these recommendations be carried out immediately after all the Europe ships are despatched and that in the mean time a proper house be provided for keeping the secretary's and accountant's offices.²

A Consultation of the 22nd February 1757 resumes: The registers belonging to the secretary's and accountant's offices being ready for removing as soon as a proper house can be hired for that purpose and the fair season being much advanced, resolved that the chief engineer be ordered to begin pulling down the back part of the Fort House agreeable to the artillery officers' opinion and our determination thereon.³

A Consultation of the 1st March 1757 continues: Notwithstanding the report noticed in Consultation of 7th December last as Captain De Funck insists that most if not all the upper part of the Fort House must be pulled down in order to render the fort sufficiently defensible, and as this will make it impossible for the President to continue therein or to keep the public offices where they now are, and as there is no proper house to be hired, resolved the offices may be kept in any remaining rooms of the Fort House. At the same time since the tank-house is wanted to accommodate the admirals on their coming here, the President will be destitute of a house for his town residence and Mr. J. Spencer's house is to be disposed of on his departure for Anjengo. This house from

**Chapter I.
History.**

Fort House,
1756.

¹ Bom. Gov. Consultation, 30th Nov. 1756, Pub. Diary 29 of 1756, 532-533.

² Bom. Gov. Consultation, 7th Dec. 1756, Pub. Diary 29 of 1756, 538, 541.

³ Bom. Gov. Consultation, 22nd Feb. 1757, Pub. Diary 30 of 1757, 59.

Chapter I.
History.

the late additions and improvements may easily be made fit for the President. It is therefore unanimously resolved to offer Mr. Spencer what the house has cost. Mr. Spencer being present accepts this offer and declares he will subscribe to a particular account of the cost of the house as it stands on his books, which he imagines will be about Rs. 15,000.¹

Sand-Hill,
1757.

At a Consultation the 18th July 1757 the President then informing the Board that on consulting the chief engineer regarding the sand-hill without the town wall and opposite the Banian bastion, which from its height and situation might annoy the garrison extremely in case of being attacked by the French on the land side, the engineer recommended its being levelled. He therefore proposes ordering the major to set the militia immediately about it and that no person belonging to that corps be excused from this service without sending a man in his room. This is approved.²

Sepoys' Wages,
1757.

At a Consultation, the 23rd August 1757, the new fortification paymaster reporting that some sepoy who were sent the middle of last month (July) to work at the Prince's bastion have refused to receive the usual pay of 4 piec a day hitherto allowed them on being employed in making the old and new dry dock, he is directed not to allow them or any other sepoy anything more.³

Muster of Men,
1757.

At a Consultation, the 2nd August 1757, it being necessary that we should know the exact number of covenanted servants such as belong to the private merchants' ships and other Europeans or mestee inhabitants capable of bearing arms now on the island, exclusive of such as belong to His Majesty's detachment of artillery or serve the Honourable Company in the military marine or militia; Ordered that the Secretary require their attendance at the fort on Friday morning next in order for their being mustered.⁴

Three days later (5th August 1757) a Consultation resumes: Having this day mustered the Honourable Company's covenanted servants and other persons belonging to the island noticed in our last Consultation for the better defence of the place in case of being attacked by the French, and finding them to consist almost entirely of Europeans and no more than 94 in number, resolved that they be all formed into an independent company under the command of Charles Crommelin, William Sedgwick, and George Scott, and that whenever the attendance of those gentlemen or any of them is required by the President, the next eldest covenanted servant in standing command the company in their stead.⁵

Thina offered
as a Refuge,
1757.

At a Consultation held the 27th September 1757, the President acquaints the Board that in consequence of his request the Nāna (Bālāji Peshwa) has sent him an order to Rāmāji Pant, governor of the neighbouring country, for receiving the European ladies

¹ Bom. Gov. Consultation, 1st March 1757, Pub. Diary 30 of 1757, 63-64.

² Bom. Gov. Consultation, 18th July 1757, Pub. Diary 30 of 1757, 276.

³ Bom. Gov. Consultation, 23rd Aug. 1757, Pub. Diary 30 of 1757, 322.

⁴ Bom. Gov. Consultation, 2nd Aug. 1757, Pub. Diary 30 of 1757, 291.

⁵ Bom. Gov. Consultation, 5th Aug. 1757, Pub. Diary 30 of 1757, 299.

and children and affording them suitable accommodation at Thána in case of our being attacked by the French.¹

On learning of this proof of the friendly feeling of the Maráthás the Directors wrote 25th April 1759: Your complimenting the Nána's general Rámáji Pant in the manner you did on the invitation to his daughter's marriage meets with our approbation, as such civilities are the best means for conciliating the Maráthás to our interest. It gives us pleasure to observe the strong and recent instance of the friendship subsisting between you and the Maráthás in the Nána's giving an order to Rámáji Pant for receiving and accommodating at Thána the European ladies and children in case of your being attacked by the French. We shall depend upon your assurances for cementing and improving this good understanding by all fitting means.²

Shortly after the Bombay Government received Nána's friendly assurances (27th September 1757) the following letter regarding the war preparations of the French (dated 25th March 1757) reached (27th December) the President from the Directors: Great preparations are making for carrying on the war between the British and French nations with the utmost vigour. The French have been very industrious in fitting out an armament at Port L'Orient for the East Indies. It consists of twelve of the French Company's ships to be joined by six large ships of the King's and two frigates, on board of which four thousand land forces were to be embarked under the command of Mr. Lally.³

About the same time (27th December) arrived a Despatch of the Court's, dated the 4th May 1757, in which the Directors write: The general situation of public affairs so far as they affect the Company, and the necessary directions in this time of danger, as well with respect to the French as your concerns with the Maráthás and other country powers, will be communicated by the gentlemen of the Secret Committee to our President and the rest of the Select Committee at Bombay.⁴

The Despatch continues: Your care and vigilance are not to be confined to your presidency. In this dangerous juncture they must extend to the general interest of the Company wherever and whenever it is in your power to be of service. For this purpose a good harmony must be kept up with our other presidencies that you may mutually assist each other.⁵

At a Consultation, the 21st October 1757, the President lays before the Board translate of four French papers intercepted yesterday by a *patamar* from some gentlemen at Goa and at the Isle of

Chapter I. History.

Thána offered
as a Refuge,
1757.

War
Preparations
in Europe,
1757.

Secret and Select
Committees,
1757.

French Papers,
1757.

¹ Hon. Gov. Consultation, 27th Sept. 1757, Pub. Diary 30 of 1757, 368.

² Court to Bombay 25th April 1759 para 90, Pub. Dep. Court's Letters Vol. 5 of 1757-1761, 182.

³ Court to Bombay 25th March 1757 para 9, Public Dep. Court's Letters Vol. 5 of 1757-1761, 2.

⁴ Court to Bombay 4th May 1757 para 79, Pub. Dep. Court's Letters Vol. 5 of 1757-1761, 25.

⁵ Court to Bombay 4th May 1757 para 80, Pub. Dep. Court's Letters Vol. 5 of 1757-1761, 25.

Chapter I.
History.
French Papers,
1757.

France for Messieurs Le Verier and Boucard at Surat. These letters advise that the first division of the French fleet, which we suppose must be the ships which passed Tellicherry the latter end of August, is arrived in India; that a second division was expected at Mauritius from Brazil where they say they heard it was already arrived, and that a third was promised to leave France before the end of the year. The writer acknowledges he does not credit the last division, and we think it highly improbable they could have advice of the second division being already at Brazil. We hope there may be nothing but gasconade in either the second or the third division. We have the satisfaction to perceive they are so greatly distressed for wheat at Mauritius that they order a very large quantity to be purchased and sent by any means possible from Surat. One of the letters in cipher, dated at Mauritius 19th August last, addressed to a committee of their India Company and strenuously recommended to be forwarded overland, is referred to the Select Committee to decipher it, with directions that if they fail copies may be forwarded to the Honourable the Secret Committee and the Select Committee at Madras that they also may endeavour to decipher it.¹

Town-Gates,
1757.

At a Consultation the 22nd November 1757 the President acquaints the Board that so long as the French war continues he thinks it proper that the town gates should be shut at beating the retreat, but that the wicket be kept open till the usual time. To obviate any inconvenience arising from this regulation he intends ordering that the gates shall be opened to admit any gentleman and his company who has the parole or may be engaged with him at Parell. This is approved.²

Fire,
1757.

On the 5th February 1757 several houses near Dongri Fort were accidentally burnt. As, if rebuilt in the same place, these houses would interfere with the fortifications, Government ordered (7th February 1757) the Collector to take the necessary measures for preventing their rebuilding. Next day a publication was issued requiring all persons, who, under pretence of assisting them, had robbed the sufferers by the late fire of any effects, to deposit the same in the Bombay custom house on or before Saturday next, otherwise any person in whose possession such property might afterwards be found or who might be proved to have purchased or secreted the property would be prosecuted agreeable to law.³

Regulations
Published,
1757.

In 1757 a new issue and translation of leading publications or regulations was prepared. On the 15th April 1757 at a meeting of the Board Messrs. Crommelin, Byfeld, and Whitchill were appointed a committee to inspect the different publications and select certain of them for issue.⁴

On the 20th September following (1757) the committee laid before the Board such publications as in their opinion ought to be

¹ Bom. Gov. Consultation, 21st Oct. 1757, Pub. Diary 30 of 1757, 392.

² Bom. Gov. Consultation, 22nd Nov. 1757, Pub. Diary 30 of 1757, 428. Forrest's Home Series, II. 93.

³ Pub. Diary 30 of 1757, 44 and 46.

⁴ Bom. Gov. Consultation, 15th April 1757, Pub. Diary 30 of 1757, 122.

renewed for preserving good order and government on the island. The Council agreed that the collection should be sent round to the members for perusing them at their leisure.¹

On the 25th November after certain alterations and additions the publications were directed to be translated into the country languages and read at the usual public places. As they were bulky, and as the inhabitants could not be sufficiently informed of their contents by one public reading, it was agreed that copies should be lodged in the Collector's and clerk of the markots' office, and the inhabitants required to read them there that none plead ignorance thereof.²

In Surat the year 1755 seems to have been quiet and prosperous. On the 4th May 1757 the Court write: We observe with satisfaction the good understanding with the Surat government, and trust our affairs are likely to be carried on at that place without the interruption and difficulties you have experienced for some time past. All prudent measures must be used to continue and preserve this tranquillity.³

The same Despatch (4th May 1757) contains the following reference to the result of the capture of Gheria by Colonel Clive (13th February 1756): The umbrage which the Maráthás have taken on the capture and plundering of Gheria without their assistance and participation, bears an unpleasant aspect. We observe a treaty was on foot when your last advices came away to accommodate matters. We hope it has been attended with success. If it is at all times greatly for the Company's interest to be upon friendly terms with the Maráthás, it is more particularly so in the present dangerous situation. In this connection we cannot avoid observing that the President has shewn his attention to the Company's interest in procuring a grant from the Maráthás for excluding the Dutch from trading in their territories. This was a great piece of service and meets with our entire approbation.⁴

In the same letter (4th May 1757) the Court continue: We shall depend likewise upon your using all prudent measures to prevent the Dutch settling in the Sidi's country at Rajpuri. As you represent the applying of some money among the Sidi's people was very necessary on the occasion, we do acquiesce therein as well as give you a liberty of making use of this method when it is absolutely necessary and done with the utmost frugality.⁵

The 1757 records contain a few references to the increase of the Company's military strength at Surat. A Consultation of the 26th September records: The chief and factors at Surat acknowledged the receipt of our commands of the 12th by the convoy and advised that as soon as some Arabs which they were enlisting were ready to go on board they should return such part of the convoy as was ordered. That their thinking the service required

Chapter I.**History.**

Regulations
Published,
1757.

Surat,
1757.

Maráthás
Offended,
1757.

The Dutch,
1757.

Arabs,
1757.

¹ Bom. Gov. Consultation 20th Sept. 1757, Pub. Diary 30 of 1757, 353.

² Pub. Diary 30 of 1757, 432. These publications are not given in this Diary.

³ Court to Bombay 4th May 1757 para 86, Pub. Dep. Court's L. Vol. 5 of 1757-61, 27.

⁴ Court to Bombay 4th May 1757 para 81, Pub. Dep. Court's L. Vol. 5 of 1757-61, 25.

⁵ Court to Bombay 4th May 1757 para 85, Pub. Dep. Court's L. Vol. 5 of 1757-61, 27.

Chapter I.**History.**

Arabs,
1757.

expedition in the despatch of the sepoys had induced them to embark five companies on the *Monmouth* ketch and three country boats hired for that purpose as no other opportunity was likely to offer.¹

On the 6th October 1757 the Council remark: As we esteem the Arabs the best country military and as they are not to be allowed provisions on shore we would have the chief and factors at Surat procure another company of Arabs.²

Englishmen in
Native States,
1757.

References also continue to difficulties arising from Englishmen taking service in Native States. On the 27th September 1757 the superintendent reporting that he has been informed the two officers of the *Anne* snow when formerly attached to the ships *Hector* and *Protector*, ran away with their boats and entered into Angria's service, Government direct that the superintendent confine them in order for their being examined.³

Sanitation in
Bombay,
1757.

At a Consultation, the 22nd November 1757, the Council record the following: As the town has become very dirty in great measure owing to the little regard the inhabitants pay to the scavenger on account of his being always a junior servant, agreed that a member of the Board be appointed to that office, and that all houses within the town be proportionably taxed for maintaining a sufficient number of labourers, carts, and buffaloes for keeping the town clean.⁴

Brick Kilns,
1758.

A Consultation of the 3rd March 1758 records that as fires have of late frequently broke out in and near the town and as the principal engineer has represented how much the risk of fire is increased by pot or tile-makers carrying on their business among or near other houses, agreed that a publication be issued by beat of drum requiring all potters and tile-makers to move to the suburbs within a month from this date under the penalty of a fine or of corporal punishment.⁵

Evil Effect of
the fall of
Gheria,
1758.

That the security which followed the destruction by Colonel Clive and Admiral Watson of the pirate stronghold of Gheria on the Ratnágiri Coast (13th February 1756) should have proved of more advantage to the Dutch and French, who had no shelter on the west coast of India, than to the English who enjoyed the security of Bombay, though natural, was an unexpected and most unpalatable result to the Court of Directors. In a despatch of the 5th July 1758 the Court wrote: It is with infinite concern we plainly see that the destruction of Angria proves a happy event to our rivals in trade. After all our immense expenses the Company's affairs are brought into a worse situation. For although from year to year we have been amused with the most specious promises that the Dutch should be drove from Rajápur, and this indeed is one of the strongest articles in your treaty, yet the Nána has not driven

¹ Bom. Gov. Consultation 26th Sept. 1757, Pub. Diary 30 of 1757, 365-366.

² Pub. Diary III of 1757, 375.

³ Pub. Diary 30 of 1757, 368.

⁴ Bom. Gov. Consultation 22nd Nov. 1757, Pub. Diary 30 of 1757, 423. Forrest's Home Series, II, 93.

⁵ Bom. Gov. Consultation 3rd March 1758, Pub. Diary 31 of 1758, 168.

them out. And now Gheria is gone, we are in doubt if he ever will. Now as we esteem it a matter of the last importance to Bombay that the Dutch should be dislodged for ever from Rájápur, we call upon you in the most serious manner to exert yourselves, using every prudent and political step with the Maráthás and Sidis to shut out these dangerous competitors in trade. Indeed when we consider the great influence you have over the Sidis both of Surat and Rájápur, and your cemented interest with the Maráthás, it is a matter of wonder that this has not sooner been effected.¹

In the following year (25th April 1759) the Court add: We shall depend upon your seeing that article of the Gheria Treaty with the Maráthás at all times effectually observed and executed, whereby they promise never to permit the Dutch to have any settlement or to carry on any trade in their dominions through Rájápur or any other port. Your utmost endeavours must be continued to prevent and frustrate all Dutch attempts to settle at Basscin.²

The recent novel and crushing disasters, the capture of Madras in 1754³ and of Calcutta in 1756,⁴ brought to the front the urgency of

Chapter I. History.

Evil Effect of
the fall of
Gheria,
1758.

¹ Court to Bombay 5th July 1758 para 30, Pub. Dep. Court's L. Vol. 5 of 1757-1761, 134. In this Despatch the Court seem to confuse the Marátha Rájápur where the Dutch had a factory with the Sidi Rájápur (Janjira) where the Dutch never had a settlement. In the record the name is written Rojepore once and Rojapore twice.

² Court to Bombay 25th April 1759 para 91, Pub. Dep. Court's L. Vol. 5 of 1757-1761, 182.

³ In January 1756 the Bombay Government write to the Court: It is the greatest satisfaction to us to observe your Honours' approval of our sending a reinforcement to Madras. We do not doubt ere this your Honours have been informed of the treaty which the President and Council concluded with the French, the 11th January 1755, to continue in force till your Honours' pleasure is known. The Board have since settled with the French for the mutual returning each other's deserters on that coast, and hope your Honours may succeed in your endeavours for establishing a lasting peace, should not a war break out between the two nations. Bombay to Court 31st Jan. 1756 para 103, Pub. Dep. Letters to Court, Vol. 4 of 1756-57, 37.

⁴ Letter from Chinsura, dated the 11th of July 1756, advised the troubles at Bengal were occasioned by the English giving protection to the family of Rája Dulab, the governor of Decca, who had been summoned by Saráj-ul-Daula on his succession to the Nabobship (on the death of his grandfather Ali Verdikhán) to come to Muxadavad to give an account of his administration. On this, through apprehensions of losing his head and treasure, he despatched all his family with his riches to Calcutta and repaired to Muxadavad. That the Governor and Council, Messrs. Holwell Mauningham and Frankland excepted, agreed to give the protection of the British flag to Dulab's family. The Nabob being advised thereof demanded them from the English, and, enraged at their refusal, came down with an army of 100,000 men and a large train of artillery, attacked Fort William, and after two days' cannonading got possession. That the Governor, some of the Council, and others had retired on board the ships the day before, but all the prisoners taken were in irons. That the castle and town with the factory at Kásimbázár were totally ruined, the houses all plundered, and the inhabitants fled or murdered. That the Governor had carried on board with him all the money and jewels which the inhabitants had lodged in the fort for security, put Amichand in irons, and seized 82 lákhs (of rupees), with the money of Rája Dulab. That by the mediation of Khoja Vánd the Nabob on his approach to Calcutta would have accommodated matters, but the English would not come to terms. That the Moors had erected a battery under Fort William without receiving a shot from the fort. That on the surrender of the fort the Nabob had confined all the prisoners in a close warehouse where most of them perished either for want of air or through the noisome vapours. But Mr. Holwell, Court, and a few others were carried up in irons, and Mr. Watts and the second of Kásimbázár set at liberty to go to the coast, for which purpose they were gone to the French. That Mr. Watts

Chapter I. History.

Calcutta,
1756.

determining the limits of civil and military responsibility and control in any of the Company's settlements during a state of siege. In a

on going out to treat with the Nabob before Kásimbazár, was by him detained a prisoner. That the next day Mr. Collet proceeded on the same errand, but soon returned with some of the Nabob's people to deliver up the ammunition. That the Nabob had given Calcutta the name of Allinogger and made his minister Monha Gent governor of it. That the Prussians would on this occasion lose 2½ lakhs, the Armenians 7, and the Danes and Portuguese would suffer considerably. That the Dutch had paid 500,000 and the French 400,000 rupees to the Nabob. He further advised that the English had applied for a re-establishment in Calcutta. (Extract from a letter, 11th July 1756, from a gentleman at Chinsura giving an account of the troubles in Bengal. Pub. Diary 1st Oct. 1756, Vol. 29 of 1756, 403-404; Forrest's Home Series, II. 91-92.)

On the above the Board observe (1st October 1756): Taking into consideration the unhappy situation which private advices lately received give of our Honourable Masters' affairs in Bengal, resolved that we send directions to the Chief and Factors at Tellicherry and Anjengo to procure all the pepper they can without paying an exorbitant price, and that we advise the gentlemen in Bengal that in case they cannot return their ships home and send a second ship round to Tellicherry, having resolved the 21st ultimo (Sept. 1756) to provide for one (we will do our utmost endeavours to load them both at that place) and Anjengo, but at the same time repeat that they will lose what redwood and saltpetre they can, in part of both ships' tonnage; and should it so happen that they cannot send us a supply of saltpetre kentledge in the ships, we must desire that the ships may come properly ballasted, as no ballast but sand, which is highly improper and dangerous, is procurable on the Malabar Coast. (Pub. Diary 1st Oct. 1756, Vol. 29 of 1756, 400.)

On the 11th October 1756 received a letter from Mr. John Zepheniah Holwell at Muxadabad, dated 7th July, advising the factory at Kásimbazár being given up to the Nabob the 4th June by the most unhappy and unaccountable infatuation in the Chief and Council there. The foundation of their ruin was laid. The accession was too important to the Nabob to be relinquished. For further details see Pub. Diary, 11th Oct. 1756, Vol. 29 of 1756, 413 to 419; Forrest's Home Series, II. 89-91. In their letter to the Court, 30th October 1756, the Bombay Government write: Our last advised your Honours our having learnt by private advices that the old Nabob of Bengal's death had occasioned disturbances there, and it is with the greatest concern we have now to acquaint your Honours that we despatch the *Phoenix* sloop quick up to Basra purposely to communicate to your Honours the melancholy situation of your affairs in Bengal, for which purpose we shall lay before you extracts of two letters for your Honours from Messrs. Watts and Collet, dated at Chandranagar the 16th and 17th of July (1756) received the 7th instant (October 1756) under a flying seal by Surat; also the extract of a letter from Mr. John Zepheniah Holwell to us, dated at Muxadabad the 17th of July and received the 11th instant (Oct. 1756) by *patamar*, being as follows. That of the 16th of July from Messrs. Watts and Collet advises that Fort William was taken the 20th of June (1756) by the Nabob of Bengal, grandson of Aliverdikhan, who died last March. For further details see this Bombay letter to the Court dated 30th Oct. 1756, Pub. Dep. Letters to the Court, Vol. 4 of 1756-57, 100-119.

Of the hostilities between the English and the Nabob and the troubles at Calcutta in 1756-57 the following extract from a subsequent (10th May 1757) letter from Bombay to the Court gives some details: We shall likewise here lay before your Honours an extract of the account transmitted the President respecting the hostilities carried on against the Nabob. The squadron had but a very indifferent passage from Madras to Bengal in which Admiral Pocock in the *Cumberland* and your Honours' ship *Malbro* were separated from them (but the former got into Ballasore Road and we learn has proceeded to join the Admiral and the latter got into Rogues River about the 10th of January). After a few days' stay at Futta to refresh such of the people as were affected with the scurvy, the squadron went up and attacked Budge Budge Fort. This employed them near a day. Colonel Clive and his party landed overnight on the 29th of December and the next morning fell in with Manekchand, the governor of Calcutta, who came down with a strong party to relieve Budge Budge. After a smart skirmish the Colonel put them to the rout and would have pursued them had he been well acquainted with the country. However they heard forty of them were drowned in hastily crossing a rivulet. Manekchand's state elephant was killed by a piece of artillery and he got a slight wound himself on the head and lost three or four of his best Jamindars. Our loss was nine killed and as many wounded and Ensign Kerr in your Honours' service was shot through the heart. Before noon the 30th of December the ship had nigh silenced the guns of the Fort and overset all the carriages but two. Towards night the

Despatch dated 12th May 1758 the Court write: In order to guard as much as lies in our power against those striking calamities

Chapter I.
History.

Calcutta,
1757.

Admiral sent ashore a party of seamen to the Colonel's assistance, one of whom leaping upon the wall fired his pistols and gave three cheers which occasioned the alarm of a storm running through the whole and made them rush upon (from) the enemy in such a manner that in less than ten minutes there was not one found remaining in the fort. It was currently reported that the governor of Budge Budge who was a favourite of the Nabob's and a good soldier was found among the dead. The *Kent* had two men wounded there by a six-pounder and Captain Dugald Campbell was killed on shore. The next day (31st) was spent in spiking up and dismounting some guns and oversetting others. On the 1st of January they reached Tanna Fort and its opposite Mocha Tanna, which forts immediately began firing on them but were deserted on their getting abreast of them. They set fire to both sides in the evening and spiked up and overset the guns as at Budge Budge. The following morning (2nd of January) the *Kent* and *Tyger* got under weigh and Captain Martin in the *Salisbury* had orders to lay between those two last forts as a guardship (but from which he was expected to join the Admiral on the 8th) and the Admiral had likewise ordered Tanna Fort to be blown up. The enemy in Calcutta began firing on the *Kent* and *Tyger* in less than half an hour after they weighed. The *Tyger* led and was thrice hulled from the fort but warmly returned the compliment as soon as she had got her broadside to bear upon it; the *Kent* brought up presently after and discharging about 150 of her lower deck shot made the enemy cease firing, the whole of which did not exceed three-fourths of an hour and our forces once more got possession of Fort William and Calcutta. The *Kent* did not receive a single shot, but the *Tyger* had 7 killed and 3 wounded. Next day being the 3rd of January the Admiral went ashore in form and delivered up the keys and reinstated Mr. Drake and his Council in the Government. Many of your Honours' godowns were full of your stores which had not been touched and many houses not much hurt; inhabitants begin to flock in daily, and bazars increase. That other accounts said as soon as the Nabob heard of our success at Budge Budge and the other forts he immediately determined to march down with his whole army consisting of 80,000 men to drive us away and had accordingly detached his advanced guard commanded by one Jafar Ali Khan who came as far as a place called Plessey (Plassey) and there halted. That it was also reported that our forces commanded by Major Kilpatrick consisting of the grenadier company with 200 sepoys, and a detachment of seamen besides the *Bridge-water* and *King Fisher* sloop, had in their way to Hugli taken a Moor's town called Cow Culchee where they met with great riches. A party of 8000 men commanded by Manikchand, late governor of Calcutta, was sent to reinforce it but arrived too late. That Captain David Rainie of the *Success* galley, who left Calcutta the 7th of February and arrived at Madras the 22nd, brought advice that Houghley (Hugli) was taken without much opposition and the loss on our side only seven killed and 10 or 12 wounded. The plunder found in the place was in goods to the value of only about one lakh of rupees owing to the Dutch at Chinsura having given protection to all the Moors' effects that could be conveniently carried thither, and all that were found being shipped off the town of Hugli and every thing within two leagues round it on both sides the river were burnt to ashes. That about the 1st of February the Nabob's advanced guard came down and encamped upon Dum Dum plain at some distance from where Colonel Clive had strongly intrenched himself, being the only avenue by which the Nabob could go to attack Calcutta. The Nabob sent word he was willing to accommodate matters amicably and would receive any proposals for us at Barraset. On this Colonel Clive sent two gentlemen with his demands. They were scarce got out of our camp when they found themselves at the Nabob's quarters at Amichand's Garden House (built by Mr. Halsey). On their expressing surprise at his being there when he said he should wait at Barraset, the Nabob replied it was true he had made such a promise, but his people had brought them on contrary to his design. After some time spent in discoursing upon trifles he referred them to his ministers. But their conversation with the ministers being of as little consequence they got away as soon as they could. In addition to the above proof that nothing could be effected by way of negotiation the Moors had begun to set fire to the houses at the extremities of the town. Colonel Clive determined to attack the Nabob immediately and the next morning marched with all his military force and sepoys. The Admiral had landed with about 600 seamen to attack the Nabob's quarters and take all his artillery. He set out about 3 o'clock and arrived at the Moors' camp about daybreak, but it being an excessive foggy morning his guide mistook the way and they missed the Nabob's quarters and his artillery. They, however, continued their march through the camp in a column keeping a constant fire on all sides, which mowed down numbers as they went on and drove the Moors before them without any loss on our part till about nine o'clock, when the

Chapter I.
History.

Military Control
during Sieges,
1758.

that have befallen us in the captures of our settlements of Madras and Bengal, we have appointed a succession of

fog dispersing they found themselves in front close to the Nabob's cannon situated upon an eminence with a trench before it. The enemy discovering their advantage began immediately to play upon us and before we could get out of the line of fire killed some men and officers. Colonel Clive immediately retreated towards the Bread and Cheese Bungalow Road and about 11 o'clock got safe into Calcutta, having made a circuit of six miles from his intrenchment in his march through the camp which stood on that extent of ground, as the number of the Moors was near 100,000. After refreshing his men in the afternoon he returned to his intrenchment near Perins. Our loss that day was about forty Europeans killed and 30 wounded. Among the former were Captain W. Pye of the Grenadiers and Captain Timothy Bridge who acted as Aid-de-Camp, Mr. W. Belcher Colonel Clive's secretary, and some inferior sea officers. The wounded were Captain Nicholas Weller of the King's Regiment, Captain Fraser in your Honours' service and Lieutenant Rumbold though but slightly, with some others whose names are not mentioned. Mr. W. Ellis, one of your Honours' covenanted servants, had also his leg shot off, and, his thigh being much shattered, it was believed he would not recover. The Nabob moved his camp to a greater distance that day, but it is said came the next day and posted it within a mile and a half of Colonel Clive's intrenchment, and to prevent his being again surprised and to keep his people more alert, continued firing guns all night long. It was reported he lost between four and five thousand men in the action. Bombay to the Court 10th May 1757, Pub. Dep. Letters to the Court, Vol. 4 of 1756-57, 209-211.

The success of the English at Calcutta (1757) after the hostilities between them and the Nabob, is thus reported to the Court by the Bombay Government (11th March 1757): It is with great pleasure we have now to acquaint your Honours that by a letter which the President received the 7th instant (March 1757) from a considerable merchant at Muxadavad, we have the agreeable news of the English forces in Bengal disembarking the 31st December and re-taking your settlement at Calcutta the 2nd January. And though we impatiently expect further particulars of this fortunate event, we have judged it necessary to transmit this brief account thereof without loss of time and shall advise your Honours as expeditiously as possible of such information as we may hereafter receive. On the 27th of January came a *putnamar* with a duplicate letter of the 15th September and another of the 25th of October from your President and servants conducting your Honours' affairs in Bengal, both dated at Futta. These are the only advices we have received from them since the misfortunes attending your affairs there in which they desire us to assist them with the *Protector*, another ship of force, and a detachment of military and artillery. We have the satisfaction to acquaint your Honours that they were long before reinforced from hence as much as possible and indeed beyond their request. Bombay to the Court 14th March 1757, Pub. Dep. Letters to the Court, Vol. 4 of 1756-57, 204-205.

Two months later, 10th May 1757, the Bombay Government again write to the Court: Under the 14th March we acquainted your Honours by the *Swallow* to Gombroon that we had learnt the English forces in Bengal commanded by Admiral Watson and Colonel Clive re-took your settlement of Calcutta on the 2nd January and have now the great satisfaction to advise that the President received private letters from Madras the 23rd ultimo (April) confirming that agreeable news. Also that those forces had entirely destroyed the town of Hugli and obliged the Nabob to retire with a numerous army from his camp on Dum Dum plain, after sustaining a very considerable loss in an action there which had induced the Nabob to offer terms of accommodation. In consequence a definite treaty of peace was actually signed the 12th of February by which, the President's letters advise, all your Honours' old *Phirman* privileges are not only renewed but your *Dustucks* (certificates) are to pass unmolested up and down the river; your subordinate factories to be immediately re-settled; such of your Honours' effects as the Nabob possessed (of which a very considerable amount remained in your warehouses at Calcutta) to be restored, and your Honours to be allowed to erect a mint there and to raise fortifications in Calcutta when and in what manner you please. The above advices do not mention whether any satisfaction is to be obtained for such effects as may be missing either belonging to your Honours or private persons though a country letter represents that the Nabob had agreed to make good all damage that has happened either to your Honours or others; to rebuild the town of Calcutta and Fort William; and give up Kásimbázár entirely to the English only desiring that, as Bengal has always been a neutral port, the French may remain unmolested in their factory. This it is said is complied with. Bombay to Court 10th May 1757, Pub. Dep. Letters to the Court, Vol. 4 of 1756-57, 208-209.

capable officers to the chief command of our military. Still as these officers must be governed by the Civil Branch, we cannot deem our settlements in time of danger to possess that security they would enjoy if the military powers could operate without civil control. Having with great attention well weighed this important subject we now lay down the following rules to all our presidencies. To these rules you our Governor and Council must strictly adhere. Whensoever it shall be your misfortune to have the island attacked by any enemy whatever, the powers of the Governor and Council, so far as respects its defence, are then suspended. In such circumstances the sole authority shall vest in our President, the Major, the Superintendent of the marine, the Engineer, and the next most capable military officer to be appointed by the said persons. In choosing such officer, should the voices be equal, the Governor and Council are to appoint the person, and these are to form the military government in this exigency. Whoever is defective in his duty must be tried by a general court martial. We further lay it down as a standing rule that, unless from want of ammunition and provisions, no fortification be given up without a breach made and until it has stood one assault. This military authority is to exist no longer than the enemy is before the place and the island is in danger. When the island is restored to safety this military government is immediately to dissolve. The President and Council are to re-assume their own powers, and our affairs are to be conducted by the same authority as now exists. Should it ever be your misfortune to be reduced to extremities, and the said military power be under the necessity of compromising with the enemy, we direct that such treaty or agreement must be considered and digested by our Governor and Council, and receive their approbation. According to our former appointment, Colonel Lawrence is Commander-in-Chief under the Governors and Councils of all our forces in the East Indies. If therefore he shall happen to be at Bombay, he is to be one of the said military government and is to take rank next to the Governor.¹

Of the progress of the French war the Directors wrote on 1st November 1758: The war with France continues with great vigour. We have the pleasure of saying that by the steady conduct of our government and the superior force and success of the British navy, that of France is greatly reduced and the remainder in a great measure confined to their ports, French commerce likewise is at the lowest ebb. The only notable efforts the French make by sea are in the East Indies. There we flatter ourselves both from the early intelligence which all our settlements have had of the naval and land forces under the command of Monsr. D'ache and Lally and from the great loss those forces have suffered by sickness they will make no great impression. We have lately received intelligence from Ilha Grande at the Brazils that in the month of May last (1758) four large French ships were at that

Chapter I.

History.

Military Control
during Sieges,
1758.

French War,
1758.

¹ Court to Bombay 12th May 1758 paras 120 and 121, Pub. Dep. Court's L. Vol. II of 1757-1761, 122-123.

Chapter I.
History.

Surat Affairs,
1758.

place, being part of a fleet of eleven which sailed together from France, and that the said four ships were waiting for the remaining seven to proceed together to the East Indies; whether they had any or what number of land forces on board we are not informed nor whether any other French ships sailed last season for India.¹

Of the negotiations then on foot for the establishment of the Company's power at Surat a letter of the 20th April 1758 from the Bombay Government to the Secret Committee of the Court of Directors gives the following details: Your Honours have been acquainted with our motives for concerting an expedition to Surat, and how far we had prepared for it, to the beginning of February. We have now to advise that after having prevailed on Pharás Khán to come hither from Bassein to execute such a treaty as was necessary for your Honours' reaping the benefit of the expedition, and having drawn up our instructions on the 17th ultimo (March) that the whole of the forces we had destined for that service might have proceeded the next day, the President received such an alarming letter from his agent at Poona in regard to the Nána's marching with his army into our neighbourhood that we deemed it necessary immediately to drop our design for the present. Agreeable to which we wrote Mr. Ellis to return such part of our marine and military ordered to the Surat Bar the beginning of March, under pretence of protecting the trade bound thither, as he might judge more than sufficient to exact a proper respect from that government. Instead of this Mr. Ellis thought fit to return the whole lest, as he alleges, any disaster might befall us. He has also desired to be relieved in the Chiefship immediately after the rains because he says the altering of our resolution to obtain redress at that juncture makes it impossible to re-establish affairs on a proper footing. We are of a contrary opinion. We hope to preserve a tolerable understanding with Ali Naváz Khán and his party till we are effectually enabled to take satisfaction for his readiness to encroach on your privileges. We hope our conduct will meet your approval, as we have been entirely influenced by our attachment to your real interest; for though we continue on the best terms with the Maráthás, we could by no means place such confidence in them as to leave this island destitute of forces and consequently liable to be insulted by them. Many circumstances gave us cause to apprehend they would take an advantage from our proceeding on the expedition. Not that we think the Maráthás would make any attempt upon this island with any other view than plunder. Still the Maráthás are a people of so mercenary a temper as never to forego any opportunity of plunder.²

Regarding the preparations to meet a French attack on the island a letter from the Bombay Government to the secret committee of

¹ Court to Bombay 1st Nov. 1758 para. 4, Pub. Dep. Court's Letters Vol. 5 of 1757-1761, 139.

² Bom. Gov. to the Secret Committee in England, Bombay Castle 20th April 1758 in Secret and Political Diary 4 of 1758, 108 and 109.

the Directors, dated Bombay Castle 19th September 1758, states: We continue putting this island in the best posture of defence under the direction of Major Mace. Your Honours may depend our utmost endeavours will always be exerted for its security. We have no account of the enemy having yet any force on this coast. The Maráthás remain in strict friendship with us and we have the pleasure to advise that we have not experienced any material ill-treatment from Ali Naváz Khán which may probably be owing to Pharás Khán having resided here since the beginning of May.¹

At a Consultation on the 3rd October 1758, it was resolved that as the pulling down of the Fort House had increased the existing great want of apartments for the Company's servants, the materials from the Fort House and from the sea side walls of the bandar warehouses be used in building apartments; Resolved that the Land Paymaster set about this work.²

In a Despatch dated 12th May 1758 the Directors approve the lowering of the Fort House. In the same letter the Court continues:³ We have taken due notice of yours and the Select Committee's proceedings for putting the island in these very dangerous times in a good and respectable posture of defence and in particular for the attention you have given with respect to the works towards the sea, which were the most immediately necessary and seem to be well intended for the designed purpose. We observe also that Mr. De Funck is forming a project for fortifying to a large extent the place on the land side concerning which your Select Committee say they shall wait for our directions. With respect to works absolutely necessary for the defence of the place you have already been sufficiently authorised to proceed upon them, and we now confirm the orders and directions which were given the last and the preceding years for this purpose. But we must defer sending any orders for carrying into execution the projected extensive works until we have had Mr. Mace's thoughts and projects upon a strict view of the works at Bombay which we are in good hopes he will have time to digest before he proceeds to Bengal. We cannot avoid repeating what we have more than once said that Mr. De Funck's plans and projects are in general too extensive, and consequently with little regard to the expenses they must necessarily be attended with. Besides we observe he still continues very dilatory in producing his plans, those for the new works, which he promised in 1755, not having been delivered in at the close of the following year.

The Despatch continues: Without economy and frugality the Company may be run to great and many unnecessary expenses in the carrying on the works. We shall therefore depend upon your constant attention for settling such rules and regulations from time

Chapter I. History.

Surat Affairs,
1758.

Fort House,
1758.

Defence of
Bombay,
1758.

¹ Bom. Gov. to the Secret Committee, 19th Sept. 1758, Secret and Political Diary 4 of 1758, 161.

² Bom. Gov. Consultation, 3rd Oct. 1758, Public Diary 31 of 1758, 439.

³ Court to Bombay 12th May 1758 para. 77, Pub. Dep. Court's L. Vol. 5 of 1757-1761, 108.

**Chapter I.
History.**

Defence of
Bombay,
1758.

to time as shall appear reasonable and necessary. The pointing out the respective branches of duty of the New Fortification Paymaster and the Engineer, so that they may mutually co-operate in carrying on the works, also the regulations for transacting the business of the Paymaster's office, seem to be well calculated and meet with our approbation. We must here observe that Mr. De Funck appears uneasy and although his complaints in general are not made out, yet we must suppose he has some foundation for his dissatisfaction. We would not have him slighted or embarrassed. He is to have the proper regard due to his station in the service, and he is to be attended in all reasonable applications for redress or in giving advice as our Engineer.¹

Pilotage Marks,
1759.

As a further precaution against a French attack a Consultation of the 20th July 1759 decided that the Master Attendant and Chief Engineer be ordered to alter the pilotage marks into the harbour so as to mislead an enemy on their attempting to come in.²

Two years later the Court express (6th May 1761) their approbation in the following terms: Your causing the pilotage marks to be removed so as to mislead the enemy in case of an attempt upon the island was so proper a measure that it cannot but meet with our approbation.³

Proposed
Settlement
at Sind,
1759.

A letter from the Court of Directors, dated 25th April 1759, contains the following details regarding the establishment of an Agency or Presidency in Sind: We have no objection to employing Mr. Robert Sumpton in carrying into execution our plan for a settlement at Scindy on the supposition that you are all satisfied he is the most proper person for such an undertaking. Should he succeed to our expectations he may rely upon our future favour. We are sorry to find you rather lukewarm upon a subject capable we conceive of great improvement, highly advantageous to us and the subjects in general. For neither are the manufactures and imports of Scindy a mystery to us, nor do we doubt that Scindy may be made a granary to your island, as well as a source of the supply of any number of excellent cattle. We are equally clear Scindy may open new and extensive channels for the vend of our woollens an object you must always cherish. At the same time we are sensible it has long been a fluctuating Government, and that the establishment of a Presidency will require circumspection and judicious conduct. If Scindy saltpetre wastes by refining to the degree you mention, the waste must proceed from ignorance. Our late Chairman procured some Scindy saltpetre which cost in Scindy Rs. 4 the *paku man* (80 lbs.). This underwent very careful trials here, and lost no more but proved equal in goodness to the best Bengal saltpetre.⁴

¹ Court to Bombay 12th May 1758, paras 75 and 76, Pub. Dep. Court's L. Vol. 5 of 1757-1761, 106-107.

² Bom. Gov. Consultation 20th July 1759, Pub. Diary 33 of 1759, 440.

³ Court to Bombay 6th May 1761 para 95, Pub. Dep. Court's L. Vol. 5 of 1757-1761, 384.

⁴ Court to Bombay 25th April 1759 para. 96, Pub. Dep. Court's L. Vol. 5 of 1751-1761, 183-184.

A Consultation of 24th April 1759 gives a curious instance of slackness of discipline among the Bombay troops. The entry runs: Two of our working sepoy having gone over to the Marátha country and under pretence of being Sidis plundered several people there; Ordered that the sheriff cause them to be whipped through the town at a cart's tail and turned off the island and that the produce of their effects be applied to the use of the charity school. As further there is great reason to believe that several similar offenders have returned to the island publication must be issued, certifying that if any such persons are hereafter found on the island, they will be severely punished and confined to work on the fortifications for a number of years.¹

Chapter I.
History.
Bombay Sepoys,
1759.

Neither the punishment nor the warning succeeded in preventing the repetition of this misconduct. Soon after the close of the rains (29th November 1759) the President acquaints the Council that some of our inhabitants had lately entered into the Sidi's service and gone to the other side to plunder the Marátha villages. Depositions taken before Mr. Byfield show that Dondu Sutár, Abdalla Rizak, and Muhammad are guilty of that charge and that Ventura Bhandári is likewise guilty of perjury and that the syrang and tindal of a Sidi galivat which has lain here some time have been assisting therein. Taking into consideration that these offenders cannot be tried at the quarter sessions, as their crimes were committed without our jurisdiction, it is agreed that the four first named be severely whipped on their bare backs and chained two together to work on our fortifications till further order and that the two latter be ordered away with their galivat, and suitable notice of the affair and our proceedings herein be taken to the Sidi at Janjira and the Marátha agent now here, and the joys (jewels) found in the prisoners' possession be deposited in the treasury in order that they may be claimed.²

The following humble information of the shoemakers to the Governor of Bombay, dated 10th July 1759, shews a notable rise, not only in the price of leather which might naturally follow the transfer of the North Konkan from Portuguese to Marátha rule, but also in food and house-rent: Your informants humbly represent to your worships as fathers of the helpless that we formerly bought half a cowskin for 3 qrs. or at most one rupee for which we now pay Rs. 2, half a buffalo skin for Rs. 1½ or at most Rs. 1¾ for which we now pay Rs. 3 or 3½, and that goat's skins which were formerly bought for Rs. 9 at most Rs. 10 the corgo now cost Rs. 17 to 20. The truth of this the goat butchers and parriar men will testify to your worships. We further humbly represent that the wax-oil, thread, black stuff, and skin is grown so vastly dear that we cannot afford to work at the present prices. If a man works the whole day he can hardly finish one pair of shoes though he is obliged to maintain four eaters. Further we humbly represent we formerly sold a pair of shoes to the soldiers and sailors at ¾ of a rupee and to the gentlemen at one rupee and though the leather and every other

Dearness of
Bombay,
1759.

¹ Bom. Gov. Consultation, 24th April 1759, Pub. Diary 32 of 1759, 296.

² Bom. Gov. Consultation, 29th Nov. 1759, Pub. Diary 33 of 1759, 707 - 708.

Chapter I.
History.

The Company
guard Surat,
1759.

material is become vastly dearer, we still sell them at the same prices notwithstanding that one *phara* of rice which we formerly bought at Rs. 1½ now costs us Rs. 2½ and that the monthly rent of a house has risen from Re. 1 or 1½ to Rs. 3.¹

On the morning of the 24th September 1759 His Majesty's and the Honourable Company's troops were drawn up near the Horn Work, and, all the European inhabitants with the principal natives being assembled, the Secretary on horseback published the following special order or *hasbul hukam* received from Surat on the 19th instant: Be peace unto the high and renowned, the brave courageous and Honourable Richard Bouchier, Esquire, the Governor of Bombay. The courage and conduct you have shewn in his majesty's service for the good of our subjects the inhabitants of Surat are made known to his majesty and their letter expressing their satisfaction therewith has also been shown. With these his majesty is well satisfied and praises you. Wherefore upon this account he has been pleased to order this *hasbul hukam* (personal command) to be sent that you may take care of his majesty's castle at Surat and that you may specially undertake the preservation of the trade of these seas, so that the inhabitants of Surat may carry on their business and live in ease and quiet and the ships and vessels going to and coming from the leading and other ports be in no fear from rovers and pirates. The charter for the government of the castle and for the command of the fleet shall be sent you from court; given on the 1st of the month Tellegge (Till haj) and the 6th year of the reign of his present majesty or the 14th June 1759. After this order was read the troops gave three volleys and a royal salute was fired from the castle.²

Regarding the transfer to the Company of the command of Surat castle and of the charge of the seas the Court wrote on the 23rd November 1759: We shall not now enter upon the consideration of Surat affairs farther than declaring our approbation of those measures you took for obtaining possession of the castle of Surat, because they appear to us resulting from necessity. Be careful to secure the Maráthás their fixed advantages and do not suffer the merchants or inhabitants to feel oppression.³

Bombay Castle,
1759.

Of the questions raised by the threatened attack of the French, the state of Bombay Castle was one of the most important. On the 10th July 1759 the President, after a survey by himself, Mr. Byfeld, Major Mace, and Captains Maitland and Lane, laid before the Council the following proposals for the defence of the Castle: That as the Turf Work made by De Funck to thicken and strengthen the curtain between the flagstaff and the cavalier bastions is decayed and in many places fallen down, it certainly is now very defenceless. The curtain not only wants widening the whole length but to be raised higher

¹ Bombay Shoemakers' Petition of July 1759, Bom. Gov. Diary 10th July 1759, Pub. Diary 33 of 1759, 430-431.

² Bom. Gov. Consultation, 24th Sept. 1759, Pub. Diary 33 of 1759, 553-554; Forrest's Home Series, II. 107, 108.

³ Court to Bombay 23rd Nov. 1759 para 45, Pub. Dep. Court's L. Vol. 5 of 1757-1761, 293.

to prevent an escalade by boats at high water; Agreed the curtain be immediately faced with stone and in all respects put into condition to receive a line of cannon. That as Major Mace declares the sallyport at the foot of the flagstaff bastion next the harbour to be no more than six inches thick and so wide that six men may march therein abreast with their arms shouldered; Agreed that it is proper to have that part next the water-side filled and to convert the other into a magazine. That as the lower bastion of the cavalier being very small and extremely weak is prejudicial to the defence of the place; Agreed that (except part of the gallery leading thereto that will serve for a magazine to fill cartridges) the lower bastion be immediately filled and heavy cannon mounted on the remaining upper works. That as several of the gun carriages now upon the works in the Castle are unserviceable and although made for field service are so heavy as to require a much greater number of men to work them than those made for the marine service; Agreed that all such carriages by the water-side be immediately removed and the cannon there mounted on marine carriages. If the number of marine carriages is not sufficient additional carriages must be indented for and completed without delay. That as at present the Castle has no secure resting place for people off duty; Agreed that such part of the buildings therein as Major Mace thinks proper should be forthwith made bombproof. That as Major Mace esteems them of easy entrance from boats at high water such workmen as can be spared be employed in raising the low flanks made by DeFunck between the Royal Bastion and the Dock Pier Head. That the officers and men both in His Majesty's and the Honourable Company's train of artillery may know where to repair when the general alarm is made; Agreed that it will be necessary for them to be stationed to the several bastions and draughts made accordingly without delay. That the proper quantities of ammunition may be not only allotted and prepared for immediate service but what is necessary distributed for the several works; Agreed that without loss of time the storekeeper should prepare and deliver an accurate account of all new and old stores that remain upon his books in order that an exact and proper distribution may be made. That in case of attack the European inhabitants and militia may act under proper officers; Agreed that they be forthwith summoned to meet and after being formed into companies be stationed where it may be deemed necessary so that the members of each company on a given signal may repair to their proper posts. That as in case of attack fire vessels may be employed with success; Agreed that materials be prepared for making two fire vessels besides boats, and that anchors with hawsers be placed at convenient distances from the shore that the fire vessels or boats may be hauled thereby on board any large ship that may lie against the Fort. That a proper quantity of provisions may be secured within the town walls for the people that will necessarily be on duty if the place should be attacked; Agreed that Mr. Byfeld prepare a statement of the supplies of each article required to stand a two months' siege.¹

Chapter I.

History.

Bombay Castle,
1759.

¹ Meeting of the Bombay Governor, Mr. Byfeld, and three principal land officers on the island to visit the Castle, 9th July 1759, Pub. Diary 33 of 1759, 432-434.

Chapter I.

History.

Further Defence
Preparations,
1759.

All these resolutions were unanimously approved and ordered to be carried into execution as soon as possible.¹

At a Consultation held about a month later (7th August 1759) a letter was read from Mr. Thomas Byfeld enclosing an abstract of the people that may be employed in case of a siege and of the provisions, hospital stores, and other articles required for their subsistence during a two months' siege. According to Mr. Byfeld's estimate a total strength of 15,750 men would be available for the defence of Bombay. The details are :

Bombay Garrison, 1759.

CLASS.	Number.	Total.	Graud Total.
A.—Garrison	—	—	8781
1 Artillery	—	521	
(a) His Majesty's Royal detachment of artillery	236		
(b) The Honourable Company's artil- lery	285		
2. The Honourable Company's military	848	848	
3. Old garrison sepoya	955	955	
4. Sidis from Surat	754	754	
5. Old Surat sepoya	209	209	
6. Arabs	316	316	
7. Scindy people	178	178	
B.—Marine Officers, now in port with the number of European inhabitants and native militia that are incorporated for the defence of this place...	—	—	5430
1. In port belonging to the <i>Guardian, Bom- bay grah, Swallow galley, Viper, Fox,</i> <i>and Defence ketches, Squirrel schooner</i> <i>and 5 galivats</i>	450	450	
2. The Honourable Company's covenanted servants, commanders, officers of the private shipping, free merchants, seafar- ing gentlemen and other European inha- bitants	98	■	
3. Bombay native inhabitants... .. .	—	3017	
(a) Christians	153		
(b) Bhandaris	330		
(c) Gentus	1906		
(d) Moors	340		
(e) Parsis	180		
(f) Coffee slaves	108		
4. Mahim inhabitants consisting of the above classes except Bhandaris and Parsis	1865	1865	
C.—Sundry Persons belonging to the out-offices .	—	—	6539
1. Barrack Master	—	28	
(a) Purvoes	2		
(b) Cooks and servants... .. .	26		
2. European Hospital	—	64	
(a) Surgeon mates	2		
(b) Purvoes	2		
(c) Servants	60		
3. Military Stores	—	371	
(a) Armourers	■		
(b) Officer	1		
(c) Sepoya	14		
(d) Purvoes	8		
(e) Bigáris	235		
(f) Artificers	111		

¹ Bom. Gov. Consultation 10th July 1759, Pub. Diary 32 of 1759, 424.

Bombay Garrison, 1759—continued.

CLASS.	Number.	Total.	Grand Total.
C.—Sundry Persons belonging to the out-offices—continued.			
4. Topass' and King's Hospital	—	36	
(a) Servants	34		
(b) Purvoes	2		
5. Military Pay Office	—	223	
(a) People properly belonging thereto.	27		
(1) Officer	1		
(2) Sepoys	11		
(3) Purvoes	7		
(4) Servants	8		
(b) Required for extra duty	196		
(1) Servants	20		
(2) Invalids	176		
i. Europeans	20		
ii. Topasses & sepoy.	156		
6. Land Pay Office	—	736	
(a) Employed in the office	14		
(1) Purvoes	4		
(2) Sepoys	10		
(b) Employed in Parel house and garden	35		
(1) Purvoes	1		
(2) Servants	34		
(c) Working on the old fortifications	661		
(1) Sepoys	162		
(2) Bigáris	189		
(3) Artificers	267		
(4) Slaves	39		
(5) Purvoes	4		
(d) Servants belonging to the Governor	13		
(e) Slave-keeper	1		
(f) Employed at the accountant's office, treasury, Old Woman's Island, and old dry dock	12		
7. Warehouse-keeper	—	64	
(a) Properly belonging to him	35		
(1) Officers	2		
(2) Sepoys	11		
(3) Purvoes	7		
(4) Servants	2		
(5) Bigáris	13		
(b) Required for extra duty	29		
(1) Sepoys	4		
(2) Bigáris	25		
8. New Fortification Pay Office	—	41	
(a) Sepoys	16		
(b) Purvoes	8		
(c) Bigáris	17		
9. General Stores	—	259	
(a) Sepoys	11		
(b) Purvoes	10		
(c) Servants	9		
(d) Bigáris	70		
(e) Artificers	159		
10. Principal Engineer	—	3039	
(a) Employed by him on the new fortifications	3039		
(1) Servants	24		
(2) Labourers	2199		
(3) Artificers	816		
11. Collector's office, including the Dongri and Mángaon coolies	—	343	
(a) Sepoys	6		
(b) Purvoes	7		
(c) Coolies	330		

Chapter I.
History.
Garrison,
1759.

Bombay Garrison, 1759—continued.

Chapter I.
History.
Garrison,
1750.

CLASS.	Number.	Total.	Grand Total
<i>C.—Sundry Persons belonging to the out-offices—continued.</i>			
12. Powder House	—	186	
(a) Officers	2		
(b) Sepoys	16		
(c) Purvoo	1		
(d) Servants	3		
(e) Bigáris	136		
13. Bombay Custom House	—	47	
(a) Officers	3		
(b) Sepoys	31		
(c) Purvoos	11		
(d) Servants	2		
14. Mahim Custom House	—	16	
(a) Sepoys	10		
(b) Purvoos	4		
(c) Servants	2		
15. Clerk of the Market's Office	—	4	
(a) Sepoys	2		
(b) Purvoo	1		
(c) Artificer	1		
16. Mint	—	217	
(a) Sepoys	3		
(b) Purvoos	3		
(c) Bigáris	139		
(d) Artificers	72		
17. Marine Office and Dependences	—	743	
(a) Boatswain	1		
(b) Sailmaker	1		
(c) Cooper	1		
(d) Sepoys	17		
(e) Purvoos	22		
(f) Bigáris	361		
(g) Slaves	7		
(h) Syrangs	2		
(i) Tindals	22		
(j) Lascars	319		
18. Slaves supposed to belong to the several gentlemen	150	150	
Grand Total	—	—	15,750

Note.—Mr. Byfield adds: The labouring people from the adjacent countries that offered to act as sepoys in the defence of the island in case it should be attacked and were put under the head overseer of the country workmen are included among the number shown as employed by the Principal Engineer.¹

Requisite
Supplies,
1759.

In 1759 on the supposition that Bombay be attacked and laid under a siege for two months an attempt was made to estimate the number of men that will have to be kept employed during such a time for its defence and the provisions and stores that will be required for the same, taking account at the same time of what grain was in store by the inhabitants of the town and island of Bombay. The details collected showed that of the total 15,750 men required, 1195 would be Europeans and 14,555 would be natives. The 1195 Europeans would consist of the King's and

¹ See Bom. Gov. Consultation of 7th Aug. 1759, Public Diary II of 1759, 475-476.

Company's artillery and Company's military and marine and the European inhabitants and sundries belonging to the out-offices. The required provisions for them at European allowance would be 1195 Surat *mans* (47,800 pounds at 40 lbs. the Surat *man*) rice, 597½ Surat *mans dāl* or pulse, 170½ Bombay *mans* (4774 pounds at 28 lbs. the Bombay *man*) *ghi*, 358,500 firewood billets, 2390 gallons Batavia arrack, 81,260 pounds beef and pork, 3585 salt curvens (*karabās*), and 52,580 pounds bread.¹ The 14,555 natives would consist of 179 men to be paid at double allowance, 236 at one and a half allowance, and 14,140 at single allowance.² For the 179 men at double allowance would be required 716 Surat *mans* rice, 358 Surat *mans dāl* or pulse, 71½ Bombay *mans ghi*, and 64,440 firewood billets. For the 236 men at one and a half allowance would be required 708 Surat *mans* rice, 354 Surat *mans dāl* or pulse, 70½ Bombay *mans ghi*, and 63,720 firewood billets. For the 14,140 men at single allowance, would be required 28,280 Surat *mans* rice, 14,140 Surat *mans dāl* or pulse, 2828 Bombay *mans ghi*, and 2,515,200 firewood billets. Besides there was to be made an extraordinary allowance of drams which it was supposed might be required for the following people during a siege: Military artillery and marine topasses, Christian militia and artificers, and the Honourable Company's slaves, 1400 gallons at ½ gallon each per month Batavia arrack.³

Chapter I.

History.

Requisite
Supplies,
1759.

¹ The curven or *karaba* is a fair sized fish still commonly dried and sent up-country. This identification seems better than the Portuguese fish *corvina* said to be so called from its crowlike blackness. The *corvina* seems not to be commonly dried or salted.

² The 179 men were to be made up of 21 subhēdārs, 80 jumhēdārs (*jumādārs*) in the garrison service and at the custom-house, 14 syrangas in the train marine and out-offices, and 114 Purvoes (*Parbhūs*) and shroffs in the train and out-offices. The 236 men were to be made up of 99 havāldārs in the garrison and out-offices, 70 naiks in the garrison and out-offices, 41 tindals in the train marine and out-offices, and 20 sabnis in the garrison. The 14,140 men were to be made up of 356 in the military, 11 in the Honourable Company's artillery, 32 in the marine, 4682 in the militia, 46 Honourable Company's slaves, 150 slaves belonging to gentlemen, 2499 sepoy in the garrison service out-offices and working on the old fortifications, 3353 bigāris and coolies (that is labourers) belonging to the out-offices, 240 servants including overseers cooks and others, 156 invalids, 628 lascars in the train marine and out-offices, and 1787 artificers in the train marine and out-offices. Total under the three rates of allowance, 14,555. Public Diary 33 of 1759, 476-477.

³ In addition to the above and the doctor's list the following articles appeared necessary to be provided and reserved in store in case of a siege: 1520 copper pots, 760 (with covers that might serve for dishes) to boil provisions of different sizes for 15,750 men and 760 for making curries; 1000 earthen cundys (*kundis* or earthen pots of flower-pot shape) pans and dishes of sorts, including 150 frying-pans, 90 dishes of sorts, and 760 copper ladles; 500 wooden gamels; 1600 cocoanut ladles; 1000 cocoanut shells; 200 *mans* candles for lamps; 400 *mans* oil for lamps; 30 *mans* tamarind; 100 *mans* sugar; 10,000 bundles straw for cattle and the people to sleep on; 1000 bundles charcoal; 400 *supas* (scuttle-forg baskets for sifting corn); 400 brooms; 1000 baskets exclusive of those for the fortifications; 10 *mans* pepper; 200 *mans* salt for salting meat and the peoples' victuals; 100 lamps for burning oil; and 200 buckets with ropes for drawing water.

Then follows in the record: Here were entered the undermentioned tables of provisions showing the daily and monthly allowance of each separate article for one man to 1000 respectively, namely, Europeans per day and per month of 30 days; topasses, ditto; sepoy, officers, and others, double allowance and 1½ allowance, ditto; sepoy and others, single allowance, ditto. These further details are not now (1892) available. Public Diary, 7th Aug. 1759, Vol. 33 of 1759, 476-477.

Chapter I.
History.

Requisite
Supplies,
1759.

The following is an abstract of the men and provisions required for Bombay during a two months' siege :

Men and Provisions required during a Two Months' Siege, 1759.

ALLOWANCES.	Men.		Rice.	Dal.	Ghi.	Fire-wood.	Batavia Arrack.	Beef and Pork.	Salt Curcums.	Bread.
	Europeans.	Natives.								
			S. M.	S. M.	B. M.	Billets.	Gallons.	Pounds.	Nos.	Pounds.
1 Europeans ...	1105	...	1105	597½	170½	858,500	2390	81,200	3595	52,580
2 Double	170	716	359	71½	64,440
3 One and a half.	...	230	708	354	70½	63,720
4 Single...	14,140	28,280	14,140	2823	2,545,200
5 Extraordinary.	1400
Total ...	1105	14,535	30,808	15,440½	3240½	3,031,900	3790	81,200	3585	52,580

Grain in Store,
1759.

As regards the quantities of grain and other provisions stored by the inhabitants, orders were issued to the Custom Masters of Máhim and Bombay to submit accounts after enquiry. On the 27th July 1759 the Máhim Custom Master submitted an account of all the grain, *ghi*, wood, and oil which was at the time in the district of Máhim, showing to whom the same belonged. This detailed statement is (1892) not forthcoming. The following abstract is alone available.¹

Máhim Grain Stores, 1759.

ARTICLES.	Quantity.	ARTICLES.	Quantity.
	Mor. p.		Kh. m.
Batty... ..	774 16	Dal or pulse ...	5 #
Batty Black... ..	109 23	Btjiri	7 0
Nákhani	30 #	Ghi	1 6
	Kh. m.	Oil	4 13
Wheat	7 4	Wood	20,000 Nos.

On the 31st July 1759 the Board record : Read a letter from the Máhim Custom Master enclosing an account of grain and other provisions in his district which is ordered to lay till the Bombay Custom Master can comply with our orders. The Máhim letter and abstract (given above) of the account must follow this consultation ; and it is agreed that the exportation of wheat and all other grain be forbid till further orders.²

Shortly after a similar account, received from the Bombay Custom Master, gives the following details³ :

¹ Máhim Custom Master to Govt. 27th July 1759, Public Diary 33 of 1759, 460-461.

² Bom. Gov. Consultation 31st July 1759, Public Diary 33 of 1759, 454.

³ Public Diary 7th Aug. 1759, Vol. 33 of 1759, 478.

Bombay (Grain in Store, 1759.

Chapter I.

History.

Grain in Store,
1759-60.

CLASS.	Batty.	Rice.	Wheat.	Mug.	Gram.	Dal.	Udid.	Válina.	Náchni.
	Mor. p.	Kh. p.	Kh. p.	Kh. p.	Kh. p.	Kh. p.	Kh. p.	Kh. p.	Kh. p.
Rugvedi Bráhmans.	13 ■	...	1 2½	■ 4½	1 4	1 6	0 5½
Gujarát do.	...	12 0½	2 1½	3 3½
Yajurvedi do.	16 15	3 4	0 3	0 3½
Shenvis	28 12	13 7½	4 1½	2 8½	2 1½	5 5½
Parbhús	110 16	28 3	3 8½	1 5½	0 4½	5 5½	1 1½	0 1½	1 0½
Baniáns	69 12	247 7	264 4½	20 0	...	100 0
Goldsmiths	■ 8	30 0½	129 5½	...	2 1½	10 1½	2 6½	...	12 4
Coppersmiths	34 9	9 3½	1 4½	3 7½	...	0 0½	■ 0½
Ironsmiths	2 18	2 0½	0 1
Bhansáls	6 13	25 8	3 0	...	11 1½	8 4
Weavers	55 12	7 4½	3 4	4 0
Pánsallás (Páñch-
kalshis)	53 8	16 7½	0 5½	0 1½
Chaukalshis	6 12	4 0½
Bhandáris	107 23½	0 1½	8 3	0 4½
Christians	68 10	5 5½	16 0	0 3½
Pársis	83 2	184 7½	28 2½	30 ■	17 0	105 4½	17 0	...	0 6
Moors	881 3	87 4½	8 3½	129 8½	45 6
Pot-makers	0 10
Mat-makers	0 19	0 4	0 0½
Tailors	12 6	0 4	1 7½
Shoemakers	...	7 4½	1 1½
Barbers	1 18
Turners	...	7 2
Washermen	0 21	8 7
Carpenters	00 0	0 4½	0 5½	1 4½
Hamáls	...	12 0	1 6
Sweetmeat-makers	...	2 0½	1 4½	...	2 5½	5 0
Bombay Coolies	53 8	2 0
Thána do.	21 3½	4 0
Total	1746 5	735 2½	467 6½	54 5½	37 4½	513 1½	21 5½	0 2	60 1½

CLASS.	Math.	Val.	Turi.	Báñri.	Chavli.	Ghl.	Oil.	Firewood.		
	Kh. p.	Kh. p.	Kh. p.	Kh. p.	Kh. p.	M. s.	M. s.	Hundles.	Billets.	Onáás (Gogs).
Rugvedi Bráhmans.	1 35	13 0	...	37,500	...
Gujarát do.	12 37	24 35	...	20,900	...
Yajurvedi do.	2 33	10 33	132	7700	...
Shenvis	10 17	40 10	2825	29,100	...
Parbhús	...	0 6½	6 10	38 15	913	101,500	805
Baniáns	2 0	...	44 0	115 4	...	284 20	210 0	...	148,985	...
Goldsmiths	0 1½	21 19	37 35	4609
Coppersmiths	...	0 1½	0 5	8 25	9 26	1830
Ironsmiths
Bhansáls	32 0	71 20	...	35,150	...
Weavers	10 10	28 10	2259
Pánsallás (Páñch-
kalshis)	6 31
Chaukalshis	2 35	237
Bhandáris	3 6	22 16	...	77,050	...
Christians	1 10	31 24	558	25 25½	13,920
Pársis	20 0	...	32½ 3½	...	0 4	541 10	283 10	...	151,500	...
Moors	6 4½	13 2½	...	34 0	100 25	35,337	634,000	...
Pot-makers
Mat-makers	1200	...
Tailors	2 27	3 6	734
Shoemakers	4 20	...	13,500	...
Barbers	4000	...
Turners
Washermen	1 0	4900	...
Carpenters	1 20	12 10
Hamáls	...	0 6½	4 1	6½ 2	5 20	75
Sweetmeat-makers	14 0	2 0	...	1750	26
Bombay Coolies	4 33	...	61,100	32,690
Thána do.	18 15	1127	19,000	8900
Total	22 1½	1 6½	379 0	140 1½	0 4	1257 39	980 20	50,645	1,360,495	134,380

Similar information was obtained and recorded about the middle of the next year, 1760. On the 8th July the Military Paymaster laid

Chapter I.

History.

Grain in Store,
1760.

before the Board a general abstract of people and provisions required and available at the time, to meet a siege of two months should Bombay be attacked and besieged. On this, the 8th July 1760, the Board observe: 'The Military Paymaster laying before us a general abstract of people who may be employed in the defence of this place, and the quantity of provisions and other articles they will require, in a siege of two months, the accountant is directed to calculate the provisions which we may want to lay in on that account, allowing for what we have in store.

The detailed estimate of people showed that of a total of 15,239 men, 985 were Europeans and 14,254 natives. For 985 Europeans in the Honourable Company's military artillery and marine, the other European inhabitants, and sundries belonging to the out-offices, would be required 985 Surat *mans* (39,400 pounds) rice, 492½ Surat *mans* *dál* or pulse, 147½ Bombay *mans* (4137 at 28 lbs. the Bombay *man*) *ghi*, 295,500 firewood billets, 1980 gallons Batavia arrack, 66,980 pounds beef and pork, 2965 salt curvens, and 43,340 pounds bread. The 14,254 natives included 176 men to be paid at double allowance, 254 at an allowance and a half, and 13,824 at single allowance. For the 176 men at double allowance would be required 704 Surat *mans* rice, 352 Surat *mans* *dál* or pulse, 70½ Bombay *mans* *ghi*, and 63,360 firewood billets. For the 254 men at one and a half allowance would be required 762 Surat *mans* rice, 381 Surat *mans* *dál* or pulse, 75½ Bombay *mans* *ghi*, and 68,580 firewood billets. For the 13,824 men at single allowance would be required 27,648 Surat *mans* rice, 13,824 Surat *mans* *dál* or pulse, 2764½ Bombay *mans* *ghi*, and 2,488,320 firewood billets. Besides there was to be made an extra allowance of drams, that it was supposed might be required for the following people during a siege: marine and military topasses, Company's slaves, Christians, militia and artificers, 1296 gallons at ½ gallon each (per month) Batavia arrack.² The abstract of the provisions required for a two months' siege is:

Provisions required for a Two Months' Siege, 1760.

ALLOWANCE.	Men.		Rice.	Pulse.	Ghi.	Fire-wood.	Batavia Arrack.	Beef and Pork.	Salt Curvens.	Bread.
	Europeans.	Natives.								
			S. M.	S. M.	B. M.	BILLETS.	GALLONS.	POUNDS.	NOS.	POUNDS.
1 Europeans ...	985	...	985	492½	147½	295,500	1980	66,980	2965	43,340
2 Double	176	704	352	70½	63,360
3 One and a half	254	762	381	75½	68,580
4 Single	13,824	27,648	13,824	2764½	2,488,320
5 Extra	1296
Total ...	985	14,254	30,099	15,049½	3053½	2,915,760	3276	66,980	2965	43,340

A comparison of these requirements with the amounts in store showed considerable deficiencies under rice, pulse, bread, salt, fish, and firewood.³ The details are:

¹ Bom. Gov. Consultation 8th July 1760; Pub. Diary 34 of 1760, 513, 519-523, 559.

² Pub. Diary 34 of 1760, 523. ³ Pub. Diary, 22nd July 1760, Vol. 35 of 1760, 559.

Provisions Required and in Store, 1760.

PROVISIONS.	Rice.	Batty.	Dál or Pulso.	Whcat.	Bread.	Ghl.
	S. M. s.	Mor. p.	S. M. s.	Kh. p.	Lbs.	S. M. s.
Necessary	30,069 0	...	15,049 20	...	43,780	3058 30
In store:						
(1) Under the Warehouse-keeper	6651 29	2698 20
(2) Under the Marine Paymaster	194 14
(3) Under the Military Paymaster	3123 5½	89 3	...	1241 38½
(4) In the Bake House	110 0	15,000	...
Total	6651 29	2898 7	3123 5½	148 3	15,000	1241 38½
Deficient	23,147 11	...	11,626 14½	...	28,780	1816 36½
Surplus	2898 7	...	148 3

PROVISIONS.	Salt Beef and Pork.	Salt Curvens.	Goa Arrack.	Batavia Arrack.	Billet Wood.
	Lbs.	No.	Hds. gal.	Gallons.	No.
Necessary	63,360	2905	...	3266	3,915,760
In store:					
(1) Under the Warehouse-keeper	280 29	5008½	...
(2) Under the Marine Paymaster	122,040	164,912
(3) Under the Military Paymaster	883,666
(4) In the Bake House
Total	122,040	...	280 29	5008½	989,577
Deficient	2905	1,927,183
Surplus	63,780	...	280 29	2412½	...

These precautions of laying in stores provisions and necessaries, as well as the other measures taken to be in readiness to defeat any French attack, in due course (Despatch dated 6th May 1761) received the approval of the Court of Directors.¹ The Court added: We shall expect to hear, agreeable to your assurances, that the two warehouses purchased for Rs. 4000 to lodge grain in are again sold when you have no further occasion to keep them.

In connection with the measures to meet a French attack, at a Consultation of the 8th July the President, the Honourable Mr. Crommelin, laid before the select committee, and afterwards before the Board, a letter from Major John Fraser, containing proposals for putting the island into the best state of defence against an attack from the French. The letter was read and the following remarks entered opposite each proposal.

To Major Fraser's first proposal that, as the French would probably make a land attack on the fort the plan of the fortification be immediately laid before the Board, and the Engineer consulted thereon, the committee remark: We are equally desirous as the Major to have a plan of the fortification laid before the

Chapter I.
History.Grain in Store,
1760.Proposals to
meet a French
Attack,
1760.

¹ Court to Bombay 6th May 1761 para. 98, Pub. Dep. Ct.'s L. Vol. 5 of 1757-1761, 385.

Chapter I.
History.

Major Fraser's
Proposals,
1760.

Board. With this object, on delivery of the plan sent to the Honourable the Court of Directors by ship *Clinton* the 26th February last (1760), the Principal Engineer was directed to draw another copy. The work of preparing this copy will probably take time as the Principal Engineer's attention is so much employed in overlooking the fortifications now in hand and as he declares he has known places lost by the enemy obtaining only a rough sketch of the fortifications, and that on that account he has never yet given any one a sight of the plans of Bombay.

In regard to Major Fraser's second proposal that all inhabitants of Bombay (Company's servants excepted) be divided into seven parts to be obliged to work one day in seven upon the fortification under the direction of the Engineer at the daily pay of the common labourer, the heads of their own castes or other proper officers to act as overseers, the committee remarks that the President had already summoned the heads of the several castes to deliver him each for his own caste a list of the number of men and boys above 10 years old, with an account of their several occupations. But that this order had not yet been carried out.¹

As regards Major Fraser's third proposal that all private work be stopped for two or three months, and that except those employed in the marine yard and artillery service, the whole carpenters bricklayers masons smiths and other artificers now employed on or upon the island be immediately turned to the public works, the committee find after consulting the Principal Engineer that he has not and that at this season he cannot procure enough chunam to employ more bricklayers or masons than he now has. The Board also remark that an order stopping private building had been in force since April.²

On Major Fraser's fourth proposal that no cattle or provisions of any kind be sent off the island and that the number and ownership of cattle and other provisions now upon the island be recorded, the committee remark: Major Fraser declares that he makes this proposal because he has been informed that numbers of cattle are now constantly passing across the harbour. To this, it is to be remarked, that at this season cattle always leave Bombay for grazing returning at the close of the monsoon. That any attempt to take an account of the cattle would alarm the inhabitants, more particularly the Gentus, who are by far the most numerous caste on the island. If they took fright the cattle owners would take methods of depriving us of the cattle instead of bringing any back at the close of the grazing season. So far as it refers to the cattle this proposal is deemed improper and impolitic especially as in case of necessity we could easily bring all the cattle within the walls. As to other provisions that not only has a particular account of them in the districts both of Bombay and Máhim been taken and delivered into the Board, but also an account of the strength of the garrison and of the *ghí*, oil, firewood and other stores

¹ Pub. Diary 34 of 1760, 530.

² Pub. Diary 34 of 1760, 530.

required for a two months' siege. As to forbidding other provisions besides cattle being sent off the island, the committee remark the export of all grain has been prohibited since the 31st July last (1759), and all suitable encouragement has been given by many publications for bringing every species of provisions to this place, a procedure which we have had the pleasure to find has had a very good effect.

Major Fraser's fifth proposal that the general stores of the garrison be immediately strictly examined and a just account given of what is fit for service, has been already carried out.

Major Fraser's sixth proposal that thirty men from each of the Europe ships be sent on shore and disciplined in case the service of the garrison should require them, might be found difficult to put in practice as the Admiral had already carried away a certain number of the men.

On the seventh proposal that all cover for the enemy within 600 yards be immediately cleared away, the Board remark that the arrangements in progress for clearing a space of 400 yards should first be completed.

Regarding the eighth proposal that all the mortars howitzers and other pieces of ordnance for which we have shells and shot be immediately mounted and completed for service. The committee ordered that the commanding officer of artillery be required to see this article forthwith obeyed if it had not already been carried out.

Major Fraser's ninth proposal was that the whole militia of the island be exercised one day in seven agreeable to the regulations made for that purpose when the troops were encamped at Byculla. On this the committee record: We agree to such of the militia as may be deemed capable doing that duty in the manner the Major proposes as soon as the President has a list of the several castes and is able to appoint them. At the same time we must observe that to require the inhabitants to work one day in seven on the fortifications and to be exercised second day in the week as militia, will be deemed a great hardship especially at this season when all are employed in the rice fields.

Major Fraser's tenth proposal that upon the alarm guns being fired the whole militia of the island repair directly to Bombay where the military quartermaster will deliver them arms and ammunition and there remain till they receive the commanding officer's orders, as well as his eleventh proposal that a list be made of all the ship's companies now in the road as well lascars as Europeans with the quantity of powder, number and quality of the shot on board or on shore belonging to each vessel, are approved by the Committee and ordered to be complied with.

The twelfth proposal that, in case the enemy should appear before Bombay, except those attached to His Majesty's ships and hospitals, all surgeons and mates with their medicine chests and instruments belonging to ships in the road or inhabiting the island be ordered to repair to the Company's hospital and there attend the

Chapter I. History.

Major Fraser's
Proposals,
1760.

Chapter I.
History.

Major Fraser's
Proposals,
1760.

general service, is also approved : Decided that surgeons and mates should receive timely warning in case there should prove occasion for this service.

The Committee remark that the thirteenth proposal that the Honourable Company's civil servants and other European gentlemen inhabitants of this island be incorporated and form an independent company to assist in the defence of the island had been carried out in August 1757, that the company had been regularly trained, but that if Major Fraser could spare them the services of a military officer to help the commandant Mr. Byfeld he would be welcome.

To Major Fraser's last proposal that it was requisite to lay in an ample stock of arrack to encourage the people during the fatigues of a siege, approval was given and a reference made to ascertain the quantity in stock.¹

An attempt to enforce the landing and drilling of a contingent of seamen from Captain Newton's *Houghton* (9th July 1760) was deprecated on the ground that the men were trained and that in the rainy season the men were required on board. These reasons were accepted and the attempt to enforce Major Fraser's ninth proposal was abandoned.²

In addition to these measures it was verbally arranged that a party of military be sent under the Principal Engineer's direction to level the sand hill without the Church Gate; pay to be allowed the Europeans at the same rate as was allowed the King's artillery in 1756 on erecting the battery between the bandar and the fort. The Major to send a roll every morning to the Principal Engineer and the Engineer to forward one every night to the paymaster, subscribed by himself.³

Out Forts,
1760.

At a Consultation on the 29th July 1760 the Board considered the following letter from Major Fraser on the treatment of the out-forts : After considering the strength of the out-forts on this island, we are of opinion that it is not advisable to attempt to defend them against an European enemy. On the one hand the forts are too confined for the proper use of the guns, on the other hand they cannot be furnished with men without an undue drain on the garrison. We therefore advise that at each fort artillery officers be appointed to survey the guns and stores so as to leave only enough to make the proper alarms on the approach of an enemy and defend themselves till they can be supported or withdrawn. At the same time we recommend that he pay a more particular regard to the forts of Sion and Warli, those being the places we judge of the greatest consequence. These proposals the Board

¹ Major John Fraser's Letter of 8th July 1760 and Select Committee's Consultation of 8th July 1760, Pub. Diary 35 of 1760, 539-546.

² Letter from the President to Capt. Charles Newton, Commander of ship *Houghton*, 9th July 1760, Pub. Diary 35 of 1760, 546-547; and his reply, Pub. Diary 35 of 1760, 547-548.

³ Bom. Gov. Consultation 15th July 1760, Pub. Diary 34 of 1760, 529-531.

approve with the addition that Sivri receive equal attention with Sion and Warli.¹

At a Consultation held the 30th November was read the following letter from Fort St. George dated 14th October 1760: The French are now effectually shut up within their walls and begin to give tokens of their distress by forcing the black inhabitants to leave the place and shutting the gates upon them, when they request admittance again on being denied permission to pass our army. Colonel Coote is making proper dispositions to strengthen the blockade and establish the necessary posts against the rains set in.²

About a month later (31st December 1760) the Court of Directors write: In the course of this year it has pleased God to bless the British arms with most remarkable success against the French in all parts of the world. The most vigorous measures are still pursuing as the best, indeed as the only, means of bringing the enemy to equitable terms of accommodation and attaining that desirable object a safe and honourable peace. Although the generous overture made by his late Majesty last winter towards a congress for a pacification has not yet produced a suitable return, it is hoped the distressed condition of the enemy will operate so strongly before the opening of the next campaign, that they will find themselves under the necessity of relieving their distress by agreeing to such terms as shall in their present condition be reasonable. These however are at present only our wishes. We do not find any overtures have this year been made on the part of either nation. We do not know of any French force proceeding to India this season, at least none of any great consequence. Whenever we can get any intelligence of their intentions and motions with respect to the East Indies, we shall give you the earliest information. It is with great pleasure we look upon the advantages gained over the enemy by the King's and Company's land forces upon the coast of Coromandel, and equally so upon the gallant behaviour of His Majesty's naval forces. We are greatly obliged to Admiral Steevens and Colonel Coote as also to Colonel Monson for the services they have rendered to the Company in their several departments. We have desired the President and Council in Madras to signify to those gentlemen how truly sensible we are of their merit, and this you will not fail to do, should any of those officers be with you on the receipt of this letter. There is the greatest reason to believe that the ascendancy over the enemy both by sea and land in India, will be maintained by our present superiority of force. We cannot help flattering ourselves that it will not be long before we hear that Pondicherry itself is fallen never to rise more.³

Chapter I.

History.

French
Difficulties,
1760.

French Reverses,
1760.

¹ Letter from Major John Fraser to the President, dated Bombay 23rd July 1760, Pub. Diary 35 of 1760, 588. Bom. Gov. Consultation 29th July 1760, Pub. Diary 35 of 1760, 587.

² Madras to Bombay 14th Oct. 1760, Secret and Political Diary 6 of 1760, 8.

³ Court to Bombay 31st Dec. 1760 paras. 56-59, Pub. Dep. Court's Letters Vol. 6 of 1757-1761, 344-345.

Chapter I.
History.

In 1760, perhaps because of the fear of a French attack, money was very scarce in Bombay. At a Consultation held the 12th February 1760, the Board agreed to deliver Rs. 60,000 of goods to Vanjárás on receipt from the shroffs of bills in favour of the Chief and Council at Surat payable at par.¹

**Want of New
Money,
1760.**

An entry a week later suggests that on account of fear of a French attack no silver was brought to the Bombay mint to be coined and that in consequence the mint was practically closed. At a Consultation on the 19th February 1760 the Board records: Our shroffs having offered to pay the Chief and Council at Surat 60,000 new rupees on our giving them the same number of current rupees, their offer is approved as we are very much distressed for new money for the coast settlements.²

**Scarcity of
Money,
1761.**

Another entry nearly two years later suggests that the scarcity of money was partly due to the wars in Upper India which culminated in the defeat of the Maráthás at Pánipat (6th January 1761). At a Consultation on the 29th December 1761 read the following petition from the coppersmiths to Government: That your Honours' petitioners beg to represent that ever since your petitioners purchased copper of the Honourable Company they have not been able to sell any part of it for want of buyers, because of the war between the Moghals and Maráthás. This year all sort of trade is stopped, an evil which not only renders the merchants unable to sell their goods but reduces the town to great want of money. This obliges your Honours' petitioners to make this request hoping as fathers of the merchants, your Honours will be pleased to grant them further time to take away their copper from the Company's warehouse;³ Resolved the consideration of the petition be deferred till the warehouse-keeper can examine the state of the copper-smiths' accounts.⁴

**Fire-Engine,
1760.**

At a Consultation, the 28th March 1760, the Board decide that as it is necessary to guard against any accident by fire in the marine yard, the storekeeper deliver the engine now in his charge to be kept in the marine yard by the Superintendent. Also that such engines as had been delivered from the *Dragon*, *Swallow*, or other ships from England be put in good repair and kept in the same place.⁵

**Surat Troubles,
1760.**

On the 25th April 1760 shortly after receipt of the news that the Company had been made commandants of Surat Castle⁶ the Court of Directors write: We are sorry to find that our affairs at Surat have been in such a dangerous and disgraceful situation, our merchants' goods forced away, our servants barbarously and openly murdered in the streets, and our Chief grossly insulted. We

¹ Bom. Gov. Consultation, 12th Feb. 1760, Pub. Diary 31 of 1760, 118.

² Bom. Gov. Consultation, 19th Feb. 1760, Pub. Diary 34 of 1760, 135.

³ Petition from Coppersmiths, Dec. 1761, Pub. Diary 37 of 1761, 805.

⁴ Bom. Gov. Consultation, 29th Dec. 1761, Pub. Diary 37 of 1761, 803.

⁵ Bom. Gov. Consultation, 28th March 1760, Pub. Diary 34 of 1760, 235.

⁶ For particulars see Bombay Letters to Court, 27th March (paras 90-96) and 31st March and 8th May 1759 paras 23-26. Pub. Dep. Letters to the Court Vol. 6 of 1759, 36-40, 97, 109-111.

have great reason to apprehend that private views and connections have brought on these mischiefs. It is certain that all our late embroils with the Surat government have had their rise from self-interested motives. We are assured the promoter of these misfortunes was the Dutch broker Muncher (Mancharji) a miscreant who, although in a foreign interest, has been most shamefully suffered to influence all our public concerns in that city, and though banished from our service by Mr. Wake, was supported in checking and controlling the measures of our late Chiefs, Messrs. Crommelin and Ellis, till he succeeded in establishing in the government his creature Ali Nawáz Khán for the subversion of our affairs and in absolute subjection to the dictates of the Dutch. In such a situation, loaded with injuries and stripped of our privilege, a war was unavoidable. We are therefore pleased to find it finished on terms so honourable and advantageous. For the future see that you give us no cause to complain that private intercourse with our enemies is continued to the prejudice of our interest. If this is repeated by any of our servants, we shall doem those servants unfaithful dishonourable and unworthy of our service.

As we now possess the castle of Surat, we shall here lay down some rules for the conduct of this important concern. The residence of our servants must be in the castle. But whether it may be proper for mercantile convenience and collecting our duties to hold the factory in the castle is left to your judgment. As already mentioned we confirm Mr. Spencer our Chief at Surat. Our experience of his prudence and discretion gives us confidence that under him our orders and regulations will be punctually enforced. In case of Mr. Spencer's death or departure, we give Mr. Thomas Hodges the option of this chiefship; if he declines it we appoint Mr. William Andrew Price. We do not apprehend any necessity for a large garrison, as at any time they can be succoured from Bombay. Still let there always be a respectable force such as will prevent a surprise, and secure the castle from danger. Great order and severe discipline must be maintained that the soldiers are never suffered to injure or maltreat the inhabitants. In the choice of the military commander no regard must be paid to seniority. The commander must have temper and abilities and be esteemed by his people. We dwell the longer upon this head because in such a city many and fatal mischiefs may flow from indiscretion in the commander.

So long as he acts uprightly it will be your interest to keep fair with the governor of Surat City. At the same time in all just and equitable instances you must appear the merchants' advocate and protector. The real and natural interest of Surat centers with the traders, and in defending them from oppression, you establish your own security. Such candid and fair behaviour will unite the inhabitants in affection and respect to your government. Make no ill use of power, distribute justice equally to all. Our Chief, we are satisfied, will maintain the character of an upright faithful servant and his example we hope will inspire others with a just senso of their duty. Should it appear that mercenary and selfish views bias any

Chapter I.

History.

Surat Troubles,
1760.

**Chapter I.
History.**

The measurement
of Land to rest
with the Collector,
1760.

one to the prejudice of public measures, such, without waiting for orders, are instantly to be dismissed from our service. As you value our favour, we depend that your vigilance and care will be at all times exercised in freeing us from unavoidable embroils and in detecting the smallest malpractices at Surat.¹

On the 25th April 1760 the Court of Directors wrote: We observe that upon some dispute President Bouchier took into his own hands the power of measuring ground. This we highly disapprove. The measuring of ground is our Collector's province. Upon an application he issues his orders to the clerk of the works who certifies such measurement to the Collector, when the same becomes regularly registered. If any disputes should arise (which to us seems improbable) the Governor in Council are to determine the difference.²

The same Despatch continues: We approve the steps you have pursued with Captain Cameron and the late Mr. Funge (Funck). At the same time we can by no means excuse our Chief in taking off our soldiers from their duty to employ them as tailors and cobblers. This is a practice we will not suffer. The example may encourage inferiors to commit great abuses.³

The Peshwa
presents an
Elephant,
1760.

During this time the Company's relations with the Maráthas continued friendly. On the 20th June 1760 Govind Shivrámpant at a meeting with the Honourable the President and Council at the Company's new house, delivered an elephant presented by Nána (Báláji Bájiráv, 1740-1761) to our Honourable Masters.⁴

Betel-Leaf
Monopoly,
1760.

A Consultation of the 26th August 1760 records: Some persons on the island having offered Rs. 1000 a year to have the sole privilege of importing and selling betel-leaf, we think the amount is so trifling and the risk so considerable, the farm will prove a hardship to the inhabitants and likewise affect the Honourable Company in some essential points; we judge it conducive to their real interest to decline the offer.⁵

On the subject of this monopoly two years later (16th April 1762) the Court observe: You did well to reject the offer of Rs. 1000 for an exclusive privilege of selling betel-leaf. We shall never acquiesce in raising a revenue by any method that may be oppressive to the inhabitants, more particularly when proposed in so underhand a manner.⁶

Troublesome
Arabs,
1760.

An entry in the Bombay Diary of 1st October 1760 shows that in spite of their excellent qualities Arab sepoys were occasionally troublesome: The Secretary by order of the President acquainted

¹ Court to Bombay 25th April 1760 paras. 78-86, Pub. Dep. Court's L. Vol. II of 1757-1761, 261-263.

² Court to Bombay 25th April 1760 para 106, Pub. Dep. Court's Letters Vol. 5 of 1757-1761, 273.

³ Court to Bombay 25th April 1760 para 134, Pub. Dep. Court's L. Vol. 5 of 1757-1761, 285.

⁴ Bom. Gov. Diary, 20th June 1760, Pub. Diary 34 of 1760, 468.

⁵ Bom. Gov. Consultation, 26th Aug. 1760, Pub. Diary 35 of 1760, 647.

⁶ Court to Bombay 16th April 1762 para 91, Pub. Dep. Court's L. Vol. 6 of 1762-64, 44.

the Board that in addition to the misbehaviour of the Arab sepoys brought yesterday to the notice of the Board by Mr. Ryfeld, Major Fraser had this morning informed the President he was afterwards told that some of the Arabs were even loading their pieces when the gentlemen at muster accepted their submission. This made it probable they would otherwise have proceeded to extremities. The Major having not only proposed but recommended to the President to get rid of such troublesome people, the President had ordered the Secretary to acquaint the Board that with their concurrence he intended to discharge the whole 250 Arabs. He would accompany their discharge with some credit to their officers and satisfaction to the rest of the corps lest on any future occasion the island should otherwise be disappointed of their service. In this proposal the Council unanimously concurred.¹

While the news of the ruin of Pánipat (January 6th 1761) was on its way to them the Directors wrote (6th May 1761): Although we are satisfied it may be attended with ill consequences, still to preserve a good understanding with them, it may be advisable to allow the Maráthás to take possession of Rájpurí. You must be careful to interfere no further in assisting the Sidi than may be really and absolutely necessary.²

On the 5th May 1761 trustworthy advices by Basra bringing word that his late Majesty George II. of ever blessed memory departed this life the 25th October 1760 of an apoplectic fit, the Bombay Council ordered that on the occasion 76 half-minute guns be fired from the castle; that all the principal inhabitants on the island be required to put themselves into deep mourning for three months and afterwards to wear half mourning for a like space of time. The Council add: Notice of this event must be given to all our subordinates and a salute of 21 guns must be fired to-morrow at sunrise for the Prince of Wales' accession to the throne. It is agreed not to proclaim the Prince of Wales till more authentic advices are received.³

At sunrise next morning (6th May 1761), agreeable to yesterday's resolution 76 half minute-guns were fired from the fort and 20 from every ship in the road. The garrison was likewise ordered under arms and fired three volleys, the drums colours and officers' spontoons (half-pikes or halberts) being put into mourning. At noon a royal salute was fired from every ship in the road and the guns all round the town were discharged on account of the Prince of Wales' accession to the throne.⁴

On the 16th April 1762 the Court of Directors wrote: It is very agreeable to us to find that you have prevailed upon a shroff belonging to Tarvari's house to settle upon the island. Every encouragement you give to merchants to come amongst you will

Chapter I. History.

Troublesome,
Arabs,
1760.

Marátha
Relations,
1761.

Death of
George II.
1761.

Encouragement
to Settlers,
1762.

¹ Bom. Gov. Consultation, 1st Oct. 1760, Pub. Diary 35 of 1760, 731.

² Court to Bombay 6th May 1761 para. 78, Pub. Dep. Court's L. Vol. 5 of 1757-61, 377.

³ Bom. Gov. Consultation, 5th May 1761, Pub. Diary 36 of 1761, 393.

⁴ Bom. Gov. Diary 6th May 1761, Pub. Diary 36 of 1761, 396.

Chapter I.
History.

Storm,
1762.

always meet with our approbation. We hope this single instance will incite others to follow his example.¹

The Diary for 1762, under date Sunday 7th November, records : A very violent gale of wind doing considerable damage to the small craft in and about the harbour, blowing down great quantities of cocoanut trees, and in other respects greatly damaging most of the oarts and houses on the island.²

The destruction and injury to cocoa trees formed the subject of a petition from the oart-holders for a remission of assessment. Of this petition and the consequent inquiry and settlement the Bombay Government gave the following account in a letter to the Court of Directors dated 25th March 1764 : On the 11th June the *fazindárs* of Bombay and Máhim delivered us a petition wherein they set forth the great loss they sustained by the storm in November 1762 and on that account desired to be released from the tax. In consequence of this we ordered the Collector to make enquiry and report to us what deduction of tax would be reasonable. Again, on the 16th August, the oart-farmers delivered us another petition desiring consideration on account of this storm. The whole matter was referred to the Committee of Accounts who on the 3rd January (1764) reported that the estimate of the loss calculated by the vereadores amounted to Rs. 14,332-3-9. In the Committee's opinion it was impossible for the vereadores or any set of people to calculate the term of years trees shall remain fruitless after such a storm. The Committee recommended that, on the fourth sort of trees, the farmers should have a proportionable abatement of their tax for the first six months after the storm, for one year on the first second and third sorts, and a proportionate deduction in their annual rent for the trees blown down. As this settlement reduced the damage from Rs. 14,332-3-9 to Rs. 8500, it was approved and ordered to be carried out. We hope it will satisfy the farmers. If not, the vereadores will be ordered from time to time to survey the oarts that should it be necessary a proportionable additional abatement may be made.³

This settlement by no means satisfied the Board of Directors. On the 22nd March 1765 the Court write to Bombay : We observe the farmers of the oarts petitioned the Board for an allowance on account of their sufferings by a storm in 1762, and after taking the same into consideration you allowed them Rs. 8500. This appears to us a very large sum. As your making such a precedent may be very prejudicial to our interest in future, we expect you will explain your motives for this transaction more fully to us in your next advices.⁴

War with Spain,
1762.

In a letter of the 3rd March 1762 the Court of Directors write : You were informed by our last letter that the negotiation for a

¹ Court to Bombay 16th April 1762 para 84, Pub. Dep. Court's L. Vol. 6 of 1762-1764, 42.

² Public Diary 39 of 1762, 637.

³ Bombay to Court 25th March 1764 para 100, Pub. Dep. Letters to the Court Vol. 11 of 1764, 67-68.

⁴ Court to Bombay 22nd March 1765 para 120, Pub. Dep. Court's L. Vol. 7 of 1765-1768, 38-39.

peace between Great Britain and France was entirely broken off. It was therein also intimated that there was too much reason to apprehend a war would break out with Spain. This event accordingly happened. On the 4th of January (1762), war was declared in London against the King of Spain. The motives for this measure will appear by His Majesty's declaration, dated at St. James's, the 2nd of the same month, which you will herewith receive. You are accordingly to cause the said declaration to be proclaimed at Bombay and its dependencies with the solemnities usual on such an occasion. This information must put you on your guard to take all proper measures for the security of our navigation against any attempts of this new enemy. In particular you must give the necessary orders and cautions to the commanders of all our homeward bound ships to be well on their guard and avoid touching at any Spanish ports during the whole course of their voyage. It is further necessary to inform you that relations with the Dutch nation are at present so critical that we should not be surprised if they take some unjustifiable measures to our prejudice in the East Indies, particularly in Bengal. In these circumstances you cannot be too watchful to prevent any dangers apprehended from the Dutch.¹

On the 10th of August (1762) the several European and native inhabitants, agreeable to the summons sent them for that purpose, being assembled upon the Green, the Board also repaired thither at 9 o'clock in the morning when all the troops in the garrison being under arms, the Secretary mounted on horseback, read His Majesty's declaration of war against Spain. After this the Board proceeded to the Bandar.²

On the 8th August 1762 read the letter and accompanying papers received last night (7th August 1762) from the President and Council for military affairs at Madras, advising us of a proposed expedition against Manilla and desiring us to afford all possible assistance in men, vessels, stores, and apparatus. After consideration it is decided to hold in readiness as many men as our situation will admit. Also one bomb-vessel, 1000 barrels of gunpowder, and such flat-bottomed boats as are finished. In the meantime we shall hope to receive farther advices how far it may be expedient to prosecute this expedition while the French are in possession of the islands. Also whether the withdrawing forces from India on so distant an expedition will not expose the settlements to the enemy's attacks.³

About the 20th June 1763 the President received by Aleppo and Basra a letter from the Court of Directors dated 30th November 1762, informing him that on the 8th instant one of the King's messengers arrived at the office of the Earl of Egremont, His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State, with the instruments of

Chapter I.

History.

War with Spain
1762.

Manilla
Expedition,
1762.

Peace in Europe
1763.

¹ Court to Bombay 3rd March 1762 paras 9-12, Pub. Dep. Court's L. Vol. 6 of 1762-1764, 3-4.

² Bom. Gov. Consultation 10th Aug. 1762, Pub. Diary 39 of 1762, 422-423.

³ Bom. Gov. Select Committee's Consultation, 8th Aug. 1762, Secret and Pol. Diary 8 of 1762, 41-42.

Chapter I.**History.**

Peace in Europe,
1763.

preliminary articles of peace signed at Fontainebleau the 3rd instant by his Grace the Duke of Bedford, His Majesty's Minister Plenipotentiary, with those of the Most Christian and Catholic Kings. In consequence of this on the 26th November a cessation of arms was publicly declared in England between the said powers. The Court continues: That this cessation of arms may have its proper and intended effect you are not only strictly to observe it yourselves, but you are to send and give immediate notice thereof to every part of India and wherever else we have any connections or it may be of any possible utility.¹ Accordingly at nine o'clock on the morning of the 24th June, the garrison being under arms upon the Green, the President and Council being present and the European and native inhabitants duly assembled, the Secretary, mounted on horseback, read His Majesty's proclamation for a cessation of arms between Great Britain France and Spain.² Two months later, 31st August 1763, on information contained in a letter from the Directors dated 31st March 1763, at nine in the morning, the Honourable President and Council, attended by all European and native inhabitants, repaired to the Green where the Secretary mounted on horseback read His Majesty's proclamation of peace. The garrison being under arms fired three volleys and the Fort 21 guns. After this every body went to the Church and heard a thanksgiving sermon prepared for the occasion.³

Decrease in
Revenue,
1760-1762.

As was natural in a time of so great danger of European attack on the coast, and of such disturbance and destruction both in Upper India and in Poona, the customs revenue of Bombay showed a decline from Rs. 1,63,931 in 1760-61 to Rs. 1,56,612 in 1761-62. Regarding the decrease in the Bombay revenues on the 6th April 1763 the Court write: We are willing to believe the decrease of our revenues does not proceed from any inattention of our President and Council, but chiefly from the inland troubles in the Marátha country which prevent the Vanjára merchants coming down in such numbers as usual. When these inland disturbances are at an end, we doubt not but trade will revive, and that nothing will be wanting on your part to bring it back to its former state, perhaps even to a higher degree of perfection. The peace between the European Nations in India may probably contribute to lessen the troubles among the inland Princes and thereby to open the door of trade and commerce in their several countries, a result which must increase our customs and revenues all over India.⁴

A year later (3rd April 1764) the Directors continue: We are sorry to find there is reason to complain of the continued decrease of the customs and duties at your Presidency during the years 1761 to 1762. This decrease as you advise us is owing to the general decay of trade and the unsettled state of the country. As the peace now established in Europe must be productive of good effects for the commerce of

¹ Court to Bombay 30th Nov. 1762 paras 1-4, Pub. Dep. Court's L. Vol. 6 of 1762-1764, 79-80.

² Bom. Gov. Diary 24th June 1763, Pub. Diary 41 of 1763, 443.

³ Bom. Gov. Diary 31st Aug. 1763, Pub. Diary 41 of 1763, 540.

⁴ Court to Bombay 6th April 1763 para 78, Pub. Dep. Court's L. Vol. 6 of 1762-1764, 205-206.

India and as we rely on your best endeavours to promote the internal tranquillity of the country, we hope that we shall hear no further complaints on this subject.¹

In one respect the disturbed state of the Deccan was not unfavourable to Bombay.

At a Consultation, the 31st May 1763, Government remark: As the Moghal, that is the Nizám's army, has entirely destroyed Poona² many of the principal traders have asked and received permission to repair hither with their families. As our Honourable Masters have frequently recommended us to give all suitable encouragement to people of substance resorting to this island, it is ordered that a publication be issued signifying that all persons who may repair hither shall enjoy the same privileges as other inhabitants, and be permitted to purchase lands or houses from any persons they think proper. This we hope will induce many substantial subjects of the neighbouring countries to resort under our protection.³

This measure was approved by the Court who write (22nd March 1765): We approve the measure you took in inviting the inhabitants of Poona to settle at Bombay.⁴ Though upon this occasion the Maráthás are said to have prevented any rich merchant leaving Poona, Bombay seems to have gained important additions as it is noticed that by 1764 the population had increased to 60,000.⁵

In the years of war and expectation of war (1761 and 1762) the fall in revenue was accompanied by an increase in charges. On the 3rd April 1764 the Directors write to Bombay: It is with concern we find ourselves disappointed in the expectations you gave us that your charges would be decreased. By your general books it appears that in the course of last year charges have been considerably increased. Still we observe that this increase is for the most part in consequence of the late war. We therefore raise no objection beyond earnestly recommending to you to take advantage of the peace to reduce your charges within due bounds.⁶

The diary of the 18th November 1763 has this entry: A Court of Admiralty was this day held on the people belonging to the *Royal Admiral* who attempted to carry off that ship out of Surat road. At this Court Andrew Pope, W. Bruce, and T. Moore were convicted of piracy and condemned to be hanged as the law directs.⁷

Chapter I. History.

Poona Settlers
in Bombay,
1763.

Increase in
Charges,
1763.

Pirates
condemned
to be Hanged,
1763.

¹ Court to Bombay 3rd April 1764 para 58, Pub. Dep. Court's L. Vol. 6 of 1762-1764, 287.

² In the war between Mádhavráv Peshwa and the Nizám in 1762, the Maráthá troops ravaged the Nizám's country and Nizám Ali advanced and plundered Poona, taking much property and destroying and burning all houses which were not ransomed. Bombay Gazetteer, Poona, XVIII. Pt. II. 252.

³ Bom. Gov. Consultation 31st May 1763, Pub. Diary 40 of 1763, 402.

⁴ Court to Bombay 22nd Mar. 1765 para 106, Pub. Dep. Court's L. Vol. 7 of 1765-1768, 34.

⁵ Historical Account of the Settlement of Bombay (1781), 6.

⁶ Court to Bombay 3rd April 1764 para 59, Pub. Dep. Court's L. Vol. 6 of 1762-1764, 287.

⁷ Bom. Gov. Diary 18th Nov. 1763, Pub. Diary 41 of 1763, 717.

**Chapter I.
History.**

Trade with
West Indies,
1765.

On the 22nd March 1765 the Directors wrote: As since the peace the slave trade to the Coast of Africa has greatly increased, the demand for goods proper for that market is very large. We are very desirous, so far as lies in our power, to contribute to the encouragement of a trade on which the well-being of the British plantations in the West Indies so much depends. Considering this matter in a national view we expect and positively direct you, as far as you possibly can, to conform, not only to the provision in general of the several articles ordered in the abovementioned list of investment, but to those in particular marked A which are more immediately wanted for that trade.¹

No Arms to
be supplied
to Country
Powers,
1765.

On the 22nd March 1765 the Court of Directors issued the following orders against the supply of arms and stores to the country powers: We forbid your supplying any of the country powers with musquets unless for special reasons to the King of Travankor. Cannon we absolutely forbid your supplying. We should not have thought there would ever have been a necessity for this order as the supplying of cannon seems so remarkably inconsistent with our interest and policy. We further positively forbid your supplying country powers with any warlike stores whatsoever. The same prohibition extends to all kinds of marine stores unless upon very extraordinary occasions for which we shall expect the fullest and most explicit reasons. With respect to building ships at Bombay for any of the country powers, whatever it may be for individuals, this can never be for the Company's interest. Consequently we forbid the building in Bombay of any ships for the use of country powers.²

Customs Duties,
1765.

At a Consultation, the 16th July 1765, the Board passed the following rules regarding the levy of customs duties: All goods brought from the north, notwithstanding they may be landed for exportation, are to pay duty in Bombay unless the proprietor can produce a certificate that they have paid duty at Surat. The duty on cotton is to be levied agreeable to the valuation of this article at Surat. To prevent the southern traders evading payment of customs by proceeding from Bombay to the northern ports without touching at Surat, the customs master is directed, upon their arrival, to call on all merchants not under our protection to deliver in a list of cargo and to charge the usual duties thereon valuing the goods 10 per cent under the market price, and granting the proprietors a certificate of their having paid the same. The customs master is further directed to observe the same rule with respect to all merchants trading under our protection, who may proceed directly to the northward without touching at Surat. On the other hand all merchants who declare their intention of proceeding to and landing their goods at Surat are to be exempted. To prevent our being deceived in this respect, a list of exemptions must always be sent

¹ Court to Bombay 22nd March 1765 para 75, Pub. Dep. Court's Letters Vol. 7 of 1765 - 1768, 23 - 24. The list A referred to in the text has not been traced.

² Court to Bombay 22nd March 1765 paras 101 - 104, Pub. Dep. Court's L. Vol. 7 of 1765 - 1768, 33 - 34.

into the Secretary's office, to be transmitted to the Chief and Council at Surat. To enable the customs master to comply with this order, the superintendent is directed to send him a list of all boats and vessels which may in future proceed under our convoys. The Bombay Council resolved to introduce a standing rule that goods remaining unsold at the end of July be valued at the then market price and the customs collected thereon accordingly.¹

At a Consultation dated 8th October 1765 the Council order that four coolies being detected in carrying off contrary to the established rules of the Government a merchant largely indebted on the island the Collector should levy the fines of Rs. 100 which the publication subjects them to on this account.²

At a Consultation of the 28th January 1766 determined as inconveniencies have arisen to the public service from Bohorás and others working up iron and exporting it across the harbour for the service of the Maráthas and other country powers, that the exportation of all iron worked upon the island for ships' use be prohibited.³

The Court of Directors' letter, dated 12th March 1766, contains the following reference to Angria's affairs: In your letter of the 14th May 1765 you acquaint us that two sons of Tuláji Angria, escaped from Marátha confinement, are arrived at Bombay claiming our protection. We wish you had not entertained these fugitives as it may give umbrage to the Maráthas. It will be more agreeable to us if you can get rid of the Angriás by giving a small sum of money to each, and desiring them to go to some other country.⁴

A Consultation of 4th November 1767 records: Received by *patamar* a letter from the President and Council at Fort St. George, enclosing a letter from Colonel Smith to their President, with the agreeable news that the army under his command has gained a complete victory over the combined forces of the Subha of the Deccan and Haidar Ali Khán. In consequence of this happy event a royal salute was immediately fired.⁵

On the 28th January 1767 the Honourable Thomas Hodges succeeded the Honourable Charles Crommelin as Governor and President of Bombay. On the 4th April 1767 the Court of Directors wrote: We must observe that for some years past under various pretences, our servants at your presidency have purchased many buildings from gentlemen leaving the island, which in general have appeared more for the interest of those gentlemen than that of your employers. To prevent this in future we positively order

Chapter I. History.

Defaulting
Debtor,
1765.

Export of Iron
prohibited,
1766.

Angria Refugees,
1766.

Madras News,
1767.

House Purchases,
1767.

¹ Bom. Gov. Consultation, 16th July 1765, Pub. Diary 45 of 1765, 439-440. Comp. of Standing Ord. Vol. III of 1759-1788, 194.

² Bom. Gov. Consultation, 8th Oct. 1765, Pub. Diary 45 of 1765, 648.

³ Bom. Gov. Consultation, 28th Jan. 1766, Pub. Diary 46 of 1766, 57. Comp. of Standing Ord. Vol. 2 of 1759-1788, 148.

⁴ Court to Bombay 12th March 1766 para 88, Pub. Dep. Court's Letters Vol. 7 of 1765-1768, 136.

⁵ Bom. Gov. Diary 4th Nov. 1767, Secret and Political Diary 9 of 1767, 33.

Chapter I.

History.

Palanquin
(Hamāls,
1767.

Operations in
the Persian
Gulf,
1768.

that no houses or warehouses be purchased on our account until leave is first obtained from us.¹

A Consultation of 1st September 1767 records: The trade of the island being greatly interrupted by people seizing *hamāls* to carry palanquins; Resolved that no *hamāls* whatever be employed in this service without permission from the customs master who must be directed not to give leave for any, except those usually called batty *hamāls*, and a publication of this, our resolution, to be issued by beat of drum. After this should any peon or other person presume to seize any *hamāl* without permission from the customs master he must be punished at the customs master's discretion.²

On the 23rd December 1767 the Board record: The unhappy accident of the ship *Defiance* being blown up in the Gulf of Persia in our opinion renders the sending another capital cruizer into the Gulf unavoidable. As we have already determined to accept Karim Khān's proposals for acting jointly with him against Carrack and Ormuz and have directed the agent and Council at Basra to signify the same to him, our Honourable Masters' interest would be greatly affected, if not entirely ruined, in case of the Khān's being disappointed in the assistance promised him which must be the consequence if the *Defiance* is not replaced. Resolved therefore that the *Revenge* proceed on this service and to assist in carrying the goods and stores intended thither a letter being sent to Surat to hasten her departure from the bar on this account. The determining or sending another military force is deferred for the present.³

Consideration of the military force to be sent to Persia resumed on 4th January 1768: Major Mackenzie now lays before us a state of our present garrison from which it appears that after completing the force now in and bound to the Gulf to what was originally intended allowing for the men lost on the *Defiance*, a point which our engagements to Karim Khān renders indispensably necessary, we shall be able to detach 400 European infantry including non-commissioned officers, about 80 artillery, and 800 sepoys including officers, which with a proper marine force the Major is of opinion will be fully sufficient to reduce Haidar Ali's fleet forts and possessions upon the sea coast, and at the same time leave such a number of men in this garrison as with the militia of the island will be sufficient for its security against a surprise. The superintendent is likewise asked as to the marine force he deems necessary on this occasion. He declares that the vessels left after the departure of those ordered to Persia together with the *Drake*, *Snow*, *Fox*, and *Fly* galivats at Onor and two of our Honourable Masters will be sufficient to accomplish every end. This object being

¹ Court to Bombay 4th April 1767 para 82, Pub. Dep. Court's L. Vol. 7 of 1765-1768, 258-259. Comp. of Standing Ord. Vol. 2 of 1759-1788, 196.

² Bom. Gov. Consultation, 1st Sept. 1767, Pub. Diary 49 of 1767, 485-486. Comp. of Standing Ord. Vol. 2 of 1759-1788, 235.

³ Bom. Gov. Consultation, 23rd Dec. 1767, Pub. Diary 49 of 1767, 744-745.

thus provided for, the Major is ordered to embark such a number of men on the vessels bound to Persia as will complete the force originally intended, allowing for the men lost on the *Defiance*. The commanders of the *Lord Mansfield* and *Earl of Chatham* are ordered to get their ships in readiness for the sea, as, if agreeable to the superintendent's opinion, we determine on employing two ships on the above service.¹

The following statement shows in detail the strength and distribution of the Bombay garrison in January 1768 :

Bombay Garrison, 1768.

**Chapter I.
History.**

Bombay
Garrison,
1768.

INFANTRY.	Major.	Captains.	Capt. Lieut.	Subalterns.	Staff Officers.		Cadet.	Serjeant Major.	Serjeants.	Corporals.	Fifers.	Drummers.	Europeans.	Natives.	Total.
					Town Major.	Adjutant.									
Fit for duty	1	7	1	18	1	1	1	1	56	40	6	20	499	194	849
Sick	1	2	...	1	1	1	7	18	1	1	160	25	213
Total	1	8	1	20	1	1	1	2	63	59	7	21	659	219	1061
Wanted for Persia...	1	...	2	7	5	1	1	121	...	139
Available for other Duty.	4	...	14	20	20	4	9	360	...	431
Total	5	...	16	27	25	5	11	481	...	570
To remain	1	8	1	4	1	1	1	2	36	34	2	10	175	219	491

ARTILLERY.	Captains.	Capt. Lieut.	Subalterns.	Staff Officers.		Serjeant Major.	Serjeants.	Corporals.	Bombardiers.	Fifers.	Drummers.	Gunners.	Matrosses.	Total.
				Adjutant.	Quarter Master.									
Fit for Duty	3	1	6	1	1	1	8	8	15	3	3	27	83	160
Sick	1	1	2	1	14	14	33
Total	4	2	6	1	1	1	10	9	15	3	3	41	97	193
Wanted for Persia	1	1	6	24	32
Available for other Duty	1	1	4	2	2	4	1	1	18	42	76
Total	2	1	4	2	2	5	1	1	24	66	109
To remain	3	1	2	1	1	1	8	7	10	2	2	17	31	85

SEPOYS.	Adjutants.	Serjeants.	Subhedars.	Jumladars.	Haraldars.	Naks.	Sabnisas.	Colour-beaters.	Trumpeters.	Tomtoms.	Bhaldars.	Warren.	Sepoys.	Total.
Fit for Duty	9	11	36	53	55	14	21	13	40	13	9	1109	1388
Sick	1	3	4	10	5	...	3	91	129
Total	1	10	14	40	63	60	14	24	13	40	13	11	1200	1503
Wanted for Persia	1	1	1	55	56
Available for other Duty	8	8	24	40	40	...	16	8	24	...	8	624	800
Total	9	8	24	41	41	...	16	8	24	...	8	679	858
To remain	1	1	6	16	23	19	14	8	5	16	13	3	621	645

¹ Bom. Gov. Consultation 4th Jan. 1768, Pub. Diary 52 of 1768, 2-3, 5.

Chapter I.
History.
Garrison,
1768.

The following tables give the detailed strength of the Persian expedition :

Troops for Persia, 1768.

INFANTRY.					Captains.	Subalterns.	Cadet.	Serjeants.	Corporals.	Filet.	Drummers.	Privates.	Total.
At Persia	1	2	1	7	9	1	1	50	58
To embark	1	2	5	121	189
Total					2	4	1	7	8	1	8	171	197

ARTILLERY.					Captain.	Subalterns.	Serjeants.	Corporals.	Reinhardt.	Gunners.	Drummers.	Matrosses.	Total.
At Persia	2	2	2	4	6	1	12	31
To embark	1	1	6	...	24	32
Total					1	2	2	2	5	12	1	36	63

SEPOYS.					Serjeants.	Subbedars.	Jumledars.	Havildars.	Nalks.	Colour-bearers.	Trumpeters.	Tombas.	Watermen.	Sepoys.	Total.
At Persia	2	2	6	11	11	4	2	6	5	149	198
To embark	1	1	1	55	68
Total					3	2	6	12	12	4	2	6	5	204	266

Salssette and
Bassein,
1768.

On the 18th March 1768 the Court of Directors wrote: We highly approve the intimation you gave to our President and Council of Fort St. George to use their endeavours with the Maráthas to obtain a grant of Salssette and Bassein. We now in the strongest manner recommend to you upon every occasion to use your endeavours to obtain these places. We should esteem them a valuable acquisition. We cannot directly point out the mode of acquiring them but should prefer obtaining them by purchase to obtaining them by war.¹

Transit of
Venus,
1768.

On the 18th March 1768 the Court of Directors wrote: The Royal Society having applied to us, as by the enclosed copy of their Secretary's letter, that observations may be made at our several presidencies or other places in the East Indies of the next transit of the planet Venus over the disk of the sun which is expected to happen on the 3rd June 1769, and being desirous by all means of concurring in an affair of such importance to the advancement of science, we thus early and earnestly recommend it to you, to direct all and every person in the service of the Company who are conversant in astronomy, and to desire in our name by particular notice or otherwise all other persons whatsoever under your

¹ Court to Bombay 18th Mar. 1768 para 91, Pub. Dep. Court's Letters Vol. 7 of 1765-1768, 332.

influence properly qualified for the purpose to exert themselves in making the most careful and accurate observations upon the said transit, and to deliver their reports to you in writing to be transmitted to us at least in duplicate by the earliest opportunities. To the persons who shall be employed as observers you are to deliver copies of the directions sent to you in 1760 for the last transit. When we receive certain promised instructions from His Majesty's Astronomer Royal for observations on the expected transit we shall forward the same that copies thereof may also be put into the hands of the observers whom we also wish to be furnished with instruments and every assistance contributory to the success and accuracy of their observations. We have given and shall send the like directions on this subject to Fort St. George, Bengal, Fort Marlborough, and China.¹

In the same letter (18th March 1768) the Court continues: The exigency of the times limiting the remittances to Europe through our cash we have considered how we can best alleviate the hardships that individuals may sustain thereby. To compensate for the same and open a channel for transmitting such sums as there may be occasion to send hither until the alteration of circumstances shall no longer require the refusal of the bills of exchange, we have resolved and do accordingly allow that all our servants civil marine and military, the traders in coral, and the commanders of our freighted ships, may import gold or silver in specie or bullion from the East Indies, free of duty and all other charges, the freight of a quarter per cent to the commanders excepted. The exportation of the said specie or bullion from Bombay is to be made under your license and register, in the same manner as is practised in respect to diamonds, except that the exporter is to be free from all duties and charges thereon. You are to transmit to us in duplicate such registers for ascertaining the particulars that on the arrival of the ships we may order the specie or bullion to be brought up to our treasury to be delivered to the persons to whom the same are respectively consigned. This indulgence is to continue until we revoke the same.²

In July 1768 as a number of people had been lately bitten some of them fatally by mad dogs, Government resolved (22nd July 1768) that a publication be issued by beat of drum requiring all persons possessed of dogs to keep them tied up for a certain space of time otherwise they will be destroyed. A party of sepoys to be ordered out on Monday morning to kill all dogs they may find straggling about.³

As many inconveniences were found to arise from the boats which ply in the road as bumboats being under no regulation, the Bombay Council agreed (18th October 1768) to forbid any boat to ply in this capacity without a permit. They direct the customs

Chapter I. History.

Transit of
Venus,
1768.

Exchange
Troubles,
1768.

Street Dogs,
1768.

Permits to
Boats,
1768.

¹ Court to Bombay 18th March 1768 paras 129 - 131, Pub. Dep. Court's L. Vol. 7 of 1765-1768, 345-346.

² Court to Bombay 18th March 1768 para 194, Ditto 365-366.

³ Bom. Gov. Consultation 22nd July 1768, Pub. Diary 51 of 1768, 420.

Chapter I.
History.
Permits to Boats,
1768.

master to order all such boats as he furnishes with permits to be numbered and registered and to require them to repair to the Mándvi at sunset. After sunset on pain of such fine or punishment as the customs master may think proper to inflict, no boats are to ply without particular leave obtained for that purpose, neither must boats at any time go between the Dock and Pier heads without express permission.¹

Convoy to
Surat,
1768.

On the 28th December 1768 a Consultation resolved: The merchants being very desirous that a vessel may be immediately ordered to Surat to carry up a large quantity of their purchases at the present sales and as we believe there is nothing now to be apprehended from the Maráthás; ordered the *Resolution* be called in from her present cruize and employed on this service and to bring down as many bales of the investment as may be in readiness, as the *Admiral Watson*, the only vessel besides that is now here proper for the same, will not for some time be ready for the sea.²

Europe Trade,
1769.

In a letter of the 31st March 1769 the Court write: We hope whenever peace is established you will give the greatest attention to the export trade, and in all treaties with the Princes of the country, you should endeavour to stipulate their taking a certain quantity of woollens annually from you.³

European
Interpreters,
1769.

In a letter of the 31st March 1769 the Directors write: In the course of your transactions with the country powers we observe that as very few of our servants are acquainted with the country languages, they are under the necessity of placing a confidence in the natives as interpreters. As Mr. Dow to whom we have given a military appointment is well versed in the knowledge of the Oriental Languages, his talents may be of great utility to the Company in the Gulf of Persia, or on other occasions. We therefore strongly recommend to you that notwithstanding his military appointment you avail yourselves of his abilities whenever it may be necessary to translate from or negotiate in those languages.⁴

Indians in
England,
1769.

On the 31st March 1769 the Directors write: It has happened of late years that among many natives of India who have been sent to England as servants to gentlemen or their families returning home, several, entirely forsaken by the persons who engaged them and thereby left in very destitute circumstances, have applied to us to return at the Company's expense on board their ships. This we have been induced to grant not only on account of their great distress but to prevent reflections on us in this respect from the people of India. In order therefore to remedy these grievances you are hereby directed not to permit any persons whatever, on returning to England, to take with them a native of India without giving security for every such native in the sum of

¹ Bom. Gov. Consultation, 18th Oct. 1768, Pub. Diary 51 of 1768, 564.

² Bom. Gov. Consultation, 28th Dec. 1768, Pub. Diary 51 of 1768, 700.

³ Court to Bombay 31st March 1769 para 39, Pub. Dep. Court's L. Vol. 8 of 1769-1771, 31.

⁴ Court to Bombay 31st March 1769 para 47, Pub. Dep. Court's L. Vol. 8 of 1769-1771, 33.

£50 to prevent their being chargeable to the Company in any manner whatever. You must send such bonds in the packets by the ships whereon any Indian servants embark that in case of necessity we may put the same in force here.¹

On the 31st March 1769 the Court writes: The importation of silk appearing to us of the greatest consequence, as well for the benefit of the Company as a national object, we have again taken this branch of trade under our consideration. We are of opinion that if the troubles at Bushire make it impracticable to procure silk there, that you strongly recommend the agent of Basra to attend to this business. As a further motive to attain this end we permit you to increase the price as far as Rs. 90 the *man*. If you can procure us a considerable investment, we even authorise you to extend it to one hundred. As the first and third sorts afford the largest profits we desire you will send as little as possible of the other sorts, taking them only as a means of procuring the first and third.²

On the 30th June 1769 the Court of Directors wrote: Though from the beginning we have seen with great concern the war with Haidar Náik and disapproved it as being contrary to the opinions we entertain of the Company's true interests in respect to the country powers, yet so long as the war continues it is the duty of our several presidencies to co-operate to the utmost in order as soon as possible to force the enemy to reasonable terms of peace. The shameful behaviour of the garrison left at Mangalor has done grievous mischief by encouraging Haidar Náik and his troops. You should have endeavoured to repair that disgrace by some fresh expedition against his possessions upon your coast. The state of your forces does not appear to us so weak as to disable you in the manner you represent, nor do the principal officers give any such opinion. It is true that Colonels Campbell and Keating in considering the state of your works give an opinion what should be the number of the garrison for their defence in case of attack by a regular army. This does not imply that such a garrison should remain for ever within the walls, nor does the nature of our service admit of such calculations. We hope our servants at Madras have before this seen an opportunity of making peace upon reasonable terms. If Haidar Náik refuses to hearken to reasonable terms our three presidencies must co-operate vigorously to reduce him. At the same time considering the Maráthás as the most dangerous growing power in India, we shall be very sorry to add to their strength by the total defeat of Haidar Náik, who has hitherto been a strong check upon their ambitious views. We wish him therefore to remain an independent power in amity with us, and we hope in time he will consider that his own interest points this out. If once he lets the Maráthás get a footing in the Mysor country, under a pretence of assisting him against the English, they will not rest

Chapter I. History.

The Import
of Silk,
1769.

The War with
Haidar Ali,
1769.

¹ Court to Bombay 31st March 1769 para 83, Pub. Dep. Court's L. Vol. II of 1769-1771, 45. Comp. of Standing Ord. Vol. 2 of 1759-1788, 248.

² Court to Bombay 31st March 1769 para 126, Pub. Dep. Court's L. Vol. 8 of 1769-1771, 62.

Chapter I.
History.

The War with
Haidar Ali,
1769.

till they are masters of the whole. The whole tenour of our letters to you and the other presidencies will show you that we are rather jealous of the Marátha power. We have sought to continue in peace with them, and to keep up a friendly intercourse. If they think fit to take a hostile part against us, to send you insulting messages, and to brave your port with their grabs, it is time to take vigorous measures for preserving that respect which we have hitherto held on your side of India. When you wrote your letter of the 13th December giving an account of the Marátha fleet cruising off the harbour and of the insolent answer of Visáji Pant, you had ships in your harbour more than sufficient to have destroyed his fleet or brought him to a more becoming and explicit declaration. Also when Mádhavrao informed you that his design was to demand the *chauth* from the Nabob of Arcot, preserving at the same time the utmost goodwill towards the English, you should have told him that those two things were incompatible, that the Nabob of Arcot was, as he knew, in firm friendship and alliance with the English, and that any demand made upon him at the head of an army laying waste his country would be answered by the English forces in all parts of India who never would suffer a people under their protection to be distressed and plundered on any pretence whatsoever. That accounts should be settled between their respective agents in the usual manner, and if anything was due from the Nabob of Arcot, your good offices should be employed in bringing the matter to an amicable conclusion. Such language, with at the same time some vigorous preparations by sea and land, would have been more likely to preserve peace with the Maráthás, than the silent respect with which you seem to have received all their insults.¹

Naval Stores
not to be sold,
1771.

On the 25th February 1771 the Honourable William Hornby succeeded the Honourable Thomas Hodges as Governor and President of Bombay. In the same year, 1771, it appeared to the Board that the Europe naval stores which the Maráthás and others procured from Bombay, led to an increase of their naval force, very much against the interest of the Company. The Government therefore, in their Consultation of 21st May 1771, resolved that no Europe naval stores be sold in or exported from Bombay without the express permission of Government, and that they be laid under the same restrictions as military stores. That no one might plead ignorance the Secretary was directed to issue a publication by beat of drum in the usual languages.²

Bombay
Defences,
1771.

At a Consultation held the 12th June 1771 the Secretary read the following letter from the Committee of Surveys to the President and Council: At the present time, when the chance of a war in Europe makes it probable that an attack upon this town may be made very unexpectedly, it becomes the duty of every person who considers himself in any shape responsible for the defence of this place, to

¹ Court to Bombay 30th June 1769 paras 7-9, Pub. Dep. Court's L. Vol. 8 of 1769-1771, 82-85.

² Pub. Diary 57 of 1771, 401.

reflect upon the attacks which are most likely to be made upon it, and to endeavour to discover the best means of making the town defensible in the shortest time considering the present situation of its works. The best attack upon Bombay is unquestionably from the sea. Troops under cover of a heavy well-supported fire from shipping, may land between the Dock Bastion and the Bandar Battery, and between the north-east curtain of the castle and the old Mándvi Bastion. This space of about one thousand yards is almost totally unprovided with fire, and for about half the distance, namely from the fort to the end of the wall near Moody's house, there is no impediment in their way. A ship laid in a line with the old Mándvi Bastion may take the whole north front in enfilade, and all the works from the line of communication at the salient angle of the Bazár Gate Ravelin to the ridge of Dongri in reverse. Vessels laid between the Dock and Bandar Piers will enfilade the greatest part of the Dock Bastion, its curtain, the gorge of the Royal Bastion, and the south face of the Apollo Gate Ravelin. They will also flank the north-east and south-west sides of the castle and take the north-west front in reverse. Vessels laid in line with the south-south-east face of the Royal Bastion will enfilade the whole south front almost to Stanhope Bastion and the north-east face of the Dock Bastion. If this town should not be attacked from the sea but the enemy determine upon an attack by land, it is for obvious reasons impossible to suppose them so ill-conducted as to attempt a landing to the southward of the town or on Colába. Neither can we suppose that they will attempt a landing to the westward of the town on account of the rocks and shoal water in Back Bay as well as for want of a sufficient space to make their approaches and many other reasons. In short one may venture without much presumption to prophesy that if an enemy determines upon an attack by land either to the southward or westward of the town, and if the garrison behaves tolerably well, they will never take the town. From the Dock Bastion therefore to the Moor's Bastion one may pronounce this town free from even the possibility of an attack by land, and yet this is the only part of the fortifications of Bombay that at this moment is in a tenable condition. Little also is wanted in all this extent but to mount the guns in the lunettes of the Apollo Gate Ravelin, and to repair the wooden platforms which at present are almost all broken. From the Moor's Bastion round to the old Mándvi Bastion the old works are in a very weak and ruinous condition, and incapable of any good defence against anything like a spirited attack. The ditches and covered way of the Hodges and Cumberland Ravelins are unfinished, in many parts not even begun, and there are no bridges of communication between these outworks and the place. The rampart for much the greatest part from the Church Gate round to the old Mándvi Bastion is ruinous. Some part of the work last done has only a revetment and the retaining wall of the parapet without being filled up. The retaining wall which was begun lately has been stopped, and, even in daylight, the terrepleine is for a considerable space not passable for more than one man in front. In some parts of the rampart the earth has given way so much for want of

Chapter I.

History.

Bombay
Defences,
1771.

Chapter I.

History.

Bombay
Defences,
1771.

the retaining wall that one discharge would inevitably drive the gun off the rampart. The ditch in many parts is not at this moment knee deep. The guns in many parts of the works on this side are of too small calibre, and in general the gun-carriages and platforms are in very bad order and want immediate repair. The houses that were ordered to be pulled down are most of them still standing, and it is impossible to move troops or guns either upon the rampart or behind it for any distance from the Church Gate all the way round to the old Mándvi Bastion. From the Bazár Gate to the old Mándvi Bastion the top of the parapet is rent and in some parts of the Princess's curtain the ditch is dry. From the old Mándvi Bastion to the end of the wall near Moody's house on the north-north-east side of the town the works have never been finished, and though there be a very good wall with buttresses where bombproof lodgments may easily and speedily be made for the troops, yet in its present situation it answers very little good purpose of defence, there being no parapet to it.

It is laid down as a rule that the nearer the works come to the body of a place, the higher they should be. Here it is the reverse, for the new ravelins are considerably higher than the curtains they are made to cover, and the doctrine of reciprocal defence between the various works of this place seems to have been forgotten in the construction of many of them. Notwithstanding the enormous sums which have been expended on the fortifications of it, this place appears at this moment just as defenceless as the Chief Engineer of Bengal thought it in October 1768. His words are: "At this instant this fortress labours under the greatest disadvantage that ever attended a fortification." In the next paragraph of the same letter he declares: "Bombay is at this instant so insecure and so open that it is capable of being assaulted at any hour in the night with the loss of very few lives to an enemy." It is with infinite reluctance that we differ from so respectable an authority as Lieutenant-Colonel Campbell in a matter immediately in his department as an engineer, but we are obliged to say that his reasons for leaving that side of Dongri Fort next to the town open are by no means satisfactory to us. It is evident that in their present situation or in any situation in which they can be put for a year to come, the works on Dongri do not add to the defence of the town. On the contrary in case of an attack they would harass and embarrass the garrison most exceedingly, if we suppose any military skill in the enemy that attacks or any knowledge of the state of the works. To every other inconvenience attending this place in its present condition must be added the absolute want of bombproof casemates for the garrison to rest in.

Having thus briefly stated the defects in the defence of this place, it becomes necessary to try how far they may by any means in our power be remedied. To prevent an enemy landing under cover of the fire of shipping on the east side of the town, a sufficient quantity of strong chevaux de frize, shod with iron should be got ready to be laid from the Dock Bastion to the old Mándvi Bastion. This will throw a great obstacle in the way of troops

landing to assault the town on this side. Heavier guns should be planted on the east bastion of the Castle. The parapets of the Two Gun and the Moody Bay batteries should be immediately repaired. Part of the wood now lying behind the Mándvi and Mulla's house should be moved into the open space behind the unfinished wall between Moody's house and the old Mándvi Bastion. The top of this wall should be raised and some embrasures for heavy cannon might soon be made at the bottom of it. The wood now lying behind the Mándvi is of that sort that it might be turned to many good purposes in case of a siege, and might very speedily make barracks for the soldiers, not much if at all inferior to bombproofs. As there is great want of bombproof places in the fort for keeping and making up ammunition, the arches of the new buildings should be turned immediately. This may be done in a short time as the frames are ready fixed. Vessels fitted as brulotts or fireboats should be kept at the Mándvi Bandar, Moody's Bay, and marine yard, which with the help of the wind or tide might considerably annoy an enemy either in his ships or in an attempt to make a landing. If the outwork round Dongri as far as the Bazár Gate be finished, that part when guns are mounted will be equally tenable with the other works of the place. This is so far advanced that it may be finished soon and the other hands at present at work on Dongri hill may be employed in securing the east side of Dongri (which is at present open and exposed to the fire of shipping), in repairing the old works, and finishing those which have been built some time. The covered way before Hodges and Cumberland Ravelins should be finished without delay. Bridges should be made between these works and the body of the place, and the ditch should be dug. Guns also should be mounted as soon as possible on these ravelins and proper stores laid in them. We are persuaded that if an enemy comes against this place and does not attempt to assault it from the sea, the attack can be made nowhere else with so great a probability of success as on the north or north-west side. The rubbish with which the ditch is in many places almost filled, should be removed as soon as the season will allow the ditch to be cleaned. The cocoanut trees to the north-west of the town should be cut down immediately, and the many holes and pits in the glacis on this side should be filled up.

We shall proceed with our survey agreeable to the Honourable Company's orders as fast as possible and shall in future make our survey regularly every three months and report to your Honour.

On considering this letter the Board resolve that the President give the Engineer directions agreeable thereto.¹

About a month later (26th July 1771) on perusing letters from the Select Committees at Bengal and Madras, and on observing from the Madras letters that a war with France is probable, the Select Committee in their Consultation of 26th July 1771, remark that all the orders necessary for putting Bombay into as good a posture of defence as is in their power have already been given.

Chapter I. History.

Bombay
Defences,
1771.

War
Preparations,
1771.

¹ Secret and Political Diary 12 of 1771, 31-37.

Chapter I.
History.

A descendant
of Angria made
a Subhedár,
1771.

That the new works may be made defensible in as short a time as possible, it is resolved that five hundred men more be retained for the purpose who with those at present in pay must be employed on such works as are directly necessary.¹

At a Consultation on the 6th August read a petition from Gopálji Angria to the President and Council, representing he was a grandson of Kánhoji Angria, and that his father and he had been ill-treated by his uncle Tuláji; praying for shelter for himself and his family; and promising, should the need arise, that he would raise 3000 to 4000 sepoys for the Company's service.² Decided, as Gopálji Angria may be useful in raising recruits down the coast, he be granted shelter in Bombay and the pay of a Subhedár.³

Possession of
Sálsette, Bassein,
and Karanja
desirable,
1772.

On 1st April 1772 the Court again raise the question of the value to Bombay of Sálsette and Bassein. They say the advantages the Company would receive from the possession of Sálsette Bassein and Karanja are so obvious that these must necessarily be the principal objects of your attention. We are the more inclined to hope that Mádhavrát may be prevailed on to cede to us the islands as the tribute he receives from them is not so considerable, but that we may be able to offer in exchange what he may deem an equivalent for such cession.⁴

Plague of Rats,
1771.

At a Consultation the 21st January 1771 read a letter from the Clerk of the Peace to the President and Council, dated Bombay Town Hall, 18th January 1771: His Majesty's Justices at the last Quarter Sessions assembled, have directed me to represent to your Honour that having taken into consideration the great damage done both to buildings and merchandise by the very great number of rats on the island, they propose a gratuity of one double pice be allowed for each rat caught and produced to the sitting justice as a means of ridding the place of those very pernicious animals. They therefore request your Honour will be pleased to order a publication to be issued to the above effect. Also one forbidding all persons to gallop horses about the streets of the town and upon the Green on pain of being fined or otherwise punished at the discretion of the acting magistrate.⁵ Ordered that a publication be issued accordingly.⁶

Highway
Nuisances,
1771.

At a Consultation the 24th July 1771 read a letter from the Clerk of the Peace to the President, dated Bombay Town Hall, 23rd July 1771: The grand jury have represented to His Majesty's Justices that the highways within the town are become a public nuisance and rendered dangerous to passengers by the owners of private buildings laying large quantities of stones in improper places.⁷ Ordered

¹ Secret and Pol. Diary 12 of 1771, 47.

² Public Diary 58 of 1771, 750-751.

³ Public Diary 58 of 1771, 745.

⁴ Court to Bombay 1st April 1772 para 40, Pub. Dep. Court's J. Vol. 9 of 1772-77, 84.

⁵ Letter from the Clerk of the Peace to the President and Council, Bombay Town Hall, 18th Jan. 1771, Pub. Diary 57 of 1771, 67-68.

⁶ Bom. Gov. Consultation, 21st Jan. 1771, Pub. Diary 57 of 1771, 65. Comp. of Standing Ord. Vol. 2 of 1759-1788, 269.

⁷ Letter from the Clerk of the Peace to the President and Council, 23rd July 1771, Pub. Diary 58 of 1771, 679.

that a publication be issued by the Secretary, and any person acting contrary thereto, be liable to such fine as the Bench of Justices may think proper to inflict.¹

At a Consultation the 16th April 1773 read the following letter from Mr. John Watson, Superintendent, to the President and Council, dated Bombay 29th March 1773: As I differ in opinion from the other members of the Committee of Defence who were appointed to take into consideration the garrison necessary for the works of this town and its fortifications, if it should be attacked, and as I think that the number in the statement² I have the honour now to lay before you is the lowest that can be estimated to give tolerable security to every part and oppose two attacks made by an active enemy, that I might be better able to point out my ideas on this very important subject I have considered the number of troops and military men necessary for each work distinctly with the nature of their duty and reliefs. The number differs much from that proposed by Colonel Campbell, and also from that by Colonel Gordon to whose superior judgment in these matters I would ever pay the greatest deference, and hope that what I have here offered will not be considered as presumption in me but to proceed entirely from my duty and obedience to your commands. If an attack is made on the north front of Fort George, I presume it will be generally necessary to have one-third of the infantry in each of its works on the ramparts and in the covered way ready to fire upon the enemy and oblige them to make their approaches under cover, and that these shall be relieved every two hours or as the commanding officer shall think proper, which are twenty men in each work to fire upon the enemy or assist the working of the artillery, which will be found very fatiguing if a brisk fire is kept up. The men in the north front and in the Bazar Gate and Prince's Bastion are I think as few as can be put there for their defence, and to annoy the enemy. The number appointed for the Cumberland Ravelin, Banian Bastion, and Hodges Ravelin, being supposed near one of the attacks, must have one-third of their infantry on constant duty ready to fire upon the enemy's approaches. I have increased the number in the Church Gate Ravelin as the redoubt and covered way are to be supported from it, and to oppose the danger there may be of the enemy's pushing in at that gate with our troops when an assault is made on the covered way or redoubt. As only 400 men are allowed for the covered way, the duty will be very severe upon them, as at least 200 of them will be obliged to keep up a constant fire to hinder or annoy the enemy in carrying on their works, more particularly in the night when a constant fire must be kept up over that part of the Esplanade towards the enemy.

I think the allotment for works not attacked cannot be lessened as there are scarce more men appointed to them than are necessary for sentinels and their reliefs as in the night two sentinels should be

Chapter I. History.

The Defence
of Bombay,
1773.

¹ Bom. Gov. Consultation, 24th July 1771, Pub. Diary 58 of 1771, 674.

² Secret and Political Diary, 14 of 1773, 16th April 1773, 44-50.

Chapter I.**History.**

The Defence
of Bombay,
1773.

together, which gives greater security as they will then be more alert. The Dock Bastion, the line between the castle and the bandar, and the Mándvi Bastion have barely sufficient men to resist any sudden assault that might be made or attempted on these parts under cover of their shipping, or to assist in manning the batteries to the sea if fired on from the ships, whilst the enemy's batteries are fired on (from) the places attacked (attached) to the land. The covered way being very severe duty, the troops should be relieved every twelve hours, and that by the troops appointed for the Castle Guard, Mándvi Bandar line, and Dock Bastions, at four several times, that is the relief to be 100 men at a time, so that when one guard is replaced the other to march. The guards for the gates and main guard are but barely sufficient for keeping good order in the place and continual patrols for the works and streets. The statement given in by me is exclusive of officers, non-commissioned officers, drums, fifes, tom toms, and trumpets. The officers in the marine may be appointed to do duty in the artillery and make up the deficiency of officers in that corps. As the life and spirit of the defence will depend greatly on having the artillery presented to the attack well served for destroying the enemy's batteries and dismounting their cannon, I think the number appointed for that service are too few, nor can there be a smaller number of European infantry as on them you must depend for the spirited defence of a work closely attacked, as well as for the vigour of sallies. Nor do I think a less number of troops can make any tolerable opposition in our extensive numerous and ill connected works. Therefore if this garrison is thought unnecessary of consequence our works are unnecessary, as it is supposed scarce practicable for an European enemy to transport an army of twelve thousand men to this very distant part of the world, and our garrison should amount to 12,267 fighting men, a very sufficient number to oppose the landing of such an enemy. I would here beg leave to urge the utility of re-establishing a militia, and having them trained as we must have numbers to make a tolerable face in each work, nor ought the teaching them the manual exercise and forming them into battalions under proper officers be deferred.

The foregoing subject leads me to consider the situation of the island with the advantages that might be taken of and the disadvantages an enemy must undergo at landing. I will therefore suppose the French should have the following army: 8000 European, 2000 Indian, and 2000 Káfir infantry, or in all 12,000 men and officers included, and that they have a fleet consisting of

2 Ships of 70 guns of 700 men each	1400
8 Ships of 60 guns of 600 men each	4800
2 Ships of 50 guns of 500 men each	1000
			Total	...	7200
2 Ships of 70 guns to carry 400 infantry	800
8 Ships of 60 guns to carry 300 infantry	2400
2 Ships of 50 guns to carry 200 infantry	400
21 Transport frigates to carry 400 infantry	8400
Each transport carrying 150 each as her complement...	3150
			Total	...	15,150

Debarkation :

12 Flat bottom boats to carry 120 men each	1440
12 Launches to carry 100 men each	1200
33 Barges to carry 30 men each	990
45 Pinnaces to carry 20 men each	900
33 Six-oared boats to carry 18 men each	594

135 Total.

Total ... 5124

Chapter I.

History.

The Defence
of Bombay,
1773.

I will suppose that they may have craft sufficient to make the first debarkation, 6000 men, officers included, complete, and to bring with them twelve pieces of field artillery and proportionable ammunition. The next thing to be considered is the coast of the island. Between Fort George and Mázgaon small fort, distance about two miles, is a good beach for boats to land at high water; but the sea is so filled with rocks and shoals that no frigates can approach nearer than one mile from the coast; consequently frigates can give no cover to the boats. Between Mázgaon small fort as far north as Cundila (near the Frere reclamation), distance about one and a half miles, the land is easy, and frigates may at high water in some parts approach near enough to the shore to fire grape and everywhere to fire round shot. Between Cundila and Suri (Siwri), distance about one mile, is good landing at high water, but no frigates can go so high up to give cover to the boats on account of the shallowness of the water, and the boats would be under the fire of Suri Fort. No frigates can proceed higher up the bay. Between Suri and Sion boats may land out of gun-shot from either place; the land is low and muddy covered with brush and intersected with muddy channels made by the water, and scarce passable but at low water, and even this must be fatiguing to troops marching with artillery, and very inconvenient for forming on. Between Sion and Máhim the landing is easy but boats must pass close to the forts under a heavy fire either way. Between Mahim and Warli the landing is easy, but coming into the river by Warli they must pass under a constant fire from that fort, and will suffer a distant fire from the forts of Warli and Máhim from their entrance into the river to their landing in the bay which is very shallow. From Warli to the Breach the coast is surrounded with sharp rocks, and a heavy swell generally rolls on the coast which would render it dangerous to boats approaching in the calmest weather, and very difficult when the sea runs high as many of them must inevitably be destroyed, and the ammunition ruined if the troops should get safe on shore. Between the Breach and Malabár Point the coast is much the same as between Warli and the Breach, consequently subject to the same difficulties to an enemy. Between Malabár Point and the Point of Old Woman's Island, though there is good landing all round, Back Bay is closed up with rocks so that nothing but boats can pass or repass on that bay, consequently troops landing can receive no cover from shipping. As regards Old Woman's Island, the only remaining part of the coast, the south-east side is easily accessible under cover of their ships, their men and stores may there be landed with little difficulty, and you cannot give them much opposition. Although I am very sensible of my inexperience in treating on military subjects, I will here beg leave with due submission to offer

Chapter I.
History.

The Defence
of Bombay,
1773.

my sentiments how everywhere except at Old Woman's Island, which is under cover of all their ships, an enemy may be greatly impeded if not totally frustrated in forcing a landing. The next place convenient for landing is between Mázgaon house and Suri Bay as their frigates may there come within a mile of the shore for disembarking the troops. I have observed that within high water mark amongst the rocks and mud mangrove trees grow in several parts, and where they grow boats cannot approach the shore at high water; and as their roots are interwoven with each other, footmen would find the greatest difficulty to scramble through them at low water. Such a plantation on this part of the island between Mánekji's Hill and Suri, which is about three miles, would in a few years prove an inaccessible barrier, and other means might be tried on the shore to render landing still more difficult. Troops landed between Suri and Sion will be at least three miles from their shipping, so that the first division must remain at least an hour on shore without any succour or relief, in which time they might be attacked labouring under every disadvantage. This low ground might also be made very difficult by planting more mangroves and widening or deepening the creeks with which it is intersected. All this, I presume, may be done at a very small expense; by such means as these you will confine the enemy to certain places for landing and those not free from great difficulties.

I will beg leave to suppose that our force consists of 1500 Europeans, two thousand sepoy, three hundred artillery and three thousand militia, and three hundred seamen and five hundred lascars. Each of our forts to have 20 Europeans 50 sepoy and 100 militia, and the upper forts in proportion, the whole to amount to 100 Europeans, three hundred sepoy, and five hundred militia to be as scouts all round the island to give information of the enemy's motions. The town to be guarded by the seamen, one hundred artillery, five hundred militia, and two hundred lascars.

A camp might be formed about Byculla consisting of Europeans 1400, sepoy 1700, militia 1000, artillery 150, and lascars 300, total 4550 with 30 pieces of field artillery. This encampment will be ready to march on the least warning, being nearly central to meet any enemy before they can be well formed, while they are scantily furnished with every necessary and not recovered from the fatigues of the voyage. Whereas this body of troops are fresh, furnished with everything necessary, aided by a numerous artillery and reinforced every moment by troops from the other parts distant from where the enemy may land. This body can march to the most distant part of the island in a little more than an hour's time. Under these circumstances I presume they are capable to beat the number thus supposed the enemy can land as they can meet them almost at setting their feet on shore. Should you be apprised of their approach you will then doubtless have a larger body of troops entertained, and should the garrison be complete, you will be able to check, if not destroy, their whole body coming on shore. Should the enemy be defeated in forcing a landing on this island, and land their army on Old Woman's Island which they may do in

safety, yet lines and intrenchments may be formed to occupy Mendham's Point, the most distant part of which is but six hundred yards from your works. To get possession of this ground will cost the enemy a great number of lives, and as it does not furnish space to cover a strong or large body of men, and is impossible to be succoured from Old Woman's Island at high water, they may be attacked to the greatest advantage. If they draw up out of their trenches, they are exposed to a heavy fire of grape from the artillery on the walls, and must be cut off; nor can they escape but by swimming.

The duty I owe to my superiors' commands, joined to my attachment to the interests of my Honourable Employers, have prevailed over that diffidence that I have of my abilities and knowledge in these matters and engaged me to offer my sentiments so particularly on this subject. I wish they may be of any service towards the safety of the town and island, and beg leave to submit the whole to your remarks and consideration.¹

The following are details of the garrison proposed for the defence of Bombay and its outworks:

Proposed Bombay War Garrison, 1773.

ATTACKS.	Privates necessary for one day's duty.	Of what Troops they are to consist.			Number of Guns to be used in each work.	Men necessary for serving one gun each day.	What Men are to serve the gun.				Total of Men serving the guns in each work.	Number of each class in each work for guns.			
		Infantry.	Sepoys.	Militia.			Artillery.	Seamen.	Soldiers.	Sepoys.		Artillery.	Seamen.	Soldiers.	Lascars.
(1) For the defence of the works against the First Attack supposed to be near the front of Fort George: In the covered way and before the place of Arms, or in the front of Fort George	90	20	40	30
In the counter guard before Fort George... ..	11	14	26	20	11	8	2	2	2	2	86	22	22	22	11
In Fort George for the North-East and North-West Bastions North Curtains and East Flank.	60	14	26	20	13	8	2	2	2	2	104	26	26	26	26
Redoubt in the Envelope on the North Face ...	60	14	26	20	0	7	1	2	2	2	42	6	12	12	12
Curtain to the Eastward of the Redoubt	3	6	1	1	1	3	18	3	3	3	9
Sentinels to Magazines &c. Gates of Fort George	11	4	6	4
In the North Front for 3 places of Arms	240	54	105	81
2nd Face of that Work	7	6	2	1	1	2	42	14	7	7	14
4th do. do.	4	0	1	1	1	3	24	4	4	4	12
Prince's Bastion North East Front	4	7	2	1	1	3	28	8	4	4	12
Do. Cavalier do.	2	8	2	1	1	4	16	4	2	11	8
Total ..	524	120	239	176	50	362	87	80	80	116

¹ Secret and Political Diary 14 of 1773, 34-43.

Chapter I.
History.

The Defence
of Bombay,
1773.

Proposed
Garrison,
1773.

Chapter I.
History.
Proposed
Garrison,
1773.

ATTACKS—continued.	Privates necessary for one day's duty.	Of what Troops they are to consist.			Number of Guns to be used in each work. Men necessary for serving one gun each day.	What Men are to serve the gun.				Total of Men serving the guns in each work.	Number of each class in each work for guns.			
		Infantry.	Sepoys.	Militia.		Artillery.	Seamen.	Soldiers.	Sepoys.		Artillery.	Seamen.	Soldiers.	Lascars.
(2) For the Defence from the 2nd Attack supposed to be against the Prince's Bastion: In Fort George North-West and South-West Bastions and West Curtain	9	5	1	1	...	8	45	9	9	27
Redoubt in the Envelope of the West Face...	3	6	1	1	1	8	18	3	3	9
Curtain in the Envelope to the South of the Redoubt	5	...	1	1	1	3	30	5	5	15
Bazar Gate Ravelin	60	11	22	17	4	6	1	1	1	3	...	4	4	19
North Front, 1st Face	4	6	1	1	1	3	24	4	4	12
3rd Face	4	6	1	1	1	3	24	4	4	12
Other Faces	4	6	1	1	1	3	24	4	4	12
Prince's Bastion W. Face.	100	22	44	31	4	6	3	1	1	4	32	6	4	16
Do. Cavalier W. Face.	3	8	1	2	1	4	24	8	6	12
Cumberland Ravelin North-West Face	150	33	66	51	...	6	2	1	1	2	36	18	6	12
Banlan Bastion, Face and Cavalier	80	11	22	17	3	6	1	2	...	3	48	8	16	24
Hodges' Ravelin	100	22	44	31	...	6	1	2	...	3	36	12	...	18
Church Gate do.	150	33	66	51	5	6	1	2	...	3	80	6	10	15
Redoubt before the Church Gate	100	22	44	31	6	6	1	2	...	3	36	6	12	18
Covered way from the Church Gate to the North Front	400	88	176	136
For twelve Mortars in the foregoing Works	3	1	1	60	36	12	12
Six Howitzers	4	2	1	...	1	24	12	6	6
20 Royals and Cohorns	2	1	1	40	20	...	20
Total	1100	242	484	374	75	579	159	109	264
(3) Guards for different Works not immediately attacked: Four Bastions, Moor, Church, Stanhope, and Marlbro. 30 privates in each and 4 men for one gun in each Bastion	120	20	...	46	4	4	...	1	...	8	16	...	4	12
Three Ravelins, Granby, South-West and Apollo. 30 privates in each and 4 men for 1 gun	90	15	30	36	3	4	...	1	12	...	3	9
Klug's Lunette	16	3	6	6	1	6	1	1	...	4	6	1	1	4
Queen's do.	15	3	6	6	1	6	1	1	...	4	...	1	1	4
Royal Bastion	50	11	22	17	2	6	...	2	...	4	16	4	4	8
Dock do.	100	22	44	31	2	8	4	16	4	4	8
Two Towers at the Dock and Bunder Piers, 30 men and 1 gun in each	60	10	20	24	2	8	2	2	...	4	16	4	4	8
Zigzag Battery	100	22	44	31	2	8	2	2	...	4	16	4	4	8
Castle	100	22	44	31	4	8	2	2	...	4	32	8	...	16
Crenailere Work to the North of the Castle	30	5	10	12	2	8	2	2	...	4	16	4	4	8
Mandvi	100	22	44	31
Moody Bay	20	4	8	7	2	6	...	2	...	4	12	...	4	8
Old Mandvi Bastion and Cavalier	30	5	10	12	4	6	1	1	...	4	24	4	4	16
Total	830	164	362	301	29	188	34	46	109

Chapter I.
History.

Military
Stores,
1773.

As these totals are exclusive of inhabitants, surgeons, attendants in the hospitals, women, and officers' servants you may justly estimate the whole number at 20,000 persons.

The following details give the quantity of stores necessary for 125 guns presented to the two attacks supposing 25 guns of 24-pounders, 50 guns of 18-pounders, 50 guns of 12-pounders, and allowing each gun to be fired twenty times in 24 hours and one-third of the weight of the shot for the allowance of powder, the siege to continue six weeks or forty-two days :

Abstract of Stores required, 1773.

	Grape Shot.	Round Shot.	Powder.
125 Guns 24-pounders...	21,000	168,000
Grape shot	1050	...	8400
50 Guns 18-pounders...	42,000	252,000
Grape shot	2100	...	126,000
50 Guns 12-pounders	42,000	168,000
Grape shot	2100	...	8400
In the different works not attacked, 20 guns are manned ready for service. Suppose them to fire twice each day as some may not be fired, others may be fired oftener particularly towards the sea where shipping and boats may come, suppose 20 of them to be 24-pounders and 9 to be 18-pounders :			
20 Guns 24-pounders...	8360	26,880
9 Do. 18 do.	766	4636
<i>For Mortars.</i>			
1000 13-inch shells @ 16 lbs. each shell	16,000
1000 10 do. do. 10 do.	10,000
2000 8 do. do. 6 do.	12,000
4000 Royals and Cohorns, 1½ do.	40,000
For the Musquetry	50,400
For wall pieces and small artillery from the covered ways	10,000
For men off duty and guards on other parts of the works	12,500
For mines and fireworks	15,000
For three days' service left when the garrison capitulates	55,800
For waste and accidents	41,826
Total ...	5250	109,116	991,742

Lead necessary for small arms, two pounds of lead to one pound of powder gives 67,900 pounds of lead.

Provisions,
1773.

Estimate of provisions for the garrison according to the accompanying establishment, that is 4000 Europeans and 10,776 natives. Allowance for one European :

Beef one lb. will be	168,000
Bread do.	168,000
Rice do.	168,000
Ghi two ounces	21,000
Fish half a pound	84,000
Arrack ½ pint	5250 } Gallons
Extra allowance	2625 } 7875

For 10,776 natives, allowance for each man, 1½ rice, ¾ dal, 2 ozs. ghi, ½ lb. fish, ½ lb. flesh :

Rice, lbs.	565,640	Onions 1 oz. per man a day	40,000
Dal	339,444	Garlic	5000
Ghi	56,616	Ginger	5000
Flesh	226,296	Turneric	5000
Fish	226,296	Quintora (that is cōentro or coriander)	5000
The wood for 25,000 men 2 large billets... ..	1,260,000	Cumin seed	5000

The above letter and two accompanying papers being read, the whole Board agreed in order that the information they contained might be kept secret, that they should be entered in the diary of this Committee. The Committee therefore ordered that they should be entered in this place.¹

In their letter of 1st April 1772 the Court write: As the obtaining a competent knowledge of the seas between the Maldives and Madagascar would be attended with great benefit, and as many of the vessels belonging to our marine at Bombay lie in harbour during the rainy season, we therefore direct as the means of employing them to advantage and of contributing to the health and improvement of the people that when their services may not be otherwise called for you send some of the Company's vessels and ketches to explore those seas for the improvement of navigation and the correction of the charts now in use. An able draughtsman or two must also be sent on such surveys and examinations to communicate the result of their observations. To assist the persons who may be employed on this service we enclose the copy of a paper lately delivered to us by Mr. Alexander Dalrymple containing his sentiments concerning the measures which ought to be pursued the first year of proceeding on this undertaking together with such remarks as have been made by different navigators passing through these seas.²

On the same subject three years later the Court write (12th April 1775): In our letter of the 1st April 1772 we gave directions for employing some of our vessels in exploring the navigation of the seas between the Maldives and Madagascar. Upon this subject we have no other information than what you advise us in your letter dated the 23rd November 1772. This is by no means satisfactory to us as no mention is made whether you intended to pursue the measure. We therefore require you if you shall have declined it to resume the same and transmit us charts of all discoveries which may be made, together with copies of the journals of the vessels which shall be employed on that service.³

In their letter of 11th February 1774 the Court write to the Bombay Government: In consequence of your neglect to take from Mr. Cooper who came home passenger on the *Godfrey* the bond directed in the 83rd para. of the general letter to Bombay of the 31st March 1769, to prevent black servants who come to England from being chargeable to the Company, Manuel Fernandez, a native of India, who attended the above Mr. Cooper on some dispute with his master complained to a magistrate that he was a slave and on such representation was by the magistrate made free. Mr. Cooper immediately dismissed Manuel and the poor man being reduced to the greatest distress applied to us for relief and is now returned on one of the Bombay ships at the Company's expense. As the required bond was neglected to be taken of Mr. Cooper, the Company were not

Chapter I.
History.

Marine Survey,
1772-1775.

Indian Servants
in Europe,
1774.

¹ Secret and Pol. Diary 14 of 1773, 34.

² Court to Bombay 1st April 1772 para 9, Pub. Dep. Court's L. Vol. 9 of 1772-1777, 23-24.

³ Court to Bombay 12th April 1775, Pub. Dep. Court's L. Vol. 11 of 1772-1777, 249.

Chapter I.**History.**

Indian Servants
in Europe,
1774.

authorised to make any demands on Mr. Cooper for the charges of Manuel's return, especially as a fresh difficulty arose from the circumstance of his being made free. To avoid every future inconvenience of this sort, we direct that you be particularly attentive to our orders before mentioned whether the persons attending passengers come under the denomination of black servants or that of slaves and to make an additional clause that the fact of any slave being made free on his arrival in England shall not exempt his master from the expense of the servant's return to India.¹

Convoy from
Bombay to
Persian Gulf
and Basra,
1774.

At a Consultation the 26th April 1774, as the time was approaching for sending a convoy from Bombay to protect the trade up the Persian Gulf to Basra, the Bombay Government resolved that the *Success* and *Fox* ketches be destined for this service, and that they must accordingly be got ready as soon as possible. As it will be very useful to have an exact survey of the little known Arab shore of the Gulf from the mouth of Basra river to Cape Mussendom, they resolved that the Agent and Council be directed to despatch these vessels on this service immediately after their arrival at Basra. Further resolved that persons skilled in this business proceed in those vessels and when the survey is completed return to Bombay.²

Convoy
Regulations
and Rates,
1774.

In a letter of the 6th December 1774 the Court lay down the following rates of convoy duty: Our resolution of the 4th May 1773 ordered that no lieutenant in command of any vessel in the marine be permitted to collect convoy money. This was intended to put a stop to that avidity of gain which appeared among the marine lieutenants who in several instances had actually sacrificed the public service to their own emolument. As we have reason to conclude that the settlement of this matter upon another footing will be attended with benefit to trade and advantage to the service, the following regulations are established respecting the rates to be paid for convoys.

That the captains of all cruizers proceeding either to or from Surat or to the southward of Bombay shall as hitherto be entitled to the money collected from all boats or vessels proceeding under their convoy provided they do not collect more than the undermentioned established rates. That the money collected for convoy by all lieutenants in command of galivats or other vessels whether belonging to the Bombay or Surat establishment proceeding to Surat must immediately after their arrival be paid to the purser of the marine at Surat, who at the close of each season must remit the amount to the superintendent in Bombay with the accounts of it. That the money collected by lieutenants in command of galivats or other vessels whether belonging to the Bombay or Surat establishment proceeding from Surat to Bombay must be paid to the Bombay superintendent immediately after their arrival. That at the close of the season the superintendent divide the convoy money so collected between the commodore and the several captains in the marine, the commodore to receive two shares, and all the captains one share

¹ Court to Bombay 11th Feb. 1774 para 27, Pub. Dep. Court's L. Vol. 9 of 1772 1777, 128.

² Bom. Gov. Consultation 26th April 1774, Pub. Diary 65 of 1774, 340.

each. That all convoy money collected by lieutenants in command of galivats or other vessels proceeding from Bombay to the southward are on their return to be paid to the Bombay superintendent immediately after their arrival here, who on the close of each season, without regard to rank shall divide the same in equal shares between the lieutenants in the marine belonging to the Bombay station who have been in command of galivats during the season; or in proportion for the time they have been in command unless they shall have been displaced for any improper behaviour, in which case they are to receive no proportion whatever. That the undermentioned rates established for convoy in the year 1767 shall never on any pretence be exceeded. Any officer convicted of exacting more than allowed by those rates or who shall conceal any part of what he may actually have collected shall be punished as guilty of a breach of orders by absolute dismissal from the service of the Honourable Company.

(1) Convoy rates between Surat and Bombay :		Rs.	qrs.
A topsail vessel or <i>batela</i>	12 2
A <i>shibar</i> between 200 and 300 <i>khandis</i>	10 ■
Do. from 100 to 200 <i>khandis</i>	7 2
Do. of 100 or under	5 2
(2) Convoy rates from Surat to Cambay :			
A topsail vessel or <i>batela</i>	8 2
A <i>shibar</i> between 200 and 300 <i>khandis</i>	7 2
Do. from 100 to 200 <i>khandis</i>	5 2
Do. of 100 or under	4 2

For all topsail boats or *batelas* proceeding southwards convoy money may be collected agreeable to and not more than the foregoing rates between Bombay and Surat and for all topsail boats or *batelas* returning from the south convoy money may be collected after the rate of one quarter of ■ rupee for every *khandi* agreeable to the number of *khandis* specified in their pass. No convoy may on any pretence be afforded to any boat or vessel unless it is furnished with an English pass and colours.¹

At a Consultation, the 28th November 1774, the President acquaints the Select Committee that he has called this meeting to lay before them a letter dated the 31st October, received yesterday from Mr. Robert Henshaw who at present resides at Goa. Mr. Henshaw's letter gives an account of the military and marine force lately arrived at Goa from Portugal, and of the intention of the Portuguese speedily to attempt the recovery of the dominions they formerly possessed to the northward of Bombay and particularly of the island of Sálsette and Bassein. This letter being read and taken under consideration; it is observed that there appears no doubt of the Portuguese intentions against the island of Sálsette, and as surely as they attempt the conquest of that island with their present force, so surely they will gain the possession of it. This event will not only put it out of our power ever to acquire its possession for the Honourable Company who have so frequently

Chapter I. History.

Convoy
Regulations
and Rates,
1774.

Portuguese
Attempt to
re-take Sálsette,
1774.

¹ Court to Bombay 6th Dec. 1774, Comp. of Standing Ord. Vol. ■ of 1759-1788, 48-51.

Chapter I.**History.**

Portuguese
Attempt to
re-take Sálsette,
1774.

expressed their ardent wish to obtain it, but will also be attended with infinite prejudice to the trade and interest of the Honourable Company at Bombay by reducing their customs and revenues in a very great degree, as by the possession of Sálsette the Portuguese will become masters of all the passes inland and will consequently be able, as they were formerly so prone on every occasion to do, to obstruct our trade and to lay whatever impositions they please upon it. We therefore think it becomes our undoubted duty by taking it ourselves without the least delay to prevent Sálsette falling into Portuguese hands. It is observed that a more favourable opportunity than the present will probably never again offer, as by the divisions in the Marátha government that empire is now without a head, and it will be out of the power of either party to send any effectual force to obstruct our proceedings. The President hereupon acquaints the committee that agreeable to their recommendation in March last, he has continued to temporize with the people who made proposals to him for the delivery of Sálsette into our hands; that they have since been frequently very pressing with him on the subject, and that they are now equally desirous as before of giving up the island to the Honourable Company. Taking all these circumstances under consideration, together with the negotiation now depending with Rághoba as well as the situation of Mr. Mostyn at Poona who is within the power of the ministerial party, the Committee are unanimously of opinion that it is a duty highly incumbent on them to prevent the Portuguese attaining the possession of the island of Sálsette by gaining possession of it for the Honourable Company. It is therefore resolved that we at once close with the offers for giving it up and that we pursue the speediest means in our power to gain the island by sending a body of forces in the manner that may be agreed on between the President and the persons who have treated with him for that purpose. The President is accordingly desired and empowered to close immediately on the most moderate terms he can obtain with the persons who have been treating with him for the delivery of Sálsette, and every other preparation must in consequence be made for effecting this desirable end. In order that this proceeding may not affect the negotiation depending with Rághoba, Mr. Gambier must be apprised of our intentions and directed to assure Rághoba that if he will not be induced to cede the island of Sálsette to the Company, on his granting us what we may esteem an equivalent for it and paying the expenses we shall incur by it, we will give it up to him whenever he may be in full possession of the Marátha Empire, our only intention at this time being to prevent Sálsette falling into the hands of the Portuguese which from the present situation of Marátha affairs most undoubtedly would shortly be the case, unless we pursue the necessary measures to prevent it. Mr. Mostyn must also be advised of our intention and the motives that have impelled us. As we hope this step will not be the means of breaking that good understanding which has till now subsisted with the ministry at Poona, we wish him to continue there and to endeavour to reconcile the ministry to the measures we are pursuing, giving them the same

assurances in case they prevail in their contest with Rághoba, as we have directed Mr. Gambier to give to Rághoba. Should Mr. Mostyn on being acquainted with our intentions be convinced he can no longer remain at Poona with safety to his person, we permit him to come away. At the same time we much hope this will not be the case, as we think his continuing at Poona will be the means of reconciling the ministry to the measure and serve to convince them of the sincerity of our professions. We deem it necessary here to remark that we have not yet heard of the arrival at Bengal of such of the Council lately appointed by Act of Parliament as were to proceed from England, and consequently we are not restricted by that from undertaking this affair. Even had we heard of their arrival in the form presented by the Act of Parliament we must think the necessity of executing this measure without delay as well as its entire agreement with the repeated orders of the Honourable the Court of Directors, would fully authorize us undertaking it without waiting for the permission of the Governor General and Council.

As we shall probably be in want of some additional force at the Presidency in case the matters now on foot should be executed, it is agreed to embrace this opportunity of reducing the garrisons of Tellicherry and Anjengo. It is therefore resolved that from henceforward the military force at Anjengo shall consist of only one subaltern officer (who for the present is to be Lieutenant Brownrig) with three serjeants, three corporals, one drummer and 36 private topasses of the infantry, with one bombardier two gunners and two matrosses of artillery. The remainder must be sent hither by the first opportunity. Except ten privates the whole company of Europeans with their officers now doing duty at Tellicherry, must be withdrawn and sent here as soon as possible, and the future garrison of that place must be considered as complete without them. Letters to the Chiefs of Tellicherry and Anjengo must be prepared to apprise them of our resolution. Letters must also be written to Mr. Gambier and to Mr. Mostyn agreeable to our foregoing minutes. The letter to Mr. Mostyn must not be forwarded till matters are so far advanced as to put it out of the power of the ministry in any degree to obstruct our views in case Mr. Mostyn should communicate our intentions to them. At the same time, in case he should deem it absolutely necessary, he must be able to come away before the affair becomes public.¹

A Consultation of the Select Committee, the 9th December 1774, records: In consequence of directions sent him by the President to quit Poona as speedily as possible, Mr. Thomas Mostyn arrived here this morning. He accordingly now takes his seat at this committee in his standing and being made acquainted with the several minutes and resolutions regarding Rághoba and Sálsette, declares he entirely approves the whole of our proceedings. He so far confirms the Goa news respecting the intentions of the

Chapter I.

History.

Portuguese
Attempt to
re-take Sálsette,
1774.

Expedition
against Thána,
1774.

¹ Secret and Political Diary 15 of 1774, 171-177.

Chapter I.**History.**

Expedition
against Thána,
1774.

Portuguese as to assure us that it was publicly reported at Poona that the Portuguese were making very considerable warlike preparations and it was generally concluded their designs were against Sálsette and their former coast possessions. The President acquaints the committee that not till yesterday was he able to see the person who before made proposals for the delivery of Sálsette to the Company; that he then had much conversation with him; but that he now excuses himself from delivering the island representing that owing to the reports of the designs of the Portuguese against Sálsette, a reinforcement of 500 men, lately sent from Poona, has arrived in the neighbourhood of Thána. Mr. Mostyn declares that to his knowledge such a reinforcement was sent from Poona before he left. As by this disappointment there is no reason to expect that the fort of Thána will be delivered after an inconsiderable resistance the question remains should our forces still proceed against it? On mature deliberation it is observed that though we may not gain Thána so easily as we at first hoped yet, as it was our duty then to attempt it, it is still equally our duty to prevent it falling into the hands of the Portuguese. Even though we may experience rather more difficulty than we at first hoped we are still of opinion that the force which will be sent will be fully equal to conquer Sálsette. The committee therefore unanimously resolved that to obtain possession of Sálsette at this juncture is a matter very essential to the interest of our Employers and that the forces designed for this service do accordingly proceed with the utmost expedition. Mr. Mostyn being asked, delivers it as his opinion that though on being acquainted with our motives for this proceeding the ministry at Poona may not be satisfied with them, yet he is convinced in the present situation of their affairs it is not in their power to prevent our designs. He believes in time they may be reconciled to the measure as they must be clearly convinced that in their present situation it is out of their power to prevent the Portuguese taking Sálsette. As soon as our forces leave Bombay, so that our designs can be no longer concealed, the President will write suitable letters to Rághoba and to the ministry on this subject. The situation of Thána, the capital fort where our forces must first proceed, is such as will not admit our vessels to approach it. Consequently the forces that do not go by land, must proceed in boats or very small vessels. Though there can be no marine command equal to the rank of our superintendent, yet we much wish that Mr. Watson was employed on this expedition as we are perfectly satisfied from his approved good services on many similar occasions that his presence will very much contribute towards success. His knowledge of the country people and the confidence they have in him, is an additional motive for us to wish that he may be on the spot, as we are satisfied that his advice will be of the greatest use to the commanding military officer. Upon this Mr. Watson assures the committee that provided he is put on a proper footing he will very readily proceed; for he has nothing more at heart than to render his Employers every service in his power. The Committee therefore resolve that Mr. Watson shall proceed on this service, that our instructions be

addressed to the Brigadier General and himself jointly, that they be directed to consult and co-operate with each other in respect to all their proceedings and designs, the executive part resting with each in his own department. The Brigadier General is then called in, takes his seat, and is acquainted with our resolutions of this day that Mr. Watson is to proceed on an equal footing with him. In this the General concurs. As it will be necessary to conciliate the minds of the inhabitants to our government, placards must be dispersed as widely as possible after our forces are landed, assuring all the inhabitants of our protection and that their properties shall be secured to them, provided they do not appear in arms against us and strict orders must be given to prevent our forces from plundering. Batta to the officers will be allowed to commence (agreeable to the custom at Madras) two days before they set out and to continue till two days after they return; provisions as always customary will be allowed to the people. In consideration of our prohibiting any kind of plunder it is agreed on this service being accomplished to allow the forces military and marine the sum of Rs. 50,000 as a donation or gratuity to be divided in the proportions hitherto customary.

As we are of opinion if the Portuguese fleet appear in sight we cannot proceed in this business, it is necessary to set forward with the utmost expedition. The proper measures for proceeding are now talked over and concerted, and it is resolved that the forces shall set out on Monday next immediately after the Governor's commission is published. A part of them are to march by land and the remainder to proceed with the stores in boats and vessels provided for that purpose. The Secretary is ordered to prepare instructions for the General and Mr. Watson.¹

Three days later (12th December 1774) at a Consultation of the Board the President, with the concurrence of the other members of the Select Committee, acquaints the Board with the proceedings relative to the intended design against the island of Sálsette. The motives of the committee are explained to the Board, and the papers with their minutes respecting this affair are read and the Board are informed that the forces intended for this service are ready to proceed. The orders of the Honourable the Court of Directors, dated the 4th of April 1769, constituting the Select Committee and showing their powers are also read, together with the 42nd and 43rd paragraphs of the Company's commands of 31st of March 1769. The President then requests the concurrence of the other members in this undertaking, which is so much for the interest of the Honourable Company and so agreeable to their repeated orders on the subject. Messrs. Fletcher and Garden hereupon desire it may be minuted that as they are not members of the Select Committee and have not an opportunity of inspecting the country correspondence, they are not sufficiently acquainted with the policy of the Marátha government to be enabled properly to judge of the propriety or impropriety of the resolutions that have been taken,

Chapter I.

History.

Expedition
against Thána,
1774.

¹ Secret and Political Diary 15 of 1774, 208-213.

Chapter I.

History.

Expedition
against Thána,
1774.

though they doubt not but that the committee have been guided by what appeared to them for the real interest of the Honourable Company. As it is a matter of a very important nature they beg leave to declare they do not esteem themselves in the least responsible for the consequences. The instructions to Brigadier General Gordon and to Mr. Watson proceeding on the service against Thána in command of the military and marine forces are now read and approved. Mr. Patrick Crawford Bruce is appointed Commissary of stores and provisions to the forces and Mr. Edmund Veale Lane Judge Advocate. A Commission empowering the Brigadier General to appoint General Courts Martial and a Warrant to Mr. Edmund Veale Lane to officiate as Judge Advocate being both prepared are now signed.

The Brigadier General takes this opportunity of acquainting the Board that the forces in general are much dissatisfied, because notwithstanding the town of Broach was taken by storm, the plunder and booty found in the town was not divided amongst the forces, which is the practice in every other service, as he had the honour to represent to the Board some time ago. Upon this it is observed to the Brigadier General that as we did not esteem ourselves authorized by any orders from the Court of Directors to give the plunder and booty found in Broach to the captors,¹ yet in consideration of the good behaviour of the forces on that service and of his representation, this measure has been recommended in the strongest manner to the Honourable the Court of Directors. Till their orders arrive no step can be taken, though as to the present service, the Select Committee having resolved to distribute the sum of half a lách of rupees amongst the military and marine forces, in lieu of plunder, their promise is confirmed and the Brigadier General is desired to assure his troops that this sum shall be distributed immediately after the reduction of the island is completed.

Since a considerable number must be posted on Sálsette to garrison Thána and the other outposts on that island, an additional military force will be wanted for this Presidency. It is therefore resolved as soon as possible to raise another battalion of sepoys to be termed the 5th Battalion. The Brigadier General took his leave of the Board and withdrew as he is proceeding immediately with that part of the forces that marches to Thána.²

The Select Committee's Consultation of the same date, 12th December 1774, records : After the Governor's commission and military

¹ In the following year orders from the Court, dated 12th April 1775, contained the following direction : As plunder and booty found in places taken by storm have usually been given to the captors at our other settlements, we acquiesce in the request of our military officers at Bombay relative to such effects as were found in Broach and belonged to the Government (cannon arms and warlike stores excepted). We permit you to deliver the same or to pay the amount thereof to proper agents to be divided amongst the persons entitled thereto so soon as the state of your treasury shall enable you to make such payment without inconvenience to our affairs. Court to Bombay 12th April 1775 para 54, Pub. Dep. Court's Letters Vol. 9 of 1772-1777, 232-233.

² Public Diary 66 of 1774, 869-872 ; Forrest's Maráthá Series, I, Pt. I. 179.

regulations were read to the forces and after a Consultation of the whole Board held this day (12th December 1774), when the other members were acquainted with our designs against Sálsette, that part of the forces intended to proceed by land to Thána marched off the parade to Sion. The remainder this evening embarked on board vessels and boats provided for the purpose. The Brigadier General proceeded with the party that marched by land, and Mr. Watson embarked in one of the vessels proceeding by water.

Previous to the departure of Brigadier General Gordon and of Mr. John Watson the following joint instructions were signed and delivered to each of these gentlemen: Having for many reasons determined to endeavour at obtaining the possession of the island of Sálsette for our Honourable Employers, we now detach such a military and marine force under your command as has been deemed equal to the capture of that island. As we make no doubt that your united efforts will be exerted on this occasion as well for your own honour as for the public good, we have the strongest hopes that you will speedily become masters of the fort of Thána whither you are first of all to proceed. We shall rely on your executing this service with all possible despatch. You are jointly to concert every necessary operation for effecting it; but the execution of the measures so concerted is to rest with each of you in your respective departments. Immediately on your landing on the island you are to cause the inhabitants to be assured in the most public and effectual manner that the lives of the whole and the properties of all those who will readily submit themselves to the Company and become their subjects shall be effectually secured to them. To convince the inhabitants of the sincerity of this profession it is our positive order that, as well in the march to Thána as when the forces are before the town and afterwards, you take the most effectual means to prevent the soldiers from plundering. Plundering must also be prevented even at the time the place falls into your hands, for it is solely from our moderation in this respect and from conciliating the inhabitants to the measure we are pursuing and to our Government that we can hope the Company will reap lasting advantages from this acquisition. Previous to commencing hostilities against the fort of Thána, you are to summon the commander to surrender it to the Company assuring him that our intention in sending this force is to prevent its being taken from his masters by other hands. If notwithstanding this representation the commander refuses to give up the fort you are then to exert the force now entrusted to your command to obtain Thána, as well as every other post on the island. In consideration of our forbidding all plunder of any kind even on the capture of Thána or of any other place, we have agreed to allow a gratuity of Rs. 50,000 to the forces engaged on this expedition as well military as marine. After the service is accomplished this sum will be divided in the manner that has hitherto been usual on such occasions. As a further encouragement to the troops, they will be allowed provisions by the Company so long as the service may continue. The officers will be allowed batta to commence two

Chapter I.

History.

Expedition
against Thána,
1774.

Chapter I.

History.

Expedition
against Thána,
1774.

days before they set off and batta will be continued to them till their return, except to those who may be left to garrison the necessary posts on the island. After you have acquired possession of Thána, you are to detach a sufficient part of the force now put under your command to reduce the fort of Vesáva, the battery of Dháravi at the entrance of Bassein river, and any other stronghold that may not be directly delivered up. Do not fail to send us immediate advice of every interesting occurrence and we shall give you further orders as circumstances may require. Your letters must be addressed to the Select Committee and not to the Board at large. We permit you to keep a table at the expense of the Company for yourselves and such persons as you both choose to admit to it, relying on your doing it with the utmost frugality.

Enclosed is a commission empowering the Brigadier General to appoint General Courts Martial as he may think necessary, at which Mr. Edmund Veale Lane must officiate as Judge Advocate; a warrant empowering him to do so is enclosed. Mr. Crawford Bruce is to officiate as Commissary of stores and provisions. We wish you every success in this expedition.¹

The Consultation of the whole Board, of the same date 12th December 1774, continues: By 10 o'clock this morning that part of the military force intended to proceed by land to Thána marched out of town commanded by Brigadier General Gordon. At 7 P.M. the remainder of the military force intended to proceed to Thána embarked on board sundry boats and proceeded with the following vessels and galivats to Thána: *Terrible* bomb, (commander) Adam Sherriff; *Triumph* prahm, Jno. Hall; *Sky* cutter, Samuel Hardy; *Otter* galivat, Thomas Buncombe; *Greyhound* galivat, Lieut. Borlace; *Lively's Prize* galivat, Nathaniel Smith; *Fly* galivat, Skinner; and *Wolf* galivat, Brice Hardy. John Watson, Esquire, Superintendent, embarked on one of the above vessels and proceeded as Commander of the marine force to Thána with instructions to the Brigadier General and himself to consult and co-operate with each for the good of the service. At the same time sailed out of port the *Bombay* grab, George Emptage, to cruise.²

Portuguese
Protest,
1774.

Four days later (16th December 1774) at a Consultation read translation of a letter of the same date from the commander of the Portuguese ships now lying off the harbour to the Governor and Council of Bombay: Notwithstanding the most illustrious and excellent Senhor Dom Joze Padre da Camara, Governor and Captain General of the State of India, supposing that the British nation will regulate all their operations in Asia according to the good harmony alliance and amity that reciprocally subsists between those two nations, yet by the obligations of the employ in which he is, and from some events that are diametrically opposite thereto, the said Captain General ordered me that I should, on his part and in his name,

¹ Select Committee's Consultation, 12th Dec. 1774, Secret and Pol. Diary 15 of 1774, 240-244.

² Pub. Diary 66 of 1774, 889; Forrest's Marátha Series, I. Pt. I, 179-180.

protest to your Honour against whatever proceedings, contract, expedition, and whatever other negotiation and conquest you may intend on the country which is on this coast of Hindustán, situated from Chaul to Daman; uniting to this protest all others which his predecessors have made on the same subject; making an especial mention of each of them, more particularly that which the Viceroy and Captain General Conde da Ega sent to the Council of Bombay; recollecting this present protest of all the clauses therein contained; charging your Honour with your being responsible for all that you will deliberate against the present protest and others that are herein mentioned, to the Court of London, and for all the satisfaction that may be asked on these points by that of Lisbon.¹

At a Consultation on the 18th December the following reply to the above letter was drawn up and approved: We have received a letter from you, dated the 16th instant, to which we deem it necessary only to reply that for all our proceedings we are responsible to our Honourable Employers in England, to whom as customary we shall transmit an ample detail of our transactions. As it is our wish and desire to cultivate a good understanding with the subjects of your nation in India, we request you will give the necessary assurances accordingly to the Captain General on your return to Goa. As to the claims of your nation to the countries situated between Chaul and Daman, we are perfectly unacquainted with them. Though part of those countries did formerly belong to your nation, yet they were taken from you by the Maráthás about seven and thirty years ago. During all the intervening time we have never understood that you even made any attempt to recover them. But if a protest is now necessary, it will be much more proper against the Maráthás who took them from you than against us, who assisted your nation at that time to defend your possessions with men stores and ammunition. By this a great expense was incurred for which the Honourable Company have never been reimbursed. We therefore take this opportunity through you again to demand payment from the Captain General at Goa. And as a vessel belonging to Dhanjishaw of Surat, a servant and subject of the Honourable English East India Company, was unjustly taken about three years ago, and still more unjustly detained by the late Captain General, notwithstanding our representation to the contrary, we also through you demand the release of the said vessel and that the value of everything taken on board her be made good to the owner.²

A Consultation of the 21st December records that, as the siege of Thána continues, with the object of striking the enemy at Thána with dismay, as large a detachment as can possibly be spared from the Bombay garrison march off this evening under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel Keating to reduce Vesáva, a strong fort and outpost on the island of Sálsette on the opposite side of the island from Thána.³

On the evening of Friday the 23rd December 1774, the barge

**Chapter I.
History.**

Portuguese
Protest,
1774.

President's
Reply,
1774.

¹ Pub. Diary 66 of 1774, 891-893. Forrest's Marátha Series, I. Pt. I. 180.

² Pub. Diary 66 of 1774, 894-896. Forrest's Marátha Series, I. Pt. I. 180-181.

³ Pub. Diary 66 of 1774, 902. Forrest's Marátha Series, I. Pt. I. 181.

Chapter I.**History.**

Fall of Vesáva,
1774.

arrived from Thána with Mr. John Watson, Superintendent, wounded and otherwise much hurt.¹

On Sunday the 25th December 1774 at 2 P.M. arrived the account of the surrender of Vesáva Fort. On Monday the 26th December 1774 except the force kept to garrison Vesáva, the detachment sent with Lieutenant-Colonel Keating returned. On Tuesday the 27th December 1774 the President and the whole Board in Council recorded the following remarks on the serious and melancholy situation of affairs before Thána from the siege being protracted to so great a length. Vast quantities of stores have been indented for and expended; many Europeans have been killed and wounded in an ill concerted attempt to fill up the ditch before the breach; and we are quite at a loss to know the Brigadier General's expectations and designs, as he does not appear to have been so explicit in his letters to the President as he should have been. To add to our concern, this present unpromising appearance seems solely owing to the general's pursuing the counsel of others, and not hearkening to the advice of Mr. Watson who from his greatest experience was so able to have given him the best. Had the two small forts to the northward been attacked and taken, as Mr. Watson proposed, there is no doubt that our forces would have been in possession of Thána many days ago, and thereby many valuable lives have been saved. On the same day (27th December 1774) at 3 P.M. John Watson, Esquire, departed this life, occasioned by the wounds he received before Thána the 21st instant. On the morning of the 28th December 1774 the remains of the late John Watson Esquire were interred in the burying ground without the town walls. The same day (28th December 1774) about $\frac{1}{4}$ before 8 P.M. arrived an express from the Brigadier General with advice that Thána Fort was taken by storm this afternoon about 3 o'clock.²

Death of Admiral
Watson,
1774.

Siege of Vesáva,
1774.

Six letters from Lieutenant-Colonel Keating to the President give the following details of the siege of Vesáva Fort. About 4 o'clock on the morning of the 23rd December Colonel Keating wrote: I am sorry to acquaint you that our attempt to escalate Vesáva last night at 8 o'clock has not been attended with success. The causes of failure were too short ladders and want of obedience in the troops. I planned the attack in the following manner. Upon our howitzers and field pieces beginning to play on the fort, Lieutenant Carpenter with 46 men advanced close to the walls upon the left, keeping up a constant firing. This firing drew the whole attention of the enemy to that quarter, while Ensigns Prosser Anderson and Gore advanced to the escalate of the only part that our ladders could reach. The firing had its desired effect as the enemy never made the least discovery until our ladders were raising. But this was done clumsily so that of three that were raised, the enemy, though very few in that quarter, easily broke

¹ Mr. Watson's chief injuries were caused by a cannon-ball striking the sand close in front of him and driving particles of sand into the flesh all over his body. Grant Duff's *Maráthás*, 374, and Low's *Indian Navy*, I. 176 in *Bombay Gazetteer*, Thána, XIV. 360.

² Secret and Pol. Diary, 21st to 28th Dec. 1774, Vol. 15 of 1774, 252-255 and Pub. Diary 66 of 1774, 905, 952. Forrest's *Maráthá Series*, I. Pt. I. 184-185, 201.

and overset them with large stones. Our troops were obliged to give over the attack with the loss of two Europeans killed, two or three wounded, and three lascars wounded. Had I fourteen bamboo ladders, eight of thirty-two and six of forty feet, I could still carry the place. But as making these will I fear take much time, two eighteen or even twelve pounders with cochora (cohorn) mortars and the stores contained in the accompanying list will soon reduce the place. Ever since we retired the garrison, who are exceedingly intimidated, have kept up a constant fire fearing a second attack.

At 8 in the morning of the same day (December 23rd) Colonel Keating wrote: I beg you will order two petards to be sent me directly, whichever choice you make in respect to what was contained in mine of this morning may be sent also. But I hope with the help of petards to get in.¹

At 10 in the evening of the same day (the 23rd) Colonel Keating wrote: Nothing can be done but by two eighteen pounders; twelve pounders might do as well but for the sake of expedition, I this evening made a second attempt to carry the fort by escalade but met with so warm a reception that our people were obliged to retire with the loss of perhaps thirty Europeans wounded and killed. Anderson is wounded badly. I have pleasure in assuring you that the troops have made ample amends for their want of regularity last night. They were perfectly obedient to command. Had it been so last night, we should have carried the place easily: To-night the enemy were fully prepared.

Next day (24th December) Colonel Keating wrote: Our loss last night was not so considerable as I imagined. It is: killed, infantry one, seaman one, hamáls two; wounded, artillery eight, infantry six, seamen three, lascars two, hamáls two.

At 5 on the same day (24th December) Colonel Keating wrote: Most of our stores are landed and brought up, and at work for the battery. Should I receive a party from Captain Liell to assist in raising the battery, I shall be able to open it to-morrow morning. When once open I think we shall soon do our business. I should not have made an attack last night but that I found the men in high spirits and eager for it, together with the confidence I placed in the bravery and coolness of Captain-Lieutenant Brickell who commanded the party who were first to mount. He did not deceive me though unsuccessful. Our ladders I increased in length to 42 feet. The petard I found unnecessary, the gate did not require one. I thank God I never was better in health. What men the surgeon thinks require it I now send to the sepoy hospital, a list of them enclosed. Wishing you the compliments of the ensuing season.²

At 11 in the morning of the 25th he continued: At sunrise, just as the battery was ready to fire, the enemy sent a deputation to treat. They had done the same last night but first wanted five

Chapter I History.

Siege of Vesáva.
1774.

¹ Pub. Diary 66 of 1774, 905-906. Forrest's Marátha Series, I. Pt. I. 181-182.

² Pub. Diary 66 of 1774, 907-909. Forrest's Marátha Series, I. Pt. I. 182-183.

Chapter I.**History.**

**Siege of Vesáva,
1774.**

days to consult upon conditions. My answer was I allowed them one hour and a half, no more. They returned at the time and reduced their demand first to three days, at last fell to this day at noon. My answer was I would not allow an hour longer. It was my business to reduce the fort as soon as possible, theirs to keep it as long as they could. This did not seem to please them. Our battery being finished, and as I suppose not further from the walls than 220 yards, has determined them to accept of the terms, a copy of which I now do myself the honour to enclose you, and hope they will prove satisfactory.

The terms were: I Thomas Keating, Lieutenant-Colonel and Commanding Officer of a body of the Honourable Company's forces now before the fort of Vesáva, do promise and agree that upon the surrender of the said fort for the use of my Honourable Masters, that the officers and inhabitants in the said fort shall enjoy whatever private property of their own is now in the fort or town; that they shall be permitted to stay in the villages adjacent or retire elsewhere provided they do not molest in any degree any inhabitants under the protection of the Honourable Company. Also that they shall have ten fishing boats to carry away themselves and their real property. And lastly, it is faithfully promised that the killedár and all others shall furnish to Lieutenant-Colonel Keating a just and true account of whatsoever is belonging to the Marátha government now under their care or charge, and deliver the same to such persons as he shall appoint for that purpose. Done before Vesáva this 25th day of December 1774.

On the 26th December, except such part as was left to garrison the fort at Vesáva, the whole detachment commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel Keating returned to Bombay.¹

**Thána Taken,
1774.**

Of the attack and capture of Thána fort General Gordon forwarded the following details on the 28th December: Immediately on getting possession of the fort, I despatched Captain McLellan that you might have the earliest intelligence of it and to him I refer you for the particulars of the assault commanded by Colonel Cockburn where both officers and men behaved with the utmost spirit. Upon the enemy's evacuating the fort Captain Farrer with his party made an attempt to get possession of the galivats but they were almost swamped and could not get near them. The slaughter was very great. Anantrao and above 200 people are prisoners. I am quite at a loss what to do with them. I am therefore to request your Honour and the Board's directions on that head. We also got immediate possession of the two forts to the northward where our colours are now flying. You may well suppose the confusion such a scene creates so as sufficiently to apologise for the incorrectness of this letter.²

**Order to reduce
Dhárávi,
1774.**

On receipt of the above letter the Board signed and despatched (29th December 1774) by special messenger a letter to the Bri-

¹ Pub. Diary 66 of 1774, 909-910; Forrest's Marátha Series, I. Pt. I. 183-184.

² Letter from Brig. Genl. Gordon to the President and Council, Thána Fort 28th Dec. 1774, Pub. Diary 66 of 1774, 957; Forrest's Marátha Series, I. Pt. I. 202.

gadier General at Thána signifying their pleasure in hearing of the reduction of Thána and directing him to reduce Dhárávi and the remaining posts on the island and if possible to destroy the enemy's boats. He was also to return such part of the force as could be spared, and communicate to us his opinion of the garrison necessary to be left for the defence of the island of Sálsette. We directed him to release the prisoners, except the most considerable, and acquainted him of the reinforcement we proposed sending him before we had news of his success, and of the civil government we had established for the island of Sálsette.¹

On the same day came to hand from Thána a letter from the Brigadier General dated this day (29th December 1774) wherein he related the particulars of the assault on storming the breach and his proceedings afterwards, and strongly recommends the spirit and conduct of Lieutenant-Colonel Cockburn who commanded the attack, and of Captain Stewart and the Serjeant-Major of the 1st battalion who led on. He also recommended in strong terms Captain McLellan, his aid-de-camp, who he judged the most proper person to send with the earliest accounts of their success. He further acquainted us that he had ordered a detachment of 40 Europeans and 240 sepoys to march the next day under the command of Captain Stewart to scour the country towards Ghodbandar and to assure the villages through which he might pass of the Company's protection. He requested our directions how to dispose of the prisoners and such guns and stores as might remain after supplying the Thána garrison.²

On the 30th December 1774 came to hand by special messenger from Thána a letter from the Brigadier General, dated this day, in which he replied to our letter of yesterday, advised that the enemy's boats had escaped, and proposed to send the prisoners to Bombay instead of releasing them in Thána. He strongly recommended Captain-Lieutenant Nugent of the artillery for a commission as captain, acquainted that by the best accounts the enemy's loss must have exceeded 600 men during the siege and in the assault, and that the inhabitants were returning to the town in great numbers.³

On the same day (30th December 1774) arrived Captain-Lieutenant Brickell from Karanja with the news of the surrender of the fort of Karanja and the reduction of that island. The following letter was at the same time received from Lieutenant-Colonel Keating who commanded that party :⁴ About two hours ago we took possession of this fort. The greatest difficulty we met with was gaining the hill, such a one I never met with. Last night our posts were established within 250 yards, and this

Chapter I. History.

Order to reduce
Dhárávi,
1774.

Karanja
Reduced,
1774.

¹ Bom. Gov. Diary 29th Dec. 1774, Pub. Diary 66 of 1774, 959; Forrest's Marátha Series, I. Pt. I. 203.

² Bom. Gov. Diary 29th Dec. 1774, Pub. Diary 66 of 1774, 959-960.

³ Bom. Gov. Diary 30th Dec. 1774, Pub. Diary 66 of 1774, 960; Forrest's Marátha Series, I. Pt. I. 203.

⁴ Bom. Gov. Diary 30th Dec. 1774, Pub. Diary 66 of 1774, 960-961; Forrest's Marátha Series, I. Pt. I. 203.

**Chapter I.
History.**

Karanja
Reduced,
1774.

morning before they surrendered within fifty. Thus situated and with no chance for retreat they gave the fort up. I permitted them to carry away their clothes only. The garrison consisted of *subhedár* Vástu Mádhav Náik, *haváldár* Attangeráv, Bháskar Pant *sabnis*, and three hundred and six scpoys. The fort is a small square, flanked by five towers, mounting thirteen guns, the wall very low. Yet we could not attempt it without scaling ladders, which could not be got up last night, the road being so exceedingly bad. The warehouse contains about 150 morahs of batty, and one in the low grounds about 30 khandis. I shall send all the troops to Bombay this afternoon except about 50. But shall stay myself until to-morrow to settle matters a little. The country volunteers, under Shaikh Ali, were the first who mounted the heights, and behaved very gallantly. We have found about seventeen hundred rupees and some little trifling joys.¹

Government
at Karanja,
1775.

On reading Colonel Keating's letter advising the reduction of Karanja, the Bombay Government in their Consultation of 3rd January 1775 observe: It is now necessary to provide for the collection of the revenues and government of Karanja as well as of the two small adjacent islands, called Elephanta and Hog Island, which being dependent on Karanja are now become the Company's. Mr. David Carnegie, at the President's nomination, is appointed to reside at Karanja for the above purposes.

The money found in the fort of Karanja must be paid into the treasury; the batty in the warehouses there must be brought to Bombay by the warehousekeeper, and the list of the stores in Karanja fort must be delivered to the storekeeper to be brought on his books. The Board resolved that all the charges incurred by the late service be brought under the head Charges reducing Sálsette and the adjacent islands.²

Capture of
Sálsette,
1774.

On the 31st December 1774 the Select Committee after Consultation signed and despatched the following letter to the Governor General and Council at Fort William. The letter was sent by express boat to Surat from whence it was to be forwarded by special messenger: Conformable to the Board's address of this date, we shall proceed to communicate to your Honour our motives for determining at this juncture to endeavour at acquiring possession of the island of Sálsette by force of arms from the late possessors the Maráthás. Of this we particularly advised the Honourable the Court of Directors in our address by the *Thames* several days before the receipt of your letter of the 24th October in which we were acquainted of your having taken possession of the government of Fort William in virtue of the late Act of Parliament. We flatter ourselves our reasons for this undertaking will appear so satisfactory and convincing to them as well as to you that we shall be fully justified in our proceedings.

¹ Letter from Lieutenant-Colonel Keating to the President and Council, Public Diary 66 of 1774, 961.

² Bom. Gov. Consultation 3rd Jan. 1775, Pub. Diary 67 of 1775, 5.

In the commands of the Honourable the Court of Directors to this Presidency dated the 31st March 1769, an attested copy of which we now enclose for your information, they are pleased to direct that we should be ever watchful to obtain the island of Sálsette, with the other places therein pointed out, which they acquaint us must be the constant objects we are always to have in view in all our treaties negotiations and military operations.

Again in their letter of the 6th April 1772 the Honourable Company expressly direct that Mr. Mostyn, one of our members, should be established at Poona, for endeavouring to acquire Sálsette, with the other places mentioned in their former commands, and they point out what they permit us to give up as an exchange. Accordingly in the year 1772 during the lifetime of Mádhavráv, and about a year before that government fell into confusion, Mr. Mostyn was fixed as Resident at the Marátha Darbár. In addition to the terms pointed out by our Honourable Employers, Mr. Mostyn was instructed to offer Broach with its territories which we had just then acquired from the Nawáb. In spite of this offer Mr. Mostyn found no probability of procuring the places desired by the Company.

Some time after the Marátha State fell into the confusion which at present distracts it. Still we took no step for attaining by force of arms the possession of Sálsette, notwithstanding the opportunity was very favourable, and that we have reason to conclude Sálsette with the small adjacent isles was ceded to the Crown by the marriage contract between King Charles II. and the King of Portugal. Previous to the receipt of your letter to the Board communicating the intelligence of your Honour having taken upon you the government of Bengal, we received advice from Mr. Robert Henshaw (a gentleman in the service then residing on some business of the Company's at Goa) that the Portuguese had this season received with their new Captain General (Dom Joze Pedro da Camara) a very considerable reinforcement of men and ships from Europe, and that their undoubted designs were immediately to attempt recovering from the Maráthás the possession of Sálsette and Bassein and the other countries they formerly held so far north as Daman. The distracted situation of Marátha affairs left us no doubt that with the force they command the Portuguese would certainly gain possession of Sálsette, which is their favourite object, and most probably of the other parts of their former possessions. Had this taken place it would not only have effectually prevented us ever acquiring Sálsette for the Honourable Company, but the Portuguese would then again have had it in their power to obstruct our trade by being in possession of the principal passes to the inland country, and to lay whatever imposition they pleased upon us. In this emergency what remained for us to do? Had we sat inactive spectators of the event, we should in our opinions have betrayed the interests of our Honorable Employers. Had we wrote to you for instruction and advice, your sentiments and recommendations most probably must have arrived much too late to have enabled us to prevent the execution of the designs of the

Chapter I.

History.

Capture of
Sálsette,
1774.

Chapter I.
History.
 Capture of
 Sálsette,
 1774.

Portuguese. And though we had not any account at this time of your being established in your government of Fort William, and consequently were not restricted by law from pursuing such measures as we judged most for the interest of our Honourable Employers, yet as the matter was in every point of view of an important nature, and we shortly expected to hear you were arrived, we should have been very glad to have submitted to your judgment the direction of the measures necessary to be pursued. But seeing that we were obliged, either to act at this very juncture or entirely to give up all thoughts of attempting to avert the evils with which we were threatened, we determined, after the most mature consideration, in order to prevent the mischiefs which must have ensued to the interests of the Honourable Company from the Portuguese being in possession, to attempt at obtaining Sálsette for our Honourable Employers. As some months before the killedár of Thána, the principal fort on the island, had offered for a sum of money to deliver it to us, the President was empowered to close with him on the most moderate terms. But the killedár now excused himself alleging that the ministry at Poona having obtained intelligence of the Portuguese designs had reinforced his garrison, which put it out of his power to deliver the fort in the manner he before wished to do. Nothing therefore remained but to send such a force as was judged necessary to reduce Thána. This was accordingly despatched under the command of Brigadier General Gordon and Mr. Watson superintendent of our marine. We have the pleasure to acquaint you that after our army had been thirteen days before the place, Thána, the principal fort on the island, was taken by storm the 28th instant; Vesáva another fort on Sálsette was also taken by a separate force under the command of Lieutenant Colonel Keating, and in consequence the whole island is now in our possession. The surrender yesterday of the island of Karanja completes the conquests we had determined to make near this place.

The very day after our forces set out against Thána, part of the Portuguese fleet appeared off Bombay with their train under their convoy bound to Daman, a settlement they still retain to the northward of this place. So soon as he gained intelligence of our proceedings, the commander of the fleet delivered a formal protest, by direction as he said of the Captain General of Goa, which shews the necessity of the measure we have pursued, and corroborates Mr. Henshaw's account of their intentions. To this protest we delivered a suitable reply, and thus the matter rests. On a moderate calculation the yearly revenues of Sálsette amount to about Rs. 3,30,000 and those of Karanja to about Rs. 40,000. We shall fix suitable civil establishments at each of these places for their government and for the collection of their revenues, with a proper military force for their protection.¹

The same day (December 31st, 1774) General Gordon forwarded

¹ *Hom. Gov. Diary* 31st Dec. 1774, Secret and Political Diary 15 of 1774, 260-266; *Forrest's Marátha Series*, I. Pt. I. 204-205.

to the Board the following details of the final settlement of Sálsette: Enclosed I send you a copy of a letter I received last night from Captain Stewart at Ghodbandar agreeable to which report, to make Ghodbandar an established post, we are now sending four nine-pounders taken from the *Triumph* prahm. You will observe by Captain Stewart's account that Dhárávi battery has been long abandoned. I have ordered him to make himself sure of that particular by observing it narrowly. Captain Stewart will inform me when the post is established and secured with a proper detachment and then return here with the remainder. The people of distinction, whom the Board mentioned in their letter, are either killed or fled, except those sent to Bombay; besides these, some *suhedárs* and others of great note were killed. By the custom of war the commanding officer of artillery is entitled to all bells found in places taken from the enemy. Major Lee claims one large bell in the Portuguese Church within the town. I would wish to know whether the Board will be pleased to allow him consideration for it, or whether he may make a demand on the clergy and parishioners.¹

Next day (1st January 1775) General Gordon forwarded to the Board the following additional particulars: In Ghodbandar he imagined it would be proper to leave fifty Europeans, two companies of sepoy, fifteen artillery, and thirty lascars; and for Thána and the small forts on the river 150 European infantry, 50 artillery, 100 lascars, and one battalion of sepoy would be necessary for the garrison of Thána. For some time there must be frequent detachments to protect the villages and to drive away the Marátha plunderers. He mentioned that as the batty was not yet threshed out, that part of the revenue had not been collected by the Maráthás, that every thing remained quiet and the inhabitants continued to return in great numbers to their houses.²

On the 2nd January he added: The garrison at Ghodbandar and the presence there of the *Wolf* and *Fly* would prevent the enemy's boats being troublesome. All was quiet at Thána. They were going on as fast as possible clearing the rubbish ruins and filth from the fort. As not less than four hundred barrels of powder were found in the fort, the three hundred barrels were returned to Bombay. Thirteen mortars and one hundred and seven pieces of cannon were found on the enemy's works.³

On these letters at a Consultation of 3rd January 1775 the Board passed the following orders: Such a force as the Brigadier General may judge necessary to remain for the defence of Thána and the other posts to be maintained on Sálsette must be left there, regard being at the same time had to the force which it may at times be necessary to detach for the protection of the inhabitants from Marátha incursions. This requisite garrison to be left under the command of Lieut.-Colonel Cockburn, General Gordon with

Chapter I.

History.

Capture of
Sálsette,
1774.

A Post at
Ghodbandar,
1775.

¹ Letter from Brigadier General Gordon to the President and Council, Thána 31st Dec. 1774, Pub. Diary 67 of 1775, 9-10.

² Bom. Gov. Diary 2nd Jan. 1775, Pub. Diary 67 of 1775, 2.

³ Pub. Diary, 67 of 1775, 11.

**Chapter I.
History.**

**A Post at
Ghodbandar,
1775.**

the remainder of the force returning to Bombay and sending back such of the stores as are no longer wanted. Except the wounded who must be cared for, the ordinary prisoners must be landed on the opposite shore, after being entirely disarmed. The brass guns and mortars found in Thána fort are to be sent to Bombay.¹

In a Consultation of the 4th January 1775 Government write: Signed and dated our fair instructions to Mr. James Sibbald, provisional Resident, Messrs. Gregory Page, Patrick Crawford Bruce, and Edmund Veale Lane appointed factors at Thána, for the management and government of that island and for the collections of the Honourable Company's revenues. Wherein we gave them such directions for their government as were necessary to form this new establishment on a proper footing.²

**Instructions to
the Chief at
Karanja,
1775.**

In their Consultation of 6th January 1775 Government write: Signed our instructions to Mr. David Carnegie appointing him to reside at Karanja, giving him necessary directions, and acquainting him that he was to collect the revenues of Karanja, Elephanta, and Hog Islands.³

**Thána Fort,
1775.**

On his return to Bombay on the 9th January 1775 General Gordon submitted the following account of Thána Fort: The fort of Thána is a regular pentagon, with three large bastions, towers at the salient angles, a tower and cavalier over the land gate and a work begun but not finished over the river gate. A good ditch with counterscarp runs from the returning angle of the south-east tower to the land gate, where there is no retaining wall to the rampart. The Máráthás wisely seeing the almost unsurmountable difficulties of an attack from this side, have not paid that attention to its defences which they have on the others. The south-east tower against which, and the shoulder of the adjoining bastion our principal attack was directed, has two tiers of guns and a powder magazine below. It is extremely strong and was as fine a piece of masonry as I ever saw. In making our approaches on this side we had the advantage of being entirely under cover of houses to within 280 yards of the works. Many of these houses were set on fire by the enemy but their walls afforded excellent shelter to the troops. The houses nearest the fort will, I believe, be found to belong to the officers of Government, or to Bráhmans who will not readily claim them. I am of opinion that, as soon as possible, these houses, together with the Darbár, should be pulled down in order to form an esplanade of at least 800 yards. If this is done, if the breaches which we made in the wall are rebuilt, and if the works in general are repaired, I will venture to pronounce that with its present garrison and plenty of ammunition stores and provisions, Thána would be in a very defensible and respectable state. Within the fort is plenty of water and a number of small irregular ill built houses and huts which should be pulled down and the ground levelled. I have directed Major Lee to examine and report the

¹ Bom. Gov. Consultation 3rd Jan. 1775, Pub. Diary 67 of 1775, 3-4.

² Bom. Gov. Diary 4th Jan. 1775, Pub. Diary 67 of 1775, 13.

³ Bom. Gov. Diary 6th Jan. 1775, Pub. Diary 67 of 1775, 14.

state and calibre of the guns, 107 of which were found in the fort, and to make a demand of what guns he wants to put the place in a proper state of defence. Agreeable to the orders of the Board I enclose a copy of the instructions which I have given to Lieutenant-Colonel Cockburn who is appointed to command at Thána. By the last paragraph of your letter of the 3rd instant, you are pleased expressly to forbid any repairs being made without particular orders from you. As a literal compliance with this order would have risked the conquest we had made, as the breach was open and easy of access, I took upon me to direct the engineer to stockade and scarp the breach, to clear the ditch, and to go on removing the ruins from the towers and works in order to make room for our guns. In repairing them the towers should not be roofed over. If even a small breach is made in the wall, the weight of the terrace at the top will be apt to reduce the whole to ruins. To considerably widen the ditch would certainly add greatly to the strength of the place, and a glacis might be formed from the earth thrown up. Whether at present it is expedient to undertake so expensive a work remains to be considered. In any case the ditch should be carried on immediately round to the south-east tower. Had this been done it would have added considerably to our difficulties in the siege.

In every part of Sálsette which I have seen the roads are very bad, indeed so bad as to render the movement of troops very difficult, and that of artillery nearly impossible. I submit to your consideration whether the making good roads is not an object well worth attention, as well for military purposes as for the conveniency of the inhabitants, who, when a little more settled, might be taxed to assist in so useful a work. I have ordered Engineer Whitman, who is at present employed in completing the post at Ghodbandar, to begin as soon as possible taking a chart of the river, ascertaining the width depth and windings. The post at Ghodbandar is by nature very strong. I sent four nine-pounders there, which with its garrison gives us little to apprehend from any attack, though it is not above four miles from Bassein. Ghodbandar commands the river, and near it is a very fertile district, which produces a great quantity of grain. Dhárávi battery has long been abandoned; it is two to three miles south-west of Bassein. I am informed on account of a long sandy point vessels going from Bassein must come close to Dhárávi. From its distance from Thána and the badness of the roads I could not be informed about Dhárávi as I wished to be. I imagine it will not be difficult to examine it by the way of Vesáva, or by water. If it has such command as it is said to have, Dhárávi is certainly a post of much importance, and no time should be lost in taking possession of it. At the same time it becomes a matter worthy of the most serious consideration of the Board, how far our present force is able to maintain possession of and repel attacks on our new conquests without hazarding too much the safety of our other settlements. My sentiments on the subject are that as soon as it can be done, two battalions of sepoys should be raised and added

Chapter I.

History.

Thána Fort,
1775.

Sálsette,
1775.

**Chapter I.
History.**

Sálsette,
1775.

to those we now have. This additional force, all things considered, will not be more than equivalent to the force employed on Sálsette, or indeed not equal to it, if a strong detachment is sent from the Presidency to Dhárávi to take post there. At present we are so far from being able to furnish any detachments for the cruizers, that we have not men to mount the common guards. As 130 lascars were left on duty at Thána and Ghodbandar, they should be replaced as soon as possible as they are a very useful body of men.¹

On the 18th January the Board ordered the Resident and factors at Thána to be very expeditious in adjusting the *toka* or share of batty.² The Company's share must be sent hither and the proprietors are to be permitted to export the remainder to this place only. Mr. Francis William Pemberton is appointed to reside at Vesáva to collect the revenues in the district about that place. He is subordinate to the Resident and factors at Thána, to whom the accounts are to be transmitted; but the batty he collects must be sent to Bombay. To hasten the collection of the Company's share of rice, the Board further ordered that, except the Resident, the several servants at Thána be sent to different districts of the island.³

Portuguese
Protest,
1775.

At the same Consultation (18th January) was read translation of the following letter from the Captain General at Goa to the President and Council, dated Goa 26th December 1774: As soon as I learnt that your Excellency projected negotiations or conquests over the fortified towns and countries that have been possessed and governed by the Portuguese Stato in this region, I endeavoured to put a stop to the same and to preserve the rights which the Royal Crown of Portugal has in those countries, by causing to be delivered to your Excellency the protest bearing date the 16th instant. I am clearly informed that your Excellency had organised an expedition against the town of Thána, that you had blockaded the said town, that you were beating down its walls, that you were in treaty about conquering the same, and intended to make permanent your conquests over the other countries above mentioned, whether by yourselves alone or united with an Asiatic Power. This obliges me to repeat and again to intimate to your Excellency that for the space of two hundred years the said fortification of Thána Bassein and other countries and jurisdictions, situated from Chaul to Daman, had been the dominion and possession of the State of Portugal. And that although, not quite forty years ago, unjustly animated as is probable by other powers, the Maráthas unfortunately invaded and took those fortifications and countries, yet the state of Portugal neither lost the right it had therein nor the intention of regaining them, nor did it omit at any

¹ Letter from Brigadier General Gordon to the President and Council, 9th Jan. 1775, Pub. Diary 67 of 1775, 25-29.

² One of the special forms of tenure merged in the revenue survey tenure is *dhép* or lump also called *taka*, *toka*, or *hon*. Bombay Gazetteer, Thána, XIII. Pt. II. 530-531. See also pages 550 note 2, 551 note 5, 565 note 7. *Hundabandi* or *tokabandi* is a vague form of lump assessment. Ditto, 574, 583 note 1.

³ Bom. Gov. Consultation 18th Jan. 1775, Pub. Diary 67 of 1775, 67.

time to do every thing requisite once more to obtain the dominion of those countries.

I persuade myself that when your Excellency resolved to attack Thána, you considered only the interests of the British Nation in Asia, and not your general interest, nor the attention due to the Portuguese State in India. I am certain on your Excellency looking into the gift of the island of Bombay, and the treaty by which it was bequeathed in the Royal Marriage Contract of Senhora Donna Catharina, you will find that His Majesty has for himself and his vassals engaged not to prejudice at any time the rights that the Portuguese Nation had in Asia, but on the contrary always to assist in defending the same. Reflecting on the said treaty, on the obligation of this alliance, on public faith reciprocally promised, and on the sacred ties of hospitality by which the British Nation obtained and still preserves a dominion which the Portuguese Nation formerly had in this part of the east, I expect that your Excellency will know, in all your proceedings, how much these projects and actions are contrary and odious to the abovementioned treaty and its ties, to the public faith, and to the decorum of the British Nation. I rely that in your great prudence you will on this consideration abstain and desist from acts so provoking. Should, contrary to my expectation, your Excellency not attend to these reasons, I do make most formal protest, declaring that your Excellency is the infractor of the public peace of the said two nations by so strange a proceeding, so contrary to the meaning of the said defensive treaty subsisting between the two Royal Crowns of our said nations, protesting against you also for all the prejudices and all sensible consequences which from these facts may ensue. Your Excellency may remain persuaded that all these damages may be recompensed from the interest which England has in the Portuguese dominions, in which there are to the English Nation much greater pledges and much more important ones than the prejudices your Excellency promotes and intends causing to this state, without entering into other most important considerations, of the danger to which your nation shall be exposed by the loss of many millions which it gains from Portugal, through the effect of their esteemable alliance and which must be put a stop to by a continuation of these strange proceedings. Neither can I dispense with informing His Faithful Majesty on all the above, being certain that His British Majesty and the whole of the English Nation will grant in this respect the most circumspect satisfaction, making your Excellency responsible for all that you shall do, and for as much as shall happen on this most important particular.¹

After consideration, ordered that a suitable but short reply be sent.²

A Consultation the 24th January 1775 records: The engineer reports that it is necessary to form an esplanade to the fort to the

Chapter I.
History.

Portuguese
Protest,
1775.

Thána
Esplanade,
1775.

¹ Translation of a Letter from the Captain General at Goa to the President and Council, 26th Dec. 1774, Pub. Diary 67 of 1775, 71-75.

² Bom. Gov. Consultation 18th Jan. 1775, Pub. Diary 67 of 1775, 68.

Chapter I.

History.

Thána
Esplanade,
1775.

distance of 600 yards. The President who has been on the spot is of opinion that for the present the distance of 400 yards will be most proper; to extend the esplanade beyond that line would be attended with too much inconvenience to the inhabitants. The engineer reports that to make an esplanade will be attended with little expense, as many of the houses within that distance were so much damaged during the siege, that they must be pulled down, and, as many others belong to the Bráhmans and officers of Government, who have left the place, and their houses are become the Company's; Resolved that an esplanade be made at Thána to the distance of 400 yards round the fort as recommended by the President, and to encourage the inhabitants whose houses must come down, it is agreed and ordered that the materials of the houses that are to be pulled down, that did belong to the officers of Government who have left the place, be distributed amongst the others, which must be done with the utmost impartiality and in such a manner as will prove most satisfactory to those whom we intend to benefit thereby. Whatever buildings the inhabitants may from henceforward erect, must be lined out into streets of 50 feet wide at least and the cross streets not less than 36 feet wide.¹

At a Consultation on the 28th January 1775 after reading such part of the advices from Thána as related to the repairs of the fort and to the making of an esplanade the Board order that the ditch to the fort be cleared and the breach repaired that the fort may again be in a defensible state; that after these two necessary services are completed the esplanade must be made to the distance of 400 yards and no more. That to extend the esplanade to 600 yards as the Engineer recommends, the whole town must be pulled down which would be too great a discouragement to the inhabitants and might disgust them with our government: that at the same time no new buildings were to be erected within 600 yards of the fort.²

Raids in Sálsatte
1775.

On the 28th January 1775 the President wrote to the Resident at Thána, directing him to require the commanding officer immediately to send a detachment of 350 men from Thána Vesáva and Ghodbandar to protect the villages and drive off the Maráthás.³

On the 30th January 1775 came to hand by special messenger from Thána a letter from the Resident, dated this day, acquainting the President that the enemy had landed about 400 men at Dhárávi, but that a detachment of 16 Europeans and 100 sepoys advanced from Ghodbandar to the relief of Dhárávi had driven every Marátha off the island before the detachment from Thána had arrived. Ten Marátha prisoners and one boat had been taken but a considerable quantity of batty was destroyed.⁴

Sea Fights with
the Maráthás,
1775.

At a Consultation, the 7th February 1775, the President lays before the Board a letter received from Commodore Moore, giving an

¹ Bom. Gov. Consultation, 24th Jan. 1775, Pub. Diary 67 of 1775, 97-98.

² Bom. Gov. Consultation, 28th Jan. 1775, Pub. Diary 67 of 1775, 118.

³ Bom. Gov. Consultation, 28th Jan. 1775, Pub. Diary 67 of 1775, 117.

⁴ Bom. Gov. Diary 30th Jan. 1775, Pub. Diary 67 of 1775, 126.

account of the motions of the Marátha fleet. Ordered that as the Maráthás have now commenced hostilities by sea, it is resolved the Commodore and all the officers in command of our fighting vessels be directed to take, sink, burn, or otherwise destroy all or any of the enemy's vessels whensoever or wheresoever they meet them, provided always that the same does not interfere with the effectual protection of such merchant boats or vessels as may be at any time under their convoy. A letter must be prepared for Commodore Hughes, who may shortly be expected on the coast, advising him of the hostile proceedings of the Marátha fleet, and desiring that he will treat them accordingly, and the Chief and factors at Tellicherry be instructed to acquaint the commanders of His Majesty's ships that may arrive on the coast of these particulars that they may act accordingly.¹

At a Consultation, the 16th February 1775, the Board record a letter from the President of Karanja, dated the 15th, in which he enclosed a statement of the annual revenues of that island as collected by the Maráthás amounting to Rs. 51,134½ and represented that last year the Maráthás farmed the customs for Rs. 20,000 which the inhabitants represented as a great grievance, the farmer having many opportunities of oppressing them. He also acquainted us minutely with the present state of the revenues enclosing the account current with the different farmers, and requested our directions on several particulars.²

At a Consultation, the 28th February 1775, the Board read advices from the Resident and factors at Thána on which the following observations were made and orders issued:

You are to lay in a quantity of batty at Thána and at the posts on Sálsette, as a store sufficient to serve the garrisons, sepoys, and labourers for six months: the rest must be sent to Bombay; for we must conclude that the amount of batty remaining with the Corumbees (Kunbis) or villagers, after the *loka* or Government share is delivered, must be sufficient for the consumption of the inhabitants and for seed. To prevent a scarcity no rice may be exported from Sálsette, not even to Bombay, till the price may be reduced below Rs. 16 the *morah* (*muda*). As this is the price at which it is always issued in Bombay, the batty issued to the sepoys and labourers must be charged at Rs. 22½ the *muda*, whether this is dearer or cheaper than the market rate. An account of Bombay daily wages to labourers and artificers must be sent to Thána, with orders to the chief and factors not to allow higher wages at Sálsette. For the encouragement of settlers on Sálsette, resolved that no duties be collected on the importation into Sálsette of any provisions nor on the exportation of provisions from Sálsette to Bombay. A proclamation to this purpose to be affixed in Bombay, and copies of it dispersed all over Sálsette, that none of the inhabitants may be ignorant of the benefits intended them. As the people round Dhárávi suffered severely in the last Marátha

Chapter I. History.

Sea Fights with
the Maráthás,
1775.

Karanja
Revenue,
1775.

Thána Revenue,
1775.

¹ Bom. Gov. Consultation, 7th Feb. 1775, Pub. Diary 67 of 1775, 164 - 165.

² Bom. Gov. Consultation, 16th Feb. 1775, Pub. Diary 67 of 1775, 197 - 198.

Chapter I.
History.

Thána Revenue,
1775.

incursion on which account 50 *mudás* of batty was distributed among them, it is agreed that this rice shall not be demanded back, but that the people be informed it is a gift from the Company in consideration of their late sufferings.¹

A Consultation of the 1st March 1775 records: A proclamation was this day published by beat of drum in the customary manner, and affixed in the usual places, signifying agreeable to our resolution in our last Consultation that from henceforward all customs were abolished on the importation of any kinds of provisions on Sálsette, on the transportation of provisions from one part of the island to another, and on the exportation of the same from Sálsette to the island of Bombay, and also on the importation of all kinds of provisions and necessaries from Sálsette hither.²

At a Consultation on the 31st October 1775 the Board ordered that on the owners producing a Thána Customs Master's certificate, all copper manufactured on Sálsette and all articles the produce of that island from goods which have paid customs there, may be imported into Bombay free of customs.³

Dhárávi and
Ghodbandar,
1775.

On the 15th March 1775 Brigadier General Gordon submitted the following details regarding Ghodbandar and Dhárávi: The situation of Dhárávi gives such command of the entrance of the Bassein river that it will be extremely difficult for any vessels to pass in or out. On the battery, which is at the foot of a very steep hill, are three 18-pounders and three 12-pounders. I cannot approve of the platform which is made of terrace instead of stone of which there is plenty. If it had been made of stone, the platform would have been much sooner fit for service. It would have lasted a great deal longer, and would have been repaired in far less time and at a less expense. Another capital fault in this platform is that instead of having the usual slope to check the recoil of the guns, and to render it easy to run them home after firing, it is made level, so that the guns must recoil a great way, and require many more men to work them. The roof too, which is intended to be carried over the battery, is so low as greatly to incommode the gunners in using their rammers and sponges. In the rear of the battery is to be a magazine and guard-room, with a traverse to cover them. On the left is a small tower, from which a couple of guns placed in barbet would have a very extensive command towards the bar. The hill is so steep that steps should be cut in it before the rains, otherwise it will be almost impossible to get up or down that side next the battery. A redoubt on the top of the hill with barracks for the troops, and with a fliche (a work open to the rear and commanded by the redoubt) at a small distance from it, will leave us little to apprehend from any attacks that may be made on that post. The troops should be put under cover as soon as possible, and oil and

¹ Bom. Gov. Consultation, 28th Feb. 1775, Pub. Diary 67 of 1775, 209-211. Comp. of Standing Ord. Vol. 2 of 1759-1788, 102.

² Bom. Gov. Diary 1st March 1775, Pub. Diary 67 of 1775, 223-224.

³ Bom. Gov. Consultation, 31st Oct. 1775, Pub. Diary 68 of 1775, 795. Comp. of Standing Ord. Vol. 3 of 1759-1788, 172.

candles (of the want of which they complain at present) should be sent over to all the posts for the use of the guards. At Bháyndar, about half-way between Dhárávi and Ghodbandar, an officer and sixty sepoy are stationed. As this is an open village opposite to Bassein, with a beach of several miles on which the enemy may land, I am of opinion that the guard should be augmented to one hundred sepoy. Signals betwixt Bháyndar Dhárávi and Ghodbandar may easily be settled, so as to communicate to each other any motions which the enemy may at any time make, should they attempt to land on that side of Sálsette. Ghodbandar is in a very defensible state, but the temporary roofs with which the barracks are at present covered will by no means serve for the rains, neither will the huts in which the sepoy are, protect them from the inclemency of the weather.¹

Experience showed the remission of taxation had been carried too far. On 1st May 1775 Government signed and despatched to Thána, by special messenger, a letter to the Chief and factors revoking their orders for discontinuing the levy of *ghar patti* or house cess, of *bandar patti* or harbour cess, and of *mohhtarfa* or shop tax. These were again to be collected as heretofore.² Six months later, the 15th November 1775, the Board observe: Directions must be sent to the Chief and factors of Thána to collect customs only on such goods as are actually sold at Thána or any of the other parts of Sálsette, and to permit the merchants to carry away such goods as they do not sell there, without any customs being paid thereon.³

At a Consultation, the 12th December 1775, the Board read letters from the Chief and factors at Thána, with enclosed letters from the officers at the different outposts on Sálsette, representing the scarcity of provisions and requesting to be allowed batta. After consideration agree that as we are sensible provisions are very scarce and dear, and as on that account the troops at those posts are allowed provisions, batta be granted to the officers at all the outposts on Sálsette where the troops are allowed provisions. This regulation to take place from the time we have had the island in our possession. The Chief and factors must be directed to issue to the troops at the outposts the salt meat they have in store at Thána. The Board also resolve that when the lands in Sálsette are next leased, a clause be inserted in the leases obliging the farmers to raise live stock of all kinds, which we hope will be the means of making provisions more plentiful and will save the Company the extraordinary expense of batta and provisions to the officers and troops there; meanwhile the Chief and factors to be instructed to give the inhabitants every encouragement to rear live stock.⁴

Chapter I.

History.

Dhárávi and
Ghodbandar,
1775.

Taxes
Re-imposed,
1775.

¹ Letter from Brigadier General Gordon to the President and Council, 15th March 1775, Pub. Diary 67 of 1775, 270-273.

² Bom. Gov. Diary 1st May 1775, Pub. Diary 67 of 1775, 363. One of the taxes on traders alone was *mohhtarfa*—a tax on shopkeepers, varying with their means, in fact an income-tax. Bombay Gazetteer, Poona, XVIII. Pt. II. 323 note 1.

³ Bom. Gov. Consultation 15th Nov. 1775, Pub. Diary 68 of 1775, 814.

⁴ Bom. Gov. Consultation 12th Dec. 1775, Pub. Diary 68 of 1775, 844-845.

Chapter I.**History.**Want of Money,
1774.

In 1774 Bombay seems to have suffered from a serious scarcity of money. On the 12th April 1775 the Court wrote: Your resolution to dispose of our oarts villages and batty grounds in case supplies of money should not be sent you from Bengal, can be justified only by the most pressing and absolute necessity. We hope that the measures taken by our servants at Fort William to throw money into your hands by means of ships returning with specie from the Gulf and the license given you to draw upon us will have rendered the above disagreeable expedient totally unnecessary. Therefore we shall not at present enter further upon the subject. In the same letter the Court continue: We are astonished at your conduct in directing Mr. Mostyn to attempt borrowing money at Poona. We are well assured that step could tend only to expose our affairs without any reasonable hope of obtaining relief. As to your subsequent proposal to procure money by raising the annual interest paid by us to 12 per cent, it appears to us so improper that we direct you forthwith to take measures for discontinuing the payment of such extravagant interest. Notwithstanding your distress for money, we observe that in the height of that distress you ventured to accept bills drawn from Balambangan (in Borneo) for so large a sum as Rs. 1,40,000 for which no value had been received and of which circumstance you were not ignorant. Your proceedings in that transaction were so contrary to your duty and so repugnant to our interest that you merit our severest censure and we hereby reprimand the majority of our Council for preferring the interest and convenience of an individual to that of the Company in opposition to the sentiments of two members of the Board, whose dissents on the occasion do them great honour and were unanswerably conclusive against the measure.¹

Encouragement
to Trade,
1775.

As regards encouragement to trade the Court write in the same April letter: As it is our wish to give every encouragement in our power to the trade of Bombay and Surat, we direct that regular convoys be appointed monthly or oftener if you shall judge it proper, to and from those ports. We are fully convinced that vessels on the Surat station with a small assistance from your Presidency, will in general be fully adequate to such service without increasing your marine establishment.²

Aid to Peshwa
Rághoba,
1775.

On the 22nd of January 1775 the Bombay Government took the important step of accepting the Peshwa Rághoba's application for a body of troops to join his army to reduce to obedience a section of his subjects, who wished to deprive Rághoba not only of the Peshwaship but of any share in the government of the Marátha empire.³ To represent their motives in making engagements with the Peshwa Raghunáth Rao the Bombay Government deputed

¹ Court to Bombay 12th April 1775 paras 40-42, Pub. Dep. Court's Letters Vol. 9 of 1772-1777, 227-228.

² Court to Bombay 12th April 1775 para 60, Pub. Dep. Court's Letters Vol. 9 of 1772-1777, 234.

³ Secret and Pol. Diary 16 of 1775, 20. For articles of agreement between the Hon. William Hornby President and Governor and Council and Rághoba, dated 6th Mar. 1775, see Ditto 118-127 and Forrest's Marátha Series, I. Pt. II. 211-215.

Mr. William Tayler to Calcutta by whom the following letter, dated Calcutta 9th October 1775, was addressed to the Hon'ble Mr. Warren Hastings, Governor General of India: 'To form a proper judgment of the motives which guided the Government of Bombay in concluding this treaty with Rághoba Peshwa, it will be necessary to be acquainted with the views of the Honourable Company regarding Bombay. The safety and accessibleness of Bombay harbour at all seasons of the year together with its vicinity to the Maráthás, and particularly to one of the passes through which the whole of the country above the Gháts might be supplied with English articles, seem chiefly to have engaged the attention of the Company in the acquisition of this island. How just were their speculations is shown by the fact that woollens and other English staples are disposed of at Bombay and the markets which it supplies, to the amount of 14 lákhs annually. Besides this, the convenience of the harbour has secured to the English, and to those who trade under their protection, almost the exclusive trade in Indian commodities with the country of the Maráthás, as well as in the cotton with which Bengal and China is supplied, the whole bringing in an annual profit of Rs. 2,70,000 in customs to the Company.¹ The influence which the Company have in the government of Surat enables them to check the commerce of rival European nations, a power the more valuable as, next to Bombay, Surat is the chief mart for the vend of staples the entire monopoly of which is the Company's leading commercial aim on the west side of India. For a considerable time commerce alone engaged the attention of the Company at Bombay. The construction of docks, the excellent supply of timber, and of skilled artificers gave Bombay a military consequence. On this point nothing need be added to the testimony of the Commanders of His Majesty's squadrons that, in the impossibility of arranging repairs elsewhere, the superiority at sea in this quarter of the globe during the last war was chiefly due to the docks and the ready assistance found in Bombay. In 1768, sensible of the importance of a strong naval station and also aware of the defenceless state of Bombay, the Honourable the Court of Directors sent out Colonel Campbell to inspect the fortifications, with positive orders to us implicitly to follow his plan. At the same time knowing the inadequacy of our garrison to the defence of the place, they very considerably enlarged our military establishment. Previous to this the expense of Bombay had exceeded its revenues. The Directors were sensible that this great increase in charges must distress the Government for means to defray them, and furnish their investments for Europe and China. Knowing also that territorial acquisition would alone furnish a revenue equal to the necessities of that settlement, they laid down a system for the attainment of territory, namely the acquisition of Sálsette and Bassein with the Maráthás' share of the revenues of Surat. These they imagined would complete their views, and this I must again repeat they urgently and especially enjoined us to

Chapter I.

History.

Aid to Peshwa
Rághoba,
1775.

¹ In 1761-62 the customs revenue amounted to Rs. 1,57,000 while in 1772-73 it stood at Rs. 2,70,000. Pub. Diary 39 of 1762, 635 and 65 of 1774, 109.

Chapter I.**History.**

Aid to Peshwa
Raghola,
1775.

embrace every opportunity to attain, and to this alone to direct all our political and military operations, declaring it at the same time to be the utmost extent of their wishes on the west of India. In the cessions stipulated by the treaty with the Peshwa the views of the Company have been completed beyond their hopes, as, exclusive of a revenue equal to its expenses and occasions, the commercial and military advantages of Bombay are permanently secured. On Salsette Karanja and Bassein, Bombay may safely depend for all provisions. Further, by possessing Bassein and its districts, we ensure to ourselves a part of the timber necessary to our marine yard, the want of which would so greatly distress our works. If Bassein were to fall into an enemy's hand or were any dispute with the Maráthás to arise during a war with France, the Bombay Docks which are now so valuable would for want of timber be rendered almost useless. In the districts ceded by the Peshwa in Gujarát grows the cotton for the Bengal market, which secures to the English and to those under English protection the entire trade in this article, and to the Company the whole customs on that trade. Exclusive of these direct advantages we shall entirely preclude the Dutch who have long been soliciting a settlement at Bassein, from all rivalry with the Company in the trade to the Maráthá dominions. We shall also prevent the dangerous consequences that might attend the neighbourhood of so active and enterprising a nation, who have never been known to let slip an opportunity of extending themselves. Should they at any time embrace an opportunity to get possession of Bassein, with the means they would have to distress our trade and carry on their own, it seems very probable that but little would be left to the English at Bombay. This acquisition also defeats the known and declared designs of the Portuguese and the probable views of the French who from former steps and their now sending so many ships to the west of India seem to incline also to participate with us in the commerce there. The striking advantages of these possessions will, I trust, be deemed worthy of the most serious regard when it is considered that the maintenance of Bombay is necessary in the general system of the Company's affairs. Instead of causing an annual loss of above £150,000 sterling, instead of being a burthen upon your presidency, at best troublesome and in the end perhaps dangerous, all chiefly for a local advantage till then uncertain, Bombay would become a winning settlement of near eight lákhs which will be a difference to the Company of £250,000 a year. It would be in a state to afford certain assistance of all kinds to a squadron in time of war, to secure the commerce of the west of India in English hands, and above all to frustrate the great rivals of the Company in their views of participating in our trade with the Maráthá dominions, an object in itself of great importance, as on this trade depends the Company's chief vend of woollens and the other staples of our Native Country.

Such were the great and leading motives which induced the Government of Bombay to engage with the Peshwa Raghunáthráv. It seemed the very crisis wished for by the Company, an opportunity of accomplishing with honour, with justice, and

without the hazard of a general war, the objects the Company had so strenuously enjoined the Bombay Government ever to keep in view. With the Company's special and repeated orders on this head before them, unrepealed by the very letter which accompanied the new Act, so far from meaning a disregard to that Act or to the power with which it vests your Honour, the Government of Bombay would have deemed themselves wanting in their conception of the words "except in such cases as when the said President and Council respectively shall have received special orders from the said United Company," and most wanting to their employers had they so slumbered on their interests as to let pass by unregarded this opportunity, perhaps the only one that may ever offer, of establishing the Company's affairs on the west of India on the footing they have so long sought to place them. To have hesitated closing with the Peshwa would in effect have been the same as a plain refusal. For, in the situation he then was, the Peshwa must certainly have had recourse to other assistance. And from the respectable footing in which the late increase of their military and the total change of government has placed them, it would most probably have been to the Portuguese who would gladly have cherished a stroke of fortune so unexpectedly co-operating in the very views to which all their late expenses and arrangements have solely tended, namely, the recovery of the provinces of the north, the grand object of their interest and honour ever since the capture of them in 1739 by Chimmaji Appa. This they would certainly have now obtained had it not been for an interference equally timely and fortunate for the Honourable Company.

Other strong inducements were not wanting to the Bombay Government to take the part they did. The reduction of Salsette without the consent of either party of the Marathas rendered it necessary to side with one, in order to procure a degree of title to the possession and to prevent the disagreeable alternative of either endangering the safety of the settlement by relinquishing this conquest, or of sustaining at some period a general war with the combined Maratha forces. A due attention to the safety and tranquillity of the Company's possessions in the east of Hindustan was also no small motive in these engagements. It was judged that should the success of the confederates at Poona end in the total depression of Raghoba, and once give them leisure to advert to other objects, the very first object that would strike their attention would be to enrich themselves by the collection of the *chauth* in the name of their *Sarkar*. In this all parties among the Marathas never fail to concur. I cannot pretend to say how far the Bengal provinces might be endangered. But from its vicinity there seems no doubt they would pay the Karnatak a visit. They never want a pretence and the reduction of Tanjor had given great jealousy at Poona, particularly to the Maratha chiefs to whose head the Raja of Tanjor is related. For these reasons the safety and tranquillity of the Company's territories in the east would be longer insured by not suffering the ministerial confederacy to predominate. By the treaty with the Peshwa this great object is for ever accomplished

Chapter I.

History.

Aid to Peshwa
Raghoba,
1775.

Chapter I.

History.

Aid to Peshwa
Raghoba,
1775.

as far as solemn engagements can bind, and could circumstances admit of a general assertion at this period our success in this point might be still more perfect. Induced by these general motives the Government of Bombay concluded a treaty with the Vakil of Raghoba. It was much to be wished that their resources in men and money had been more adequate to this undertaking. But trusting that the same sentiments would generally prevail of the policy and utility of their engagements, the aid of the other Presidencies was not doubted. Accordingly such troops as could possibly be spared embarked for Surat from whence they were to proceed to form a junction with the army of Raghoba in the manner that circumstances on their arrival might point out to be most expedient.

From the southward part of Bassein to the point of Chaul the land forms a deep bay in which lie the islands of Sálsette, Bombay, Karanja, Hog Island, Elephanta, and Canary (Kenery). Bombay is situated about eight miles from the continent and forms the harbour to which it gives its name. Sálsette, which lies north of Bombay, is separated from it by a channel of about half a mile broad, is about twenty miles long and on an average about the same in breadth. Its chief produce is rice. The island is capable of much improvement, not being above two-thirds cultivated and great part of it is also breached by the sea. The fort of Thána about the middle of the eastern side of the island commands a fordable channel, dividing Sálsette from the main. Karanja is a small island to the east of Bombay, forming part of the east side of the harbour. Its chief produce is also rice. It at present yields about Rs. 6000 a year and is capable of improvement. Elephanta is a small island valued at about Rs. 800 a year. Hog Island at the top and Kenery at the mouth of the harbour are little more than barren rocks. Except Kenery, which was not worth reducing, we have possession of all these and hold regular grants for them from the Peshwa. Bassein is a peninsula formed by a large river on the north, by the sea on the west, and by a large river which divides it from Sálsette and to which it gives its name on the south. A cross rivulet or back water which fills during the rains makes the peninsula an island during the greater part of the year. Bassein produces rice, many fruits, and particularly fine sugarcane, and it has an extensive fort on the south, commanding the river. The district of Bassein extends north to Bálda-Párdi (that is Párdi about ten miles south of Balsár) within 8 *kos* or twelve miles of Daman, including Tárápur Máhim . . . Arnála and other towns situated on rivers flowing from the Gháts. We hold the *sanads* for Bassein and its districts. But as we had not sufficient force to reduce them after the departure of our troops to the northward, and as the conducting the Peshwa to Poona was the great object which was to ensure us the peaceable attainment of these places, it was not thought prudent to delay or diminish our force by their previous reduction. The Bassein districts are not therefore as you imagined in our possession. They are still in the hands of the ministerial party.

These acquisitions to the south of Surat form with Bombay a continued chain about 86 miles from north to south. Two additional

battalions of sepoys will, I imagine, be sufficient to maintain the necessary posts, which being called in on any apprehensions from the French will be a considerable reinforcement to the standing army of Bombay. From Bassein to Dáhnú and the rivers comes great part of the timber indispensably necessary for the ships. The revenue of Sálsette with Bassein and its districts is estimated at Rs. 7½ lákhs. Under our government they will, I doubt not, in a few years produce at least ten lákhs.¹

In addressing the Directors on the refusal of the Governor General to approve the treaty with Rághoba, Mr. W. Tayler on the 20th January 1776 wrote: I cannot help again lamenting that the Governor General and Council would neither permit the Government of Bombay to proceed in their engagements with Rághoba, nor entrust to them the accommodation they had determined on. In either case I can confidently assert that at this hour you would have been in quiet possession of an increased revenue of 22 lákhs with all the advantages set forth in my first address to this Government; affairs would have been in tranquillity in the west of India, and your commercial concerns proceeding in their usual channel. Instead of this you may perceive the uncertainty of your political situation in Bombay and the probability there is of being either farther embroiled in military operations, or of making concessions equally inconsistent with your interest and honour. I learn by private accounts that the vend of your woollens and staples is totally at a stand, as, contrary to their agreement with the Government of Bombay, the ministerialists do not suffer the merchants to come down to trade. From this cause this season bids fair to be a very unfortunate one for private merchants. Should the next produce another scene of hostilities, as the stoppage of trade would of course continue, I am afraid many now opulent merchants of Bombay and Surat would be reduced to infinite distress, besides a very considerable loss that must ensue to you by the failure of customs.²

On the 10th June 1776 the Board signed a letter to the Resident at Karanja in which they advised him that in consequence of a reference to the Governor General and Council by the late treaty, they had determined that the islands of Sálsette, Karanja, Hog and Elephanta should remain for ever in possession of the Honourable Company. They therefore directed that this circumstance should be made known to the inhabitants in the most public manner and acquainted him of the standing orders they had established in their Consultation of the 15th ultimo.³

In 1776 the Court write (5th April) to the Bombay Government: Since it becomes you continually to have a vigilant eye upon such powers as from their situation and disposition may at any time

Chapter I.

History.

Aid to Peshwa
Rághoba,
1775.

Karanja
Annexed,
1776.

¹ Letter from Mr. William Tayler to the Hon. Mr. Warren Hastings Governor General of India, Calcutta 9th Oct. 1775, Secret and Political Diary 16 of 1775, 502-521. Forrest's Marátha Series, I. Pt. II. 248-268; Hist. Aect. of Bombay (1781), 2-10.

² Letter from Mr. William Tayler to the Court, Calcutta 20th Jan. 1776, Secret and Political Diary 17 of 1776, 250-251.

³ Bom. Gov. Consultation 10th June 1776, Pub. Diary 70 of 1776, 523.

Chapter I.
History.

affect our interest, we trust that a due sense of your duty has always directed and will still continue to direct you heedfully to observe the public proceedings of the states around you, whether Natives or Europeans, and to endeavour to develope every machination that may be forming against us reflecting on the very important station in which you are placed as guardians of the commercial and political rights of the English nation in those parts committed to your government.¹

Trade
Depression,
1776.

Some months later, 1st December 1776, the following memorial from the European and country merchants of Bombay was addressed to the President and Council: Your memorialists beg leave to represent to your Honour the melancholy state to which the trade of the island is now reduced. Your memorialists and others have many lakhs of rupees of goods now in warehouse totally unsaleable and have been so for more than a twelvemonth past. This ruinous state of affairs is occasioned by the entire stop put to all communication between this island and the Marátha country by the present government at Poona. Your memorialists have for many months past flattered themselves that the communication would have been properly opened in consequence of the late Treaty of Peace.² To their great disappointment and heavy loss they find the impediments to the sale of every kind of goods far greater than before the cessation of arms was proclaimed. Previous to that event the Poona government stood so much in awe of the English power as to permit their Vanjárs and merchants to carry away goods from Bombay. Since that period they have forbidden the Vanjárs and others to have any dealings or intercourse with the English, nor will they suffer English goods to pass their *chaukis* without paying such heavy duties as amount to a prohibition. In this alarming situation your memorialists do most earnestly entreat your Honour will be pleased to make such applications to the Poona government as may induce them to open the communication, agreeable to the tenor of the treaty of peace, and to encourage that free trade between this island and the Marátha country, which it has ever before enjoyed. Your memorialists doubt not your Honour will take into your most serious consideration the adopting such means as may prove speedy and effectual, as they are sensible it must be striking to you that should the same impediments continue but for a twelvemonth longer, the trade of this once flourishing island must be lost for years to come, to the very great detriment of the Company, and to the total ruin of many individuals.³

Protest against
Marátha Dues,
1776.

On receipt of the above memorial the Board observe (11th December 1776): A memorial is now delivered in by the principal European and country merchants representing in the most affecting terms the melancholy state to which the trade of this settlement is

¹ Court to Bombay 5th April 1776 para. 35, Pub. Dep. Court's L. Vol. 9 of 1772-1777, 271.

² See Secret and Political Diary 17A of 1776, 642-647 and Forrest's Marátha Series, I. Pt. II. 277-280, 284.

³ Memorial from the European and country merchants of Bombay, 1st Dec. 1776, Pub. Diary 70 of 1776, 896-898.

reduced owing to the almost total stoppage of communication with the Marátha country by the present Poona government, and requesting our speedy interference to endeavour to remedy this alarming evil which threatens ruin to so many individuals. Being thoroughly sensible of the justice of what is set forth in this memorial, and well convinced of the destructive consequences which must ensue if this obstruction to our trade is not soon removed, of which the Honourable Company will likewise severely feel the effects in their sales and customs, it is resolved immediately to send a copy of this memorial to Colonel Upton and to recommend to him in the strongest terms to insist upon the Poona government instantly giving the most effectual orders for opening the communication and in the same free and unlimited manner as before the war. It is ordered likewise that a copy thereof be sent to the Governor General and Council with our next advices and that it be represented how inconsistent this conduct of the ministers is with their professions of amity and good inclination towards the English and how contrary to the true spirit and meaning of the late treaty.¹

On the 4th July 1777 the Court of Directors write to Bombay: We herewith transmit the copy of a memorial very lately received from one of His Majesty's Principal Secretaries of State respecting a formal complaint that had been made to the British Ambassador at the Ottoman Porte against a trade carried on to Suez in the Red Sea by several persons residing in India under our protection. Having also received private intelligence that several vessels are now in Suez and others expected from India, which have imported and will import very considerable quantities of piece-goods and other valuable commodities, the produce and manufacture of India, for which we are informed a return is made in merchandise, we cannot but be justly alarmed at a trade of this nature which in its consequences may not only involve the British nation in disputes with the Sublime Porte but be highly prejudicial to the trade of the East India Company here. We have therefore taken this matter into our most serious consideration, and we do hereby positively prohibit all British subjects in India, whether employed in our service or remaining there under our license, from trading in the Red Sea to any other ports than Jidda and Mokha. You are to signify in the most public manner at your presidency, that if any British subjects as before mentioned shall act in violation of our orders, they will not only incur our highest displeasure, but as such orders will be communicated by us to the King's Ministers here and by them most likely to the British Ambassador at Constantinople, it is more than probable that whatever cargoes may be henceforward sent from India and imported at Suez, will be immediately confiscated. At the same time we shall take every step that the Company may be secured in the privilege of passing the despatches under their seal to and from the East Indies by the way of Suez, and that all vessels conveying such despatches and furnished with the Company's passport, be suffered to enter that

Chapter I.

History.

Protest against
Marátha Dues,
1776.

Red Sea Route
closed to Trade,
1777.

¹ Bom. Gov. Consultation 11th Dec. 1776, Pub. Diary 70 of 1776, 887-888.

Chapter I.
History.

Red Sea Route
closed to Trade,
1777.

port and remain there without molestation, provided they have no goods or merchandise on board for carrying on any kind of traffic. It will be therefore necessary for you immediately to signify the same to the commanders and officers of such vessels respectively, and we hereby direct that you take effectual means to prevent the shipping of any goods or merchandise thereon.¹

On the 4th July 1777 to limit the independent action of the President the Court ordered: The business to be transacted with the country powers must be done by the Board, and the opinion of the majority is to be adhered to in all cases. They continue: The correspondence with the country powers is to be carried on in the name of the Chief alone. But no letter is to be sent away by him until approved by the Board, and the answers as well as all letters that may be received from the country powers are to be laid immediately before the Board.²

The French and
the Poona
Government,
1777.

At a Consultation of the Select Committee, the 7th May 1777, the Committee observe: As the proceedings of the French with the Poona government may be attended with the most serious consequences to the interest of the Honourable Company, it is ordered that immediate advice thereof according to the intelligence we have received be transmitted to England and to the Governor General and Council. Resolved also that the same intelligence be communicated to the Commander-in-Chief of His Majesty's ships, and that he be requested to bring round the squadron as early as he possibly can, as we think their appearance here cannot fail having a good effect on the conduct of the Poona government and may possibly deter the French from attempts which the present very weak state of our military establishment might otherwise tempt them to undertake. We cannot but be equally alarmed with the prospect however remote of the French obtaining an establishment at Chaul or any other port so immediately in our neighbourhood. Should this prove to be Monsieur St. Lubein's scheme the bad consequences of his success cannot be too much dreaded. Great injury to the commerce of Great Britain and inevitable ruin to the trade of this settlement would be the first and certain effects, exclusive of the advantages such an establishment would afford in case of a national war. Much therefore, in our opinion, should be hazarded to subvert their scheme, whether on further intelligence it should prove to be directed to views of commerce only or to the forming a treaty of alliance with the Poona government. Circumstanced as we are we must wait for instructions from the Governor General and Council and in the meantime it is agreed to direct Mr. Mostyn to expostulate with the ministers on the impropriety of their giving such an encouragement to the French, our natural enemies, after the peace so lately concluded by Colonel Upton,* and to demand from them the nature and design of their negotiation with Monsieur St. Lubein.

¹ Court to Bombay 4th July 1777 para 63, Pub. Dep. Court's L. Vol. 9 of 1772-1777, 361-362. Comp. of Standing Ord. Vol. 2 of 1759-1788, 293.

² Court to Bombay 4th July 1777 paras 38 and 39, Pub. Dep. Court's L. Vol. 9 of 1772-1777, 351. Comp. of Standing Ord. Vol. 2 of 1759-1788, 291.

We think it will be also proper to instruct Mr. Mostyn to endeavour to excite their jealousy of the French by representing the ambitious views and encroaching disposition of that nation and their attachment and engagements to Haidar Ali, and, at the same time, to make it his study himself to preserve the most amicable intercourse with the Darbâr. The dangers which may be apprehended from the intrigues of the French at the Darbâr and their settling so near us, and the present very weak state of our military force must be pointed out to the Governor General and Council, and it must be submitted to them how far it is expedient to let us remain any longer in our present defenceless state while the French are continually sending ships to this coast.¹

In agreement with this decision the following letter, dated Bombay 10th May 1777, was addressed to the Governor General and Council at Fort William: Having lately received from Mr. Mostyn some very alarming accounts of the proceedings of the French with the Poona government, we think it our special duty to lose no time in transmitting you copies of his letters, that you may take what measures you may judge proper for guarding against the bad consequences which must ensue from too close a connection between those powers. If the French succeed in obtaining the port of Chaul, or any other port so immediately in our neighbourhood, it will totally ruin the Company's trade at this settlement and materially injure the commerce of Great Britain, exclusive of the advantage such an establishment would afford them in case of a national war. Much therefore in our opinion ought to be hazarded to subvert their scheme, whether on further intelligence it should prove to be directed to views of trade only or to the forming a treaty of alliance with the Poona government. We have only considered ourselves authorised to direct Mr. Mostyn to expostulate with the ministers on the impropriety of their giving encouragement to our natural enemies after the peace so lately concluded by Colonel Upton and to demand from them the nature and design of Monsieur St. Lubein's deputation. We have also instructed Mr. Mostyn to endeavour to excite their jealousy by representing the ambitious views and encroaching disposition of the nation, and their attachment to Haidar Ali, and at the same time to make it his study himself to preserve the most amicable correspondence with the Darbâr. Mr. Mostyn will by our direction continue to keep you constantly and fully advised of such of their proceedings as may come to his knowledge. Whilst we have such reasons for suspicion of the designs of the French we beg leave to submit to your judgment how far it is expedient we should remain in our present defenceless state. The enclosed return will show you the great diminution of our European corps and until the dispute with America is subsided we have no reason to expect any considerable recruit from England. At any rate it is good to be prepared against every event, and the appearance of a respectable force will

Chapter I.
History.

The French and
the Poona
Government,
1777.

¹ Bom. Gov. Select Committee's Consultation, 7th May 1777, Secret and Political Diary 18 of 1777, 81-83.

Chapter I.
History.

The French and
the Poona
Government,
1777.

at least have a good effect on the conduct of the Poona government, and may deter the French from designs which our weakness might otherwise tempt them to undertake. From the same motives, and as they have had lately several ships of force upon this coast, we have applied to Sir Edward Hughes or his successor in command, to bring round His Majesty's squadron to Bombay as early as he possibly can.¹

On the 19th May 1777 Mr. Mostyn writes from Poona to the President and Members of the Select Committee at Bombay: On the 8th instant at his audience of the Peshwa, at which the principal ministers were present, the Chevalier St. Lubein delivered his credentials, being letters from the King and Ministers of France, and made a present. I cannot help observing the difference of his reception and mine on this occasion. Sakhārām Bāpu and Nāna Fadnis going without the tent walls to receive him as he alighted from an elephant the Darbār had supplied him, and introducing him into the Darbār, while they only sent Mādhavrao Jādhavrao and Bāpu Pant to receive and introduce me. Indeed, in every respect, the ministers pay the greatest attention to the French. Your Honour may depend on my continuing to exert my endeavours not only to penetrate into the true object of Mons. St. Lubein's deputation, but also to prevent his carrying any schemes into execution to the prejudice of my Honourable Employers. His real view is undoubtedly to obtain a port on the coast in the Marātha dominions and a factory at Poona. In several conversations I have had with the ministers, I have always endeavoured to excite the jealousy of the Darbār by representing to them the ambitious disposition of the French. So long since as the 5th April I represented to Mādhavrao Jādhavrao, one of the people appointed by the ministers to transact our business with the Darbār, the impropriety of their permitting the French to send an ambassador to this Darbār. That I doubted if they considered the ill consequences which might attend this conduct. That I was well assured the French had not only this year sounded the harbours of Kolāba and Chaul, but last year that of Gheria. This, in my opinion, notwithstanding any professions of friendships they might make, clearly pointed out their views to be on one of those ports. I desired him to make a proper representation of the matter to the Darbār, that they might not hereafter blame us for failing to give them a timely caution. I at the same time mentioned to Mādhavrao the connection between the French and Haidar.²

Bombay and
the Marāthās,
1777.

At a Consultation of the Select Committee, the 10th October 1777, the President the Honourable Mr. Hornby read the following minute on the present situation of Marātha affairs: It is obvious that all the country adjacent to Bōmbay derives an additional value from its situation adjoining to a capital city. Among the

¹ The Governor and Council at Bombay to the Governor General and Council at Fort William, dated Bombay 10th May 1777, Secret and Political Diary 18 of 1777, 84-85. Forrest's Marātha Series, I. Pt. II, 228.

² Bom. Gov. Select Committee's Diary 23rd May 1777, Secret and Political Diary 18 of 1777, 90-91. Forrest's Marātha Series, I. Pt. II, 268-269.

inhabitants of Bombay are many men of considerable property either themselves traders, or concerned in some of those occupations to which a large import and export trade gives rise. The number of Christians Musalmáns and Pársis who are not restrained to the abstemiousness of the Hindu is large. Besides these there is an European garrison, many families, a fleet of European seamen, and a great resort of shipping. These circumstances combine to create in Bombay a brisk demand for the necessaries of life, for all which Bombay must entirely depend on the neighbouring country which produces only a little rice and some cocoanuts. It is this Bombay demand which increases the value not only of all lands of the Maráthás immediately contiguous to Bombay, but for a considerable distance round it. The late disturbances prove this, for when the zamindárs demanded their rents the rayats pleaded the impossibility of paying, for want of a vend for the produce of their farms, and their distress was so evident that the Governor of Bassein permitted several boats to come to Bombay though under stringent orders to the contrary. The Maráthás know that if the English should become possessed of Bassein, its territory, together with Sálsette and Karanja, might with due management be made to produce sufficient for all the purposes of Bombay; therefore by alienating lands contiguous to it they not only give up so much actual revenue, but lessen the value of what remains, as, no doubt, if their own are sufficient, the English will give every encouragement to imports from their own in order to induce industry and cultivation and thereby increase their rents. Besides these economical considerations the Maráthás have political reasons of much greater force. When (1737) the destruction of the Moghal Empire by the invasion of Nádir Sháh tempted the Maráthás to issue from their hills and establish themselves by conquest, the policy of Bájirao naturally suggested to him first to secure himself on the west. This he did by the reduction of Gujarát, the Konkan, and other districts they still possess. It was their perfect security on the west of India that contributed to render the Maráthás so long the scourge and dread of the east. Every sepoy could with safety join their army, and proceed to the desolation of other countries, while every thing they held dear and sacred remained secure and unapprehensive at home. For a considerable time after the Maráthás had established their empire, the English resided in India merely as merchants. In that light alone the Maráthás regarded the English. But when the Maráthás beheld the English possessed of large territories formerly subject to a *chauth*, and connected with powers, who, guarded by the English alliance refused also to pay, and even repelled Marátha invasions by force, they plainly foresaw that either they must entirely relinquish all thoughts of *chauth*, or at some period expect to be embroiled with the English. From the open situation of the English territories on the east of Hindustán, the Maráthás possess in its full force the advantage of ravaging with large bodies of horse knowing the difficulty to the English of entering the Marátha country with an army from that side, and that a large part of the English forces must always be kept at home for the defence of their own exposed possessions, the annual collections of which form

Chapter I.
History.

Bombay and
the Maráthas,
1777.

Chapter I.
History.

Bombay and
the Maráthas,
1777.

the great resources of the Company. The Maráthas are little apprehensive of molestation from the eastward. It is from the west alone that a check can be put on Marátha incursions. If once a formidable power was established on their west connected with the Company's interests in the east, the Poona Darbár must bid adieu to all thoughts of farther inroads into Bengal. The forces which would be requisite would be but barely sufficient to defend their own possessions. They could not with prudence issue to the plunder of other countries, while their own houses and families, and the collected riches acquired by former invasions, lay subject to the retaliation of a great western power. In its present situation the Bombay Presidency is by no means an object of alarm. The troops which could be spared from the defence of the several garrisons could amount to no very considerable force, and in its unconnected state the most they could effect would be to ravage the Konkan on which the Maráthas have but a small dependence. On the east the Gháts form a barrier preventing the approach of the English to Poona. The trifling effects of the Bombay troops would then by no means be adequate to the different ills the Company must sustain by hostilities with the Maráthas. Therefore whatever might happen with the English in the east of Hindustán, the Maráthas trusted their own interests would keep the English quiet in the west. For these reasons the Poona Darbár has ever guarded with a watchful eye against the most minute accession of territory on the Bombay side, rightly judging that without an adequate revenue to defray the charge of it the Company would never maintain any respectable force there merely for a contingent occasion. We have always found the Maráthas most particularly careful to prevent such accession adjacent to Bombay, partly for the economical reasons before assigned, partly because by affording Bombay an ample supply of provisions, such possessions would avert one of those distresses, to which hostilities would subject Bombay. From the rivers adjacent to Bassein is brought great part of the timber for Bombay marine and other works, which, by preventing the repairs of shipping, strikes at the root of Bombay trade. The immediate territory of Bassein being defended on three sides by water, and on the fourth easily made impenetrable, the Maráthas, in case of misunderstanding, could also lose the natural advantages they possess in an open country of ravaging it with their horse. All these, it must be confessed, were forcible motives with the ministers to withhold Bassein from the Company. We therefore can never sufficiently regret that they did withhold it, more especially as in those cessions which probably Colonel Upton was taught to consider as an equivalent for his acquiescence in relinquishing this favourite point, it is clearly evident that the ministers had as much in view the interests of their state as they had of depriving the English of Bassein.¹ The force of the Marátha empire depends solely on the union of its constituent members. This union again depends solely on the degree of effectual power lodged in the Poona government.

¹ Bom. Gov. Select Committee's Consultation, 10th Oct. 1777, Secret and Political Diary 18 of 1777, 154-157.

Although by the dissipation of their family treasure, and by the natural decrease of their provinces it would require a length of time and much good management to restore the power of the Peshwa to that degree that is requisite for reunion of the force of the empire, yet if we were to reinstate Raghoba to the unrestricted rights of the Peshwáship, and to support him, it would be laying the foundation of a power that might in time be dangerous to ourselves. To prevent this, therefore, it seems to me expedient that the Gaikwár, the Bhosle, Holkar, and Sindia should of right under our guarantee be established in what they now in fact are. I mean they should be confirmed in the independent possession of their several dominions, and these dominions should be rendered hereditary without any pretence of interference on the part of the Poona Darbár. It seems to me so clearly the views and interests of the jágirdárs to obtain this point, that I cannot think they would hesitate a moment to accede to any plan of accommodation founded on this basis, to which we were to be guarantees, more especially as they must know that we also are much interested to keep the powers of the Poona Darbár under due limitations, and would therefore rigidly maintain the terms of the guarantee. The Bráhmans would no doubt be averse from this mode of accommodation. But if once we can gain over the jágirdárs, the Bráhmans must know their objections would be fruitless, and they must be compelled to acquiesce.

The advantages of such a settlement seem to me too obvious to need much comment. It would resettle the Marátha country without restoring the empire. To turn from fact to speculation I may venture to observe that as the characters and manners of men greatly depend on the government they live under, so when they find it will answer no purpose to commit their former depredations, the Maráthás may be converted from a destructive life of indolent marauding to cultivation and the other arts of peace. This by increasing the Marátha population would greatly increase the staple trade of Great Britain, the different articles of which are necessities of life to them. It would also tend to enrich the provinces of Bengal by a consumption of many of its manufactures, the vend for which is totally gone to decay in these last ten or fifteen years during which their feuds have subsisted with violence. Whatever may be determined with respect to this general plan, I would by no means neglect the third point which is to form an effectual check from the Bombay side on the Poona Darbár, should any future concurrence of circumstances give us apprehensions from them.¹

On the 7th December 1777 the Governor and Council at Bombay wrote to the Governor General and Council at Fort William: We are much pleased to find that our letter of the 10th of May has excited your attention to the state of our forces. Our establishment as last settled by the Company consists of one battalion of artillery

**Chapter I.
History.**

Bombay and
the Maráthás,
1777.

Bombay
Garrison,
1777.

¹ Bom. Gov. Select Committee's Diary, 10th Oct. 1777, Secret and Political Diary 18 of 1777, 168-170.

Chapter I.**History.**

Bombay
Garrison,
1777.

of four companies, two battalions of European infantry, six battalions of sepoy, and a corps of 500 sepoy marines for the service of our cruisers. Since our late acquisitions it is become very necessary, and we have accordingly recommended it to the Company to augment our European corps. The enclosed general return will shew the disposition of this force and how greatly deficient the European battalions are of their proper complement, which we have no means or prospect of completing. Notwithstanding we give every encouragement it is very difficult to raise good sepoys on this coast. When any occasion may make it expedient to augment our forces, it will require so much time to raise and discipline a further number of sepoys so as in the least degree to be considered effective troops, that it will be much better in every respect to send us a reinforcement of disciplined sepoys if Europeans cannot be spared. Such being the state of our forces, you will readily comprehend our inability to co-operate with the other Presidencies in case of an attack upon either of them, and that in the event of an European war, the safety of this place can no otherwise be secured than by having a superior fleet, or a proper garrison in actual readiness to repel an enemy. That this our present force is by no means equal to we can have no doubt. In case of a national war with the French, from the excellence of the harbour and the convenience of the docks, Bombay would be the first object of their attempts in India. The arrival of the French fleet off the port in the month of August or September, being the best season for a quick run from the islands, might probably bring us the first notice of their intentions and neither give us time to receive succours from such a distance as Bengal and Madras, nor for any diversion to be made in our favour. We have thus according to our duty and your desire laid before you a statement of our military force, and of our means of defence. It will rest with you, gentlemen, to put into our hands resources equal to our exigencies, and to the importance of the Company's possessions in this quarter.¹

Ghodbandar
Dam and
Reclamation,
1778.

In addition to fears of the French and troubles with the Maráthas the records of this time contain references to schemes for improving Sálsette by damming out the sea from the low rice lands and by encouraging the settlement of Pársi families. On the 20th January 1778 Captain D. Spaeth made the following proposals for a large reclamation near Ghodbandar: In obedience to an order received some time past, directing me to survey and estimate the expense of damming a piece of ground which Rangáji Rámset, the present farmer of Ghodbandar and Káshi proposed to enclose, and likewise to point out what quantity of ground would be rendered useful for cultivation in consequence of such a dam being made, the accompanying plan is submitted. I have at the same time made and annexed a project with an estimate of the expense that will be attended by constructing a dam of masonry across the creek with a sluice that it may remain navigable as it now is.

¹ Bombay Government to the Governor General and Council at Fort William 7th Dec. 1777, Secret and Political Diary 18 of 1777, 226-228.

By this estimate the expense may at first seem considerable, but the advantage that would accrue by it will very soon indemnify that expense as will appear. A square piece of ground that measures twenty rod each way (country measure) the rod being eight feet nine inches long, will produce, when good arable soil, two *morahs* batty. This area of ground contains 3403 square yards. The new dam will enclose ground to the following extent from the back part of Ghodbandar hill till close to Mirah village and thence westward as far as the dam marked in the plan Mon-plaisir. Several considerable encroachments of good ground on the east side of Bháyndar plain will be regained. Eastward the ground which the spring tides lay waste extends in one place to the very foot of the hills and in several other places leaves but a narrow space cultivable along the chain of these hills. The ground that will be actually enclosed by the new dam will at the least computation amount to 5,080,000 square yards. Supposing as aforementioned that 3403 square yards yield two *morahs* of batty, then the product of the whole will bring 2986 *morahs*. Admitting that half this sum be deducted to make allowance for the different channels of the creek and the part of Ghodbandar which requires a time of several years before it can be rendered cultivable, there remain 1493 *morahs* that by the improvement of this district in making the proposed dam will be acquired. Exclusive of this much will be gained by actual batty fields which are yearly overflowed in some parts or other by accidents occasioned by the breaking in of dams, and wherever that happens those batty fields that are overflowed for one spring are rendered useless for that season. Another consideration is that a great part of ground which at present produces black batty will, when the inundation is prevented, change to white. The care and attention which the people must give every spring, especially on high springs, will be much eased when the new dam is perfected, as it will then render upwards of 6½ miles dam useless, which now they are obliged to watch though too few in number to prevent accidents when the tides run very high and when any part is carried away by the impetuosity of the flood and often rendered impracticable to be repaired without great trouble and labour. Then they have recourse to a remedy which is by giving up a piece of ground to make a dam within and distant from the damaged one which may be observed by the plan of the survey, by which means the inundation makes a gradual progress which must have much increased since the time of the Portuguese, and the water gains force as it comes near the cross dam that joins Káshi with Bháyndar plain owing to its ground being three feet lower in that part than it is by the banks of the river. Another advantage which deserves to be noticed that will proceed from the new dam is this: The length of the road from Ghodbandar to Bháyndar post frequented in the dry season is 4½ miles. When the dam is made that distance will be reduced to 2½ miles, that is nearly half. Consequently a reciprocal assistance can be given much sooner to any of the two posts. I have already observed that the banks of the river lie much higher than the ground near the cross dam which joins Káshi and Bháyndar plain together. This proportion remains

Chapter L History.

Ghodbandar
Dam and
Reclamation,
1778,

Chapter I.
History.

Ghodbandar
Dam and
Reclamation,
1778.

much the same with the inland part all along the river from Ghodbandar to Dhárávi, a few places only excepted. I think it therefore not practicable to effect the entire exclusion of the water which now overflows nearly or perhaps the best half of that extensive plain. Provided it be no difficult matter on the side of Vesáva to stop the inundation from thence, the most considerable or useful of the creeks might be secured with a lock which by its reservoir has that property that boats could go in or out without being subject to the tides. The method which the farmer means to pursue in making the dam and stopping up the creek will, I apprehend, be such as will scarcely answer his own time. When the land is again to pass into the Company's hands then the same operations to secure it perfectly which are now wanted will become necessary. He means to stop the creek by sinking two old boats. This should serve only for the preparatory part and would very much facilitate the perfecting of a good dam. The mud dam across the inundated ground would be made agreeable to their wonted custom, which is by digging up the mud close underneath where they form the dam. This ditch they dig on the outside of the dam which weakens it so much that it is immediately subject to perpetual repairs. This method adds force to the water to act upon it with better success to destroy it again. I, on the contrary, intend that the dam should be made mostly of ground taken from the heights on the back of Ghodbandar hill. The mud used should be dug out in narrow trenches at distances and that from within the dam in a perpendicular direction to it, not suffering their joining the dam by twice the breadth of its depth. Should it be thought proper that this work be executed on the Company's account, then the battery on the southward close by Charni village, which was raised by the Maráthás of square Dongri cut stones not laid in chunam, which are in great number, would serve to a very good purpose for the facing of the intended wall dam. The bull (wall) plank which is I believe in the land paymaster's carpenter's yard, would likewise facilitate the making of the temporary dam across the creek.¹

At a Consultation, the 25th March 1778, the principal engineer's report of the dam and sluice at Ghodbandar being laid before them the Board take it under consideration, together with Captain Spaeth's letter and plan. It is unanimously agreed that carrying this work into execution will be attended with much benefit to the Honourable Company. It is therefore resolved to give orders for its being immediately begun and completed with all expedition. The Board add: As it will be necessary to make some previous agreement with the farmer of Ghodbandar respecting the lands that will be recovered by means of this work, the Chief and factors at Thána must make the necessary settlement.² After correspondence as the farmer refused to give more than one-eighth of the additional outturn, Government decided (21st December 1778) to keep in their own hands the additional area made fit for cultivation.³

¹ Letter from Captain D. Spaeth to the President, Thána 20th Jan. 1778, Pub. Diary 73 of 1778, 155-159.

² Bom. Gov. Consultation 25th March 1778, Pub. Diary 73 of 1778, 144.

³ Bom. Gov. Consultation 21st Dec. 1778, Pub. Diary 74 of 1778, 909-910.

Another question regarding the administration of Sálsette which occupied the attention of the Government of Bombay at this time, was the absence of increase of population under British management. The question was brought to the front in a letter of the Directors, dated 4th July 1777,¹ complaining of the large uncultivated share of Sálsette and suggesting that the very industrious and quiet people the Pársis be encouraged to settle. The Bombay Government ordered (7th October 1778) that public notice be given to Pársis promising the most advantageous terms to settlers in Sálsette and that through the Chief and Council in Surat these notices should be published in Navsári, Gandevi, and Balsár, as well as in Bombay and in Karanja.² On the 11th November the Chief at Thána replies that such offers had already (2nd November 1776) been made with great liberality and every publicity. They point out that all the Sálsette villages are now farmed and to bring in fresh cultivators with special exemptions would involve a breach of contract with the farmer and a loss of revenue.³ Government accept this explanation (25th November 1778). They order when villages fall in by the insolvency of farmers or other causes they be kept in the Company's hands and disposed of in such a manner as to increase the population.⁴

At a Consultation of the 29th October 1778 is recorded a letter from the Resident at Karanja dated the same day, forwarding the books of that Residency for the year ending 30th April 1777 and acquainting the Bombay Council that agreeable to their directions he had put the island of Elephanta up to public outcry and granted a fresh lease for Rs. 716.⁵

At a Consultation on the 25th March 1778 the Board notice that a certificate had been laid before them the last Council day that Ensign Hierne was duly qualified to receive the additional allowance for speaking the country language; that they had deferred granting the certificate judging from the short time he had been in India that Ensign Hierne could not have attained a competent knowledge; that as a letter was now presented by Mr. J. Sibbald, the gentleman we appointed for the examination of officers in the country language, representing that Ensign Hierne had made extraordinary proficiency, it is agreed that the allowance be made from the term of nine months after his arrival in India. The Board continues: As this must be a disagreeable service for any person singly it is resolved that a Committee be appointed for the examination of officers in the country language, and that this committee consist of Mr. J. Sibbald, Mr. Lewis Corkran, and Lieut. Kerr. A certificate being now laid before us that Ensign Abraham Maximilian Richardson is duly qualified in the country language, ordered that he be paid the usual allowance.⁶

**Chapter I.
History.**

Thána
Population,
1778.

Elephanta
Island,
1778.

Vernacular
Examinations,
1778.

¹ Public Dept. Court's Letters Vol. 9 of 1772-1777, 348.

² Bom. Gov. Consultation 7th Oct. 1778, Pub. Diary 74 of 1778, 708-709.

³ The Chief and factors at Thána to Bombay 11th Nov. 1778. Sec. Inward Letter Book 81 of 1778, 355-357.

⁴ Public Diary 74 of 1778, 844-845.

⁵ Bom. Gov. Diary 29th Oct. 1778; Pub. Diary 74 of 1778, 796-797.

⁶ Bom. Gov. Consultation 25th March 1778, Pub. Diary 73 of 1778, 143. Forrest's Home Series, II. 213.

Chapter I.**History.**

Customs on Goods
passing Thána
from Bassein,
1778.

A Consultation of the 17th June 1778 passed the following resolution on the subject of the levy of customs on Bassein goods passing Thána: It is resolved that all goods passing Thána from Bassein and the continent shall pay full customs at Thána, and free certificates be given to the proprietors on producing which at Bombay only half customs will be collected at our custom house. Similarly, all goods from Bombay to Bassein and the continent, on producing a certificate of having paid the full customs at Bombay will be charged only half customs at Thána. By this change the Honourable Company will be secure of their full customs and the merchant be relieved three per cent. It is further resolved that the usual duties be again laid on timber grain and other articles at Thána, as it is made clearly to appear that the giving them up has not been attended with any manner of benefit to the public.¹

Special Duty on
Foreign Ships,
1778.

On the question of goods brought on foreign ships to Bombay the Court of Directors wrote on the 19th March 1778: As you seem convinced that a prohibition would not prevent foreign ships landing their cargoes in your neighbourhood, that if this were done your markets would be affected in the same degree as though the foreign goods were landed at Bombay, and that in such case we should lose the amount of our import duties, we have the less objection to your permitting foreign cargoes to be landed at Bombay, relying on your prudence to prevent any detriment happening to individuals in our service or enjoying our license.²

At a Consultation, the 28th October 1778, the Bombay Council directed this order to be sent to the customs master for his guidance. At the same time they add: As it is certainly a hardship on our merchants for foreigners to be permitted to trade on equal terms; resolved that an additional duty of three per cent be levied on all staples landed at this place from foreign bottoms. This we think will not deter foreign ships landing their cargoes here and is but an adequate compensation for their having the benefit of this market.³

Trade to Suez,
1778.

On the 1st May 1778 the Bombay Council direct: The most public notice must be given at this place and subordinate settlements of the Company's orders respecting the trade to Suez and every measure in our power will be pursued to put an effectual stop to that trade.⁴

Six months later (28th October 1778) the Bombay Council again direct: The further prohibition respecting the Suez trade must be made known in the most public manner at this Presidency and its dependencies. We do not think the obtaining permission for packets being forwarded from India by the Suez route is very material, as we have ever hitherto found it a very tedious conveyance. On the other hand, it will be of the utmost importance if

¹ Bom. Gov. Consultation 17th June 1778, Pub. Diary 73 of 1778, 467-468. Comp. of Standing Ord. Vol. 2 of 1759-1788, 174-175.

² Court to Bombay 19th Mar. 1778 para 44, Pub. Dep. Court's L. Vol. 10 of 1778-1782, 31.

³ Bom. Gov. Consultation 28th Oct. 1778, Pub. Diary 74 of 1778, 768-769.

⁴ Bom. Gov. Consultation 1st May 1778, Pub. Diary 73 of 1778, 225-226.

the Honourable Company can forward packets from England by way of Suez, as there being no quarantine and as the vessels come over from the Red Sea in the time of the monsoon, the packets are received with incredible despatch. Of this we can give no better instance than that on the 18th of this month (October) we received an account from Europe of so late a date as the 25th of July. Nor need the prohibition against our vessels going to Suez deter the Company from sending their packets as Mr. Baldwin can get boats at Suez to transport the packets by an easy and safe navigation to Jidda or Mokha where they will generally meet with shipping from India in the months of June July and August.¹

As regards the action of the Bombay Government in the thorny question of their negotiations with Rághoba in a letter of 4th July 1777 the Court of Directors write: Although we cannot but agree to the protection you have given to Rághoba, considering the connection you have had with him by which we must suppose the Company have been benefited, yet we are under some apprehensions that the Maráthás will think this protection a breach of the treaty entered into with them by Colonel Upton. For though that treaty is not upon the whole so agreeable to us as we could wish, still we are resolved strictly to adhere to it. You must therefore be particularly vigilant, whilst Rághoba is with you, to prevent him forming any plan against what is called the ministerial party at Poona. And we hereby positively order you to engage with him in no scheme whatever for retrieving his affairs without the consent of the Governor General and Council or the Court of Directors. At the same time we think common humanity will warrant us in giving you orders to protect Rághoba's person from violence if any such attempt should be made by the partisans of the ministers.²

In the following year (7th May 1778) the Court continue: Our letter of the 4th of July 1777 gives you our sentiments and instructions concerning the protection afforded by you to Rághoba. We have now only to direct that you continue to govern yourselves according to the tenor of those instructions. That you may not be at a loss for our meaning respecting the personal safety of Rághoba, it is our positive order that he be on no account compelled to quit the island of Bombay and that you inform him in our name that if he leaves the said island it shall be by his own free will and consent.³

In the same year in their letter of 19th March 1778 the Court remark: We find the total amount of expenses incurred in the expedition undertaken on behalf of Rághoba, of money paid to him, and of money expended on his account stated by you at Rs. 22,29,652.⁴

Chapter I. History.

Trade to Suez,
1778.

Peshwa Rághoba,
1777-78.

Cost of Rághoba's
Alliance,
1778.

¹ Bom. Gov. Consultation 28th Oct. 1778, Pub. Diary 74 of 1778, 764-765; Forrest's Home Series, II. 226.

² Court to Bombay 4th July 1777 para 65, Pub. Dep. Court's Letters Vol. 9 of 1772-1777, 363.

³ Court to Bombay 7th May 1778 para 26, Pub. Dep. Court's Letters Vol. 10 of 1778-1782, 76.

⁴ Court to Bombay 19th March 1778 para 62, Pub. Dep. Court's Letters Vol. 10 of 1778-1782, 36.

Chapter I.**History.**

Secret and Select
Committees,
1778.

In 1778 the Court appointed the following officers members of the Secret Committee at London and wrote to Bombay (10th April): Having appointed George Womell Esquire, Chairman of our Court, William James Esquire, our Deputy Chairman, and W. Devaynes Esquire, to be a committee of secrecy, we hereby direct that all orders and instructions which you shall receive from our said committee of secrecy be observed and obeyed with the same punctuality and exactness as though they had been signed by thirteen or more members of the Court of Directors. And having also thought proper to appoint a Select Committee at Bombay for transacting all political military and naval affairs, and likewise all such as may require secrecy, it is our order that the said Select Committee consist of W. Hornby Esquire, our President and Governor or our President and Governor for the time being, John Carnac Esquire, the second member of our Council or the second member of our Council for the time being, Colonel Charles Egerton, our Military Commander-in-Chief or our Military Commander-in-Chief for the time being, and Daniel Draper Esquire, the fourth member of our Council or the fourth member of our Council for the time being. If our military commander-in-chief shall at any time be absent from the Presidency then our order is that our President and the second and fourth members of our Council shall be a Select Committee for the purposes aforesaid during the absence of the commander-in-chief.¹

French Plot,
1778.

On the 27th March 1779 the Bombay Government addressed the following letter to the Honourable the Secret Committee of the Court of Directors: Upon the first notice of an approaching war with France, which was received in June last, orders were given for our fortifications being carried on with all possible vigour, and we have the pleasure to inform you that our works towards the sea are in great forwardness. By the *Royal Admiral* now under despatch the plans and estimates ordered by the Honourable Court in their commands of the 19th March will be transmitted and a full reply sent thereto by the Governor and Council.²

French Factory
at Surat Seized,
1778.

In the same letter (27th March 1779) Government add: In our address of the 29th December we advised our having taken possession of the French Factory at Surat and seized the persons of the Consul and of every other Frenchman in that city. This step we doubt not from your commands of 31st August will be approved. We removed all the Frenchmen to Bombay except the Consul and his family whom we permitted to remain at Surat upon his parole. Among the prisoners removed to Bombay was a priest who some time after his arrival sent to inform the President that he had intelligence of an important nature to communicate. Being accordingly examined he gave information which was confirmed by another of the prisoners that a plan had been concerted by Monsieur Briancourt, the French

¹ Court to Bombay 10th April 1778 paras 1-3, Pub. Dep. Court's Letters Vol. 10 of 1778-1782, 58-59.

² Bom. Gov. Select Committee to the Secret Committee of the Court of Directors 27th March 1779 para 145, Secret and Pol. Diary 20 of 1779, 375.

Consul, and Monsieur St. Lubein for bringing a body of Marátha troops to seize and plunder the city of Surat in which scheme they had engaged some of the Nabob's officers. A copy of the narrative of what was declared by the priest and the other prisoner Monsieur Charleval now waits on you under No. 40. The President observing the most profound secrecy immediately sent Mons. Charleval to Surat in hopes of his being able to find the box of papers mentioned in the narrative which contained the particulars of the conspiracy. He, however, did not succeed and no further discovery has yet been made, though we have offered a reward of Rs. 10,000 and directed Mr. Boddam to trace this matter with all possible diligence. As it appeared very improper under such a surmise to permit the Consul to remain any longer at Surat, we have removed him with his family to the fort at Thána where we propose to keep them till they are sent to Europe.¹

On the risk of an alliance between the French and the Maráthás Mr. Horsley, the representative of the Government of Bombay, addressed the following letter to the Governor General, dated Calcutta 2nd August 1779²: However contrary it may seem to the true interests of all parties among the Maráthás to call in the French, yet there is hardly a country in the world whose history is come down to us that does not furnish more than one example of the absurd policy of introducing foreigners as the arbitrators of domestic quarrels. We know for certain that more than five years ago, before we had taken part in their civil wars, Rághoba and the confederacy which opposed him had each been applying to Bombay for assistance against the other. The Nizám and Haidar have both been courted and been engaged in a greater or less degree ever since the death of Mádhavrao, the former by Nána and his party and the latter by Rághoba and his friends, and have each respectively made their advantage of their allies. The same state of things, we may suppose, will lead to the same measures and surely not the less probably for the share we have had in the same. The real military strength of the Marátha empire and the forms of it are at present in different hands. Rághoba, the authority of whose name was never more evidently shown than in the respect paid to it at the settlement as it was called of the government while he was a prisoner in the camp of his enemies, is at large and still maintains his pretensions. These circumstances alone,

Chapter I. History.

French Factory
at Surat Seized,
1778.

French and
Marátha
Alliance,
1779.

¹ Bom. Gov. Select Committee to the Secret Committee at London, 27th Mar. 1779 para 151, Secret and Pol. Diary 20 of 1779, 376-377.

² Bombay Government to the Governor General at Calcutta, 4th April 1779: As in whatever political system you may think proper to adopt for this Presidency you may possibly require information on certain points or details of local knowledge which, as we cannot foresee we cannot supply, we have, in order to prevent any loss of time in correspondence, judged it expedient to send round to Bengal a gentleman well informed in the state of the Company's affairs and the present political circumstances of this Presidency, and having made choice of Mr. George Horsley for this commission, he now waits on you with these despatches. We request you will permit Mr. Horsley to be informed of the measures you may think proper to adopt respecting this Presidency and allow him to represent to you any particulars which his local knowledge may suggest or may appear to him material to be attended to in your deliberations. Secret and Political Diary 20 of 1779, 428.

Chapter I.**History.**

French and
Marátha
Alliance,
1779.

I apprehend, constitute the same state of things or perhaps rather a worse anarchy than during the contest between Rághoba and the confederacy. Nana's is certainly the faction whose views are turned to the French for assistance. Nána Fadnavis knows well that if we do not take arms against him it is all he can expect. This will not answer his purpose. He wants active friends. Even against Haidar Nána could not support himself with all the aid he could procure from the Nizám till Mahádji Sindia came to his assistance, and now Sindia seems Nána's most formidable rival. The French come to India as the enemies of the English, but without establishments of their own to support them. Mutual necessities may seem to Nána to form the basis of an alliance with them of mutual advantage. Nána may flatter himself that there is little present danger in the connection; that for the moment money may gratify the French, and in case they should continue too powerful to be slighted after they have served his purposes, that they may be satisfied with such possessions as he may assist them to conquer from us. These considerations induce me to believe that if the French have any considerable force at Mauritius, it will certainly be at Chaul before the month of September is past. Sir E. Hughes and the reinforcement on board his fleet may possibly arrive soon after if their destination is Bombay, but it is much more likely that they will be as late as December or January. Should the French bring a force which with all the assistance they can procure from Nána and his influence they think equal to an attack on Bombay, this no doubt will be the first enterprise they will undertake. I believe it is certain they will meet with all the aid Nána can give them. If an attack on Bombay seems beyond their strength, they will probably offer themselves as the allies of the Maráthas, and as the open and declared enemies of the English, soliciting at the same time such cessions as St. Lubein desired to distress us and to procure as advantageous an establishment for themselves as possible. That of the Marátha party with which they connect themselves the objects are to overawe its competitors, to satisfy its allies on the easiest terms possible, and to curb the English from whom at least no good offices are to be expected. Yet I do suppose that, unless compelled to it by the last necessity, Nána himself will not desire to see a French army at Poona or in the heart of the Marátha empire. He will probably think that since his affairs oblige him to be connected with Europeans, and while Europeans must be near neighbours to the Marátha empire, it is a point of good policy to have them so situated as to be a check upon each other, forming a double line between the sea and the mountains. On this principle I should not be surprised to see Chaul and a considerable part of the Konkan opposite Bombay granted to the French as a permanent establishment, together with all else they might be able to conquer from us. Sálsette and the other harbour islands must fall unless we can bring a body of troops into the field to fight a battle for them. And though the enemy might not find themselves strong enough to form the siege of Bombay, yet, when once we were confined to Bombay island, we should certainly be put to considerable straits, and if the sea were not open might be

much distressed. In case Nána should not be disposed to encourage the French to remain in the neighbourhood of Bombay as a barrier between us and him and as an ally whose nearness to Poona might serve to support his authority there, and in case the force should not be such as to encourage them to form the siege of Bombay, the reductions of the harbour islands may perhaps seem too inconsiderable an object, and while Bombay still remained in our hands, could not be of much benefit to them. It therefore appears to me likely that with the concurrence of their Marátha allies the French may turn their views northward where Surat and Broach appear very desirable acquisitions, and if in addition to these they are allowed, as I make no doubt they might be, to help themselves out of the Gáikwár's share of Gujarát, they might, I think, with ease lay the foundation of a power in the West of India, which would bid fair to vie with any establishment of ours in the east. I must confess this seems to me the most eligible plan for them to act on, unless they could make sure of success in an attack on Bombay, in which case the rest of our possessions on that side would follow of course. But to take Bombay, I suppose, they must have a much greater force than I can imagine they will bring, whereas 4000 men and a good body of Marátha cavalry would insure the execution of their attempts in Gujarát against all the force we could of ourselves bring against them. If you, gentlemen, should be of opinion that there is a probability of circumstances like any of these I have supposed taking place, you will, I dare say, think it proper to take the necessary measures against them. You will perceive that the first step to be taken and on the spot would be to form such counter-alliances as might balance those of our enemies, whatever theirs may be. We are certain that at present we have no alliance on that side of India. If any are to be now formed in order to guard against the probable designs of the French or in future if such designs should actually be carried into execution, some extraordinary powers are in either case, I apprehend, equally necessary, and perhaps there may not be any time to lose in determining what those powers should be, on whom they should be conferred, and the rest of the very important points which these questions would naturally bring under your consideration. I am afraid we yet want a more detailed knowledge of the present strength, resources, interests, and views of the several Marátha chiefs who are comprised under the general name of the Marátha State. A peace concluded with a nominal minister may prove of little avail unless we are certain we are friends with those who really form the strength of the nation. In case of the arrival of a French armament circumstances may occur which for want of this knowledge of detail will be entirely new to us and according to which it may be necessary somebody or other should be empowered to act on the spot. I have considered this subject at large with a good deal of attention and have formed some general ideas on it. But I would not venture to say anything of this kind before you, unless I was called on for it, and now merely submit such general reflections on the state of affairs on our side of India as induce me to think that provision yet remains to be made for events

Chapter I.

History.

French and
Marátha
Alliance,
1779.

Chapter I.

History.

Navigation
Charts,
1779.

for which, if they do arrive, it will be of the utmost consequence to be prepared.¹

On the 27th May 1779 the Court addressed the following letter to Bombay on the improvement of marine charts: As we are desirous that every person under the Company's protection conversant in naval affairs should co-operate with us in aiding the navigation to and from the east, we direct that you forthwith notify our intentions by public advertisement and that you order our master-attendant to take such other measures as shall appear to him expedient for making our pleasure in this respect known. We shall order our supracargo in China to send you annually a quantity of transparent paper for your master-attendant to deliver to such persons as may be inclined to furnish copies of charts and plans already in their possessions. All this must be mentioned in your advertisement.²

Caste Disputes,
1779.

At a Consultation of the 28th July 1779 the following note is recorded: For some time frequent disputes have arisen between the Bráhmans and Goldsmiths respecting the mode of salutation termed *namaskár*. This the Bráhmans allege the Goldsmiths have no right to perform, and that the exercise of such a ceremony by the Goldsmiths is a breach and profanation of the rites of the Gentu religion. As repeated complaints have been made to the British Government by the Bráhmans, and as the Peshwás also have several times written to the President requesting the Goldsmiths may be forbidden the use of the *namaskár*; Resolved that the Bráhmans have reason in their complaint, and as the matter does not concern the Company, the Peshwa be moved to forbid to the Goldsmiths the use of the Bráhman salutation *namaskár*.³

Marátha
Preparations
against Thána,
1779.

On the 20th December 1779 the Chief and factors write from Thána: Different people who have been sent to the other side for that purpose bring intelligence that several thousand troops are come down to Bassein, Máhuli, Kalyán, Panvel, and Belápur with the design of invading Sálsette. Two methods occur to us to prevent the intended invasion. That your Honour send us well armed boats commanded by Lieutenants of the marine to lie off Báلكhum (three miles north-east of Thána) and Belápur, which might prevent any boats of the enemy coming near the island. The other method is to send us as many troops as your Honour can spare, at least six companies. These we would station one division at Báلكhum, the other below Thána Ghodbandar and Dhárávi. We think these districts would be sufficiently guarded if a small field piece or two to each division was sent with a few artillery. We do not doubt that this would prevent the enemy attempting to land or supposing they did make the attempt, we should most probably drive them back before they would effect their landing. A

¹ Letter from Mr. Horsley to the Governor General, Calcutta, 2nd August 1779, Secret and Political Diary 21 of 1779, 630-634.

² Court to Bombay 27th May 1779 para 36, Pub. Dep. Court's L. Vol. 10 of 1778-1782, 161-162.

³ Bom. Gov. Consultation 28th July 1779, Pub. Diary 75 of 1779, 387-388.

company or two of Europeans would be of the greatest consequence to defeat any intention the Maráthás have against us. Something must be done or the island will most probably be plundered, and if there is any treachery, the fort will be lost. We submit these sentiments to your Honours: Permit us to add our vicinity to the Presidency will enable us to send back what troops you may demand should necessity call for them at Bombay. Though we believe the scheme of the Maráthás is to take place during the dark nights, yet as their numbers are already great in our neighbourhood the attempt may sooner be made. We therefore require your Honour's determination as soon as possible.¹

On the 21st December 1779 in acknowledging receipt of the above letter the Bombay Government write: Upon your representing the necessity of a reinforcement, we shall as soon as possible send you such a force as we can spare for the protection of Thána when we shall advise you of the particulars.²

On the same subject Government write to the Resident at Karanja (22nd December 1779): Having received from Thána accounts that large bodies of Marátha forces are assembled in the neighbouring parts and of their hostile intentions, we judge it proper to reinforce your post and have accordingly ordered two companies of the 6th battalion of sepoy and a company of the native Portuguese battalion with two six-pounder field pieces and a party of artillery to proceed to Karanja under the command of Captain Colbatch and to continue in post there till further orders. The company of the 2nd battalion now doing duty at Karanja must be returned.³

On the 18th December 1779 the Chief and factors at Thána write: We now purposely address your Honour to acquaint you that we have this morning received the following intelligence. Nána Fadnis having learnt that Raghunáth Ganesh an inhabitant at Carsi (Persik?), Fakirseth a coppersmith of Thána, and one Konájirao of Belápur were people fit to carry on any schemes he might undertake against Sálsette, sent for them some days ago to Poona. On Nána Fadnis offering to send a body of troops they engaged to manage their landing on this island. In consequence they were dismissed with a present of turbans, and 10,000 troops (5000 horse and 5000 foot) were ordered into the Konkan, 7000 of whom are arrived and are near Bassein on a pretence of fetching Visáji Pant that we may have no suspicions of an attack on the place. Fakirseth, Raghunath Ganesh, and Konájirao propose to land part of these troops during the next dark nights below the southern towers at Pan Bruje (*Burnj* or tower) and others at Bálkhum. The better to ensure success these fellows have sent over a number of *Purbeahs* that is *Purbiás* or North Indians, to entice the *Purbeahs* of this battalion to join in giving up the fort. In this they have succeeded and the *Purbeahs* have agreed to join

Chapter I.

History.

Marátha
Preparations
against Thána,
1779.

Marátha Designs
against Thána,
1779.

¹ Letter from Thána 20th Dec. 1779, Secret and Pol. Diary 21 of 1779, 852-853.

² Bom. Gov. Diary 21st Dec. 1779, Secret and Pol. Diary 21 of 1779, 854.

³ Secret and Pol. Diary 21 of 1779, 855-856.

Chapter I.

History.

Marátha Designs
against Thána,
1779.

the onset against the rest of the garrison. We submit the above information to your Honour's consideration. We had it from a man of some consequence and to appearance no ways interested to deceive us. We have only to observe it is well known the 4th battalion is chiefly composed of *Purbeahs* and *Maráthás*. Were an attempt of this kind to be made we imagine some Europeans, could you spare them, would be the best means of preventing any bad consequences. We have thought it proper to acquaint the commanding officer with the foregoing in order that he might be on his guard to endeavour to counteract any attempt should one be made.¹

Conspiracy
at Thána,
1780.

On the 6th March 1780 the Chief and factors at Thána submit the following additional evidence of a conspiracy: *Kásamkhán*, a subhedár in the 4th battalion having been tampered with to bribe a party of our sepoys to agree to give up the fort, took the precaution to call two *Jamádárs* to be present at an interview he had with one *Fakir-ud-din Dhabára*. The subhedár and his companions took *Fakir-ud-din* and another man prisoner, a third escaping. *Fakir-ud-din* confessed. In the course of his examination he mentioned his being employed by a *Bráhma*n *Rámchandra Pant Fadnis* of *Belápur* who had resided there these three years. We have thought it better to send *Rámchandra Pant* and his son under a guard to Bombay, not having any proper place to confine them in here. The examination we have already taken and those to be taken, with any further information we may be able to get shall be sent as soon as possible.²

About five months later a fresh conspiracy was discovered. At a Consultation, the 18th September, the Bombay Council observe: The President acquaints us that he has summoned this meeting to communicate intelligence relative to a dangerous conspiracy formed among the sepoy recruits at Thána. He lays before us the following written information given to him by one of the parties concerned and a letter from the Chief and factors at Thána advising their having seized and sent to Bombay under a strong guard 135 of the suspected persons who arrived here last night. As to the information of *Válaji Thákor*, a sepoy in Captain *Hayes'* battalion in the company of *Krishnáji Subhedár* at Thána taken before the Governor 15th September 1780; he has a sanad from the government of Poona, agreeing to pay him Rs. 50 a month, but as yet he has not received a rupee. That the undermentioned persons likewise have deeds from the Poona government, namely *Báváji Náik Tauriah* a sepoy in Captain *Dawson's* battalion, who receives Rs. 60 a month from the *Maráthás* and has 40 men under him, now upon pretence of procuring recruits gone to *Rámji Pant* at *Vishnu Jogi* to get money for the payment of the abovementioned 40 men; *Kásamkhán*, a sepoy in the same battalion who receives Rs. 60 a month from the *Maráthás* and has 60 men under him at Thána; *Tukáji*

¹ Letter from Thána 18th Dec. 1779, Sec. and Pol. Diary 21 of 1772, 824-826.

² Letter from Thána to the Select Committee, 6th March 1780, Pub. Diary 77 of 1780, 154-155. For further information see pages 151, 155-165 of the same Diary.

Náik Godiah, a sepoy in the abovementioned battalion, who receives Marátha pay, the informant does not know how much, and has a deed likewise from the Poona government. Kondáji Gaikwár alias Ambáji Náik, a sepoy in Captain Hayes' battalion who draws Rs. 60 a month pay from the Maráthás and is now gone to Poona to get money and recruits for the intended treachery. The following persons are promised palanquins, umbrellas, torches, and oil bottles, namely: Dharmáji Jumledár and Kondáji Gaikwár in Captain Hayes' battalion, and Tukáji Náik Godiah and Kásamkhán in Captain Dawson's battalion. The Maráthás have agreed to favour them with ten horses, and four hundred gold and silver bangles to be divided amongst all, agreeable to their rank and station. The number of sepoy prepared for the treachery are: Under the informant Valáji Thákor 35 men, under Báváji Náik 40 men, under Kásamkhán 60 men, under Jaysávant a sepoy in Captain Dawson's battalion 35 men, and 100 others or 270 in all. It is agreed each sepoy shall have Rs. 15 a month wages, and they have received two months' impress, and are to have Rs. 25 a month during life after the business is done. The chief managers are Dharmáji, Tukáji, Kásamkhán, and Kondáji Gaikwár who have agreed to take the fort of Thána and deliver it to the Peshwa. Kondáji Gaikwár is daily expected from Poona with Rs. 5000 on whose arrival the intended treachery will be put into execution, all the *chaukis* and rounds of the fort being now under the abovementioned people, excepting about 40 other sepoy who mount guard with them. These are innocent of the treachery as is Krishnáji Subhedár.

That one Rághopant who came from Poona to Bassein has promised to get this business done, and the persons mentioned in this paper came to Thána by his means and persecution (persuasion?). A Banian called Kachero of Paigam, and a Moorman of Bassein bring and carry messages from and to Rághopant's Diván called Rámáji-pant. Sometimes when any of the traitors want to go to Rághopant on business, they obtain permission to go on pretence of procuring recruits and bring some with them. The deeds granted them are kept at their houses at several places. The informant says he knows all the abovementioned people, and can point them out, but knows only the names of a few of them. He entered into our service one month and five days since. Of the others some have been two three or four months in the service. He has received nothing from the Maráthás, but the others have received two months' impress. That Visáji-pant, hearing that this informant had taken service with the English, ordered a *chauki* on his house at Bassein, and forced his family to give up their joys of Rs. 350 value as a fine. He did also punish Jaysávant's brother Bahirsávant by name on account of his said brother having taken the English service, on which Lakshmanpant waited upon Visáji-pant from Pappery (Pápli, a village between Bassein town and railway station) and acquainted him that these people were employed on the Sarkár's business, when Visáji-pant released the said Bahirsávant giving him Rs. 25 as *indm* (gift). The following eight people are gone out with leave to procure recruits: Báváji Náik,

Chapter I.

History.

Conspiracy
at Thána,
1780.

Chapter I.
History.

*Conspiracy
at Thána,
1780.*

Haibatrao, Bháusing, Sindhi Man, Kondáji Gáikwár, Bálsing, Vitthojirao, and one whose name is not remembered ¹

After noting the above information, at the same Consultation (18th September 1780) the Board observe: After the discovery made in April last, this second attempt is very alarming and the more dangerous from the instance which so lately happened at Vengurla and the appearance of a regular system to introduce into the sepoy battalions a number of men ready prepared for the express purpose of executing a plan so big with danger to the Company's settlements, instead of the precarious method before practised of attempting to corrupt the fidelity of men already engaged in and attached to the service. This emergency therefore demands our most serious attention and vigorous exertion as well to discover the extent of the design as to prevent further danger. As the first step necessary, it is resolved to pursue to the fullest proof possible to be obtained the discovery already made in order that the most exemplary punishment may be inflicted on the offenders to suppress by the terror of example every possibility of the enemy again finding persons daring enough to engage in designs of this nature.²

At their Consultation the 27th September 1780 the Board pass the following orders relative to the aforesaid conspiracy: Having now taken every step that can throw light upon this conspiracy and recorded the examination of every person pointed out as materially concerned, it appears that Tukáji Godiah, Dharmáji and Kásam Khán, with Kondáji Gáikwár who has absconded, are the principals and conductors of this most alarming and dangerous enterprise. As an act necessary to the public safety and an example to deter others from engaging in such schemes, it is resolved that the said three persons be put to death at Thána by blowing them from great guns. It is further ordered that their crime and the reason of their punishment be fully explained to the whole sepoy establishment. We think proper to remark that Kásam Khán, now ordered to be put to death, is not the person mentioned in our proceedings in April last and rewarded for making discovery of a design of the same nature as the present.³ Such of the seven men as are now in custody and pointed out in Válji Thákor's information taken at Thána as being concerned in an inferior degree are ordered to be put to hard labour upon our works for life chained in pairs. The private sepoys are ordered to be discharged and to be acquainted that if they return again to the Company's districts they will be put to hard labour for life. Samin Khán is pardoned according to the promise given him the 18th instant. Orders must be issued for the Captains of sepoy battalions to be very strict and cautious what men they enlist in their battalions and particularly in their promotion of Black officers, paying regard as much as possible to those who have connections or families in the Company's settlements. Resolved that in acknowledgment of the good services rendered by Válji Thákor in making discovery of the conspi-

¹ Bom. Gov. Consultation, 18th Sept. 1780, Pub. Diary 77 of 1780, 386-388.

² Bom. Gov. Consultation, 18th Sept. 1780, Pub. Diary 77 of 1780, 390-391.

³ Bom. Gov. Consultation, 10th April 1780, Pub. Diary 77 of 1780, 151.

racy, a handsome gratification be given him in the name of this Government which the President is desired to confer to the amount and in the manner that he may judge most suitable and agreeable to the party. As the battalion of Native Portuguese is now complete and nearly ready for review, it is resolved that they be sent to garrison Thána and the sepoy removed from thence which we trust will effectually destroy every latent spark that may remain of this conspiracy. The other subordinates must be cautioned to be circumspect and vigilant that no similar schemes may be formed amongst the sepoy at any other of our garrisons.¹

On the next day (28th September 1780) the Board signed the following letter to the Chief and factors at Thána: We now return Kásam Khán, Tukáji Godiah, and Dharmáji to Thána, whom we direct should be put to death in the manner ordered in our last Consultation and for which this letter is to be esteemed a sufficient warrant. The other resolutions we had come to respecting the orders to be issued to the Captains of the sepoy battalions and our intention to send the Native Portuguese battalion to garrison Thána fort, are also communicated to them. In a postscript we advise that we judge it best not to send the private sepoy to be discharged at Thána but shall cause them to be conveyed from hence to some place at a more convenient distance. Kásam Khán, Tukáji Godiah, and Dharmáji are this day sent to Thána under a strong guard with the above letter containing our orders for their execution.²

A Consultation of 3rd October 1780 records a letter from Thána, dated this morning, advising that our orders respecting the three prisoners returned there on the 29th ultimo were yesterday put into execution in the manner directed and that the prisoners died with great firmness and resolution.³

A Consultation of the 21st February 1780 records: The Select Committee having this day received advice of the capture of Ahmedabad by storm on the 15th instant by the forces under Brig. Genl. Goddard, a royal salute was fired from the castle on the occasion.⁴

On the 2nd May 1782 the Bombay betel-leaf sellers offered, if a five years' monopoly were granted them, they would pay Government Rs. 2000 a year and reduce the price from 25 *res* to 16. On the 17th May the Board record: We are averse from monopolies of this nature which however apparently calculated or intended for the public good frequently produce inconvenience and grievances which in this case would chiefly fall on the lower order of people to whom betel-leaf is an absolute necessary of life. As the benefit offered to the Company for this exclusive privilege is no object, resolved that the prayer of this petition be not complied with.⁵

Chapter I.
History
Conspiracy
at Thána,
1780.

Ahmedabad
taken by
Storm,
1780.

Betel Leaf
Monopoly
Refused,
1782.

¹ Bom. Gov. Consultation, 27th Sept. 1780, Pub. Diary 77 of 1780, 413-414.

² Bom. Gov. Consultation, 28th Sept. 1780, Pub. Diary 77 of 1780, 423.

³ Bom. Gov. Diary, 3rd Oct. 1780, Pub. Diary 77 of 1780, 436.

⁴ Bom. Gov. Consultation, 21st Feb. 1780, Pub. Diary 77 of 1780, 58 and Secret and Political Diary 22 of 1780, 81. Forrest's Maratha Series, I. Pl. II. 396.

⁵ Bom. Gov. Consultation, 17th May 1782, Rev. Diary 2 of 1782, 45.

Chapter I.**History.**

Measures against
the Unlicensed,
1783.

In a letter of the 15th January 1783 the Court of Directors write: Notwithstanding the attention which we have paid to preventing unlicensed persons proceeding to the East Indies on board the Company's ships, means have been found to elude our vigilance in that respect. It is therefore our positive order that upon the arrival of any of the Company's ships at your presidency you do make the strictest inquiry whether the passengers on board have been duly licensed by us to take their passage thereon. In case it shall appear no such permission has been granted to them, we direct that the names of the offenders, together with the name of the ship and every other particular you can collect that may throw a light upon the subject, be transmitted to us by your next advices as we are resolved to punish very severely those commanders who shall dare to disobey our instructions in this material point.

Further, as persons have been frequently taken on board our ships in England as part of the crew and afterwards designedly left in India, being set down on the ship's books as runaways, it is our further order that you do also particularly attend to any circumstances of this kind that may occur, and that any persons who may be found at your presidency under the above description be sent home by the next ships as we cannot suffer such evasions of our authority to pass with impunity.¹

Duties on
Foreign Ships,
1784.

In January 1784 the Honourable R. H. Boddam Esq. became Governor and President. At a Consultation of the 27th February 1784 reparsed the letter from the commander of a Tuscan ship read last Council day, when reference being had to the resolution of this Board established on the 28th October 1779, it is agreed to pass the following regulations with regard to foreign ships: That they be permitted to land copper on paying a duty of twelve per cent, and all other articles which come under the denomination of staples on paying a duty of nine per cent; that all necessaries and articles of consumption be charged with the usual duty; that the importation sale or transshipping of woollens in this harbour be totally prohibited; that these regulations noways relate to Austrian ships with whom all commercial intercourse is forbidden by the Company.²

Asiatic Trade,
1787.

In a letter dated the 23rd March 1787 the Court of Directors write: As it is essential we should have the completest information possible of the nature and extent of the trade carried on to and from the different parts of Asia by the several European nations, and as we are convinced that our own concerns have received very material detriment from the illicit practices of interlopers trading thither under the sanction of foreign colours, it is our positive instruction, which you are to consider as a standing order, that there be transmitted us from time to time an account of all ships or vessels that shall arrive at Bengal under foreign colours particularising their names and burthen, the name of the commander,

¹ Court to Bombay 15th Jan. 1783 paras 10 and 11, Pub. Dep. Court's L. Vol. 11 of 1783-1786, 3-4. Comp. of Standing Ord. Vol. 2 of 1759-1785, 59-60.

² Bom. Gov. Consultation 27th Feb. 1784, Pub. Diary 83 of 1784, 132. Comp. of Standing Ord. Vol. 2 of 1759-1785, 178-179.

the time of arrival, from whence, in whose employ, with the best specification you may be able to procure both of their import and export charges, to which we desire may be added such observations and remarks as may occur to you thereon in order, if it shall appear necessary, that we may take the needful measures for checking such trade where it may be found to be improperly conducted. A strict attention to this subject will form an important part of the duty of our new board of trade. If faithfully executed, it will be attended with most beneficial consequences to our commercial interests. We trust we shall hereafter find that a strict and punctual obedience has been paid thereto. We expect this register to be kept in the office of the Custom Master, conceiving it to fall properly within the line of his duty and that the Company be put to no additional expense on account of the same.¹

Early in November 1799 a severe storm passed over Bombay. To this storm, in an account of the progress of Sion Causeway, the Engineer Mr. Robert Nicholson has the following reference: I have the further satisfaction to inform you that during the late severe storm, in which it may be supposed the water was very much agitated, not a single stone was displaced.²

One of the gravest calamities which has fallen on Bombay was the great fire of February 1803. In a letter to the Court of Directors the Honourable Jonathan Duncan Governor and President gives the following account: With extreme concern we acquaint your Honourable Court that on the 17th February a most alarming fire broke out in the very extensive and populous Bazar situated within this garrison. It is not exactly known whence the fire originated. Notwithstanding surmises and suggestions to the contrary, in our opinion there is no sufficient reason to consider it arose from any other cause than accident. The fire broke out early in the day and the wind continuing unusually high the flames increased with astonishing rapidity. So great and violent was the conflagration, that at sunset the destruction of every house in the fort was apprehended. The flames directed their course in a south-easterly direction from that part of the Bazar opposite to the Cumberland Ravelin quite down to the King's barracks. During the whole of the day every effort was used to oppose its progress, but the fierceness of the fire driven rapidly on by the wind baffled all attempts; nor did it visibly abate till nearly a third part of the town within the walls had been consumed.

The apprehensions excited by this calamitous event were considerably increased by the direction of the wind impelling the flames towards the arsenal. For whatever security the magazines might be supposed to afford against access to the fire, still the smallest crevice was sufficient to admit a spark to the great mass of gunpowder within the castle. It was impossible to view otherwise than in a state of awful suspense the destruction to the whole garrison which was thus within the bounds of possibility. Before midnight the wind

Chapter I.

History.

Asiatic Trade,
1787.

Storm,
1799.

Fire,
1803.

¹ Court to Bombay 23rd March 1787 paras 80, 81, Pub. Dep. Court's L. Vol. 12 of 1787 - 1790, 36 - 37. Comp. of Standing Ord. Vol. III of 1769 - 1788, 68 - 69.

² Bom. Gov. Diary of Nov. 1799, Pub. Diary 144 of 1799, 3000.

Chapter I.

History.

Fire,
1803.

changed more to the northward whence it veered round gradually to the eastward, abating at the same time in its force. From this rather than from any human effort, the conflagration visibly decreased and the danger which threatened the castle gradually diminished. While using every practical exertion to check the progress of the flames, we derived particular and most useful assistance from the presence of Vice Admiral Rainier who repaired to the spot with all the officers and a due proportion of the men of His Majesty's squadron. From their active interference and uncommon exertions was derived the greater part of any opposition that could be made to the extension of the conflagration. This help proved more eminently advantageous in the two or three days that followed the first extensive destruction by pulling down the crumbling ruins and thereby smothering the remaining fire and smouldering embers. Otherwise we might have had to lament far greater devastation than has occurred.

The loss of lives has been small though there has not yet been time to take any exact account. But the fire having raged chiefly throughout the day, afforded opportunity to the inhabitants to save not only their lives but many of them a considerable share of their portable property. The damage sustained on this occasion by the Honourable Company has been proportionably inconsiderable. At the same time the occurrence of the calamity has rendered manifest to all who witnessed it, the danger to which the garrison would have been exposed in the event of the appearance of an enemy before Bombay. The number of houses in the Bazar, the very exceptionable mode of their construction, and the combustible materials of which the greater part of them are composed and with which many of them were also filled in the commercial pursuits of their owners, would have exposed us to nearly equal hazard from the enemy's throwing in only a few shells. Whilst from the confined situation joined to the distress that must at all times have been incident to such a conflagration, the means of effectual defence must soon have been rendered impossible without any consideration to the number of the garrison or to the strength of the works. Under this view of the local circumstances it will require the most mature deliberation whether to admit the bazárs to be rebuilt under any modification. It must probably appear under every point of view preferable to allot a space in the oarts adjoining the fort and esplanade for the erection of a black town such as at Madras; or gradually to effect such a separation between the town and the fortifications as exists at Calcutta. On these and other points our subsequent proceedings will be in due course submitted.¹

Four days later (26th February 1803) the Bombay Government wrote to the Court: From enquiries made since our letter of the 22nd it has been ascertained that during the conflagration 471 houses were burnt, a number very much less than at first was supposed. Considering the far greater apprehensions of the extent of the damage at first entertained, it affords us subject of consolation

¹ Bombay to Court 22nd Feb. 1803, Pub. Diary 171 of 1803, 782-785.

to be able to conclude from data which we consider of pretty good authority, that the real damage occasioned by the fire cannot exceed fifty lákhs of rupees both in real and moveable property; whilst in view to the various recoveries of valuable articles since the fire and which are still continuing to be made, it may reasonably be hoped that the total amount of loss in moveables and merchandise may not ultimately exceed forty lákhs of rupees—a result which viewing Bombay as an emporium of general commerce cannot, we trust, be productive of any other than partial and temporary prejudice to the commercial interests of the port.¹

Some further useful details are contained in a letter dated 27th February 1803 from the Superintendent of Police to Government: In consequence of your order on the 21st instant to remove from within the fort all tatty walls and projections with thatched roofs or *cajan* structures, mat frames, and other combustible articles, I immediately ordered the *battaki* to be beaten to that effect and went with my people into the different streets and alleys not only in the Black but also in the European part of the town within the walls. At first, wherever I turned my eye, I observed more or less combustible materials from whole houses (generally stables or cow-houses filled with hay or straw) to two or three *cajans* tied up to keep off the rain or the sun.

The number and description of these projections which I herewith subjoin,² will enable you to judge of the very great danger from fire to which the town was daily exposed by such quantities of these combustible substances being collected in it. In many places these materials were so old and had become so inflammable that I am surprised the town has not been more frequently set on fire. Excepting in the houses of some of the most wealthy inhabitants where the partition walls are built with strong materials, the rooms are generally divided by partitions of tattys particularly in all houses let out to rent where many of the apartments are not more than eight or nine feet square. In this small space they dress victuals three times a day surrounded with nothing but these inflammable substances almost as bad as tinder itself. Many of these partitions appeared so old that I think they must have been put up at least eight or ten years. With every precaution, I am perfectly astonished how they escaped so long. Wherever either a whole wall or any considerable portion of a wall has been removed I would humbly recommend that it ought to be built up as soon as possible with a wall of mortar and stone or of mud and stone. In the state they are now as much danger is to be apprehended as before removal from

¹ Bombay to Court 26th Feb. 1803, Pub. Diary 171 of 1803, 798-799.

² List of houses removed by the orders of the Governor and Council: 10 in Church Gate Street, 7 in Govind Kánóba's Street, 5 in the lane opposite Sorábjí's house, 2 in Vithoba Yádevji's Lane, 2 in Framji Nánábhái's Lane, 4 in Purshotam Chimáji's Street, 5 in Kávasji Patel's Street, 3 in Nánábhái Bamanji's Street, 2 in Kávasji Subhedár's Lane, 5 in the Governor's old stable, and 9 others, total 54. Nine Bhoys' (Bhois' or Palanquin bearers') houses ought to be removed and three others near the Bazár Gate are very dangerous and can easily be set fire to. A large quantity of matting and mat frames has been removed from the European part of the town to the northward of Church Street. Public Diary 172 of 1803, 1091-1094.

Chapter I.**History.**Fire,
1803.

the current of air being now greater and therefore more liable to blow about the sparks of fire. Before I conclude this subject I humbly beg leave to draw your attention to the houses of a class of people called Bhois. They are situated in the street of Kávasji Subhedár surrounded by a number of wealthy Pársis' houses. They have occupied that spot of ground from the time of Governor Law sixty years ago. The houses originally built of nothing but wooden frames filled up with tattys, are now so very old and decayed that they are actually tumbling to pieces and are so very inflammable that I am confident was a spark once to take effect particularly in the night, they would be consumed in a few minutes together with their miserable inhabitants. The ground they occupy if exposed to sale would bring a very high price, and these poor wretches might be provided with better lodgings and many more comforts by being removed without the fort while at the same time the town would be rid of a dangerous and alarming nuisance. I cannot help also taking notice of the Carwas' (Khárvás') houses near the Bazár Gate. They are a class of useful and industrious men who ply in the boats in the harbour and with a few regulations I think their houses might be rendered safe which at present is far from being the case. Two or three other old houses in the town ought to be rebuilt, but the owners I am informed are too poor to build them. In the European part of the town the principal objects worthy of notice were mats and mat frames attached to every house with here and there a stable, part of which was filled with hay, all of which has been removed.¹

On the 21st February Captain Brookes the property assessor submitted with a plan a statement of the number of houses and an estimate of the value of the property destroyed at 24 lákhs. In a Consultation of the 26th March Government preferred the estimate in the *Bombay Courier* of the 26th February of 20 lákhs of house property, and merchandise and moveables about as much more, or between 50 and 53 lákhs in all, a total which recoveries might be expected to reduce to 40 lákhs.² On the 26th March 1803 Government resolved that a Committee be immediately constituted with Mr. Hallet for their secretary on an allowance of Rs. 400 as salary to report on the best means of repairing the destruction caused by the late fire.³

This committee which was called the Town Committee received the following instructions: Upon due consideration of the several suggestions from our own members it may perhaps become expedient to allow the native merchants whose premises have been burnt to build in lieu of those now destroyed, warehouses for the reception, under due precautions, of their goods and counting houses in as far in respect to both these descriptions of structures as shall be deemed consistent with a due regard to the security of the fort, which seems at the first glance to oppose this class of inhabitants being allowed

¹ Letter from the Superintendent of Police to the President and Council, 27th Feb. 1803, Public Diary 172 of 1803, 1089-1091.

² Bom. Gov. Consultation 26th March 1803, Pub. Diary 172 of 1803, 1058-1062.

³ Bom. Gov. Consultation 26th March 1803, Pub. Diary 172 of 1803, 1174.

to have their dwelling houses within the walls. Objection is also rightly taken to any of the proposed warehouses or offices being of more than two stories at the highest or otherwise covered than by terraces instead of the pitched roofs that have hitherto prevailed. It may be hoped that you will be able to convince the natives in question of the unadvisableness of their residing in a garrison crowded with lofty structures filled with goods and merchandise and intersected by such narrow streets as existed before the late fire. And that from the conviction forced on their minds by the late sad calamity, they will willingly concur in the expediency of their dwelling houses and families being without the fort where they ought to be sensible that under the advantage of our insular situation both will be in perfect security. The motives for our inclining to admit any description of their goods to be lodged within the walls and for their being consequently indulged with counting houses adjoining arise out of what the papers now transmitted to you indicate to be the local circumstances of the harbour, where that part of it immediately opposite to the fortifications is represented to be the only eligible spot for the lading of ships particularly during the monsoon. This point it will be your object still further to investigate since it would certainly prove above all things desirable that every mercantile house, especially of the natives, should be situated without the fort as is completely the case at Calcutta and has we understand lately become so at Madras. Before any plan be finally adopted it is necessary that the right of possession or property in the tract laid waste by the late conflagration should be thoroughly ascertained. Towards assisting in this inquiry you are herewith furnished with statements taken from the collector's registry of the two descriptions of ground, namely public and private, affected by this calamity. To these statements are added remarks from Mr. De Souza a well informed native of this place. We are pleased to find Mr. Hall, the Company's attorney, does not deem it necessary altogether to acquiesce in Mr. De Souza's conclusions. Mr. Hall considers that the part of the ground styled 'public' was given to the tenants not in perpetuity as understood by Mr. De Souza but merely as a permissive indulgence to be resumed at will. Mr. Hall holds that unless any of the public or unpensioned tenants can show leases from Government conferring a superior title those distinguished under the name of pensioned proprietors can alone claim compensation from the Honourable Company for any ground which it may be deemed advisable to re-occupy.¹

In April 1803 the Superintendent of Police was called on to report regarding the nuisance of noisy dogs of which the grand jury had complained. Mr. Halliday, the Police Superintendent, said the number of stray dogs on the esplanade had of late greatly increased in consequence of their owners' families having been burnt out or forced to quit their houses in the fort. He said the dogs though ownerless were fed by the natives especially by the Pársis. He

Chapter I.
History.

Fire,
1803.

Destruction
of Dogs,
1803.

¹ Bom. Gov. Diary 26th March 1803, Public Diary 172 of 1803, 1175-1178.

Chapter I.**History.**

Destruction
of Dogs,
1803.

recommended that at a certain time of year after warning all stray dogs especially puppies should be destroyed. Government forwarded the Superintendent's report to the Justices with the suggestion that a rule be passed to afford reasonable relief. At the same time they expressed the wish that the new rule should show some regard to the customs of the natives especially of the Pársis, who were known to cherish these dogs as is requisite in view to certain observances in their ritual.¹

¹ Bom. Gov. Diary 27th May 1803, Pub. Diary 174 of 1803, 2162-2163.



NOTES.

2a (PAGE III NOTE 2.)

Apta is suggested for the village Batty from which the Bráhmans were carried away. Mr. R. A. Lamb, I. C. S. Collector of Kolába notices (19th July 1893) as more likely the village Vát about $1\frac{1}{2}$ miles from the right bank of the Pátálganga in Panvel some six miles above Apta. Though now stopped by a dam the river may formerly have been tidal to Vát. Mr. Lamb's identification is probably correct.

Chapter I.
History.

Notes.
Batty Village
1677.

1a (PAGE 87 NOTE 1.)

On the 7th April 1684 the Court write to Surat regarding the redeeming of the drowned lands of Bombay¹: Redeem those drowned lands of Bombay, for which we shall now propose you a method which we think cannot fail. That is, you may agree to give the undertakers every Saturday night a day and a half's pay for every day's work for every man they shall employ in that service, part money and part rice; the rice at a price by which we may be a little gainers. And promise the undertakers over and above such daily pay to give them . . . 3000 (?) dollars when the whole work is completely finished. Whatever use you shall give the ground to hereafter, it will be absolutely necessary to frame a substantial strong sluice in the middle of your great dam to drain the ground upon occasion if you should plant it, or to let in the salt water if you should make a salt work of it. This we leave to your consideration, being nearer the place, with this note only that salt is a commodity in the bay (of Bengal) and in some places of the South Seas. If from any of the coasts near Bombay you can exchange equal quantities of salt for rice, nothing can be so profitable to us as to convert all those drowned lands when they are rescued from the sea into salt pans after the manner of those at Rochelt in France or Santuvaly in Portugal. This you may discover from many seamen in our ships which have seen those salt pans in both places, and the manner of causing it to shoot into small grains. Whether you resolve upon a salt work or not, we conceive the bottom or lowermost part of the valley when the sea-water is pent out must be filled up with earth from the higher parts of the ground to the level of the sea without your dam at half flood or thereabouts, and your sluice

Drowned
Lands,
1683-84.

¹ Various causes were assigned for the alarming mortality amongst Europeans in Bombay. The atmosphere was at first supposed to be polluted by the putrid fish with which the trees were manured. A more reasonable conjecture was that malaria arose from the low plains which were overflowed at high tides, and left in a swampy state when the sea receded. In 1675 a proposition for draining the swamps was submitted to the Court by the Government of Bombay. Several surveys were in consequence made; and in 1684 authority to commence the work was received. Letters from the President and Council of Surat dated 11th January 1676; to the Court dated 17th January 1676; and from the Court dated February 1684. Description of Hindustan by Walter Hamilton Esq. Anderson's English in Western India (1854), 62-63. Neither the Bombay proposals of 1675, the details of the consequent surveys, nor the Court's Orders of 1684 have (1893) been traced in the Bombay Records.

Chapter I.**History.**

Notes.
Drowned
Lands,
1683-84.

must be set accordingly in height. Otherwise when you draw up your sluices to let out the fresh water in the time of great rains, the sea water may troublesomely return upon you. We conceive likewise that, when you have levelled the whole to such a height as is fit for draining the valley, it will be necessary from your sluice to draw a ditch or trench quite through the lowermost parts of the valley if you should plant or till it, as well as for keeping the fresh water out of your salt if you should turn it into salt ponds. If you should agree with the undertakers for draining of the drowned lands as aforesaid, it is necessary that you should appoint some trusty English to keep constant check upon the workmen that we may be sure to pay no more days' wages to the workmen than we have full day's work done.¹ Three months later, 2nd July 1684, the Court resume: Prosecute with effect the draining of our over-flooded ground at Bombay as we wrote you last year (April 1683-84). If for the furtherance of that or for any other cause you shall find our President's own presence necessary at Bombay and that he may be spared from Surat, we leave to him and our Council to take such a time for his going thither, stay there, and return from thence, as you shall find most accommodable to our general affairs and our interest.²

2a (PAGES 111 AND 112 NOTE 1.)

Pilgrim Ship
Gunsway,
1696.

The name Gunsway seems to be Ganjasawái, literally the Ganja or figure-headed ship *Sawái*. *Sawái* is still in common use as a name for large Native craft as *Náudi Sawái*, the *Náudi* or vessel called *Sawái*. Such names as *Phateh-Sawái* Victory *Sawái* are also common. *Sawái* or *Sawa* seems to be the Maráthi and Gujaráti for one and a quarter. It is used with a sense corresponding to such English laudatory phrases as a man and a half, a horse and a half, or a ship and a half. Thus among Maráthas, Bráhmans the second Mádhavrao Peshwa (1774-1795) is still known as *Sawái* Mádhavrao, the greater Mádhavrao. Compare Rajputána Gazetteer, II. 136. Jaya Singh, commonly known as Siwái Jaya Singh, Siwái meaning 1½ and representing Jaya Singh's superiority over others whom the unit represents. The same meaning seems to explain the title (Tod's Western India, I. 438) Rinna Sawa or *Sawái* of Rae Mal, the noble Ráthod pirate of Bet-Dwárka in Káthiáwár, who (A.D. 1572) lost his life in saving his sovereign Muzafar Sháh (1561-1572). The phrase is proverbial in the saying *Báp sawái beta*, a son cleverer than his father.

5a (PAGE 130 AND NOTE 5.)

Butcher's Island,
1701.

The original is 'to Robin the Butcher's Island'. The only apparent sense is that the butcher after whom the island was supposed to be called was named Robin. Perhaps a fairy Robin Goodfellow name suitable to the mythical namer-giver. In spite

¹ Court to Surat 7th April 1684, Public Dep. Court's Letters Vol. I of 1681-1685, 80-82.

² Court to Surat 2nd July 1684, Pub. Dep. Court's Letters Vol. I of 1681-1685, 91. The Court's 1683-84 Orders have not been traced (1893).

of Grose's (1750) explanation (Voyages, I. 58) that the island was called Butcher because cattle were kept on it for the use of Bombay, the English name Butcher Island seems a case of meaning-making. Fryer, 1673 (Travels, 61-62 and Map), calls the Island Putachoes (properly Patecas) or watermelons, and this derivation is accepted in a Portuguese account of Bombay, 1728 (Arch. Port. Or. Fas. 6 Supt. New Goa, 1876, pages 287-292). Patachos Yachts, a word used by Baldæus, 1680 (Churchill's Voyages, III. 533) and Putas harlots, in connection with a story that as in Goa a Bishop banished the harlots to an island, have also been suggested. But Patecas melons, seems the only derivation for which authority can be quoted. Besides the commoner Dardivi, the Maráthi name Bhát or Bhátiche Bet, the lowlying island, is said to be still in use for Butcher's Island. It seems fairly certain the English Butcher is the Portuguese Pateca. The absence of any connection between the island and watermelons suggests that in its turn the Portuguese name is also a meaning-making from the Maráthi Bhátiche Bet.

A. (PAGE 146, 17 LINES FROM THE TOP.)

Mapont under Angria has been provisionally identified with Mohopáda on the Panvel river. Later inquiry fails to find any trace of fortifications at or near the Panvel Mohopáda. At the same time information obtained from Mr. R. A. Lamb, I. C. S., Collector of Kolába, shows that the broad entrance to the Apta river is known as Mohopanth the False Channel, and that traces of a fort, also known as Mohopanth, remain on a hill at the creek side near the Panvel village of Avre.

Chapter I. History.

Notes.
Butcher's Island,
1701.

Mapont,
1718.





सत्यमेव जयते

APPENDIX I.

Part I.—Proposed Scheme.

EXTRACT paras 1 to 5 and 8 from the Collector of Bombay's Report No. 1 submitted to Government in July 1891, containing as required by Government a detailed scheme for the compilation of a statistical account of the Town and Island of Bombay :

1. As directed in your letter No. 1721, dated 15th May, last, I beg to submit the following scheme for the preparation of a Statistical Account of the Town and Island of Bombay.

2. I propose that the Statistical Account should consist of four volumes each of 400 to 500 pages uniform with the published set of district statistical accounts.

3. Except that I think the volumes should contain copies of the greatest possible variety of old and recent maps and charts of the town island and harbour, I would not propose any illustration of the account.

4. I would suggest that the first volume should consist of three leading parts :

(a) Description including climate and geology.

(b) History in periods showing for each period the leading general and local events and a summary of the changes and progress in the size of the city : the increase of population, the growth of trade and industries, the development of management, revenue, municipal, harbour, justice, police, education : changes in the appearance and character of the city and island due to engineering works, surveys, roads, buildings, filling low-lands and foreshores, docks, fortifications : also changes in the conditions of life, social changes, political religious and social movements.

(c) Places and objects of interest including public buildings, churches, temples, mosques and shrines, forts, place names of historic interest, traces of early rulers Hindu, Musalmán, and Portuguese.

The second volume should be devoted to trade under the heads of communications, industries, manufactures, commerce, and capital.

Under Communications

(a) By land : Roads and bridges, tramways and railways.

(b) By sea :

(1) General steam and sailing vessels. (2) Local coasting steamers and country craft.

Under Industries

(a) Labour :

(1) Settled in the island. (2) Drawn from the country round.
Classes who labour, condition, character, qualifications as workmen, effect of railways and coasting steamers on the supply of labour.

(b) Crafts :

Classes who follow each craft or calling : their numbers, condition, character, qualifications ; changes in the classes employed : earnings : processes not in detail : prospects.

(c) Manufactures—The great development of steam industries, factories, foundries, workshops : information for each class as under (b).

Appendix I.

PROPOSED
SCHEME.
Contents.

Vol. I.

Vol. II.

Appendix I.**PROPOSED
SCHEME.
Contents.**

Under Commerce—The bulk and the value of the trade in the different articles of export and import. Past changes and history illustrated by series of statistical curves. The existing course of trade in each article: the agencies in Bombay, importers, brokers, or agents, wholesale dealers and distributors, retailers: relations with other countries as suppliers and as consumers; local and general causes of change; prospects.

Under Capital, lenders and borrowers, rates of interest, native banking and other financial agencies. The Bank of Bombay, other general exchange banks; tables of monthly and yearly fluctuations in interest.

Vol. III.

The third volume should be devoted to population under the main divisions of the resident people, their settlement and history in Bombay: their occupation, character, condition, locality, mode of living, religious and social customs, beliefs, festivals, amusements, religious and social movements. For the leading classes under the main divisions information on the same points so far as it is special to the class. Similar information should be furnished for the classes who are migratory staying in Bombay during part of the year. Details of the harbour and floating population will be of special interest. And for strangers some notices of places of entertainment, hotels, clubs, eating and rest-houses.

Vol. IV.

The fourth volume would be confined to administration, showing the history constitution and results of the leading managing bodies; the various Departments of Government, the Municipality, the Port Trust, the Chamber of Commerce, Millowners' and other Associations, Societies, Institutions, and Clubs.

At the end of each volume all available statistics should come in tabular form and so far as possible illustrated by curves. The first volume should supply a detailed table of contents for all four volumes and each volume should be furnished with a full index.

5. I would notice that so far as my present information goes on almost all subjects abundant materials exist and can under favourable conditions be collected by local inquiry and from newspapers, records, reports, and books. With the help of specialists and other public-spirited contributors, I am hopeful that a strong special staff will succeed in tracing with fair completeness the steps by which Bombay has risen to be the second city of the Empire in size and one of its foremost cities in wealth, manufactures, and trade; in the variety and handsomeness of its buildings; in the excellence of its water-supply and of its roads, markets, and docks; in the efficiency of its defences; and in the success of its municipal and harbour management.

**Collecting
Agencies.**

8. I propose that the necessary information should be collected and worked into final form by three agencies:

A.—A special establishment costing about Rs. 1150 a month.

B.—The regular Government and municipal offices and the leading private societies and institutions who will supply articles and materials illustrating the history duties and results of each department or institution. The supply of information by Class B is not expected to involve any outlay.

- | | |
|--------------------|------------------------|
| 1. Ecclesiastical. | 11. Port & Port Trust. |
| 2. Educational. | 12. Postal. |
| 3. Income-Tax. | 13. Public Works. |
| 4. Judicial. | 14. Railways. |
| 5. Marine. | 15. Revenue. |
| 6. Medical. | 16. Customs. |
| 7. Military. | 17. Excise. |
| 8. Mint. | 18. Land. |
| 9. Municipal. | 19. Opium. |
| 10. Police. | 20. Telegraph. |
| | 21. Volunteering. |

C.—Private contributors and specialists who will write on such subjects as description, geology, climate, botany, natural history, trade and commerce, and agriculture. Except in the case of such laborious subjects as trade and commerce and to the poorer contributors, contributors under Class C will probably require neither establishment nor remuneration.

Appendix I.

Part II.—Heads of Inquiry.

Information is available from three main sources :

- A.—Government Records, Books, and Newspaper Files.
- B.—Municipal Records and Officials.
- C.—The People.

The following points of inquiry are proposed under

A.—RECORDS, BOOKS, AND NEWSPAPERS.

HEADS
OF INQUIRY.

Records and
Papers.

I. DESCRIPTION.

Descriptive notice of any parts of the Town or of the Island. Views, references to changes in the surface of the Island. Quarrying, filling hollows, reclamations, making vellards, complaints of crowdedness of trees or of houses.

Temperature or other daily records (except in very early papers, a reference to such records will be enough, since most such details have been compiled). Unusual or untimely weather, sudden or excessive rainfalls, failures of rain, intense heat, singular cold, storms in monsoon, cyclones, earthquake shocks, famines, epidemics.

Notes connected with geology, special rocks, fossil or other animal or vegetable remains.

II. PRODUCTION.

Notes of the qualities, values, and uses of stones, quarries, sand, and earth.

Special harvests, introduction of new crops, plants, or trees. New methods of grafting. References to blights or to new diseases.

Notes regarding the habits of animals, especially of migratory or stranger birds. Regarding fish, appearance of whales, dugongs, and other unusual fish; plagues of flies, mosquitos, locusts, rats; notices of sea snakes; trade in animals, sheep, cattle, horses. Any tables or details of prices of animals. Shows of cats, dogs, cattle, and horses.

III. POPULATION.

Settlements of new castes; histories of castes; caste quarrels. Notices illustrating changes of customs, dress, food, and mode of living among the different classes; also changes in the place of living and in the style of house. Any notes of drunkenness, of excessive use of opium or other stimulant. Any references to slaves, to European prostitutes. Notes on any observances, religious or other great Mâhâjan or Jain gatherings. Pilgrim traffic, census and census details.

IV. AGRICULTURE.

There will be little except what has come under plants and trees. Still there may have been interesting schemes and attempts to grow exotics and introduce new practices. References to famines, years of scarcity, also years of epidemics, should come under climate. At any rate wherever the references may be worked up, all references should be

Appendix I.

**HEADS
OF INQUIRY.**
Records and
Papers.

cherished. The information collected should refer solely to Bombay. It should show the effect of upcountry famines on the City and Island under the following heads :

- (a) Price of grain.
- (b) Influx of famine-stricken people.
- (c) Development of grain traffic.
- (d) Spread of epidemic disease.
- (e) Increase of mortality.

V. CAPITAL.

Notes regarding the Mint and the Bombay Bank.

Notes on forms of investment ; on rates of interest ; on the hoarding of bullion ; on different phases of speculation, time bargains, rain bargains, shares. Labour mortgages. Self-sale or hereditary servants ; investment of labour. Forced labour.

All statements of wages are valuable, whether of skilled or of unskilled labour. An interesting point connected with labour is the classes of work of which the different communities have a monopoly. Any notices of extinct monopolies are valuable.

Especially grain, milk, water, and firewood prices, that is the prices of necessaries are interesting.

As a rule, a reference will be enough in the first instance, as most price-details have probably already been compiled.

Prices of land should be carefully noted. The Collector's office is trying to prepare a full account of the increase in the value of land at different times and in different parts of the Island. Notes on sales of land require care or they mislead. What interest and title was transferred by the sale? Was the interest complete? Was the title free from doubt? How far was the land transferred burdened by charges? Was the price at the time of transfer considered high, low, or fair? Rents of houses or shops at any time are useful and should be noted.

VI. TRADE.

References to early road-making, cost of compensation, cost of making. Statements of mileage under roads.

The old Europeans used to go in palukhis, then in bullock carts ; I think Mr. Patel refers about 1800 to the first horse carriage used by a Parsi in Bombay. Notes about the first carriage, the first buggy, the first and last omnibus, the first victoria, would be interesting.

Embankments and vullards, causeways—Sion and Jamssetji—would come under roads and bridges. Railways—Opening of G. I. P. and B. B. & C. I. Ferries—Any traces of ferries through the Island or from one part of the Island to another in old times. Steam ferries across the harbour. Docks references (the account published 7th March 1891 will help). Vessels—Special kinds of vessels, new rigging, visits of foreign men-of-war, the first steam boat. Statements of tonnage and details of large ships might be useful ; but a reference to such would be better than an extract.

Rest Houses—To come under Buildings.

Post Offices—To come under Administration, Post.

Light-houses—To come under Administration, Port Trust, and Objects of Interest.

Trade Returns, only references. There may be good papers comparing the returns over a series of years or a history of the trade in a certain

article. Any notice of the starting of a new article of import or export or of some new line of trade would be interesting.

References to Fairs might be given.

Markets would come under Municipal Works. References would be valuable.

References to Carriers and Pack Bullocks would be interesting.

Bohorás and other packmen.

References to exports and imports would be enough. Any articles or notes on the course of trade, on the hands through which trade passes, would be interesting.

References to special trades—Cotton, Opium, Salt, would be valuable.

The introduction of new crafts is always important. Any notes regarding such special crafts as Ship-building or Salt-making would be interesting. Under Ship-building, notes of launches, of ship's size, rig, cost, and use are all valuable. Building of steamers, iron founding, starting of Factories (except for very early references extracts should not be made, as there are other sources of information).

VII. HISTORY.

References to early local history valuable. (May be articles in connection with some Antiquarian or other discovery.) Discovery of canoes or tools or other traces of early man interesting.

In later times notice of great events with which Bombay has been connected. Effect of defeats. Rejoicings over victories. Preparations for expeditions. Visits of distinguished strangers, illuminations. Events of public interest, fires, storms, epidemics, condition of the people, times of plenty and money-making, times of want and money-losing. Such events should, as a rule, be arranged as a year book or year statement. The yearly summaries, such as have for several years been given in the *Times of India*, would help. Also speeches connected with great public events give an opportunity of making comparisons and tracing progress and development. Lord Reay's Jubilee speech was, I believe, to a great extent an historical retrospect. Probably speeches have been made at intervals on great public occasions where useful items of contrast have been well brought out.

Riots and disturbances important. Also cases of public interest in the Courts.

All that sheds light on the condition and mode of life of the people at different times.

Any epidemic or other matter connected with public health which would affect the general happiness of the people.

State of trade at the time; failures and bankruptcies.

VIII. ADMINISTRATION.

All notices of early Courts and other arrangements for administering justice are valuable. Arbitration Courts.

Notices of the beginning of Municipal Government, Health Department, Educational Department. Summaries occasionally given of past progress and need of further changes. Objects and reasons at the beginning of Acts.

References to Land Administration, to Surveys of the Island, Customs Administration, Excise, Opium, Tobacco.

Naval and Military—Forts and Fortifications. Arrangements for troops, barracks, parade-grounds, volunteering.

History of Police.

Appendix I.

HEADS
OF INQUIRY.
Records and
Papers.

Appendix I.

HEADS
OF INQUIRY.
Records and
Papers.

Ecclesiastical.

Management of the Harbour, Port Trust.

Post and Telegraph.

Railways and Tramways.

Taxation—Notes of new taxes, why levied, incidence, proceeds. Disturbances in connection with levy of taxes. Result of disturbances.

IX. OBJECTS OF INTEREST.

All notes which give any place in the Island an historical interest. Where any important fact happened, as where the Sidis camped when (1695) they held the greater part of the Island; any scene of old fighting; the burial-place of any distinguished man.

Any description of a place in contrast to its present condition or use (as the Cotton Green, now Elphinstone Circle).

Accounts of the circumstances attending the construction of the chief buildings (reference to building details is all that is wanted at first). Buildings would include charitable institutions.

Chiefly monuments, statues, fountains, institutions, societies, shows, clubs, parks, museums.

X. GENERAL DIRECTIONS.

All references to books about Bombay, to charts, to maps, to reports, should be carefully noted. Note sets of articles about 1866 by Major Stoqueller on the old Artillery cantonments at Mátunga. Also recent articles on the *Courier* newspaper by Professor MacMillan.

Note.—Each note or extract must have the name and the date of the newspaper. Without this no note or extract is of any value.

B.—MUNICIPAL RECORDS AND OFFICIALS.

Municipal.

A leading source of information in preparing any statistical description of the Town and Island of Bombay is the Municipal Record and the Municipal Staff.

The Municipal Record would directly supply information under two heads

- (a) Constitution. (b) Administration.

In addition to information under constitution and administration, the knowledge and experience of Heads of Departments and other members of the Municipal Staff would indirectly furnish a mass of information regarding

- (a) The development of the City.
(b) The supply of the people's wants.

Further, as employers of labour, the Heads of the different branches of Municipal Administration have on record a mass of details regarding wages, work-people, skilled and unskilled labour, cost of production and materials, which would add greatly to the completeness of any account of the City.

The details supplied by the Municipal Record reach back to the foundation of a Municipality in Bombay. Under constitution, details would be given of the form of town management which the Municipality superseded. The first Municipal constitution would be described and subsequent changes noted in the qualifications and functions assigned to the elective and administrative bodies. The classes which have had the greatest share of the voting and of the nominees at different times might be illustrated by analysis. The growth of interest in Municipal affairs might be shown by the greater number of candidates and the increase of votes.

The position and functions of the Municipal Commissioner should be noted and his relations described to the Standing Committee and Corporation on the one hand, and to the Heads of the different branches of Administration on the other. A list of Municipal Commissioners and the chief works carried out during the term of office of each should follow.

Under administration would come details of the financial history of the Municipality, the incidence and the yield of taxes; loans, ordinary and special; how far repaid; how far met by the proceeds of special cesses; how far a burden on general revenues. An account of the different branches of Administration would follow with a statement of the staff by which each branch is administered and a record of the ordinary duties and of the special works carried out by the different branches since the Municipality was started. This summary would be an introduction to details regarding each of the main Departments:

- | | |
|--------------|----------------|
| (1) Finance. | (3) Health. |
| (2) Works. | (4) Education. |

(1) FINANCE.

The section on Finance would include details of the Departmental Staff, its strength, cost, and duties; an explanation of the different taxes and other sources of revenue:

General.	Town duties.
Water.	Licences.
Halalkhor.	Tobacco.
Wheel and tolls.	Property.
Miscellaneous.	

Under each of these heads would come the history and the management of the tax: of the changes of rate and of yield, and, so far as available, an estimate of the causes of the different changes. The account might also contain a statement of the arrangements made for collecting receipts, checking frauds, and auditing accounts. A summary illustrating the growing pressure of departmental work at five years' intervals would be useful.

(2) WORKS.

Under Works come:

- | | |
|---------------|----------------|
| (1) Drainage. | (5) Buildings. |
| (2) Water. | (6) Markets. |
| (3) Roads. | (7) Gardens. |
| (4) Fires. | (8) Museums. |

Under each of these heads the chief points for notice are the staff: the amount and nature of the routine work: the leading schemes: their cost: how far completed: how far still to be carried out.

(1) Drainage.

Under Drainage would come the history of the chief branches of drainage:

- (a) *Storm Water Drains*, reservoirs, drainage sluices. The character and object of each, when carried out, the cost. How far present arrangements are satisfactory. Works under contemplation, their object and estimated cost.
- (b) *Surface Drainage*.—Character of the works, difficulties, how much done, style of drain, cost. Further requirements, estimated cost and order of urgency.
- (c) *Sullage*.—Style of sullage drain, how far system complete, cost to date: further requirements, estimated cost and order of urgency.

Appendix I.

HEADS OF INQUIRY. Municipal.

Finance.

Works.

Appendix I.

HEADS
OF INQUIRY.
Municipal
Works.

(d) *Sewage*.—Past system, baskets, carts, night-soil depôts. How far still in use. How far will be permanently required. How far drains introduced as a substitute. Progress made: pumping stations, main drains, house connections, vent pipes and vent towers; final outlet cost; statement of cost mileage and measurement of completed built sewers and pipe lines. Portions of scheme incomplete, estimated order of urgency, cost, and time required to complete. Difficulties, risks, and advantages anticipated and experienced.

(e) *Latrines and Urinals*.—Construction, standard plan and flushing arrangements; number, locality, accommodation; how far existing provision incomplete. To what standard of accommodation is the Municipality working.

Should finish with a statement of staff and pay and figures of office work and of miscellaneous works.¹

(2) *Water.*

Water.

The information regarding water-works comes under two main sections:

(a) *Supply.*(b) *Distribution.*

An introductory notice of the sources of supply in Bombay before water was brought from the mainland should be followed by the history of the leading supply projects:

Vohár.

Tulsi.

Tánaa.

Pawái.

For each of the different reservoirs should be stated the position, size, and character of the works:

(a) *At the storage lakes.*(b) *Between the lakes and Bombay.*

Details of cost, time required, quantities supplied. Note increase in demand and in supply. Causes of increase in demand. A record of the increase in supply. Distribution in the Island: reservoirs, details of Malabár Hill and Bhandarwáda; size and mileage of distributing pipes: taps, dipping wells, house connections, supply per head in different parts of the City. Portions of scheme still to be carried out, quantity of final supply; how much to be allotted

(a) *To house uses.*(b) *To factories.*(c) *To drain flushing.*(d) *To fountains and road-watering.*

Either here or under drainage, a note of the intended system of flushing would be interesting. Cost of all water-works, both storage and distribution, how far met:

(a) *By Loans.*(b) *By Rates.*

Statement of financial position of water schemes. How far loans can be reduced. How far is the interest met by the water-rate, how far does the interest fall on general revenues.

A statement of the chief accidents and failures of supply would be interesting, with available details of outbreaks of cholera or other epidemic traceable to an enforced return to the use of local well-water in consequence of the non-local supply being cut off.

(3) *Roads.*

Roads.

History.—Under History would come references to old lines of road and to early methods of construction: list of the main roads when and

¹ Compare Administration Report for 1890-91, 219.

under what circumstances made, how and why named. Mileage of roads at beginning of Municipality and at five years' intervals since. Statement to show existing miles of road made, watered, pathed, lighted, bridged. The breadth of roads is hardly less important than their length.¹

Schemes for fresh lines of road. Cause of delay. Frontage purchases and other arrangements for making new roads. Set-backs and other means for improving and widening existing roads. How far are such changes fixed beforehand?

Making.—Road-making and repairing arrangements, steam rollers, character and quantity of metal and sand yearly used in road-making, road staff, out-door in-door duties, nature and amount of work, cost. How far is cost of roads met by vehicle, toll, and public conveyance taxes? How much falls on general revenues?

Watering.—Arrangements for watering by cart, by bullock, by hand. How far is fresh water, how far is salt water used? Cost of watering staff? How far done by contract? How far it varies at different times of the year?

Paths.—What is the length and breadth of foot-paths, miles gravelled, miles paved with stone, with cement, with asphalt? How does each of the different styles of pavement answer? Special difficulties in the way of keeping foot-paths in order.

Lights.—What are the lighting arrangements, the staff, the cost? How many miles of road are lighted by gas: how many by oil? How far are present arrangements satisfactory? Are any lighting schemes under consideration? When was electric lighting introduced, how long was it maintained, on what roads, at what cost? What were the difficulties? Why did the use of the electric light cease? Is there any prospect of a revival of electric lighting?

Bridges.—The position, date, measurements, name and origin of name, cost and distribution of cost between Government, the Municipality, the Port Trust, and Railway and other Companies. Traffic and uses of the bridge, copy and description of any inscription on the bridge.

Traffic.—How far are traffic returns available? The amount, the style of traffic, horse carriages, bullock carriages, carts. Busy hours of the day; busy seasons of the year. Street accidents, number, character and causes. It seems more suitable to bring street accidents under streets than under health.

Probably no traffic statistics are available. Still, at least for the leading thoroughfares, officials connected with the roads may be able to furnish a useful general estimate of the amount and the character of the traffic. Under traffic a history of the changes and development of means of moving would be valuable—Litters or *dolis*, palanquins or *palkhis*, sedan chairs, how far formerly used; how far still in use: carts, different varieties for carrying merchandise, improvements, present pattern. One-bullock carts, mule carts, horse carts, carriages for passengers, single bullock, pair bullock. Horse carriages when introduced. Varieties—buggies and hansoms when and why given up. Public conveyances, hansoms, omnibuses, trams. Private conveyances, bicycles, tricycles, dog-carts, pony carriages, shigrams, tongas, phaetons, victorias, landaus, barouches.

Appendix I.

HEADS
OF INQUIRY.
Municipal
Roads.

¹ The list of roads at page 312 of the 1890 Municipal Administration Report seems not to show breadth. How far are breadth details available from other sources?

Appendix I.

HEADS
OF INQUIRY.
Municipal,
Fires.

(4) Fires.

Former arrangements.

Statement of existing system :

Fire Provision, 189

Station.	ENGINES.		Hose.	Tenders	Escapes.	STAFF.					
	Steam.	Hand.				European,		Native,		Total.	
						No.	Cost.	No.	Cost.	No.	Cost.

The distribution of fire stations, the means of communicating news of fires, the arrangements in the station, time required

(a) to start from the station, (b) to reach the scene of fire.

The cost of the stations

(a) The ground,

(b) The building.

The cost of engines and the expense of the staff. When the existing system was introduced? How far the existing system is complete and what changes and what additional stations, engines, and staff are proposed? What are the conditions of Bombay as regards fires? What are its special safeguards? What its special risks? A statement or table of fires would be valuable, showing the month, the locality, the number, the cause, and the estimated loss. To prevent this table proving unwieldy, it will be advisable to group the smaller fires, say all fires causing less than Rs. 10,000 of damage. The totals of these smaller fires might be shown under the different heads of the statement and the following summary added as a footnote. Thus: Of the fires causing loss of less than Rs. 10,000, caused between Rs. 10,000 and Rs. 9000, between Rs. 9000 and Rs. 8000, and so on in decreases of Rs. 1000. Details of notable, long-continued, widespread or destructive conflagrations would be valuable.¹

Buildings.

Municipal Offices.

Markets.

Police Stations and Quarters.

(5) Buildings.

Fire Stations.

Cattle Sheds.

Latrines.

A return should be furnished of the leading Municipal buildings, their positions, date of building, cost of construction, accommodation, and use. In the case of the Municipal offices, the leading markets, and the Police stations, some full description is probably available in printed form.

Markets.

(6) Markets.

The following details should be given in table form :

Markets, 189

Name.	Locality.	Date.	Area.	Land.	Buildings.	Covr.	STALLS.												Charges Including Staff.	Receipts.	Offences.																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																															
							Vege- table.		Fruit.		Flowers.		Fish.		Mutton		Beef.					Live- stock.		Stores.																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																												
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¹ Compare Administration Report for 1890-91, 834-847.

Besides these details, some account is required of the arrangements for securing order, cleanliness, and lighting in the different Municipal markets. During what hours of the day is the market open to the public? Details should be given of the quantities of the different articles offered for sale and the quantities sold, with a statement of how the remainder is disposed of. In addition to the administrative details, of which official record is probably available, the Superintendent of the Market or other experienced official could furnish much general information regarding Bombay marketing. To what classes of the population do the sellers and stall-holders belong? What arrangements do stall-holders usually make for securing a stall and for renewing their stock? Of what articles or class of articles is the supply sufficient, of what insufficient? From where do the different articles come? Through what hands do they pass between the grower or rearer and the retail market stall-holder? The increase in price from the grower to the stall-holder or other retail-seller. How far of late years has the cost increased or diminished? What is the cause of the change? How far does there seem a fashion in the demand for articles? How far have certain articles come into demand and again fallen into disfavour? Special interest attaches to any new articles or to the opening of any new sources of supply by the spread of railways or by rapider steamers. The seasons when the different articles come to market. Changes in supply, changes in price. Again, an account of marketing from the buyers' side would be interesting. What classes come to buy? From what parts of the City do they come? Among what classes do servants, do women, do men, carry on the marketing? What portion of the day is the buying time for the leading articles of daily consumption? At what hour of the day do the different classes of buyers, the rich the middle and the poor attend the markets? How far have any classes or races a special weekly market day? If so what is the day? What observances have the buyers and sellers of different races and of different articles for luck or to keep off the evil eye? When marketing do any classes observe any practices or rites in honour of the guardian or spirit of the market place? How far is there any feeling that it is lucky to begin a day's purchases or sales with some particular article, or by a transaction with a person belonging to some particular class, sex, or age?

(7) Gardens.

List of Gardens :

Municipal Gardens, 189

Name.	Position.	When Made.	Area.	Cost of		Staff.	Visitors.	Receipts.	
				Making.	Keeping.			Visitors' Fees.	Produce Sales.

Besides the tabular statement some description of each garden should be given: its attractions, walks, water, grass, trees, shrubs, flowers, animals. Has it any temples or shrines, monuments, fountains, or other objects of interest, including rare or noteworthy shrubs or trees? Under

Appendix I.

HEADS.
OF INQUIRY.
Municipal
Markets.

Gardens.

Appendix I.**HEADS
OF INQUIRY.
Municipal.
Gardens.**

what circumstances was the garden made? How was the cost distributed? A list of cages, fountains, or other gifts, with value, date, and name of giver. Under cost of keep, the quantity of water used and the charge. Under visitors the classes who come, the time of day they come, how they spend their time in the garden; on what occasions special numbers visit the garden. Are any local fairs held in the garden? How far is the garden used as a picnic place, at what season, by what classes? Under staff should be shown the strength of the watch or police. What offences are committed in the garden, thefts, assaults, damage to trees? Under receipts, gate-money, when levied, at what rates. Who attend on free days, who on fee days? What income is derived from the sale of articles grown in the garden? Development of income from sales of produce. Future increase of this source of profit.

(8) Museums.**Museums.**

The name, position, cost, date of founding, staff, description of buildings, list of contents or at least a summary of contents and a note of the chief objects of interest in the collection. The chief wants of the institution, any scheme for developing and completing it. Receipts from fees or other sources. When and at what rate fees are charged? What numbers attend, to what classes they belong? What is their object in coming? Is the Museum formally used for educational purposes? If so, what subjects are taught and to what class do the learners belong?

(3) HEALTH.**Health.**

Administrative staff. Work done; quantities of garbage and night-soil removed. Improvements required. Difficulties in enforcing health rules. Unhealthy conditions in different wards or quarters of the City. Improvements in the past; present shortcomings; future expectations. Vital statistics for a series of years. Details of births and deaths grouped—by ward or district; by months; by caste or race; by sex. For deaths in addition by age, by occupation, by different forms of disease. Violent deaths, murders, suicides. Accidental deaths, by falls from trees or heights, by fire, by falling houses. By risks of calling, by street accidents. Under all these heads the details seem remarkably complete; with careful and intelligent grouping, the results would be specially interesting. Some account should be given of the chief epidemics of which record remains. The time each lasted, the beginning, the waxing, the waning, the disappearance. The spread of the disease through the different wards and quarters of the City. What caste, calling, sex, or age seemed specially open to attack or free from attack. The leading symptoms of the disease at its different stages. The special measures taken to arrest the disease and to separate the sick. The treatment and its results. Any insight obtained into the origin, the spread, or the disappearance of the disease. Chances of similar visitations. Preventive and curative measures to be adopted.¹

The Health Department have valuable information on two additional subjects. Of these one, the account of which might come under crafts and callings, are details of dangerous and unwholesome trades and commodities. In treating this subject the licensing rules might be described, the localities set apart, the different unwholesome or dangerous callings and the conditions enforced. The income from license fees, the duties and the cost of supervision, the offences against the rules.

¹ Administration Report for 1890-91, 375-555, 576-579.

The other subject regarding which the Health Department has special information is markets. Details of the enforcing of health rules and of the punishment of dealers in unwholesome food are of special value. Probably many of the details regarding the social aspects of the markets may be best obtained from officials connected with the Health Department.¹

The full details supplied by Inspector Higgins for the Bándra Slaughter-house in the Thána Gazetteer show how much valuable information is available.

(4) EDUCATION.

Under Education would come an account of the share the Municipality takes in supporting schools. For the Municipal schools the following details should as far as possible be supplied. The position that is the ward and street, the name or number of the school, the style of building, the rent paid, the accommodation with or without play-ground or gymnasium, and the language taught—English, Vernacular, Classic or other language, other subjects taught, any craft or physical training. The teachers, number, pay, race, qualifications. The pupils by race and sex. Their parents' calling and place of living, the rates and amounts of fees, the cost of the school; a list of gifts, prizes, and endowments and the results of examination. The defects of existing arrangements, the developments and improvements under consideration. How far are the educational officers of the Municipality the proper authorities to show the extent to which the different castes and classes in the different parts of the City know to read and write and are sending their boys and girls of school-age to school? How far are the Municipal schoolmasters or other officials in a position to show to what extent the different classes have overcome their distrust of school influence for girls and of English and other higher education for boys? How far the higher education has been overdone and is now the subject of a reaction? To what causes this re-action is to be traced and what remedies can be suggested? How far has the idea of technical—that is of craft—schooling found favour? What classes take to this form of craft training? How far is their object the hope that the Technical Institute may prove a side-door to Government service? How far do the parents, how far do the lads intend to earn their living by the practice of a craft? Of the lads who have passed through the Institute, are details available? How many are earning their living by the exercise of qualifications obtained from their training in the Technical Institute?²

In addition to the purely Municipal administrative details, the chief subject on which the Municipal records can supply information is the Development of the City. The history of the taxes is an index to the growth of population and wealth; the house-tax to the number and value of houses; the animal and vehicle tax to wealth and business. The record of works done is a second important factor in any record of progress.

Less directly the Municipal registration system supplies for a long series of years highly useful details of the price of land and of the value and numbers of buildings in the different parts of the City. This mass of information is chiefly available and might be most serviceably arranged under the different Municipal wards.

Appendix I.

HEADS
OF ENQUIRY,
Municipal.
Health.

Education.

¹ Administration Report for 1890-91, 563-566.

² Compare Administration Report for 1890-91, 590-595.

Appendix I.

HEADS
OF ENQUIRY.
Municipal.
Ward
Histories.

Wards.—A statement of the limits of each ward : its area : mileage of streets of different classes ; number of buildings of different classes ; number of people, greatest density, least density, average. How far evenly peopled : how far empty spaces mixed with crowded areas. Is the ward on the whole a rich or a poor quarter : is it rising or waning ? What changes have taken place since the Municipality was started or from other convenient epoch ? Spread of buildings, growth of factories, increase in the different castes and races, changes in the occupation and condition of the people ? What character does the ward bear for order, health, cleanliness, prosperity ? What changes can be noticed under these heads during the last twenty or other available term of years ?

In illustration of these general remarks would follow tables or abstracts showing the registration of properties in each ward : different classes of properties : increase in houses : increase in rents : decrease in rents. This through a series of years would throw valuable light on the condition of Bombay, especially if care were taken to show in what portions of wards property values and rents had risen or fallen, and as far as possible what was the cause of change.

In recording these changes in the number and valuations of properties, care must be taken to show when the rise is due to the enhanced valuation of existing properties ; to the erection of fresh buildings ; to increase of rate ; to properties previously existing but formerly untaxed.¹

Indirect information of change in the value of land and house property is also available from the following sources²:

- (1) Street set-backs.
- (2) Sales of Municipal lands.

To avoid the risk of misleading, this information should be compiled by some one acquainted with the conditions under which the set-backs were effected and the Municipal lands sold. The following details would be required :

Land Values.

Year.	Ward.	Street.	Area.	COST PER SQUARE YARD.			Remarks.
				Most.	Least.	Average.	

*Reclamations.**Reclamations.*

A further point on which the Municipal Reports contain valuable information is the filling of low land. Details might be given in the following form³:

Land Raising.

Year.	Locality.	Area.	Height.	Cost.

¹ Administration Report for 1890-91, 13, 164.

² Administration Report for 1890-91, 294-295, 305.

³ Compare Administration Report for 1890-91, 285.

As the filling of its low lands is at once one of the greatest and most characteristic improvements effected in the Island of Bombay, all available details should, if possible, be collected.

C.—POPULATION.

The third leading source of information is enquiry regarding the people. The chief points of enquiry regarding the people follow in detail for Hindus and for Musalmáns. Further repetition seems unnecessary since, with very slight adaptations, the same questions suit the case of the other main classes of Bombay Population Christians, Parsis, Jews, Armenians, and Chinese.

HINDUS.

1. Census figures will be entered in the Compiler's office. In what out-of-India places are members of the caste found; in what parts of India beyond Bombay Presidency limits; in what parts of the Bombay Presidency out of Bombay City? Information regarding the distribution of the caste over the different wards of the city and island should be noted, especially any ward, street, or square where the caste musters strong enough to have the locality called by its name either officially or in common talk. How do the 1891 census details compare with the details of former censuses or with any other available information regarding their strength and distribution in Bombay in former years?

2. Details of origin come under the two heads of tradition and book references. Traditions should be recorded with any available notice of the source of the tradition. Where book references are available, the authority should be quoted with details of chapter and verse. The Bombay history of a caste comes under three divisions:

- (a) The history and condition of the class before their arrival in Bombay.
- (b) The cause and date of their coming to Bombay.
- (c) Their life in Bombay.

Under (c) comes a notice of their connection with or share in important events since their arrival in Bombay. Any change in their religious leaders; in the position and relations of the caste to other castes; in their appearance, speech, dress, style of house, place of abode, way of living, social and religious practices, social position, employment, condition. How far do they continue to own land and houses and maintain connection with the part of the country where they were settled before they came to Bombay? Do they consider themselves natives of Bombay? If so how many years have passed since they first came to regard Bombay as their home?

Four points indirectly throw light on origin and history: home-speech, names, surnames, household gods. The name of the dialect or the cause to which the peculiarity of speech seems traceable. The names in common use for men and for women. Has any change in names been recently introduced? To what is the change due? What are the chief surnames, and how far are surnames relics of difference of tribe? Is this difference taken into account in settling weddings? If so, what is the rule? Must both the girl and the boy have the same or must they have different surnames? The name and the district where the chief shrine of the family deity is should be recorded.

3. The subdivisions of the caste or tribe. The origin of the subdivisions. How far are the different subdivisions distinct communities? Do the members of the different subdivisions eat together? Do they

Appendix I. HEADS OF ENQUIRY.

Population.

Hindus.
*Strength and
Distribution.*

*Origin and
History.*

Divisions.

Appendix I.**HEADS
OF ENQUIRY.**

Population.

Hindus.

*Appearance.**Speech.**House.**Food.*

intermarry? In the higher castes the family stocks or *gotras* are valuable. How does the question of *gotra* affect a marriage?

4. How do you recognize a man or a woman of the caste? Have they any peculiarity of face, figure, or bearing? Which of the well-known classes are they like? And in what respects are they peculiar? In the case of classes which seem to you to represent the earliest people of the island, information under the head of appearance should, if possible, be full. In such cases the chief points to notice are, in comparison with ordinary Hindus, size, shape, strength, liability to any special disease, length of life, colour of skin, expression of feature, form of face, size and colour of eyes, style of features, height of nose, thickness of lips, prominence of cheek bones, and texture of hair.

5. Under speech the chief point is, how far the home tongue differs from the standard Hindu dialect, and how far it differs from what the people themselves talk in public? The differences are chiefly of two classes: pronunciation of letters and use of strange words. The source of the peculiarities should, if possible, be noted. Is there any trace of a former disused home speech? How far in the case of Kámáthi or other Telugu, Támil, Malabári or Kánarese castes is Maráthi taking the place of their former home-speech? How far is Gujaráti taking the place of Urdu, Márwári, Hindi, or other northern dialect? How far in any caste is English becoming the home-speech? When any change of home-speech can be traced, kindly ascertain the date and origin of the change: the section of the family who first took to the change, the father, the mother, the school-boys or girls. How far and with what results is this change of home-speech likely to spread?

6. In what style of a house do the rich, the middling, the poor families of the caste live? How far and with what results have the conditions of Bombay residence interfered with family life? How far does the number of men exceed the number of women and the proportion of adults to children exceed the normal proportion? What are the effects of this and other special Bombay conditions on the style of house? How far among the rich, middling, and poor does the family own the house? How far does it rent a whole house: how far has it only rooms in some barrack or *chál*? How far are rich, well-to-do, and poor dwellers in *cháls* long settled in the same *chál*? How far are they able to fill the *chál* with families of their own class or their own country? What house arrangements do bachelors or men whose wives are up-country make? How far do they live with relations or friends as one of the family: how far do they live in inns, in clubs, in lodgings? In the different classes of house or lodging what rents are charged and what sleeping, cooking, bathing, and closet accommodation is provided? In all cases the state of the house, its cleanness or untidiness, the household goods, the quantity and value of cooking vessels and dishes, the staff of servants, and the number of useful or of pet animals, are valuable as evidence of character and condition.

7. Are the caste excessive or moderate eaters? Are they good cooks? Is there anything special, anything proverbial, about their style of cooking and their favourite dishes? What is their every-day food? Do they observe any peculiar practices at meals; have they any special holiday dishes? When and what sort of caste feasts do they give? Is animal food eaten? If so, when and what kinds? Is flesh eaten only after being sacrificed, or only on holidays, or how? To what deity is the animal sacrificed? Is it the cost or is it religious scruple that prevents animal food being regularly used? Has there been any change of late

as regards eating animal food? To what is the change due? What are the people's views about eating cattle, swine, or poultry?

8. Do they drink, smoke, or otherwise use intoxicants? If they drink alcohol, are they temperate in its use? Do they take it daily or only on special occasions? Are any other stimulants or narcotics used? If so, what and how and when are they taken? Has there been any recent change in the amount or in the kind of stimulant? If so, to what has the change been due?

9. What is characteristic in the dress of the men, the women, and the children of the caste? How do the men wear their head and face hair? How do the women wear their hair? Do they deck it with flowers? Do they use false hair? Are the men and women neat and tasteful in their dress? Have they any special liking for gay colours? Note any peculiarity in the articles of the men's ordinary dress, the loin-cloth, waistcloth, shouldercloth, jacket, headscarf cap or turban, and shoes. How in form or material does their holiday and their ceremonial dress differ from their every-day dress? Have there been recent changes in the shape or material and to what have the changes been due? Where are their clothes made? Where are they bought? The same for women's dress, noticing specially how the rebo is worn. Do most families have a good stock of clothes for ordinary and special wear? What ornaments do the men and the women wear? Is there anything special in the style? What tokens of mourning are usually worn by men, by women, by children? On what occasions are signs of mourning worn: how long does the wearing of mourning last: how far is its wearing optional?

10. Describe the daily life of a man, a woman, a child. What are their ordinary hours of work, their busy season, their slack time, their holidays? Trace the life of a man and a woman through their different stages from childhood to age. In unsettled castes note generally how they divide the year between Bombay and up-country and their mode of life in each division of their year.

11. What is their position in any local caste list? What position do they claim for themselves? With whom will they eat and meet socially on an equal footing? What classes hold aloof from them? From what classes do they hold aloof? Has there been any recent change in this respect?

12. What is the social, religious, and business reputation of the caste? What characteristic is shown in their own customs and proverbs or in their neighbours' proverbial or other estimate of them? How far are they clean, neat, idle or hard-working, honest, sober, thrifty, hot or cool-tempered, hospitable, orderly, religious? What is their character for enterprize? How far are they travellers by land or by sea? By land what parts of India outside of the Bombay Presidency do they visit? Do they travel by land to any places beyond the borders of India? Where do they go by sea; with what object do they go, with what results? Have they always been ready to travel or is this fondness for travelling a new development? Any information regarding their existing and past settlements westwards in the Persian Gulf, Arabian and Red Sea and East African Coasts: and eastwards in Ceylon, Burma, Siam, the Straits Settlements and Java or China, with details of their object in travelling, their life in foreign parts, the extent to which and the means by which they maintain Hindu rules in foreign lands, is an interesting and important feature in the account of many Bombay castes. How far among this class has the more recent practice

Appendix f.

HEADS
OF ENQUIRY.
Population,
Hindus,
Drink.

Dress.

Life.

Position.

Character

Appendix I.

HEADS
OF ENQUIRY.
Population.
Hindus.

Calling.

of travelling to Europe been introduced? What are the difficulties, the objects, and the results? How far in Bombay is the class settled or migratory? If migratory what portions of the year do they spend in Bombay? Where do they live when absent from Bombay? How far is their migratory character disappearing? Are they beginning to settle in Bombay all the year round? If so to what is the change due?

13. Is the class by name or by history associated with any special craft or calling? If it is, how far and under what circumstances has the practice of their special calling ceased? By the exercise of what calling do the bulk of the class earn their living? In what other ways do members of the class support themselves? Do they enter Government service in its higher revenue and judicial branches, or as clerks, as police, as soldiers, or as mechanics in the Mint, Dockyard, Arsenal, or other Government workshops? How far do members of the class enter the service of the Municipality, of the Port Trust, of the Railways, or of trading, manufacturing, and other companies? What is the school or college training of those who enter these branches of service? At what age do they begin to draw pay? On what pay and position do they begin and to what pay and position do they rise? Of those who enter one of the professions what is the training

(a) in school and college?

(b) as assistants or apprentices?

What are the duties of their profession? At what age does the profession begin to support them? What measure of success in income, position, and respect may the profession be fairly expected to secure? How far do the wives and daughters of men in Government service or in professions add to the family income or aid it by their services? Of those who go into trade what branches of trade do they generally follow? How far are they hereditary dealers in any article of trade or merchandise? Do they enter into new lines of business? What is their training: what is their success? From whom do they buy, to whom do they sell? Do any members make a living as manufacturers? If so, what do they make? Do they work by steam or hand power? What is the character and size of their factories? Do the wives or daughters of merchants and traders add to the family earnings or aid the family by their services?

In what articles do those of them who are shopkeepers generally deal? Is their business wholesale or retail? From whom do they buy, to whom do they sell? What is their training at school and in the shop? What amount of success may they look for? What would be considered marked success, moderate success, and failure? How far do the wives and daughters of shopkeepers add to the family income or aid it by their services? Do any men of the class take service as sailors or as soldiers? If so, do they take service in sailing vessels or in steamers and as seamen, captains, or engineers? Do they make long voyages and visit distant lands? If so, where do they go? Has the class now or had it formerly a name for skill and daring as sailors? How far do they take service in the army? If so, in what branch do they serve? Are they ready to undergo foreign service? Is the practice of any craft specially associated with the name or with the history of the class? What training or apprenticeship do they undergo? How long does the training last? What processes have they to learn? What articles have they to make? At what age and after what experience are they considered master workers? How far is a fairly skilled worker sure of

employment? What is his position? Is he an independent dealer buying the raw material with his own money and selling the finished article: or does he work for some moneylender or other man of capital who advances funds: or does he work under some fellow-craftsman who supplies the raw material and takes the risk of disposing of the finished article and pays the worker by the piece? In each of these different positions what are highest average and lowest gross and net earnings? How far is the craft hereditary with those who practise it? How far has it been lately adopted as a means of living? If so, how did the workers previously support themselves? What changes have recently taken place? How far has the spread of steam factories interfered with, how far has it helped their craft? If the products of their craft have been more or less ousted by factory products, to what calling have the craftsmen taken? How far do they practise other crafts: how far have they found work in factories: how far have they fallen to be unskilled labourers?

Of those who go abroad to earn their living what craft, trade, or occupation do they follow when abroad: and how do they employ themselves when they return to Bombay or to their native country? Of those who are migratory and live only part of the year in Bombay, what is their occupation when up-country at their homes?

14. Condition is closely connected with calling. Is their craft or calling prospering or declining? If so to what is the change due? If there is little change is their work steady or well paid, or is it uncertain or poorly paid? Has there been any change of late years?

15. Take a representative family, a man, a wife, two children and one aged relation or dependant, and estimate their expenditure, their way of living being neither miserly nor extravagant. If it is not possible to give detailed or precise estimates, still under the leading heads extremes of expenditure may generally be fixed. Of ordinary expenditure under house the cost of the house to build and to rent. The value of the furniture and other household goods, the outlay on servants' wages and on the keep of domestic animals. The ordinary charges for food and drink. The yearly outlay on dress and the value of the clothes in store. Under special expenditure details should be given of the charges incurred on occasions of birth, threadgirding, marriage, coming of age, pregnancy, and death. In each case the difference of cost should be shown when the ceremony is for a son and for a daughter.

16. Are the class on the whole indebted or free from debt? What is the usual cause of indebtedness? Is it their style of living, whether their ordinary or special expenses: or is it the state of the markets, the failure of demand for or the fall in value of the products of their skill? From whom do members of the class generally borrow; from professional moneylenders or from men of means with whom they have dealings in the way of trade? Is their credit good? At what rates do they borrow?

17. Are the caste religious? Have they family gods, have they a family priest? If so, to what caste does he belong? Do they respect Bráhmans? Do they call Bráhmans to conduct their chief ceremonies? At what ceremonies are Bráhmans required? If they do not call Bráhmans, who acts as priest? Do they belong to any sect? Do they worship the ordinary Bráhmanic gods? If so for which of them have they the greatest respect? Do they keep the regular Hindu holidays? If so, which are their chief days? Do they make pilgrimages? If so, to what shrines? Have they a spiritual head or guide, *guru*? To what

Appendix I.

HEADS
OF INQUIRY.

Population.

Hindus.

Calling.

Condition.

Expenditure.

Indebtedness.

Religion.

Appendix I.

HEADS
OF INQUIRY.

Population.

Hindus.

Religion.

sect does he belong? How did they come to make him their guide? What are their relations to him? What does he do for them, what do they do for him? How far does their guide proselytize and try to get new followers? How is the succession settled? If they do not belong to a sect, what is their chief object of worship, village gods, local gods? How do they conduct the worship, who acts as priest, what offerings are made, what days are specially kept? What is the image of the god like? What are his attributes? How far do they believe in sorcery, witchcraft, soothsaying? To what classes do the sorcerers, witches and soothsayers belong? When are they consulted? What powers have they? Is there any special class of mediums? What nursery or other observances are there to keep off ill-luck or secure good-luck? To what extent or in what circumstances is the evil eye feared? What rites are observed to avoid or to cure the evil eye? How far are omens observed and astrologers consulted? Do children generally have a horoscope? If so, who prepares it? What does it contain? What does it cost? How far do the caste trace their success in trade or their other prosperity to the favour of some god, religious leader, or saint? If so, what measures are taken, what rites are performed, to secure and maintain the saint's or the guardian's favour?

Customs.

18. Which of the sixteen regular customs or *sanskāras* do the caste keep? Have they any special ceremonies? Please give these in as great detail as possible. Follow an individual from birth to death, and give in detail the rites and practices on all ceremonial occasions. Have any changes been made of late years? Under marriage four points are to be noticed: child marriage, widow marriage, polygamy, and traces of polyandry.

Community.

19. What special organization has the caste as a separate social community? By what agency are social disputes between members of the caste settled? How far is the settlement of disputes the function of the religious head? How far of an hereditary or elective social leader? How far are such questions referred to a committee of the caste or to a general caste meeting? If there is a social headman what is his title? How did he gain his position and what are his duties and functions? If disputes are referred to a class council who chooses the members; how many members are there; is the social head the president? What arrangements have they for hearing or settling disputes? If disputes are referred to a general meeting of the caste what arrangements have they for calling a meeting, for conducting a meeting, and for ascertaining and recording the decision of the majority? How far has the caste a trade or craft organization distinct from its social organization? Are disputes relating to employment or wages settled by one headman, by a council, or at a mass meeting? What sort of trade questions arise; what action is generally taken? Do the traders or the majority of the caste ever organize strikes or procure the boycotting of offending classes or individuals? How far has any recent change taken place in trade organizations? What is the nature of the change and to what is it due?

Prospects.

20. Do they send their boys and girls to school? If so, how long do they keep them and what do they teach them? Do they take to new pursuits? Are they a rising, a steady, or a falling class? How far are the callings or crafts which at present support the bulk of the caste likely to continue to support them? In the event of the existing employment failing, what chance do their history and present character give that the caste will succeed in finding other not less gainful employment? How far do the caste take advantage of the new training in the School of Arts,

the Technical Institute, the Railway and other engineering workshops or in factories? How far does the caste seem unable to adapt itself to social and trade changes? Does any considerable number of them seem likely to fall to be labourers? By what means can such a decline be stayed?

In the case of classes who yearly come and go between Bombay and some up-country home, what is the prospect of their settling in Bombay? If they settle what occupation are they likely to secure? And are the chances in favour of their increase or decline in comfort and well-being by becoming permanent dwellers in Bombay?

MUSALMANS.

1. Please begin with a short paragraph stating the name, sect, and total Bombay strength of the class, noting whether they are converts or strangers, and whether or not they form a separate community.

2. In what out-of-India places are members of this class found? In what parts of India beyond Bombay Presidency limits? In what parts of the Bombay Presidency out of Bombay City? How do the 1891 details of strength and distribution compare with the details of former censuses? What according to the 1891 census is their strength and distribution in the different wards or quarters of the city or island? Note any ward, street, or square where the caste musters strong enough to have the locality called by its name either officially or in common talk.

3. Details of origin come under the two heads of tradition and of book references. Traditions should be recorded with any available notice of the source of the tradition. Where book references are available, the authority should be quoted with details of chapter and verse. History comes under three divisions:

- (a) The history of the class before their arrival in Bombay.
- (b) The cause and date of their coming to Bombay.
- (c) A notice of their connection with important events in Bombay.

Since their arrival in Bombay has any change taken place in their religious leaders, in their position and relations to other divisions of Islam, in their appearance, speech, dress, style of house, place of abode, way of living, social and religious practices, social position, employment, or condition? How far do they continue to own land or houses, and maintain connection with the part of the country where they were settled before they came to Bombay? Do they consider themselves natives of Bombay? If so how many years have passed since they first came to regard Bombay as their home? Among the points which throw light on origin and history are: appearance, dress, home speech, names, and surnames. Any details on these points are valuable. Under home speech the name and peculiarities, and if possible the source of these peculiarities should be noted. Under names, those in common use for men and women: any change in the style of names and cause of change if available. Under surnames a list of as many as are available, with a note how far the name is tribal or local. If local, whether the name-giving place is in or is outside of India.

4. By what peculiarity of face, figure, or bearing do you identify a man or a woman of this class? Which of the leading Musalmán classes do they most resemble? In what respects are they peculiar? How far do foreign wandering or isolated classes differ from ordinary Musalmáns in size and shape, in strength or weakness, in liability to special disease, in long or short-livedness, in colour of skin, in liveliness or dreaminess of expression, in form of face, in size of eye, in regularity of feature, in

Appendix I.

HEADS
OF INQUIRY.
Population,
Hindus,
Prospects.

Musalmáns.

*Strength and
Distribution.*

*Origin and
History.*

Appearance.

Appendix I.

HEADS
OF INQUIRY.
Population.
Musalmáns,
Speech.

height or flatness of nose, in thinness of lip, in prominence of cheek bones, in roundness or gauntness of cheek, in curl or lankness of head and face hair?

5. A few of the most marked peculiarities of their home speech would be useful. How far does the home tongue differ from the standard local Musalmán dialect? How far does it differ from the public speech of the same class? Are the peculiarities of home speech more marked among the women than among the men? The differences between public and home speech are chiefly of two classes: the odd sounding of certain letters, and the use of strange words. The source of the peculiarities should, if possible, be noted. How far is a former dialect passing into disuse? How far is Urdu taking the place of Maráthi, Hindi, Gujaráti, or one of the South Indian languages? How far is English becoming a home speech? When any change of home speech can be traced, kindly ascertain the date and origin of the change: the section of the family who first took to the change. Was it the father, the mother, the school boys or girls? How far and with what result is this change of home speech likely to spread?

House.

6. In what style of house do the rich, the middling, and the poor families of the class live? How far and with what results have the conditions of Bombay residence interfered with family life? How far does the number of men exceed the number of women, and the proportion of adults to children exceed the normal proportion? What are the effects of this and other special Bombay conditions on the style of house? How far among the rich, middling, and poor does the family own the house? How far does it rent a whole house? How far has it only rooms in some barrack or *chál*? How far are rich, well-to-do, and poor dwellers in *chúls* long settled in the same *chál*? How far are they able to fill the *chál* with families of their own class or their own country? What house arrangements do bachelors or men whose wives are up-country, make? How far do they live in inns, in clubs, in lodgings? In the different classes of house or lodging, what rents are charged? And what sleeping, cooking, bathing, and closet accommodation is provided?

Food.

7. Of what does the ordinary, the holiday, and the public-feast food of men and women of the class consist? Are the men and women great eaters or drinkers, or are they temperate in food and in drink? Are they good cooks? Is there anything special, anything proverbial in their style of cooking, and their pet dishes? When and what sort of caste feasts do they give? Is beef eaten? Has any change of food been lately introduced? If so what was the change, and why was it made?

Drink.

8. Do the people of this class drink, smoke, or otherwise use any intoxicant? If so what and on what occasions? If they drink alcohol, are they temperate in its use? Do they drink alcohol daily or on special occasions only? Are any other stimulants or narcotics used? If so, what and how and when are they taken? Has there been any recent change in the amount or in the kind of stimulant? If so to what has the change been due?

Dress.

9. What is the in-door, out-door, and ceremonial dress of men, of women, and of children before and after Bis-millah or puberty? How do the men and women wear their head hair, and the men their face hair? Do either men or women deck their hair with flowers, wear false hair, or dye their hair? If so, when and in what way? Are the men, are the women neat and clean in their dress? Have they any special liking for gay colours, or for certain hues and shades? What is peculiar in the ordinary dress of the men? The loincloth, shouldercloth, jacket, head-

scarf cap or turban, shoes? How does their holiday dress differ from their every-day dress in form, material, or colour? Have any changes been recently introduced into the shape or material of the men's clothes? To what is this change due? Where are their clothes made? Where are they bought? Similar details should be given for women's dress, the way of wearing the dress being specially noticed. Do the people of this class generally have a good stock of clothes for ordinary wear and for special occasions? What ornaments do the men and the women wear on ordinary days and on special occasions? Is there anything peculiar in the form or material of their ornaments? An examination of the names of ornaments sometimes yields valuable information on two points:

- (a) the foreign nation from whom the ornament has been borrowed;
- (b) the original substance, grain, leaf, fruit, tooth or claw, of which the metal ornament is a copy.

What tokens of mourning are usually worn by men and women? On what occasions are signs of mourning worn? How long does the wearing of mourning last? How far is the wearing optional?

10. Please detail the daily life of a man, a woman, a child. What are their ordinary hours of work?

11. What social position does the class claim for themselves? What position do they hold among the Musalmāns of Bombay? With whom will they eat and meet socially on an equal footing? What classes hold aloof from them? From what classes do they hold aloof? Has there been any recent change in this respect?

12. What is their social, religious, and business reputation? The characteristics of the class, as shown in their own proverbs or customs, or in the proverbial or other estimate of them by their neighbours. How far are they neat, clean, idle or hard-working, honest, sober, thrifty, hot or cool tempered, hospitable, orderly, religious? What is their character for enterprise? How far are they travellers by land and by sea? By land what parts of India outside of the Bombay Presidency and what places beyond the limits of India do they visit? Where do they go by sea? With what object do they go and what result? Have they always been ready to travel, or is this fondness for travelling a new development? How far in Bombay is the class settled or migratory? If migratory, what portions of the year do they spend in Bombay? Where do they live at other times? How far is their migratory character changing, and are they beginning to settle?

13. Is the class by name or by history associated with any special craft or calling? If it is, how far and under what circumstances has the practice of their special calling ceased? By the exercise of what calling do the bulk of the class earn their living? In what ways other than the practice of the main calling do members of the class support themselves? Do they enter Government service in its higher revenue and judicial branches, or as clerks, as police, as soldiers, or as mechanics in the Mint, Dockyard, Arsenal, or other Government workshops? How far do members of the class enter the service of the Municipality, of the Port Trust, of the Railways, or of the leading manufacturing and other companies? What is the school or college-training of those who enter these branches of service? At what age do they begin to draw pay? In what pay and position do they begin and to what pay and position do they rise? Of those who enter one of the professions what is the training (a) in school and college, (b) as assistants or apprentices? At what age does their profession begin to support them? What is the

Appendix I

HEADS
OF INQUIRY.
Population.
Musalmāns.
Dress.

Life.

Position.

Character.

Calling.

Appendix I.

HEADS
OF INQUIRY.
Population.
Musalmáns.
Calling.

nature of their duties? What measure of success in income position and respect may the profession be fairly expected to secure? How far do the wives and daughters of men in Government service or in professions add to the family income or aid it by their services? Of those who go into trade what branches of trade do they generally follow? How far are they hereditary dealers in any article of trade or merchandise? Do they enter into new lines of business? What is their training? What is their success? From whom do they buy, to whom do they sell? Do any members of the class make their living as manufacturers? If so what do they make? Do they work by steam or hand power? What is the character and size of their factories? Do the wives and daughters of merchants and traders add to the family earnings, or aid the family by their services? In what articles do those of them who are shopkeepers generally deal? Is their business wholesale or retail? From whom do they buy, to whom do they sell? What is their training at school and in the shop? To what success may they look forward? What would be considered marked success, what moderate success, what failure? How far do the wives and daughters of shopkeepers add to the family income or aid it by their services? Do any men of the class take service as sailors or as soldiers? If so do they take service in sailing vessels or in steamers, and as sailors, captains, or engineers? Do they make long voyages and visit distant lands? If so where do they go? Has the class now or had it formerly a name for skill or daring as sailors? How far do they take service in the army? If so in what branch do they serve? Are they ready to undergo foreign service? Is the practice of any craft specially associated with the name or with the history of the class? What training and apprenticeship do they undergo? How long does it last? What processes have they to learn? What articles have they to make? At what age and after what experience are they considered master-workers? How far is a fairly skilled worker sure of employment? What is his position? Is he an independent dealer buying the raw material with his own money and selling the finished articles, or does he work for some moneylender or man of capital who advances funds; or does he work under some successful fellow-craftsman who supplies the raw material and takes the risk of disposing of the finished article and pays the worker by the piece? In each of these different positions what are highest average and lowest gross and net earnings? How far is the craft hereditary with those who practise it? How far has it been lately adopted as a means of living? If so how did the workers previously support themselves? What change has recently taken place? How far has the spread of steam factories interfered with, how far has it helped their craft? If the products of their special craft have been more or less ousted by factory products to what callings have the craftsmen taken? How far do they practise other crafts? How far have they found work in factories? How far have they fallen to be unskilled labourers? Of those who go abroad to earn their living, what craft, trade, or occupation do they follow when abroad, and how do they employ themselves when they return to Bombay or to their native country? Of those who are migratory and remain only part of the year in Bombay what is their occupation in Bombay, and what is their occupation when up-country at their homes?

Condition.

14. Condition is closely connected with calling. Is the craft or calling by which the bulk of the class earn their living prospering or declining? Is their work steady and well paid? Or is it uncertain and poorly paid? Has there been any change of late years?

15. Trace the life of a man and a woman through the different stages from childhood to age. In unsettled classes note generally how they divide the year between Bombay and up-country and their mode of life during each division of the year. Estimate the expenditure of a family of husband, wife, two children, and one aged relative or dependant whose living is neither lavish nor stingy. If it is not possible to give detailed or precise estimates, still under the leading heads extremes of expenditure may generally be fixed. Of ordinary expenditure under house would come the cost of the house to build and to rent, the value of the furniture and other household goods, the cost of servants' wages and the keep of domestic animals, the ordinary charges for food and drink, the yearly outlay on dress and the value of the clothes in stock. Of special expenditure details should be given of the charges incurred on occasions of birth, marriage, coming of age, pregnancy, and death. In each case the difference in cost should be shown, when the ceremony is for a son and for a daughter.

16. Are the class as a whole indebted or free from debt? What is the usual cause of indebtedness? Is it their style of living, whether their ordinary or special expenses? Or is it the state of the markets, the failure of demand for, or the fall in value of, the products of their skill? From whom do members of the class generally borrow, from professional moneylenders or from men of means with whom they have dealings in the way of trade? Is their craft good? At what rates do they borrow? How far do the well-to-do among them lend money? If so at what rates and under what name do they accept interest?

17. Are the people of the class, as a rule, religious? Do they make pilgrimages? If so to what shrines? How far do they believe in sorcery, witchcraft, soothsaying? To what class do the sorcerers, witches and soothsayers belong? When are they consulted? What powers are they supposed to possess? Do the people employ any special class of mediums?

18. Has the class a special religious head? Who is he? Why was he chosen? How is the succession arranged? Where does their religious head live? What are his functions? Is he judge in civil as well as in religious matters? How far do they consult him or seek his blessing in connection with their business or prospects? Are vows ever made to their religious head? What ordinary and what special payments do the members of the class make to their head?

19. What nursery or other observances are there to keep off ill-luck or secure good-luck? To what extent and in what circumstances is the evil eye feared? What rites are observed to avoid or to cure the evil eye? How far are omens observed and astrologers consulted? Do children generally have a horoscope? If so who prepares it, what does it contain, what does it cost? How far has the class a *Pir* or saint to whose favour they ascribe their prosperity? If so what measures are taken, what rites are performed to secure and to maintain the saint's favour? How far is the saint by whose favour prosperity is secured the religious head of the community? To what does he owe his position as their religious head? What ceremonies unlike those performed by Sunni Muhammadans do families of this class observe on occasions of pregnancy, birth, naming, circumcision, *Bis-millah*, puberty, betrothal, marriage, divorce, death? With whom do members of the class marry?

(a) With all Musalmāns of the same sect, that is if a Sunni with any Sunni, if a Shia with any Shia?

Appendix E.

HEADS
OF INQUIRY.
Population.
Musalmāns.
Life.

Indebtedness.

Religion

Constitution.

Observances.

Appendix I.

HEADS
OF INQUIRY.
Population.
Musalmāns.

(b) Only among people of their own class, as a Khoja marries no Shia who is not a Khoja and a Sunni Bohora marries no Sunni who is not a Sunni Bohora.

(c) Only with certain families of their own class? As a Sunni Bohora of good family marries only into certain families of his own class.

In the case of classes originally Hindus such distinctions are important as they may be due to an initial difference of caste.

Holidays.

20. What are their feasts and what their fasts? Notice any saint or *Pir* whose fair they are careful to attend, any legend connected with the origin of the respect paid to the saint, and any service or advantage his favor is believed to secure. In connection with holiday observances, with pilgrimages, with fairs, or with the worship of certain saints, do cases of possession occur? Instances of possession come under two main classes:

(a) Devotees or others who become possessed by some saint or guardian spirit. This is the ecstasy or *hāl* (literally state) of the Moharram bridegrooms (*dūla*) and others.

(b) Cases of nervous seizure, hysteria, and melancholia believed to be caused by the possession of *jīns* or other evil spirits.

Regarding (a) all details of holidays, local fair days, epidemics, or other occasions on which members of the class fall into a state or *hāl* are valuable. Who become ecstatic? By whom are they inspired, what are the signs of inspiration? What are its results? How far when ecstatic are the inspired considered oracles? How far does inspiration give power to exorcise?

Regarding (b) who chiefly are so affected? What spirits are supposed to possess the sick? What are the signs of possession? What steps are taken to effect a cure? How far do certain cases of this kind yield to simple treatment? What course is taken with the more obstinate cases? Who is the final healer and last hope of the haunted? This is a subject of much interest. How far are cases of inspiration and of possession becoming more common or less common?

Community.

21. What special organization has the class as a separate social community? By what agency are social disputes between the members of the class settled? How far is the settlement of disputes the function of the religious head, how far of an hereditary or elective social leader? How far are such questions referred to a committee of the class or to a general meeting of the class? If there is a social head, what is his title? How did he gain his position and what are his duties and functions? If disputes are referred to a class council, who chooses the council? How many members are there: is the social head the president? What arrangements have they for hearing or settling disputes? If disputes are referred to a general meeting of the class, what arrangements have they for calling a meeting, for conducting a meeting, and for ascertaining and recording the sense of the meeting? How far has the class a trade or craft organization distinct from the social organization? Are disputes relating to employment or wages settled by one headman, by a council, or at a mass meeting? What sort of trade questions arise? What action is generally taken? Do the leaders or majority of the class ever organize strikes or procure the boycotting of offending classes or individuals? How far have changes recently taken place in the matter of trade organizations? What is the nature of the change and to what is it due?

22. Do they send their boys and girls to school? If so how long do they stay at school and what do they learn? How far are the callings or crafts which support the bulk of the people likely to continue to support them? Are the profits of their caste rising waning or steady? In the event of their existing employment failing, what chance do their history and their present attitude seem to offer that the members of the class will succeed in finding other not less gainful employment? How far do the class take advantage of the new training available in schools of arts, in technical institutions, in railway and other engineering workshops, and in factories? How far do they seem unable to adapt themselves to social and trade changes? Does any considerable number of their skilled workers seem likely to fall to the level of unskilled labourers? If so by what means can such a decline be stayed? In the case of classes who yearly come and go between Bombay and some up-country or foreign home, what is the prospect of their settling in Bombay? If they settle, what occupations are they likely to secure? And are the chances in favour of their increase or of their decline in comfort and well-being by becoming permanent dwellers in Bombay?

Appendix I.

HEADS
OF INQUIRY.
Population,
Musalmáns.
Prospects.



APPENDIX II.

State Papers not available in Bombay, 1661-1700.

Appendix II.

MISSING PAPERS.

No.	Title and Date.	Subject.
1	Court to the Earl of Marlborough, 19th Mar. 1661-62.	Instructions to Sir Abraham Shipman for taking possession of Bombay. Bruce, II, 106.
2	King's Orders to the Earl of Marlborough and Sir Abraham Shipman, 1661-62.	Orders issued by King Charles on despatch with an armament to take possession of Bombay in March 1662. Ditto ditto.
3	Court's Orders to Sir George Oxinden, 1661-62.	Appointing Sir George Oxinden to be President of Surat with authority to seize unlicensed traders. Ditto ditto.
4	Court to Sir George Oxinden, 19th Mar. 1661-62.	Commission and instructions to Sir George Oxinden on appointing him President of Surat. Ditto, 107.
5	Warrant from the King to the Company, 21st Feb. 1661-62.	Warrant to Sir George Oxinden under the Privy Seal for seizing unlicensed persons in India. Ditto ditto.
6	Court to the Presidency of Surat, 19th Mar. 1661-62.	Appointing Sir George Oxinden President at Surat, fixing his salary and position. Ditto ditto.
7	Court to Sir George Oxinden, 1662-63.	Instructions to assist the King's General and Admiral and their armament in taking Bombay. Ditto, 113.
8	Court to the President and Council at Surat, 26th Sept. 1662, 24th Mar. 1662-63, 4th April 1663.	Referring to the treaties concluded between the King and the States-General; approving of the precautions which the Surat Presidency had taken; recommending that properly qualified persons might be sent to Agra and Ahmedabad when the Factors are withdrawn; recommending, in regard to the arbitrary manner in which the (Moghal) Governor of Surat had shut up their servants, that the President should endeavour to conciliate the Governor; disapproving of sending an Agent to the Emperor; leaving to the Surat President and Council's discretion to dispose of English broadcloths and manufactures at so small a profit as to deprecate the sales of the private traders in those articles; and sending equipments to Surat of two ships and stock and money estimated at £65,000. Ditto, 119-120.
	Agreement between the Commissioners of the Navy and the East India Company, 1661-62-63.	Agreement made before the fleet under the Earl of Marlborough left England to take possession of Bombay, that, after landing the troops at Bombay, three of the ships should be at the disposal of the President at Surat, and that after it has done the particular service intended, the <i>Leopard</i> frigate should proceed to Goa and be offered to the Viceroy. Ditto, 124.

Note.--1. Bruce's Annals of the East India Company in three Volumes published at London in 1810.

2. Italics mark papers of special value.

Appendix II.

MISSING
PAPERS.

No.	Title and Date.	Subject.
10	Sir George Oxinden to Mr. Gerald Aungier, 16th Aug. 1662.	Commission and instructions to negotiate with the Viceroy of Portugal regarding the freight of the <i>Leopard</i> frigate. Bruce, II, 124-25.
11	Captain Browne of the <i>Dunkirk</i> to Sir George Oxinden, Bombay, 20th Sept. 1662: Also Mr. Aungier to Sir George Oxinden, Bombay, 26th Sept. 1662.	The Earl of Marlborough's fleet arrives at Bombay on 18th September 1662; demands the cession of the Island of Bombay and of its Dependencies; the Portuguese Governor evades the cession; the treaty interpreted differently by the British and the Portuguese officers, the dispute being about the cession of the Dependencies. Ditto, 126.
12	The Earl of Marlborough to Sir George Oxinden, 6th Oct. 1662.	The Earl demands the cession of the Island of Bombay; the Portuguese Governor objects, saying that the Commander of the English troops, Sir Abraham Shipman, had not arrived; the Earl stated the length of the voyage and the number of men who were daily dying from want of refreshment; but the Portuguese Governor would not allow the troops to be landed. When Sir Abraham Shipman arrived and demanded the cession of Bombay from Don Antonio de Mello de Castro, it was objected that the form of the Letters or Patents did not coincide with the usual form observed in Portugal and wanted sufficient authority from Lisbon and from England. The Earl and Sir Abraham then applied to Sir George Oxinden to allow the troops to land at Surat, but the President said this would offend the Moghal Governor who would expel the Company's servants from the Surat port. Ditto, 126-27.
13	Letter from the Presidency of Surat to the Earl of Marlborough, 8th Oct. 1662.	
14	Letter from the Earl of Marlborough to Sir George Oxinden, 18th Oct. 1662.	
15	Reply of Don Antonio de Mello de Castro to Sir Abraham Shipman, relative to the surrender of the Island of Bombay, 16th Oct. 1662.	
16	Surat Consultations, 22nd Oct. 1662.	The Earl of Marlborough determines to return to England with the fleet. On learning this Sir George Oxinden held a consultation at Surat, when it was resolved to request the Earl to leave the <i>Convertine</i> man-of-war at Surat, to take on board the investment for England. Ditto, 128.
17	Mr. Aungier and Mr. Gary to the Presidency of Surat, Goa 27th Oct. 1662.	Failure of Mr. Aungier's negotiations with the Portuguese about the rates of freight for the <i>Leopard</i> frigate, and the return of the <i>Leopard</i> from Goa to Surat. Ditto, 128-29.
18	The President and Council at Surat to Captain Richard Mynors, 6th Dec. 1662.	Sir George Oxinden's instructions to the Commander of the <i>Leopard</i> to sail to Porcat and Kárwár and intimation to the Factors that Sir Abraham Shipman had been obliged to land the troops on the Island of Anjidiv, twelve leagues from Goa. Ditto, 129.
19	The President and Council at Surat to the Factors at Kárwár and Porcat, 6th Dec. 1662.	
20	The President and Council of Surat to the Court, 6th April 1663.	Failure of the King's projects respecting Bombay, and of the Company's for bringing home investments on the King's ships; the Dutch taking advantage of the opportunity to embarrass the Company's trade, and take posses-

Appendix II.

MISSING
PAPERS.

No.	Title and Date.	Subject.
21	The Court to the President and Council of Surat, 10th Aug. 1663.	sion of Cochin excluding the English from every port except Kárwár. Bruce, II. 129-130. On the Earl of Marlborough's return remonstrance of King Charles to the Portuguese Ambassador on the evasion of the cession of Bombay; King's Memorial of July 1663 to the Portuguese Ambassador; subsequent correspondence; interpretation of the treaty as to including the Dependencies of Bombay. Instructions from the Court to Sir George Oxinden for the trade on the Malabar Coast; orders from the Court that the homeward ships should sail as a fleet and be prepared to defend themselves against any enemy. Ditto, 134-138.
22	King's Memorials and the Answers to them, July 1663.	
23	Sir Abraham Shipman's proposal to Sir George Oxinden, 1663-64.	
24	Consultation of the President and Council at Surat, 1663-64.	As the King's troops on the Island of Anjidiv are much reduced by sickness Sir Abraham Shipman proposes to Sir George Oxinden to cede the King's rights over Bombay to the Company if the Viceroy of Goa would agree. Ditto, 141-42. On consultation the President and Council at Surat reject Sir Abraham Shipman's proposal. Ditto, 142.
25	Sir George Oxinden to Sir Abraham Shipman, 1663-64.	Grounds for declining proposal. Ditto ditto.
26	President and Council at Surat to the Court, 14th Nov. 1663, 28th Jan. 1663-64. ¹	Regarding Sir Abraham's proposal; the Council's consultation on it; the President's reply to the proposal, with reasons saying the superior naval power of the Dutch and the English was their only defence against the exactions of the Moghal Governor; state of trade at Surat and its Dependencies; receipt of a grant from the Moghal of remission of customs duties. Ditto, 142-144.
27	Court to the Presidency of Surat, 17th Mar. 1664-65.	Anticipating a Dutch war, the Court's instructions to narrow in the Factories, place funds at interest but not invest money in Indian produce. Orders or warrant from the Duke of York, then Lord High Admiral, to the Captain of the <i>Chesnut</i> Pink despatched to bring the King's surviving troops at Anjidiv. Ditto, 152.
28	Warrant from the Duke of York to the Commander of the <i>Chesnut</i> Pink, 15th Mar. 1664-65.	
29	Captain Bowen Captain Barker and Captain Higgenson, to Mr. Cooke, Kárwár, 28th Nov. 1664.	Mr. Cooke applied to these three Captains of the Company's ships at Kárwár, lading pepper for Europe, to take on board the King's troops and stores and accommodate them with a passage from Anjidiv to Bombay. The Captains said in reply they could not deviate from the orders they had to return to Surat, and that Sir George Oxinden would despatch shipping from Surat to Anjidiv. Ditto, 154-7.
30	Return of troops, Anjidiv, 3rd Dec. 1664.	Original return of the King's troops signed by Mr. Cooke, showing their numbers and charges, including pay from February 1662 to 3rd December 1664, from the period of

¹ The January letter is available.

Appendix II.

MISSING
PAPERS.

No.	Title and Date.	Subject.
31	Account of pay, 1664 ...	embarkation in England to the time when they left Anjidiv for Bombay. Bruce, II. 156-57. Account of pay and disbursements to the King's troops from February 1661-62 to 3rd December 1664. Ditto, 157.
32	Muster of troops, 22nd Feb. 1664-65, (East India Papers in the State Paper Office, Nos. 228, 229, 230, 235.)	Muster taken at Bombay, on the arrival of the troops at Bombay, by direction of Sir George Oxinden, by Mr. Gary on the 25th February and 3rd March 1664-65, showing the numbers of the troops surviving, and the inventory of stores taken by him at the same time, showing cannon pieces and shots remaining. Ditto, 157.
33	President and Council of Surat to the Court, 31st Mar. 1665, 5th April 1665.	Effect on the Company's settlement and trade of the unfortunate termination of the armament sent to take possession of Bombay and the evading the cession of the Island of Bombay by the Portuguese, the Dutch taking advantage of the situation to increase their trade, and bringing articles to Surat, suited to the Surat and Indian markets, to the detriment of English sales and purchases; the English character for power lowered in the eyes of the Natives. Ditto, 157-159.
34	King's Orders, 1665-66 ...	Mr. Cooke's convention with the Portuguese disavowed by the King and Sir Gervase Lucas appointed Governor of Bombay; the King at the same time gives assurances to the Company that protection will be afforded to their Factories and trade by his forces occupying the Island of Bombay. Ditto, 168.
35	Sir Gervase Lucas' observations on the papers respecting Bombay, 18th Jan. 1665-66. (East India Papers in the State Paper Office, No. 232.)	On his appointment as Governor of Bombay by the King, Sir Gervase Lucas had the whole of the documents transmitted by Mr. Cooke laid before him. <i>Whereupon he made a report on the troops and stores required for Bombay, representing to the King the ruinous condition of the fortifications of the Island of Bombay, and the garrison wanted for defence.</i> Ditto, 169.
36	Report from the Duke of Albemarle, Lord Arlington, and Sir William Coventry, to the King, 26th Mar. 1666. (East India Papers in the State Paper Office, No. 236.)	Sir Gervase Lucas' report was referred by the King to the Secretaries of State. They reported that it being uncertain whether or not the island was in His Majesty's possession it would be improper to incur so large an expense (£11,498 16s.) upon it. Ditto, 169-170.
37	Court to the President and Council at Surat, 7th, 24th, 31st Mar. 1665-66.	Sir Gervase Lucas embarks on board the Company's ship <i>Return</i> and obtains from the Company, at the King's desire, a credit for £1500 on the Presidency of Surat; the Court issue instructions to Sir George Oxinden, President at Surat, to observe the same precaution against the French as against the Dutch; to keep Factors at Porcat and Kattrwar; and consign only one ship to Surat. Ditto, 170-71.

Appendix II.

MISSING
PAPERS.

No.	Title and Date.	Subject.
38	President and Council of Surat to the Court, 1st Jan. 1666, 16th Mar. 1666, 4th April 1666.	The President and Council of Surat recommend to the Court to solicit the King's permission to build a Factory at Bombay. Possession of Bombay precarious from the impositions of the Portuguese and the jealousy of the Moghal Government. The Portuguese levied from the boats from ten to twelve per cent duty on merchandise and provisions, which obliged Mr. Cooke to put soldiers on board the boats to resist this demand. The cause of this trouble was Mr. Cooke's not taking possession of the dependencies of Bombay. The jealousy of the Moghal Government was heightened by Mr. Cooke, who had invited native merchants to settle at Bombay under the protection of the English garrison; the Moghal Governor from this thought the whole to be a scheme of the Surat President to remove the Factory to Bombay. Mr. Cooke in January 1666 seized a junk belonging to the Moghal Governor at Surat that had put into Bombay; the Governor threatened the President with seizure of their Factory at Surat; Sir George Oxinden, President of Surat, thereupon sent a remonstrance to Mr. Cooke on his conduct. Bruce, II. 174-179.
39	Mr. Cooke to the President and Council of Surat, 21st Feb. 1665-66.	
40	President and Council of Surat to Mr. Cooke, 1st Mar. 1665-66.	
41	Application from the Court to the King, 1666-67.	The Court make an application to the King to issue orders to Sir Gervase Lucas, Governor of Bombay, to disavow Mr. Cooke's conduct in capturing the junk belonging to the Moghal Governor of Surat, and for its restoration; also to afford his assistance and protection to the Presidency of Surat in preserving the rights and trade of the Company; and in return the Presidency was authorised to advance £1000 to Sir Gervase Lucas. The Court's commercial instructions to Surat; only one vessel consigned to Surat with a cargo worth £16,000; ordered the investment to consist of a proportion of saltpetre and indigo and calicoes, and to obtain if possible a quantity of Carmania wool from Persia. Ditto, 186-87.
42	Court to the President and Council of Surat, 31st Aug. 1666, 14th Sept. 1666, 5th Oct. 1666.	
43	Protest by Sir Gervase Lucas, 15th Dec. 1666. (East India Papers in the State Paper Office, No. 239.)	Protest by Sir Gervase Lucas against Mr. Humphrey Cooke, requiring the latter to refund the money, 12,000 Xeraphins, extorted from the inhabitants of the island of Bombay and converted to his own private use, as Sir G. Lucas found out by inquiry after his coming to Bombay on 5th November 1666 and taking charge of the Government of Bombay. Ditto, 189-190.

Appendix II.

MISSING
PAPERS.

No.	Title and Date.	Subject.
44	President and Council of Surat to the Court, 1666-67, 26th Mar. 1667.	Dispute between Sir George Oxinden and Sir G. Lucas relative to issuing passes in the King's name. Correspondence consequent upon this dispute. Bruce, II, 190-192
45	Sir G. Lucas to the President and Council of Surat, and their answers, 9th, 16th, 22nd, 24th Nov. 1666, 4th, 10th Dec. 1666, 26th Mar. 1666-67.	
46	Sir G. Lucas to Lord Arlington, Bombay, 21st Mar. 1667. (East India Papers in the State Paper Office, No. 241.)	
47	Letters Patent by the King, 27th Mar. 1668. (Printed Collection of East India Charters, page 80.)	Granting the island of Bombay to the East India Company. Ditto, 198-99.
48	Court to the President and Council of Surat, 27th Mar. 1668.	Instructions to Sir George Oxinden to receive the island of Bombay from Sir G. Lucas. Ditto, 199-201.
49	Court to Sir G. Lucas, Governor of Bombay, with accompaniment, being copy of the King's grant, 27th Mar. 1668.	Intimating the grant of the island of Bombay by the King to the Company. Ditto ditto.
50	Commission from the Court, 30th Mar. 1668.	Commission to Sir George Oxinden and the Council of Surat to receive possession of Bombay. Ditto ditto.
51	Court to the President and Council of Surat, 26th Aug. 1667, 4th Oct. 1667.	Encouraged by the grant of the island of Bombay the Company adopted a more extensive commercial plan in this season than they had done since the restoration of their Charter; determined to enter into commercial competition with the Dutch; consigned three ships to Surat with a stock estimated at £60,000; ordered in return an investment of Surat cloths, indigo, drugs, pepper, and such quantity of the finer spices as the Surat Presidency could procure; authorized the Surat Presidency if necessary to borrow money, without being limited either in the amount or the rate of interest. Again in the spring of 1668 three more ships were consigned to Surat with cargoes of broadcloths, pepper, lead, tin, and bullion to the amount of £70,000 under similar orders as the autumn ships respecting the investment; trade between Surat and Bantam to be revived; orders about the subordinate Factories; the Court send Sir George Oxinden in recognition of his services a gold medal and £400 to be distributed among his Council. Ditto, 201-203.

Appendix II.

MISSING
PAPERS.

No.	Title and Date.	Subject.
52	Sir George Oxinden to Lord Arlington, Surat, 24th June 1667.	Death of Sir G. Lucas at Bombay (21st May 1667) communicated to the Secretary of State by Sir G. Oxinden, who also informed him of the reconciliation between himself and the deceased before his death, and expressed regret for the loss. On hearing the death of Sir G. Lucas, Mr. Cooke, who had been dismissed and was at Goa under the protection of the Jesuits, by letter addressed Mr. Gary, and claimed his right to succeed to the Government. Mr. Gary and his Council rejected Mr. Cooke's claim to Government. Mr. Cooke comes to Bándra on Sulsette, assembles a force, assisted by the Jesuits, to re-establish himself on the island of Bombay. Mr. Gary proclaims him a rebel and a traitor; Sir George Oxinden refused to receive or encourage him at the Factory of Surat. The whole of these parties refer the matter in dispute by letters to the King, to the Lord Chancellor, and to the Secretary of State. Mr. Gary's letter to the King contains an account of the state of the Treasury and the measures he had taken. Mr. Gary's report on the revenues of Bombay. Bruce, II. 212-216.
53	Correspondence between Mr. Cooke and Captain Gary, and the Officers at Bombay, 9th, 30th Aug. 1667, 8th, 9th, 10th Oct. 1667.	
54	Proclamation of Captain Gary declaring Mr. Cooke a traitor, 15th Oct. 1667.	
55	Mr. Gary to the King, Bombay, 12th Dec. 1667.	
56	Mr. Gary to the Earl of Clarendon, Bombay, 12th Dec. 1667.	
57	Mr. Gary to Lord Arlington, Bombay, 12th Dec. 1667. Statement of the revenues of Bombay inclosed in the preceding letters. (East India Papers in the State Paper Office, Nos. 243, 245, 246, 248, 249).	Appointing Sir George Oxinden Governor and Commander-in-Chief at Bombay with power to nominate a Deputy Governor from his Council, to reside on the island; and framing general regulations with the view of rendering the island of Bombay an English colony, the fort to be enlarged or strengthened, a town to be built, inhabitants to be chiefly English and to be exempted for five years from the payment of customs duty; calicoes manufactured in Bombay, silks, cotton yarn, bullion, and jewels, to be permanently exempted from duties; the revenues (£6490 per annum) to be improved; Protestant religion to be favoured; manufactures of all sorts to be encouraged; a harbour with docks to be constructed; soldiers with their wives and families to be sent from England; an armed vessel of 180 tons to be stationed at Bombay. Determining to persevere in enlarging their trade on the west of India, the equipments to Surat being 1200 tons of shipping and the stock worth £70,000 in goods and money; directing that the investment should consist of Surat cloths and Malabar pepper; agencies to be established at Karwar, Calicut, and Porcat. Ditto, 223-227.
58	Court to the President and Council of Surat, 4th Aug. 1668, 24th Aug. 1668, 10th Mar. 1669.	
59	Court to the Chief and Council at Bombay, 10th Mar. 1668-69.	

Appendix II.

MISSING
PAPERS.

No.	Title and Date.	Subject.
60	<i>Account of Receipts, 1667-68.</i> (East India Papers in the State Paper Office, No. 257.)	} <i>Account of the receipts and disbursements of the island of Bombay from 22nd May 1667 to 3rd October 1668, by Mr. Gary, Governor of Bombay. Bruce, II. 237-239.</i>
61	Mr. Gary to Sir Joseph Williamson, Secretary of State, Bombay 5th Oct. 1668. (East India Papers in the State Paper Office, No. 258.)	
62	King's warrant to the Governor of Bombay, 1668.	} Communicating account of the transfer of Bombay from the Crown to the East India Company. Ditto, 239.
63	Commissioners at Bombay to the Presidency at Surat, 28th Sept. 1668, 30th Oct. 1668. (Surat Letter Book in the Indian Register Office, vol. lviii. page 7.)	
64	Bombay to Surat (from the Commissioners at Bombay to the Presidency of Surat?), 6th Oct. 1668, 8th Dec. 1668.	} <i>Report of the Commissioners appointed and sent from Surat to Bombay to receive charge of Bombay. Ditto, 239-242.</i>
65	Presidency of Surat to the Court of Directors, 1668-69.	
66	<i>Regulations for Administration, 1668-69.</i>	Reporting the events and circumstances which had attended the cession of the island of Bombay to the East India Company. Ditto, 239.
67	Mr. Goodier to Sir George Oxinden, 5th Jan. 1668-69.	<i>Regulations established by Sir George Oxinden for the administration of the island of Bombay. On 5th January 1669 he went to Bombay to establish a system for the Civil Government of it and to form a Code of Military Regulations for the garrison. Ditto, 242-43.</i>
68	<i>Laws of War, 1668-69.</i> (Surat Letter-Book, vol. lviii. page 91.)	Bearing on the Regulations of Sir George Oxinden. Ditto, 243.
69	Sir George Oxinden's measures and orders at Bombay, 1668-69.	} <i>For governing the Company's Militia. Ditto, 243.</i>
70	(Bombay Deputy Governor and Council?) to the President and Council of Surat, 17th, 20th Mar. 1668-69 and 1669. (Surat Letter-Book, vol. lviii. pages 107, 110, 117.)	

Measures which Sir George Oxinden took during his month's stay (January 1669) at Bombay, and his proceedings there and the orders he gave to the Deputy Governor and Council at Bombay, relative to Bombay, when Sir George Oxinden left Bombay for Surat. Ditto, 244.

Reporting the steps taken for the administration of Bombay as per orders of the Surat President. The Bombay Council intimate to the Court the necessity to construct three small armed ships to protect the import and export trade of the island of Bombay, and to serve as temporary convoys to the trade to and from the Gulfs of Persia and Arabia. Ditto, 244.

Appendix II.

MISSING
PAPERS.

No.	Title and Date.	Subject.
71	<i>Regulations of the Court, 1669-70.</i>	<p><i>Regulations of the Court for the Marine and Military establishments at Bombay. Letters from the Court appointing Mr. Warwick Pett to proceed to Bombay to build two vessels; appointing Captain Smith and Captain Tol-derey to act as Engineers; the Deputy Governor must strengthen the island so as to prevent obstructions from Thana and Karanja, and exact customs from the Portuguese; encourage plantations of pepper and manufactures of cloths; claims of the Jesuits not to be held valid. Equipments to Surat for Surat and its Dependences, amounted to 1500 tons of shipping, and the stock was worth £100,000. Appointed a Council of eight members to assist the President of Surat; five of them always to reside at Surat. Bruce, II. 252-256.</i></p>
72	<i>Court to the President and Council of Surat, 2nd Aug. 1669, 16th, 17th Feb. 1669-70.</i>	
73	<i>Presidency of Surat to the Court, 26th Nov. 1669, 23rd Dec. 1669, 30th Mar. 1670.</i>	<p>Death of Sir George Oxinden (14th July 1669). Provisional appointment of Mr. Gerald Aungier to be President of Surat. Measures of President Aungier for disposing of the Company's goods and procuring an investment. Extension of trade required an enlargement of stock—a proposition recommended by Mr. Aungier to the Court; considerable amount of money borrowed. The Moghal had banished the Shroffs and Banias of Surat on account of some religious dispute; this materially injured the Company's trade at Surat; Europe goods required in the Surat market. Ditto, 260-266.</p>
74	<i>Bombay to the Presidency of Surat, 4th Aug. 1669, 6th, 16th Oct. 1669, 2nd Nov. 1669. (Surat Letter-Book, vol. lviii. pages 123, 148, 151, 153.)</i>	<p>Report of Mr. Young, Deputy Governor of Bombay, to the Court on the state of the island of Bombay. He said that the fortifications were improved; the garrison required recruits and accommodation for soldiers; if Rájapur be taken possession of, it would place the Company's trade and shipping in a better situation than they were at Bombay or even at Surat. Ditto, 268.</p>
75	<i>Presidency of Surat to the Commissioners at Bombay, 1st Nov. 1669.</i>	<p>Mr. Aungier, the Surat President, doubtful of the Bombay Deputy Governor Mr. Young's prudence in the administration of Bombay, recalls him to Surat. Mr. Young resigns (13th Nov. 1669). Ditto, 269.</p>
76	<i>Bombay to Surat, 15th Nov. 1669.</i>	
77	<i>Presidency of Surat to the Court, 26th Nov. 1669, 23rd Dec. 1669.</i>	

Mr. Aungier's preparation to go to Bombay postponed owing to the Moghal's suspicion that the English intend to ruin the trade of Surat by seizing on the junks and withdrawing to Bombay. Mr. Aungier orders one of the ships to touch at Bombay and take from the Commissioners a full report for the Court on the state of the fortifications, and docks, and on the reinforcements required for the garrison. Mr. Aungier goes to Bombay (January 1670) to establish Courts of Judicature and other internal regulations. Ditto, 270.

Appendix II.

MISSING
PAPERS.

No.	Title and Date.	Subject.
78	Commissioners' report for the Court, 1669-70.	Bombay Commissioners' full report for the Court on the state of the fortifications and docks, and on the reinforcements required for the garrison. This report states among other things that the expenses incurred for building the Fort at Bombay would require a separate fund. Bruce, II. 270.
79	Commission from the President Mr. Aungier to Mr. Master, 11th Jan. 1669-70.	Commission and Instructions to take charge of the Company's affairs at Surat during the absence of the President at Bombay. Ditto ditto.
80	Presidency of Surat to the Court, 30th Mar. 1670.	Mr. Aungier on going to Bombay publishes the Company's Regulations for the Civil and Military administration of the island of Bombay, forms two Courts of Judicature, reduces the military establishment, appoints Mr. M. Gray to be Deputy Governor with three members of Council, and returns to Surat. Ditto, 271-72.
81	Company's Regulations, 1669-70.	Company's Regulations for the Civil and Military administration of the island of Bombay, which President Aungier on his arrival at Bombay (January 1670) published at Bombay. Ditto, 271.
82	Mr. Aungier's measures, 1669-70.	Measures or regulations introduced by Mr. Aungier at Bombay and his proceedings there. Ditto ditto.
83	Court to the President and Council of Surat, 11th Aug. 1670, 22nd Feb. 1670-71.	The Court amend the order they had given to build two vessels at Bombay; recommend caution to be observed in transactions with the French Company or trade; direct Surat to avoid partiality to any of the country powers; order the plan for correspondence with the Court to be observed by their Presidencies and Agencies; confirm Mr. Aungier as President of Surat; consign five ships to Surat and its Dependencies, of 2000 tons, and with cargoes worth £100,000; recommend that their plan of Government and Civil and Military establishment should be followed; trial by jury should be introduced into the Courts of Justice; send Captain Shaxton with a company of soldiers for the defence of the Island of Bombay; recommend that a Mint should be established at Bombay. Ditto, 276 to 280.
84	Court to the Deputy Governor and Council at Bombay, 22nd Feb. 1670-71.	
85	Court's Regulations, 1670-71.	Court's regulations for settling the Government of Bombay, for increasing the garrison, and erecting a mint. Ditto, 278.
86	Presidency of Surat to the Court, 20th Nov. 1670, 15th Dec. 1670 (Post-script), 19th Dec. 1670.	Shivaji pillages Surat; the Moghal sends additional force to defend it. These events render the trade at Surat precarious. The President at Surat infers from this and recommends to the Court for attention that many of the merchants and Banias would resort to Bombay as soon as they should be satisfied that the forti-

Appendix II.

MISSING
PAGES,

No.	Title and Date.	Subject.
		fications and garrison were sufficiently strong to protect them and their property. Bruce, II, 286.
87	Presidency of Surat to Bombay, 6th Sept. 1670.	Mr. Aungier appoints Mr. Gyfford to succeed him at Bombay. The bastions and curtains of the fort had been raised. Mr. Herman Bake was appointed Engineer and Surveyor General in Bombay. His surveys were to be directed to ascertain the rights to property as well as to the works. A supply of three hundred recruits was required for the garrison. Ditto, 288-89.
88	Presidency of Surat and the Deputy Governor of Bombay to the Court, 20th Nov. 1670, 9th, 14th Jan. 1670-71, 7th April 1671.	
89	Bombay to Surat, 20th Dec. 1670.	
90	President Aungier's Report, 1670-71. ¹	President Aungier's plan for the administration of Bombay. His report on the plans for rendering the island of Bombay sufficiently strong to resist any enemy. His measures to strengthen Bombay and increase the garrison. Ditto, 288, 294.
91	Court to the President and Council of Surat, 23rd June 1671, 15th Mar. 1671-72.	Court's Regulations for Bombay; approval of the appointments of Mr. Gyfford and Mr. Bake; instructions to the Surat President to examine and approve of all plans before carrying them into execution; to strengthen the garrison 150 soldiers were embarked. Ditto, 294-95.
92	Court to the Deputy Governor at Bombay, 15th Mar. 1671-72.	
93	General letter from the Presidency of Surat to the Court, 7th Nov. 1671.	French fleet causes depression of Surat trade; Agent sent to Shivaji to negotiate a treaty. Ditto, 300-306.
94	Governor and Council of Bombay to the Court, 18th Nov. 1671.	Bombay fortifications would be ready next year; great mortality among the soldiers; shipping of the island of Bombay as well as of Surat exposed to captures by the Malabar pirates; necessity of building and equipping small armed vessels for the protection of the trade of the island of Bombay. Ditto, 306.
95	General letter from the Presidency of Surat to the Court, 10th Jan. 1671-72.	About trade, and troubles with Shivaji. Raise the question whether it would not be wise to remove the Presidency from Surat to Bombay. Ditto, 305-307.
96	Presidency of Surat to the Court, 3rd, 23rd Feb. 1671-72, 6th, 23rd April 1672. ²	
97	Court to the President and Council of Surat, 5th July 1672, 9th Aug. 1672, 18th Dec. 1672, 10th Jan. 1672-73, 28th April 1673.	Mr. Aungier's salary increased. Orders given to keep open the trade at the different ports subordinate to the Presidency of Surat, for which a stock worth £90,000 is sent; and to avoid, as far as possible, taking the Presidency from Surat to Bombay. Ditto, 313.
98	Deputy President and Council at Surat (to the Court & the President	About trade, and troubles from the Sidi and the Moghal. Necessity of building an armed vessel at Bombay for the protection of the

¹ Mr. Aungier's letter of 10th Jan. 1671 and his proposals of 3rd Feb. 1671 are available.² The Letter of 23rd April 1672 is available.

Appendix II.

MISSING
PAPERS.

No.	Title and Date.	Subject.
	being at Bombay, 22nd Oct. 1672, 10th Dec. 1672, 10th, 17th Jan. 1672-73, 26th Feb. 1672-73, 4th April 1673. ¹	trade and to maintain the English character. Bruce, II. 314 - 317.
99	President Aungier and the Council at Bombay to the Court, 14th June 1672, 7th Oct. 1672.	Bombay fortifications strengthened; troops prepared for action; inhabitants formed into a militia; revenue from customs not more than 20,000 Xeraphins a year; difficulty of establishing a mint. Captain Shaxton represented that the garrison would be inadequate to defend the island of Bombay against a European enemy; 500 soldiers and proper officers should be sent from England; admitted at the same time the immense charges incurred in building the fort. Dutch fleet between Bombay and Surat, making the inhabitants fly to the Portuguese settlements for safety. Ditto, 317 - 319.
100	Captain Shaxton to the Court, 3rd Jan. 1671-72.	
101	President Aungier and the Council of Bombay to the Court, 6th, 11th Jan. 1672-73, 18th, 28th Mar. 1672-73.	
102	Court to the Presidency of Surat, 13th March 1673-74, 3rd April 1674.	In consequence of the Westminster Treaty (17th February 1673-74), the Court enlarge their trade, the equipments to Surat being one ship with a cargo worth £10,000 in money and £8000 in goods, and three more ships of 1500 tons; the Court recommend to the Presidency of Surat rather to solicit temporary protection from the Native governors than to incur heavy charges and uncertain results by seeking phirmans from the Eastern Sovereigns; three more ships at the end of the season were sent to Surat with a cargo worth £82,000. Ditto, 328.
103	Court's Letters, 1673-74 ...	Court's instructions to Bombay in this year were not to enter into any treaty with the Portuguese; Regulations sent for approval were not approved; orders to the Bombay Government were: to take all its directions from the Presidency of Surat, to confine itself to the encouragement of arts and trade among its settlers, to attend to the discipline of the recruits sent, and always to place the island of Bombay in a state of defence, notwithstanding the present return of peace. Ditto, 328-29.
104	Council at Surat to President Aungier at Bombay, 6th, 7th, 11th Aug. 1673.	After forming an estimate of the charges at Bombay and considering the advance in the prices of goods and obstructions in the markets daily increasing by opposition from the Dutch, an investment for 1600 instead of 4000 tons would be all they thought would be collected; the stock of £90,000 from the Court was unequal to their orders; besides they had to meet daily charges at Bombay; they thought little would be left to make purchases. Under these difficulties they referred

¹ The Letter of 22nd Oct. 1672 is available.

Appendix II.

MISSING
PAGES.

No.	Title and Date.	Subject.
		the whole matter to Mr. Aungier at Bombay, and transmitted to him an account of the Company's quick stock up to August 1673. Bruce, II. 337-38.
105	President Aungier at Bombay to the Deputy President and Council at Surat, 21st Aug. 1673.	Containing Mr. Aungier's answers to the above letters of August 1673 from Surat to him. Ditto, 338-39.
106	President Aungier and Council at Bombay to the Presidency of Surat, 23rd Oct. 1673.	Probability of an attack on Surat by Shivaji; Mr. Aungier thinks of removing the goods to Swally; anxieties both of the Presidency of Surat and the Council of Bombay, increased by the Sidi's fleet blocking up the river of Karanja, and attempting to cut off provisions from the island of Bombay. Ditto, 339-40.
107	Surat Consultations, 25th Oct. 1673.	
108	Council at Bombay to the Presidency of Surat, 31st Oct. 1673.	Sidi's fleet retired; native merchants withdrew the assistance they had given him; the Surat Presidency were enabled to raise the Rs. 30,000 required to place the garrison of Bombay in a state of defence against any attack from the Dutch under Van Goens. Ditto, 341.
109	Presidency of Surat to the Court, 14th, 18th Nov. 1673.	
110	Presidency of Surat to the Council at Bombay, 22nd, 29th Nov. 1673.	
111	President Aungier's Report, 1673-74.	Describing the state of the funds at Surat and the state of the island of Bombay with improvements made there and the heavy expenses incurred on that account. Ditto, 341-42.
112	President Aungier and the Council at Bombay to the Court, 15th Dec. 1673.	About the funds necessary to preserve the Company's dead stock and the money required for carrying on the purchase and sales for investments; the causes of the want of money and obstruction to trade were said to be general wars in India due to rivalry of Shivaji and Aurungzeb and the decline of lesser States, and the necessary and unavoidable charges incurred in securing Bombay which when made over to the Company was a desert island, but which had been made a centre for their trade protected by strong fortifications. Ditto, ditto.
113	Account of Bombay, 15th Dec. 1673.	Account of the island of Bombay by President Aungier and the Council. Ditto, 343-44.
114	Council of Bombay to the Court, 19th Jan. 1673-74.	State of the trade and the garrison of Bombay. Statistical Account of Bombay specifying its districts and divisions and giving an account of its inhabitants. Ditto ditto.
115	General letter from the Presidency of Surat to the Court, 12th Jan. 1673-74.	In spite of the difficulties an investment worth £104,000 was collected from the Presidency of Surat. Ditto, 342-43.
116	Presidency of Surat and the Council at Bombay to the Court, 16th, 20th Mar. 1673-74, 1st April 1674.	Alarm of an attack on Bombay or Surat by the Dutch fleet under Van Goens; arrival of four large Dutch ships laden with spices. Court's instructions were required as to what conduct should be observed towards the European Maritime allies or enemies. Ditto, 343.

Appendix II.

MISSING
PAPERS.

No.	Title and Date.	Subject.
117	Court to the President and Council at Surat, 5th Mar. 1674-75.	Ordering that the Governor should not encourage the settlement of any Europeans on the island of Bombay but such as might be sent from England under covenants. Bruce, II. 357-58.
118	President's instructions to Mr. H. Oxinden, 11th May 1674.	Instructions from the President and Council at Bombay to Mr. Henry Oxinden to negotiate with Shivaji Raja. Among other things permission was to be obtained from Shivaji that the Company's Agents might make inland purchases and sales particularly at the ports opposite to Bombay. Ditto, 363-365.
119	Mr. Henry Oxinden's narrative, 13th May to 13th June 1674. (Vol. XXXI. No. 2879.)	Narrative of his negotiations with Shivaji. Ditto ditto.
120	President Aungier and the Council at Bombay to the Court, 20th Aug. 1674.	Sending Mr. Henry Oxinden as envoy to Persia to revive the English interests in that kingdom. Ditto, 365.
121	Deputy President and Council at Surat (to Bombay or the Court ?), 12th Oct. 1674.	About trade and obstruction to it by European competition and inland wars, and about extending trade by establishing a factory at Rajapur. Ditto, 366-67.
122	Deputy President and Council at Surat to Bombay, 4th Nov. 1674.	
123	General letter from the Government of Bombay to the Court, 12th Nov. 1674.	
124	General letter from the Government of Bombay to the Court, 20th Mar. 1674-75.	Difficulty of carrying out projects for extending trade owing to want of funds; request to the Court repeated for a larger stock. Ditto, 366-67.
125	General letters from the Presidency of Surat to the Court, 9th, 11th, Jan. 1674-75, 25th Mar. 1675.	
126	President Aungier and the Council at Bombay to the Deputy President and Council at Surat, 20th Aug. 1674 23rd Oct. 1674.	For want of money the enlargement of the fortifications postponed; a dangerous mutiny in Captain Shaxton's company detected and punished, the Captain brought to trial. Of the three ringleaders, Corporal Fako was shot, the others pardoned. This was the first example of the Company exercising martial law. Ditto, 367-68.
127	General letter from Surat to the Court, 16th Dec. 1674.	Improvement of the revenues of the island of Bombay by establishing a mint, farming the customs, and introducing excise duties. Ditto, 368-69.
128	President and Council at Bombay to the Court, 18th Jan. 1674-75.	
129	Mr. Aungier's Rules and Regulations, 25th Mar. 1675. (Vol. XXXI. No. 2939.)	Rules and Regulations framed by Mr. Aungier and his Council for the Custom House at Bombay; one object of this was to apply one per cent to defray the charges of the fortifications. Ditto, 369.

Appendix II.

MISSING
PAPERS.

No.	Title and Date.	Subject.
130	Court to the President and Council at Surat, 12th July 1675, 8th Mar. 1675-76.	Forming a more regular system of administration at Surat and Bombay by fixing the rank of their servants on the principle of seniority, by connecting the Civil and Military Service in a particular way; fixing the pay according to standing in the service. Bruce, II. 374 - 377.
131	President and Council at Surat to the Court, 10th, 26th Oct. 1675, 17th Nov. 1675, 6th Dec. 1675, 17th, 26th Jan. 1675-76, 2nd Feb. 1675 76.	Trade at Surat depressed from the wars of Shivaji and the opposition of the Dutch. President Aungier's report on the trade at Surat and its dependencies. Ditto, 381 - 384.
132	President Aungier's Report to the Court, 1675-76.	Regarding the Civil and Military administration required for Bombay. He gives to the Court an account of the different classes of the inhabitants of the island of Bombay; speaks of the Company's great object to render Bombay an emporium of trade; recommends measures for the encouragement of the trade of the island of Bombay; makes recommendations in connection with the military service. Ditto, 384 - 386.
133	President and Council at Surat to the Governor and Council at Bombay, 15th, 28th June 1675.	Relative to the administration and trade of Bombay. Ditto ditto.
134	Governor and Council at Bombay to the President and Council at Surat, 4th June 1675.	
135	Mr. Aungier to the Deputy Governor and Council at Bombay, 28th Sept. 1675. (Vol. XXXI. No. 2958.)	
136	Deputy Governor and Council at Bombay to the Court, 26th Nov. 1675, 8th Jan. 1675-76.	
137	Court to the President and Council of Surat, 28th June 1676, 25th Aug. 1676, 7th Mar. 1676-77.	In consequence of wars between Shivaji and the Moghal and obstruction to trade, the Court order to reduce the number of their servants at Carnapoly and Karwar, and to employ the smallest number of soldiers to guard houses of trade; sent three ships of 1480 tons with stock worth £97,000; orders to Bombay that charges be abridged. Letters Patent of 5th October 1676 obtained from the King for establishing
138	King Charles to the Viceroy of Goa, 10th Mar. 1676-77. ¹	
139	Report of the Lords of Trade on the petition of the East India Company relative to Bombay, 23rd Feb. 1676-77.	
140	Letters Patent granted to the East India Company	

¹ The Letter of 10th March 1676-77 is available.

Appendix II.

MISSING
PAPERS.

No.	Title and Date.	Subject.
	for establishing a mint at Bombay, 5th Oct. 1676 (Erroneously printed 1677.) (Printed Collection of Charters, page 108.)	a Mint at Bombay; forty additional recruits sent for the garrison. Bruce, II. 391-393.
141	Presidency of Surat to the Court, 22nd Sept. 1676, 22nd and 23rd Jan. 1676-77, 18th Feb. 1676-77. ¹	Additional Civil and Military arrangements adopted for Bombay. Messrs. Gray and Gyfford died. Mr. Aungier recommends a Notary to keep a register of private trade. Trade of Surat lowered by the depreciation of bullion; Surat menaced by Shivaji. Ditto, 400-401.
142	Deputy Governor and Council at Bombay to the Court, 24th Jan. 1676-77, 19th Mar. 1676-77. ²	
143	Court to the Presidency of Surat, 15th Mar. 1677-78.	Administrative and defensive measures for Bombay. Appointment of a Judge for the island of Bombay; encouragement to be given to diamond merchants to settle at Bombay; protection to weavers; supply of recruits to be sent, without specifying whether they were Germans or English; good soldiers to be promoted to small civil trusts. Ditto, 407.
144	Court to the Deputy Governor and Council at Bombay, 15th Mar. 1677-78.	
145	Presidency of Surat to the Court, 1677-78, Mar. to 31st Aug. 1667 (1677?), 31st Dec. 1667 (1677?), 19th Jan. 1677-78, 6th Feb. 1677-78, 13th Mar. 1677-78, 3rd Apr. 1678.	Death of Mr. Aungier (30th June 1677) and succession of Mr. Rolt to the Presidency, and of Mr. Henry Oxinden to the Deputy Governorship of Bombay. Ditto, 414-15.
146	Deputy Governor and Council of Bombay to the Court, 15th Jan. 1677-78.	<i>Mr. Henry Oxinden's report on the state of Bombay, saying, among other things, that the inhabitants of the island of Bombay were numerous and of the poorer classes; prospect of the island becoming a seat of trade was remote; commercial and political importance of Bombay was distant; difficulties of bringing it beyond its present narrow influence were daily increasing. Mr. Oxinden and Mr. Gary recommend that a supply of at least 150 recruits should be sent every year; the fort was completed, except the eastern bastion which was being finished; no dependence could be placed on the Portuguese or the Militia. Ditto, 416-17.</i>
147	Mr. Henry Gary, Chief Justice of Bombay to the Court, Jan. and Feb. 1677-78.	
148	Court to the President and Council of Surat, 5th, 9th Aug. 1678, 28th Feb. 1678-79.	Presidency of Surat to be reduced to an Agency; trade to be decreased; equipments and stock to be limited; other reductions in servants to be made; Civil and Military establishments at Bombay to be reduced. Ditto, 422-424.
149	Court to the Deputy Governor of Bombay, 28th Feb. 1678-79.	

¹ & ² Letters of 22nd Sept. 1676 and 24th Jan. and 19th Mar. 1676-77 are available.

Appendix II.

MISSING
PAPERS.

No.	Title and Date.	Subject.
150	Presidency of Surat to the Court, 24th Sept. 1678, 19th Oct. 1678, 7th Dec. 1678, 21st Jan. 1678-79, 17th Feb. 1678-79, 5th Apr. 1679.	Trade at Surat depressed by the irregular wars and the reduction of rank. Difficulty of trade at Bombay; the weavers were so poor that without some advances manufactures could not proceed; the diamond merchants could not be persuaded to settle at Bombay; deaths among the soldiery were frequent and arrivals of recruits to fill up the vacancies were few. Bruce, II. 427-429.
151	Deputy Governor and Council at Bombay to the Court, 21st Jan. 1678-79.	
152	Court to the President and Council of Surat, 14th July 1679, 29th Sept. 1679, 19th Mar. 1679-80.	The Court alarmed at a new class of interlopers resolve to continue the reduced establishment at Surat, send short equipments and stock for Surat and Bombay and continue their orders for retrenchments at Bombay and for increasing the revenues. Ditto, 433-436.
153	Court to the Deputy Governor and Council of Bombay, 19th Mar. 1679-80.	
154	Presidency of Surat to the Court, 18th Nov. 1679, 24th Jan. 1679-80, 8th Apr. 1680.	Court's orders for reducing expenditure at Surat impracticable; Bombay endangered from Shivaji and others having occupied Henery and Kenery Islands; difficulty of executing the Court's orders for reducing the Military establishment at Bombay. Ditto, 441-443.
155	Deputy Governor and Council at Bombay, to the Presidency of Surat and to the Court, 7th, 31st Dec 1679.	Revenue cannot be improved; fortifications cannot be discontinued; the workmen would leave the island of Bombay and the cultivation of the land would cease; Court's orders for reducing expenditure were complied with, except allowances for table money. Ditto, 441-444.
156	Court to the Presidency of Surat, 16th July 1680, 15th Aug. 1680, 15th Mar. 1680-81, 22nd, 25th Apr. 1681. ¹	Court's instructions to Surat on intelligence of a large fleet fitting in the Baltic for the East Indies. Equipments of 1500 tons (three ships) with stock worth £155,000 for Surat and its Dependencies. Diamond purchases not to be regarded as private trade, but as a branch of the investment; pepper, turmeric, to be kept in store. In the event of the President coming to Europe, Mr. Child was to succeed him; but as agent only. Directed not to employ force to expel Shivaji and the Sidi from Henery and Kenery islands. The Deputy Governor of Bombay censured for not calling upon the Company's ships to assist in preventing the enemy taking possession of these islands; instructions given for future; Captain Keigwin and seventy soldiers sent as reinforcement for Bombay. Ditto, 446-448.
157	Court to the Deputy Governor and Council at Bombay, 15th Mar. 1680-81.	
158	Court to the President and Council of Surat, 18th Oct. 1680.	Regarding the prevention of an increase in the customs duties by offering a present to the Moghal Governor at Surat. Ditto, 456.

¹ The Letter of 22nd April 1681 is available.

Appendix II.

MISSING
PAPERS.

No.	Title and Date.	Subject.
159	Presidency of Surat to the Court, 24th Jan. 1680-81, 11th Apr. 1681.	Trade and revenue of Bombay improving. Bruce, II. 457-58.
160	Deputy Governor and Council at Bombay to the Court, 3rd Dec. 1681.	Promising the survey of the island of Bombay. Bom. Sec. Pub. Dep. Court's Letters, Vol. I. of 1681-1685, 29.
161	Court to the Presidency of Surat, 10th Feb. 1681-82, 6th Apr. 1682.	To conduct the enlarged trade Mr. John Child was appointed President at Surat with eight members of Council, one of whom was to be Deputy Governor of Bombay; instructions to promote the sale of English manufactures. Bruce, II. 460-61.
162	Court to the Deputy Governor and Council at Bombay, 31st Jan. 1681-82.	Orders for limiting the Civil and Military charges of Bombay to a fixed sum; Captain Keigwin appointed Lieutenant. Ditto, 461.
163	Presidency of Surat to the Court, 23rd Jan. 1681-82.	Embarrassed state of Bombay; administration of Bombay difficult for want of a direct communication from the Deputy Governor and Council, from occupation of the Henery and Kenery islands by Shivaji and the Moghal, from obstructions to trade by the Portuguese, and from Sambhaji following up the plans of Shivaji. Ditto, 472-73.
164	Deputy Governor and Council of Bombay to the Court, 22nd Sept. 1682, 8th Jan. 1682-83.	Report on the state of the Island of Bombay. Sambhaji continued on Kenery Island, and had ten or twelve armed galivats which interrupted the trade. Bombay island was kept in a state of constant alarm. Aid and instructions from the Court were required. Ditto, 488-490.
165	Court to the Presidency of Surat, 31st May 1683, 20th July 1683, 14th Aug. 1683, 6th Sept. 1683, 16th Nov. 1683, 12th Dec. 1683, 7th Apr. 1684. ¹	Court authorized by Charter from the King to erect Courts of Judicature and establish Admiralty Jurisdiction in India. The object was to enable them to seize and condemn the ships of the Interlopers; the President was appointed Judge Advocate. A Judge of the Admiralty, for Bombay, was appointed by the King. The Court was to be held at Bombay and was to consist of the Judge and two merchants. Ditto, 496-97.
166	Letters Patent granting the Company authority to exercise Admiralty Jurisdiction &c., 9th Aug. 1683. (Printed Collection of Charters, page 116.)	
167	Commission from the King to Dr. St. John to be Judge of the Admiralty Court in India, 6th Feb. 1683-84.	
168	Commission from the East India Company to Dr. St. John, 7th Apr. 1684.	
169	Letters, Papers, Commissions, and Instructions	

¹ Got the May July November and April Letters.

Appendix II.


MISSING
PAPERS.

No.	Title and Date.	Subject.
	from the Presidency of Surat, relative to the island of Bombay; Report of Commissioners; 30th Nov. 1683, 29th, 30th Dec. 1683, 1st, 5th, 6th, 7th, 10th, 14th, 30th Jan. 1683-84.	Captain Keigwin seizes the Deputy Governor, Mr. Ward, of Bombay and takes possession of the island of Bombay in the name of the King. Measures of Captain Keigwin on assuming the Government of Bombay. Measures of President Child on receiving intelligence about the revolt at Bombay. Recovery of Bombay impeded by Interlopers. Bruce, II. 512-517.
170	Account of the Revolt at Bombay, Jan. Feb. Mar. 1683-84.	
171	Address from the Revolters, and Captain Keigwin's letters to His Majesty and to His Royal Highness the Duke of York, 28th Jan. 1683-84, 23rd Feb. 1683-84.	
172	Correspondence between President Child and the Revolters, Feb. 1683-84. (Indian Register Office.)	
173	Court to the Presidency of Surat, 18th Apr. 1684, 2nd July 1684. ¹	Court's plans to check Interlopers and lessen the charges of Bombay. Commercial instructions for Bombay, that one-half of their fleet should take in the investment at Bombay. Ditto, 522-23.
174	Court to (Bombay or Surat?), Feb. 1684.	Giving authority to begin the work of draining the swamps at Bombay, for which proposals were sent in 1675, and several surveys were made since that proposal. Anderson's English in Western India (1854), 62-3.
175	Report from the Secret Committee of the East India Company to King Charles II., 15th Aug 1684.	Secret Committee's Report on the revolt at Bombay. King's order to deliver the island of Bombay to the Company. Commission from the King for taking possession of the island of Bombay. Bruce, II. 523-525.
176	Order under the Sign Manual to Captain Keigwin, 23rd Aug. 1684.	
177	Commission from the King to the President and Council of Surat and Bombay, 25th Aug. 1684.	
178	Instructions from the Secret Committee of the East India Company to the Commissioners, 25th Aug. 1684.	Measures for recovering the island of Bombay from the Revolters and giving it over to the East India Company; transfer of the seat of Government from Surat to Bombay. Ditto, 526-528.
179	Secret Committee to the Presidency of Surat, 26th Sept. 1684.	
180	Commission to Captain Tyrrel of His Majesty's Ship <i>Phoenix</i> , 23rd Oct. 1684.	

¹ The July Letter is available.

Appendix II.

MISSING
PAPERS.

No.	Title and Date.	Subject.
181	Court to the Presidency of Surat, 3rd, 15th, 24th Oct. 1684, 26th Nov. 1684, 7th Jan. 1684-85. ¹	Commercial instructions to Surat. Equipment and stock considerable. Bruce, II. 528-29.
182	Presidency of Surat to the Court, 10th, 16th, 26th April 1684, 1st May 1684.	Connection between the Revolters at Bombay and the Interlopers at Surat. Captain Keigwin sends an Agent to Sambhaji to negotiate a treaty for free trade with his dominions. Captain Keigwin mentions this service of his to the King and reports that the island of Bombay is supported by its own revenues. President Child and his Council exerted to prepare an investment of Surat goods, pepper, and indigo. A Factory established at Tellicherry. Ditto, 536-37.
183	Presidency of Surat to the Secret Committee, 26th Sept. 1684.	
184	Captain Keigwin's letter to the King, 15th Sept. 1684.	
185	General letter from the Presidency of Surat to the Court, 26th Sept. 1684.	Dr. St. John arrives at Surat as Judge Advocate under the King's Commission. Ditto, 538.
186	<i>Dr. St. John, Judge at Surat, to His Majesty and the Privy Council, Surat 20th Sept. 1684.</i>	
187	<i>Dr. St. John's Official report on the revolt at Bombay. Surat 23rd Sept. 1684. (East India Papers in the State Paper Office, Nos. 272, 273.)</i>	
188	Letters and Papers from the Presidency of Surat to the Company relative to Bombay; and Sir Thomas Grantham's letters on the same subject, 23rd, 30th Oct. 1684, 3rd, 12th, 29th Nov. 1684, 8th, 9th Dec. 1684, 6th, 13th Jan. 1684-85.	
189	Original letter from Sir Thomas Grantham to His Majesty, notifying his arrival in England with Captain Keigwin as prisoner, 24th July 1685. (East India Papers in the State Paper Office, Part II. No. 20.)	Surrender (19th November 1684) of the island of Bombay to Sir Thomas Grantham and redelivery to the Presidency of Surat. The new Deputy Governor Mr. Zinzan ratifies the pardon; two companies of infantry at Bombay formed into three. Ditto, 540-542.
190	President and Council of Surat to the Court, 31st Jan. 1684-85, 16th, 23rd Feb. 1684-85.	
191	Deputy Governor of Bombay to the Court, 5th Feb. 1684-85.	Able measures of President Child to procure
192	Dr. St. John to His Majesty and to the Duke	

¹ The 3rd Oct., 26th Nov., and 7th Jan. Letters are available.

Appendix II.

MISSING
PAPERS.

No.	Title and Date.	Subject.
	of York in favour of Sir Thomas Grantham, Bombay, 27th Jan. and 5th Feb. 1684-85. (East India Papers in the State Paper Office, Nos. 274, 275.)	an investment. Unsettled state of Bombay. Thirteen ships with large cargo of pepper worth Rs. 4,35,700 were sent. Bruce, II. 543.
193	<i>Court to the President and Council at Surat or Bombay, 28th Oct. 1685, 23rd Dec. 1685, 26th Mar. 1686.</i>	<i>Seat of Government ordered to be transferred from Surat to Bombay; large reinforcement of two hundred English soldiers to be sent for Bombay; Company's store to be kept in the Castle; orders for the Internal administration of Bombay.</i> Ditto, 553-555.
194	<i>Commission to Sir John Child, Bart., and Sir John Wyborne, 3rd Feb. 1684-85.</i>	
195	<i>Court to the General or President and Council at Surat, 6th May 1685, 13th May 1685.</i>	Commercial Instructions for Surat, Bombay, and Persia. Ditto, 555.
196	<i>President and Council of Surat and the Deputy Governor and Council at Bombay to the Court, 21st, 28th, 30th Apr. 1685, 9th May 1685, 27th Oct. 1685, 27th Jan. 1685-86.</i>	Bombay not recovered from the effects of the revolt; measures in progress for improvement; the fortifications require repairs and additions; the garrison needs recruits. Disputes between Dr. St. John and Sir John Child, owing to the appointment of Mr. Vaux to be Judge for Civil actions, maritime cases only going to Dr. St. John, who consequently took part with some of the interlopers. Ditto, 564-65.
197	<i>Address of the President and Council of Surat to His Majesty, 27th Jan. 1685-86.</i>	
198	<i>Dr. St. John to Sir Leoline Jenkins, Secretary of State, 10th May 1685. (East India Papers in the State Paper Office, Part II. No. 18.)</i>	
199	<i>Council's order and Proclamation, 11th July 1686. (East India Papers in the State Paper Office, Part II. No. 21).</i>	Order of Council with annexed copy of proclamation for recalling all English subjects in the service of the Native powers in India to return to Bombay or to Madras within six months from the publication of the proclamation. Ditto, 569.
200	<i>Court to the President and Council at Surat or Bombay, 24th Apr. 1686, 10th May 1686, 14th, 28th July 1686, 25th Aug. 1686, 3rd Sept. 1686, 15th, 22nd Oct. 1686 (Secret), 6th Dec. 1686, 3rd Feb. and 23rd Mar. 1686-87.</i>	Dutch Batavia example to be followed at Surat or Bombay. Mr. Child appointed Director General of all settlements in India. Reinforcements of troops sent to India. Commercial orders to Surat to promote the sale of English cloths and to increase the imports of silk from Persia. Ditto, 570.
201	<i>Sir John Child's Commission to be General President and Director of all Presidencies and Forts in India, 22nd Oct. 1686.</i>	

Appendix II.

MISSING
PAPERS.

No.	Title and Date.	Subject.
202	Letters from the Presidency of Surat (to —?), 3rd July 1686, 3rd Oct. 1686, 10th Feb. 1686-87 (Secret).	Able measures of Sir John Child in the interests of the Company. He thought of avoiding hostilities with the Moghal, of employing the force, when arrived, to attempt the conquest of Salsette, and of cultivating friendship with Sambhaji, Bruce, II. 576-77.
203	Secret Committee's letters, 1686-87,	Letters of the Secret Committee brought by the Ship Worcester to Sir John Child, disclosing the whole of the Court's intentions and the objects of the King and of the Court in sending the armament. Sir John Wyborne's arrival and his being put in possession of Bombay as Deputy Governor. Ditto ditto.
204	General letter from the Presidency of Surat to the Court, 10th Feb. 1686-87.	Recommending the trade with China to be under the management of Fort St. George. Ditto, 578.
205	Court to the President of Surat and Governor and Council at Bombay, 13th May 1687, 6th, 8th June 1687, 3rd, 8th August 1687 (Secret), 28th September 1687, 7th Jan. 1687-88.	Court determine to constitute Bombay a Regency in imitation of the Dutch at Batavia. Sir John Child appointed Governor General with control over all Settlements and Factories. Court's orders to coin money at Bombay, and for all country ships to take passes from the Government at Bombay and pay a duty of rupee one per ton. Commercial orders for Surat and Bombay. Ditto, 584-588.
206	Court to the General and Council of Bombay, 11th April 1688, 1st May 1688, 26th July 1688, 27th Aug. 1688, 27th Sep. 1688, 8th Oct. 1688, 5th Dec. 1688, 11th Jan. 1688-89, 14th Jan. 1688-89, 15th Feb. 1688-89, 22nd Feb. 1688-89, 19th Mar. 1688-89.	Court determine to make Bombay the chief seat of trade and power, and reduce Surat to an Agency. Court approve of the Provisional Convention with the Moghal Governor of Surat. Fortifications of Bombay to be strengthened, and duties to be levied to defray the charges. Commercial instructions for rendering Bombay the General Depot of the Company's goods. Sir John Child and his Council ordered to reside at Bombay, Company's Agent and Factors being kept at Surat for commercial intercourse. Ships for Europe were in future to clear out from the Port of Bombay and not from Surat. The Court order the Governor of Bombay that if he has made peace with the Moghal, he should endeavour to take possession of Salsette. Ditto, 611-618, 625-627.
207	General and Council at Bombay to the Court, 5th Dec. 1688, 18th Feb. 1688-89, 7th June and 16th Dec. 1689, 25th Feb. 1689-90, 22nd June 1690.	Court's order to occupy Salsette impracticable, and the delivery of their letter to the Moghal inexpedient. Bombay acts on the defensive; did not attack the Sidi's fleet; his fleet made several descents on the island of Bombay, in which they were repulsed by the English troops. Desertion prevailed among the English troops. Death of Sir John Child and succession of Mr. Harris.
208	Mr. Harris, at Surat to the Court, 27th Feb. 1689-90, 28th April 1690, 6th May 1690.	Aurangzeb's phirman to the Company. The Sidi's fleet and army invade Bombay and

Appendix II.

MISSING
PAPERS.

No.	Title and Date.	Subject.
209	Sir John Child to the Moghal, Feb. 1688-89.	take possession of Máhim, Mázgaon, Sion ; the Governor and the garrison were besieged in the town and the Castle. In the midst of these events, Court's recommendations to improve the revenues of the island of Bombay could not be carried out. The revenues and trade of Bombay were depressed. Bruce, II, 644.
210	General and Council to the Deputy Governor of Bombay, 7th June 1689, 26th Dec. 1689, 22nd June 1690.	Difficulties connected with the withdrawal of the Sidis from Bombay. Ditto, 665-667.
211	Court to the Presidency of Bombay, 31st Jan. 1689-90.	When the accounts reached England of Bombay having been blockaded by the Sidi's fleet, and that Fort St. George was threatened with a siege, the interlopers took advantage of the times to attempt to carry out their wishes of becoming themselves a new Company on the separate Joint Stock ; the present misfortunes were ascribed by them to the ' Misconduct ' of the Court of Directors. The House of Commons resolved, on the application of the interlopers, to have a new Company and a new Joint Stock and to establish it by an Act of Parliament. Commercial and other instructions from the Court to Bombay to raise the revenue, with a view to establish Independent Power in India ; to render the Port of Bombay of commercial consequence to the Europeans and Natives ; to complete the dry-Dock and enlarge the harbour. Ditto, 73-83.
212	Court to the Presidency of Bombay, 1st, 18th May 1689, 11th Sep. 1689, 14th Mar. 1689-90. (Commons' Journals, Vol. 10, pages 345-347.)	
213	Court to the Presidency of Bombay, 3rd Oct. 1690.	
214	Court to the Presidency of Surat, 18th Feb. 1690-91.	Court's commercial instructions to Bombay and Surat. Appointment of Mr. Harris to succeed Sir John Child as Governor and of Mr. Vaux to be Deputy Governor of Bombay ; fortifications of Bombay to be improved ; a reinforcement of 150 soldiers sent to Bombay. Ditto, 86-89.
215	Presidency of Surat and the Governor of Bombay, to the Court ; and correspondence between Surat and Bombay, 30th June 1690, 30th Dec. 1690, 15th Jan. 1690-91, 9th, 25th Feb. 1690-91.	Mr. Vaux and Mr. Cooke having died, Mr. Weldon was appointed Deputy Governor of Bombay. Mr. Weldon's report on the state and affairs at Bombay and the measures required to place it in a respectable state of defence. The Jesuits' land at Bombay seized for having assisted the Sidi in his invasion at Bombay. The Moghal agrees to pay the English Rs. 80,000 as a compensation for the goods plundered during the war. Ditto, 93-96.
216	From the East India Company to the Portuguese Envoy, 18th Mar. 1691-92. (East India Papers in the State Paper Office, Part II. No. 22.)	Answer of the East India Company to the Memorial of the Portuguese Envoy relative to the military services of the Portuguese inhabitants of the island of Bombay. Ditto, 105.

Appendix II.

MISSING
PAPERS.

No.	Title and Date.	Subject.
217	Court to the Presidency of Bombay and Surat, 13th May 1691, 25th Sep. 1691, 29th Feb. 1691-92.	Measures for increasing the Military Establishment at Bombay. Bombay again made the chief seat of Government. Mr. Harris confirmed as Governor on £300 a year to carry out the measures for fortifying Bombay. Court approve of the seizure of Jesuits' lands. Increase of revenue deemed necessary. Equipments of this season consisted of five large ships, two or three of them being for Bombay. Rs. 40 were to be paid for the Company's passes. Bruce, III. 103-107.
218	President and Council at Surat to the Court, 19th June 1691.	President Harris and Council reported to be taking effectual measures to seize on and to prevent the appearance of vessels of interlopers. Bombay defenceless from the reduced state of the garrison. Commercial distress of the Presidency. Disputes between the Deputy Governor, Council, and the Governor about precedency and being attended with ensigns of dignity. Ditto, 117.
219	Deputy Governor and Council of Bombay to the Court, 27th Oct. 1691, 28th Jan. 1691-92.	
220	Court to the President and Council of Bombay and Surat, 1st April 1692.	Commercial instructions for the season 1692-93. Orders to suspend the Deputy Governor Mr. Vaux of Bombay; orders to the Surat President not to leave Surat to go to Bombay until further orders. Ditto, 123.
221	Presidency of Surat to the Court, 11th Jan. and 11th Feb. 1692-93.	Representing the circumstances of Bombay and intimating the prevention of the revival of Courts of Admiralty and Judicature at Bombay by the defenceless state of the Bombay garrison. Ditto, 128.
222	Letters Patent, 7th Oct. 1693. (Printed Collection of Charters, page 141.)	New Charter granted to the East India Company by William III. and Mary. Ditto, 133.
223	Letters Patent, 11th Nov. 1693. (Printed Collection of Charters, page 152.)	
224	Letters Patent, 28th Sep. 1694. (Printed Collection of Charters, page 169.)	Renewal of the Charter. Ditto, 135.
225	Court to the Presidency of Surat and the Lieutenant General and Governor of Bombay, 1st, 24th May 1693, 27th Oct. 1693, 3rd Jan. 1693-94. ¹	A proviso added to the Charter. Ditto, 158.
		Sir John Goldesborough appointed General in India, and Sir John Gayer Lieutenant-General and Governor of Bombay. Military instructions for Bombay. The Governor was ordered not to comply with the Portuguese demand for customs at Thána and Karanja; and to keep up the garrison to two companies of European infantry, for which 120 recruits were to be sent on the ships of the season; and to see that the auxiliary Native soldiers were as many of them of the same caste as he could engage. Ditto, 140.

¹ Letters of 27th Oct. and 3rd Jan. are available.

Appendix II.

MISSING
PAPERS.

No.	Title and Date.	Subject.
226	Sir John Gayer's instructions, 26th May 1693.	Probably Court's instructions to him. Bruce, III, 140.
227	Court to the General, President and Council at Bombay and Surat, 6th June 1694, 6th March 1694-95.	Plan for the correspondence with the Court and appointment of a Secret Committee for shipping; all orders sent to India should be signed by the Governor, Deputy Governor, and twelve Directors. Commercial orders for Surat and Bombay for the season. Court's anxiety to meet the public wishes for increasing the export of British woollens. Ditto, 160.
228	<i>Sir John Gayer's report, 1694-95.</i>	<i>On the state of affairs at Bombay. He arrived at Bombay on the 17th May 1694; he found the Company's Government and trade in a miserable condition; the revenue had fallen from 62,500 to 17,000 Xeraphins, and the principal source of it the cocoanut trees from being totally neglected had yielded a small sum only; the garrison was weak, only one hundred English Dutch and French soldiers. Sir John Gayer determined to make Bombay the centre of the English trade on the west of India. Ditto, 164.</i>
229	General and Council at Bombay to the Court, 3rd Oct. 1694, 11th, 16th Feb. 1694-95.	<i>At Bombay and Surat commercial proceedings fettered by the magnitude of debt and the want of stock. Company's credit lowered by the conduct of Mr. White the interloper. Great debts and want of stock caused difficulties. Instead of receiving eight lakhs of rupees from Bombay, the Surat Presidency receive only three and a half (3½) lakhs. The Company's debt at Surat amounts to 20 lakhs of rupees. Ditto, 167.</i>
230	President and Council at Surat to the Court, 15th Nov. 1694, 8th Dec. 1694.	
231	Court to the General at Bombay and the President and Council at Surat, 13th Sept. 1695, 18th Dec. 1695.	Commercial orders for Surat and Bombay; the Bombay fortifications to be strengthened; an Engineer sent to direct this service, a reinforcement of 70 soldiers sent under a Lieutenant. Ditto, 183.
232	General and Council at Bombay to the Court, 28th May 1695, 5th June 1695, 3rd, 29th Dec. 1695, 3rd Feb. 1695-96, 18th Mar. 1695-96.	In consequence of an alarm of Rám Rája's troops, the Dutch and French fortified their factories, and Sir John Gayer sent twenty topasses with arms and ammunition from Bombay for the defence of the factory at Surat. Surat President proposes that the principal magazine on the west of India should be at Bombay under the protection of the Castle and its garrison. The Moghal Governor at Surat seizes the Company's factory on a large interloping ship becoming a pirate and capturing vessels conveying Mahomedan pilgrims. English trade at Surat at a stand. Sir John Gayer offers to be responsible for the safety of the pilgrims between Surat and Mokha. He is alarmed for the safety of Bombay
233	General and Council at Bombay to the Presidency of Surat, 30th Sept. 1695, 29th Oct. 1695, 8th, 19th Nov. 1695.	
234	Sir John Gayer to the Moghal, 16th Nov. 1695.	

Appendix II.

MISSING
PAPERS.

No.	Title and Date.	Subject.
235	President and Council of Surat to the Court, 29th April 1695, 13th May 1695, 10th April 1695-96.	itself, owing to the harsh treatment of passengers in the Moghal's ship having exasperated the inhabitants as well as the Moghal, and owing to Bombay Island not being in a situation to make a proper defence, the garrison being reduced to 110 Europeans, and even this small force being sickly. A Vakil Issa Cooly, is sent with a present to the Moghal to vindicate the Company and to solicit a phirman. Military establishment at Bombay from the low state of the revenue to be farther reduced; the outforts also reduced to five Máhim, Sion, Siwri, Mázgaon, and Warli; a battery on each side of Malabar Hill is proposed to be erected. Bruce, III, 174-196.
236	Presidency of Surat to the General and Council of Bombay, 11th Sept. 1695, 12th, 25th, 30th Oct. 1695, 12th, 30th Nov. 1695, 22nd Dec. 1695.	
237	President of Surat to the Moghal, Jan. 1695-96.	
238	Court to the General and Council at Bombay, 4th May 1696, 1st, 17th July 1696, 7th, 27th Aug. 1696.	Approving Sir John Gayer's measures for the release of President Annesley and his Council at Surat; ordering Bombay to be made the principal magazine of the Company's treasure and stores. Informing Sir John Gayer that the Company would have been established by an Act of Parliament, but for the Parliament's Resolution to raise £2,500,000 to meet the expenses of war by a Land Bank. Ditto, 200-205.
239	General and Council at Bombay to the Court, 1st, 10th June 1696, 22nd July 1696, 15th Oct. 1696, 15th Jan. 1696-97, 19th Feb. 1696-97, 4th March 1696-97.	Obstruction from pirates and interlopers. Sir John Gayer again offers to arrange to convoy the pilgrims to Mokha. Company's ships taken by pirates. Reduced situation of the garrison at Bombay. Ditto, 207-215.
240	President and Council at Surat to the Court, 19th June 1696, 4th Aug. 1696, 3rd Sept. 1696, 20th Nov. 1696, 8th, 15th Dec. 1696, 15th Jan. 1696-97, 6th Feb. 1696-97, 19th Mar. 1696-97.	
241	Court to the General and Council at Bombay, 16th April 1697, 1st Sept. 1697, 1st Oct. 1697, 5th Feb. 1697-98, 10th Mar. 1697-98.	Court's instructions regarding trade. Apply to the King to send a force to the East Indies to destroy the pirates, so harmful to the continuance of the East India trade. Equipments to Bombay of two ships to be increased to ten. Court's instructions for the separate administration of Bombay and Surat. Court fix the value of money coined at their Bombay and other settlements. Ditto, 222-227.
242	Court to the President and Council of Surat, 23rd April 1697, 10th Mar. 1697-98.	

Appendix II.

MISSING
PAPERS.

No.	Title and Date.	Subject.
243	General and Council at Bombay to the Court, 11th April 1697, 10th May 1697, 30th Oct. 1697, 30th Nov. 1697, 15th, 18th Dec. 1697, 12th, 25th, 26th Jan. 1697-98, 20th, 23rd Feb. 1697-98, 10th Mar. 1697-98.	Affairs at Bombay and Surat and their Dependencies, continue precarious ; oppression of Moghal Governors ; probability of Civil wars on Aurungzeb's death ; increase of piracies ; Sir John Gayer and the Surat President recommend to the Court to make an application to the King for a Commission to apprehend the pirates. The embarrassments of the time make trade difficult. Hazardous state of Bombay, Sir John Gayer reporting the means of defence and the resources to be unequal ; garrison weak ; trade exposed to heavy duties. Pepper trade at Anjengo equally precarious. Bruce, III. 223-240.
244	President and Council of Surat to the Court, 2nd, 21st April 1697, 4th May 1697, 12th Jan. 1697-98, 12th, 14th Feb. 1697-98.	



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REFERENCES

- | | |
|--------------------------------|------------------------------------|
| a) Government House | s) Commissary's Quarters |
| b) Church | t) Bunder |
| c) Secretary's Office | u) Police Office |
| d) Theatre | v) General Hospital |
| e) Fire Office | w) Marine Board Office |
| f) Bazaar | x) Military Board Office |
| g) Military Stores | y) Commissary of Provisions Office |
| h) Kings' Barracks | z) Records Court House |
| i) Mangrove | 1) Jail |
| k) Tank Barracks | 2) Rape Walk |
| l) Mint & Pay Office | 3) Cotton Store |
| m) Treasury | 4) Mess's Brack Tower A & C's |
| n) Laboratory | 5) Fort's B & D |
| o) Commissary of Stores Office | 6) M ^r Adamson |
| p) Military Hospital | 7) Hradshaw |
| q) Mail Guard | 8) Saradjik Munichange |
| r) Arsenal | 9) Honda Company |

J. Blund, Lt. Col. Asst. Chief Engineer.



Reduced in Scale from a Tracing from Illustration of the Port of Bombay 1802.

REMARKS (HOUSES BURNED)

European Property	5
Hindoo	231
Parsie	141
Mosulman	83
Places of Worship	6
Total burned	466
Tank barracks destroyed	5
Total Loss in Houses	471

N.B. The Blue indicates the Space affected by the Conflagration

J. C. Solomon, Engineers.